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Preface
This research marks the end of an extremely intense, inspiring, vivid and turbulent 
period. I would like to go back 12 years, when this all started as I made the choice 
to study international law at Tilburg University. At the same time I was studying 
drums and mallets at the Conservatory in the same city. I gradually found my 
way through the University curriculum, and ran into the ear-splitting lectures of 
Mr Frank Vlemminx, PhD. While in this book it will become apparent that I do 
not always agree with his points of view, he most certainly inspired me to learn 
more about this wonderful field of expertise that is called human rights. Since 
we had a thing or two in common, not in the least the fact that Frank was not 
only a lawyer but also artistically active as a painter, he would later be my thesis 
supervisor. During an internship at Wageningen University and Research Centre, 
I became acquainted with Professor Bernd van der Meulen, who introduced me 
more specifically to one of the most violated rights in the world: the right to 
adequate food. After graduating, I found a job as lecturer at Fontys University 
of Applied Sciences. In the meantime I was composing a rock opera to finish 
my second study at the Conservatory: conducting. My employer gave me the 
opportunity to start a research project, and I became an external PhD student at 
the WUR, under the supervision of Bernd. I was now able to do all the things that 
I admired doing: teaching, playing music, and doing research. A perfect match 
for which I am ever grateful.
Finalising this book marks the end of a period of approximately five years of 
conducting intense research. I cannot even begin to imagine how much I have 
learned from the whole exercise. Writing a PhD thesis is a very lonely experience. 
However, during this period, I was never truly alone. I therefore wish to thank 
many people from the bottom of my heart.
First of all, of course Bernd, who never lost his patience in guiding me through 
the whole process. He has the rare gift of making a person feel encouraged, 
determined and self-assured about the research on the way back home, while 
feeling completely lost on arrival.
Next to that all my colleagues at Fontys University, who were always very supportive 
and interested in my progress, and to the management of my department, which 
gave me the financial support and time necessary to complete this book.
Furthermore, I would like to thank all my students whom I had the joy of teaching 
throughout the years. I would dare to say that I’ve learned at least as much from 
you as you might have learned from me.
For me, music is my first and primary way of expressing myself. Throughout 
the year, I have had the honour to play music in my role as a drummer and 
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conductor with many people. A special thank you goes to my percussion group in 
Valkenswaard and both my choirs in Heusden, for sharing your talents with me. 
You have no idea what the beat of your drums and the sound of your voices mean 
to me. A big applause for my rock band the Seasons, for we did some incredible 
things lately, and to the Ameezing band and vocals: it seems that I’ve become 
Bart Wernaart, PhD, after all.
Also, I would like to thank my friends. Some of them I have known for a lifetime, 
others just recently jumped into my life. I count myself lucky with such a wonderful 
group of amazing persons who keep surprising me with the humour, wisdom and 
solid friendship they share with me.
My family in law-to-be, for their continuous support and encouragement.
My wonderful brothers, Peter and Geert. If a comparist would compare us, the 
conclusion would be that we are so similar in our differences. It is a joy to see 
the paths they chose so far, and I am extremely proud of them.
My father who, from the very beginning, believed in my scientific capabilities, is 
one of the most intelligent persons I have ever encountered, and has been simply 
indispensable during the whole process.
Then, I am blessed with two power-women around me.
My mother, whose passion for teaching the very young amongst us certainly 
ended up somewhere in my DNA, and who has always been a safe haven when 
times were a bit rough.
My fiancée, Sylvia, the love of my life, who said ‘yes’ to my marriage proposal. Being 
with a man who is from time to time losing himself somewhere between books, 
reports, documents and Court rulings requires a lot of love and determination. I 
will not try to put into words how thankful I am for that.
Bart Wernaart
Valkenswaard 2013
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Abbreviations
(A selection of the most relevant and frequently used abbreviations was made)
AB Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen (Dutch case law on 
administrative law)
AU African Union
BS Belgische Staatscourant (Belgian Government Gazette)
CA Constitutional Act
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
COA Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers (Dutch reception organisation 
for asylum-seekers)
CSO Civil Society Organisation
EC European Community
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECOSOC rights Economic, social and cultural rights
ESC European Social Charter
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICRC International Convention on the Rights of the Child
IGWG Intergovernmental Working Group
ILO International Labour Organisation
JV Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht (Dutch case law on aliens’ 
law)
LJN Landelijk Jurisprudentie Nummer (Dutch case law numbering)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
NJB Nederlands Juristenblad (Dutch legal magazine)
OAS Organisation of American States
OAU Organisation of African Union
OP-ICESCR Optional Protocol to the International Convention on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights
UN United Nations
UPR Universal Periodic Review
OCMW Organieke wet betreffende de openbare centra voor maatschappelijk 
welzijn (Organic Law on Public Centres for Social Welfare)
SK Sociaalrechtelijke Kronieken (Belgian case law of social law).
TAR Tijdschrift voor Ambtenarenrecht (Dutch case law on civil servant 
law)
USZ Uitspraken Sociale Zekerheid (Dutch case law on social security)
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1. Introduction
1.1 A right for all and a right for each
It is paradoxical, but hardly surprising, that the right to food has been endorsed 
more often and with greater unanimity and urgency than most other human 
rights, while at the same time being violated more comprehensively and 
systematically than probably any other right.1
Although Philip Alston wrote this line back in 1984, it is unfortunately still an 
accurate reflection of reality.2 Worldwide, there are too many people who have 
no access to adequate food. This means that worldwide, there are too many 
persons who have no access to adequate food. The slight difference between the 
two previous sentences perhaps explains why this thesis was written in the first 
place, as will be discussed below.
It is not surprising that the right to food is more urgently recalled in the 
context of developing countries, where ravaging famines but also less obvious 
undernourishment problems are a painful reality. The right to food may then be 
discussed in the context of complex global issues, closely related to matters of 
high politics and the world economy. In this light, many valuable research has 
been conducted, and inspiring books were written, all unanimously – although 
from different perspectives – concluding that hunger should be put to an end, is 
an unnecessary evil, and a shame on humanity: ‘hunger is a political condition’3, 
‘hunger is not a question of fate: it is manmade’4, ‘hunger, disease, the waste of lives 
that is extreme poverty are an affront to us all’5, ‘the global community stands indicted 
for knowing much about how to reduce hunger, but not doing so’6, theirs is no reason 
that world hunger should continue’7, ’this is a silent holocaust, repeated year after 
year.’8 Of course, those statements and their urgency can only be underlined. 
While the right to adequate food is often discussed in the context of global issues, 
involving a large number of people, focusing more on the right to adequate food 
1 P. Alston and K. Tomasevski (eds.), The right to food, International Studies in Human Rights, Utrecht, 
1984, p. 9.
2 See for the most accurate date, the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate food, 
available at: www.srfood.org, or the Food and Agricultural Organisation website: www.fao.org.
3 G. McGovern, Third Freedom, Ending hunger in our time, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc: Lanham, 
2001.
4 E/CN.4/2003/54, 10 January 2003, Section 7, report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to food 
submitted to the Commission on Human Rights.
5 Bono, in: J.D. Sachs, The end of poverty, economic possibilities for our time, London: Penguin Books, 2006.
6 C.F. Runge, B. Senauer, P.G. Pardey and M.W. Rosegrant, Ending hunger in our lifetime, food security and 
globalization, Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.
7 J. Ziegler, C. Golay, C. Mahon and S.-A. Way, The fight for the right to food, lessons learned, Geneva: The 
graduate institute, 2011.
8 G. Kent, Freedom from want: The human rights to Food, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2005.
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‘to all’, this thesis starts from a different perspective, focusing on the right ‘to each’ 
individual. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that ‘all people 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.’9 This reflects the principle idea of 
human rights: simply because a person is born, that person, without exception, 
has human rights, to live a life in dignity. Adequate food is one of those rights, as 
recognised by many international human rights treaties.10 Within the framework 
of the UN human rights system, and elsewhere, the importance of an enforceable 
international human right to adequate food has often been stressed. A right is 
after all not a right if it is not enforceable, and individuals are not empowered to 
claim their rights.11 However, considering the global issues that relate to hunger 
and malnutrition, it is not easy to talk about individuals on such a massive scale, 
let alone the enforceability of such a right in an operating an accessible Court. 
In such a situation, it is questionable whether an individual will find that the fact 
that he or she was born, and therefore has a right to adequate food, will make any 
difference in their case, and matters will probably have to be solved at a global or 
near-global level. But what about a country in which theoretically the circumstances 
allow this right to be enjoyed by ‘each’ individual? A country that has an effective 
and accessible Judiciary, has rule of law, is democratic, is relatively prosperous, 
has an extensive system of social security, and has a domestic food production 
that exceeds the population’s need? Since there are always people, even in the 
most developed countries, which somehow fall through all the safety nets that 
are in place, would a human rights then make any difference for them? Human 
rights then naturally may function as an ultimate safety net, with the purpose to 
catch every single individual that somehow falls through the cracks of the national 
safety net not being able to have access to her/his most basic needs in order to 
lead a life in dignity. In that situation, would the right to adequate food be of any 
help for the most vulnerable in society? In other words: would this right make a 
difference for that single individual searching for food somewhere in a trash can? 
It is after all no new information that ‘even in functioning democracies, the Courts 
do not always succeed in enforcing rights especially for the poor, the marginalised, 
and the unpopular.’12
This might be demonstrated by the fact that during the writing process of my 
master thesis I ran into two Court rulings in which direct applicability of the right 
to food was discussed. One ruling came from the Dutch Central Court of Appeal, 
9 217 A (III), 10 December 1948, The universal declaration on human rights, Article 1.
10 See into detail: Chapter 3.
11 See Chapter 3.
12 See the contribution to the preface by K. Roth, at the moment of writing Executive Director of Human 
Rights Watch, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), D. Harris (cons. ed.), International human 
rights law, Oxford University Press, 2010.
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the other from the Belgian Constitutional Court13, both a Court of Last Instance.14 
The cases show, despite their different national legal context, one important 
resemblance: an illegally residing foreigner can inter alia invoke the right to an 
adequate standard of living, as stipulated in Article 11 ICESCR. The Dutch Court 
ruled, freely translated, that Article 11 ICESCR was not generally binding and 
by its nature not directly applicable, for its content is not sufficiently precise to 
distil concrete rights that can be invoked in a Court of law.15 The Belgian Court 
had a different approach, ruling that it was not unreasonable to assume different 
obligations regarding the needs of persons lawfully residing on Belgium territory 
on the one hand, and illegally residing persons on the other hand, implying that 
only a legally residing person might successfully invoke the right to an adequate 
standard of living. To put this in other words: in both cases, while both Courts 
seemed reluctant in applying Article 11 ICESCR, invoked by an illegally residing 
asylum-seeker, the Dutch Court came to its conclusion using trias politica arguments 
to justify non-application of the norm, while the Belgian Court simply excluded 
the requesting party from the ratio personae of the invoked norm.
At first glance, this legal practice certainly does not correspond with the reports both 
countries submit to various human rights institutions. In their country reports on 
the implementation of the ICESCR, both the Netherlands and Belgium consistently 
report that the countries fulfil their obligations under Article 11 ICESCR. This 
is basically done by summing up all the initiatives taken during the reporting 
period, mostly in the field of social security, and assuring that the countries have 
a food supply that is more than adequate to fill the population’s needs.16 Also, 
the legal practice as described above does not seem to be widely known in the 
international arena. For instance, in several researches on the embedding of the 
right to food in the world’s national Constitutions, the FAO concluded that in both 
the Netherlands and Belgium the right to food was implicitly recognised in the 
Constitution, by recognising a broader right: in the Netherlands, the right to an 
adequate standard of living (Article 20 (1) of the Constitution) and in Belgium the 
right to the means necessary to lead a dignified life (Article 23 of the Constitution).17 
According to the same research, the Dutch Constitution is amongst a small group 
13 At that moment under its former name, the Court of Arbitration.
14 The inspiration for the search for these rulings came after reading a contribution of my former 
supervisor at Tilburg University for the Dutch Association for Comparative Law, in which he briefly 
referred to a different approach between Dutch and Belgian Courts regarding direct applicability of 
certain economic, social and cultural rights, including Article 11 ICESCR: F.M.C. Vlemminx, De autonome 
rechtstreekse werking van het EVRM, De Belgische en Nederlandse Rechtspraak over verzekeringsplichten 
ingevolge het EVRM, Deventer: Kluwer, 2002a.
15 Central Court of Appeal, 25 May 2005, LJN AP0561.
16 See for the Netherlands for example: E/C.12/NLD/4-5, 17 July 2009 Sections 219-234; see for Belgium 
for example: E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Sections 418-558 (especially 541-558). See for more 
details: Chapters 9 and 13.
17 L. Knuth and M. Vidar, Constitutional and legal protection of the right to food around the world, Right to 
food Studies, Rome: FAO, 2011.
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of four countries in which the Constitution clearly states that treaties have an 
equal or higher status than national law (reference was made to Article 94 of the 
Constitution). Furthermore, ‘several sources, including case law, laws on treaties 
and reports to the human rights bodies’ indicated that Belgium is amongst another 
group of countries in which there is supremacy of international law over national 
law. The research suggests that in the Netherlands and Belgium, the right to food 
is indirectly embedded in the Constitution, and the Constitutional mechanisms 
of both countries ensure that the right to food as embedded in the international 
treaties signed by the Netherlands and Belgium is directly applicable in the national 
legal order of these countries.18
In addition, the legal practice appears not to be in line with the UN and other 
human rights institutions purpose to realise human rights for each individual 
to deny its effect in Court cases. Although it is certainly not undisputed in the 
global arena, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, the obligations under Article 
11 ICESCR include – according to various UN organs and scholars specialised in 
the matter – that the right should be enforceable through the national Courts.
1.2 Research objective and questions
It is the main objective of this research to contribute to the improvement of the 
effective realisation of the right to food through enforceability. Therefore, the 
main research objectives are:
1. to gain knowledge about the enforceability of the right to food as embedded 
in UN human rights instruments in the Netherlands and Belgium through law 
comparison; and
2. where necessary critically evaluate both approaches in view of the UN human 
rights doctrine regarding the enforceability of the right to food.
It is expected that comparing the Dutch practice with the Belgian leads to more 
insight regarding the implementation of the right to food in two countries in which 
nothing of significance stands in the way of an enforceable right to food. That 
legal practice is translated into periodic reports under the reporting obligations 
recognised by the Member States of the UN human rights treaties. This is the basic 
source of information for the UN treaty bodies, which greatly influences their 
view on the effect of the human rights standards in the domestic legal order of the 
reporting countries. This means that some data might get ‘lost in translation’, so 
to speak, as the above example suggests. To put this in other words: the Judiciary 
may respond differently to the question whether or not the right to adequate food 
has direct effect than the Governments through their reporting. Also, as discussed 
above, the response of the Judiciaries and Governments of the Netherlands and 
18 L. Knuth and M. Vidar, Constitutional and legal protection of the right to food around the world, Right to 
food Studies, Rome: FAO, 2011; see in particular the conclusion, Chapter 6.
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Belgium may be different compared to the expected legal practice according to 
the United Nations human rights system. Therefore, the main research question 
of this thesis is:
What are the legal factors that explain the differences and similarities regarding 
the response of the Dutch and Belgium Judiciaries and Governments to the 
enforceability of the right to adequate food in view of the UN human rights 
system?
This research thus implies a triple comparison.
I. a comparison between the legal practice in Belgium and the Netherlands (what 
the countries really do);
II. a comparison with those legal practices and the reporting behaviour of both 
countries (what the countries say they do); and
III. a comparison between the legal practice and the interpretation on the 
enforceability of the right to food within the UN human rights system (what 
the countries should do).
It is the comparing process, as discussed in Chapter 2, that leads to in-depth 
insight, and provides multiple dimensions in the evaluating process. To be able 
to compare, it is necessary to first collect and analyse the relevant data. Because 
of that, three sub-questions need to be answered:
1. To what extent is the right to adequate food perceived to be an enforceable 
right within the UN human rights system?
2. A.  What is the response of the national Judiciaries of the Netherlands and 
Belgium when the right to food as stipulated in the UN human rights system 
is invoked by individuals?
 B.  And how can this response be explained?
3. What do the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium communicate in 
their reports in the United Nations arena regarding the enforceability of the 
right to food in their domestic legal order?
This data then will be compared and critically evaluated in view of the UN human 
rights system, and where possible, recommendations to all actors involved will 
be made for improving the realisation of the right to food through enforceability.
1.3 Demarcations, terminology and references
As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, the field of human rights is closely 
interrelated to complex global and national issues. In this light it is not easy to 
address one single issue, without addressing another, correlated problem. Therefore, 
it is important to be very clear on the boundaries of this research, to avoid a 
superficial or a too general approach, or to avoid writing a book that is overly 
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extensive and unreadable. Also, there is a need to clarify some terminology and 
the use of references in this book.
1. This thesis is about the enforceability of the right to adequate food as embedded in 
UN human rights treaties. It does not concern (if there is any) the enforceability 
of a national right to food, nor does it concern national standards that are adopted 
with the purpose of realising the international right to food in the national legal 
order. Although the implementation on the national level through legislation 
of the right to food is one important obligation of the Member States of the UN 
human rights treaties, it is a different obligation than ensuring that the right to 
food is directly applicable in the national Courts. The last obligation is important 
in view of the purpose of a human rights in a developed country: to offer a 
safety net when all other measures fail to work. This is especially important 
considering the fact that both the Netherlands and Belgium are of the opinion 
that they generously fulfil all the obligations implied by the right to food. If that 
were true, no one would have to invoke the Article in front of a Court.
2. During the research process, I found out that within the context of certain 
research questions the right to food as such was not an issue in itself. Therefore, 
instead, it was frequently necessary to explore a broader range of human 
rights (Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in general), that were treated and 
considered in a similar way, as one category of rights. So, where possible, my 
research focuses on the human right to adequate food, and where necessary 
the focus was widened to ECOSOC rights in general.
3. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, the right to food is embedded in the 
international human rights system in many different ways. In this research, 
there will be a focus on the UN Provisions that most directly stipulate the right 
to adequate food. Those include Article 11 ICESCR, Articles 24 and 27 ICRC, 
and Article 12 CEDAW. Occasionally however, especially in the Chapters on 
the reporting cycles (Chapters 9 and 13) there is reason to also discuss other 
Provisions, due to the fact that the Netherlands and Belgium may assume a 
strong inter-relationship between the right to food and the other Provisions, or 
chose to report relevant matters on the implementation of another Provision. 
The latter may also be caused by the UN reporting guidelines and formats. 
This will then be discussed in the relevant Chapters.
 The ESC is mainly excluded from this research, as will be discussed in Section 
2.4, due to the fact that the ESC does not stipulate the right to food, most 
individuals who invoke the right to food do not fall under the ratio personae of 
the ESC, and including the ESC would hinder the establishment of a coherent 
tertium comparationis. As it will appear however, for other reasons an analysis 
of the Dutch case law on the direct applicability of Article 6 ESC and the 
corresponding Parliamentary History will be necessary to eventually determine 
the criterion used amongst the Dutch Courts to establish whether or not an 
international provision is directly applicable.
4. This thesis explores the enforceability of the international right to adequate 
food by individuals. ‘Individuals’ does not mean the same as citizens. This 
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thesis is about the enforceability of the international right to adequate food 
by each individual, regardless the residential status of the person.
5. The Netherlands are a country that are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
which also included Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles until the reforms of 
2010, and since then includes Curaçao, St. Maarten and Aruba as sovereign 
States, and Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba as special municipalities. Since it 
is the Kingdom of the Netherlands that signs and ratifies the UN treaties, they 
also apply to the overseas parts of the Kingdom, and thus it is the Kingdom 
that is responsible for submitting the reports on the implementation of human 
rights in all parts of the Kingdom. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is also Court 
of Last Instance for the overseas territories. No evidence could be found that 
in the overseas territories a profoundly different legal doctrine exists on the 
enforceability of the right to food. However, considering the research questions 
and objective of this thesis, the focus of interest should be on the European 
part of the Kingdom. Therefore, but only when of significant relevance, the 
case law and reports of the overseas territories are included in this thesis. This 
is especially discussed in more detail in Section 9.1.2.
6. In both literature and legal practice, a variety of terms is used to describe 
the effect of international law in domestic law. The Dutch Courts use the 
term ‘directly applicable’ as an equivalent to ‘binding for all persons’ (the 
latter standard is stipulated in Articles 93 and 94 CA), while the terms ‘direct 
effect’ and ‘self-executing’ can be found as well. All terms are also used here 
to describe a similar concept.19 The Belgian Courts prefer to use the wording 
‘direct effect.’ In the international arena, mostly terms as ‘justiciability’, and 
‘self-executing’ are being used. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights seems to consider a standard as ‘self-executing’ when it can be applied 
without the interference of a national Legislator, while ‘justiciability’ in this 
context covers a broader category of standards that may have some effect in 
case law. ‘Self-executing’ standards in the jargon of the UN are more or less 
similar to the national concepts of standards that are ‘binding for all persons’ 
or have ‘direct effect.’ To avoid national or international interpretations in 
the problem statements or research questions, a meta-standard is used in this 
research as a generic term, which is ‘enforceability.’
7. When referring to sessions with a treaty body on a report on the implementation 
of a UN treaty, reference is made to the body as one entity, while during those 
meetings usually one body Member asks questions. Since the body, outside 
the scope of those meetings, does act as one entity, this reference is continued 
when referring to the sessions. However, to be more accurate, in the footnote 
reference is made to the exact Committee Member. For reasons of consistency, 
the same is done when referring to a Delegate of the Netherlands or Belgium.
8. The reference of the sources is as much as possible in accordance with the 
generally accepted rules of academic legal writing style. Furthermore, especially 
19 C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht (6e druk), Deventer: Kluwer, 2008, pp. 183-185.
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in case of references to specialised sources such as Parliamentary History, case 
law, UN documents or other international sources of a non-literary nature, the 
references are similar to the way of referring of those bodies that create the 
sources or are mostly in use in the field. In the case law analyses, especially 
concerning the more recent cases, I frequently chose to refer to the well-
organised online databases instead of using the more traditional approaches 
in referring to publications of selected legal case law.
9. While I studied sources in four languages (English, Dutch, French, and 
occasionally German), the language used in this thesis is English only. Therefore, 
to avoid misunderstandings on languages, quotes from different languages 
were translated into English for the main text, and the quote in its original 
language is included in a footnote.
10. Legal practice is an ever changing and lively field of expertise. During the 
writing process of this thesis, the text was rewritten several times to catch 
up with the latest developments in the field, making sure that this book is 
as accurate as possible. However, one needs to draw a line somewhere. This 
thesis is up to date through the end of 2012. While there are no limitations back 
in time regarding the case law analyses, there is a strong focus on the period 
2000-2012, since this would give the most accurate and up-to-date impression 
on the legal practices.
1.4 Book structure
One might expect a section on the structure of a book in the first Chapter. However, 
since the organisation of this book is greatly determined by the methodology 
used, it makes more sense to discuss this in the Chapter on methods. Therefore, 
an explanation on the book structure will be included in Section 2.7.2.
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2.1 Introduction
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the purpose of this research is ‘to gain knowledge 
about the enforceability of the right to food as embedded in international human rights 
instruments in the Netherlands and Belgium, and where necessary critically evaluate 
both approaches in view of the UN human rights doctrine regarding the enforceability 
of the right to food.’ It is especially the comparison of two countries in view of the 
international human rights system that may lead to more insight, since the Courts 
in both countries appear to reason differently regarding the implementation of 
the same right in a similar case, and the international communication of the 
countries seems not to correspond with the actual legal practice.
The methods used in this study therefore naturally include legal comparative 
methods. However, there are two reasons to show some restraint in classifying 
this research as a comparative legal study. Firstly, as the scientific quality of 
comparative law is not uncontested and its methods are not (yet) very coherent, 
I need to address the question to what extent comparative law as such is a toolbox 
from which tools can be taken legitimately to conduct scientific legal research, and 
where comparative methods might be complemented with other legal methods, 
such as legal theory on legal reasoning. Secondly, this research focusses on an 
international standard that has been adopted for a large part in the UN human 
rights framework. This system is based on certain ideas on law, including the 
idea of a top-down approach towards human rights, with the ultimate goal of 
successful enforcement by the national Courts, including enforceability for those 
who invoke the right in a trial. In fact, domestic enforcement is the core focus of 
interest of this research. Starting from these rather defined presumptions on how 
international law should work, may however oppose to the more flexible nature of 
most methods on comparative law: as will appear below, most comparists prefer 
to start from more neutral perspectives.
This Chapter explores what methodological tools are most suitable for this research. 
To this end, an impression will be given of the state of the art of comparative 
law in Section 2.2. As it will appear, in comparative law literature, certain issues 
are almost unanimously recurring topics, and from a methodological perspective 
deserve further elaboration in view of this research. Therefore firstly, in Section 
2.3, the purpose of the law comparison will be discussed. Secondly, in Section 2.4, 
the choice of country will be further elaborated. Thirdly, comparative methods in 
itself will be discussed, starting from the traditional functional method as proposed 
by Zweigert and Kötz (Section 2.5.1), criticism on this method (Section 2.5.2), and 
alternatives to this method (Section 2.5.3). Then it is time to consider what specific 
needs this research has in relation to a comparative method (Section 2.5.4), and 
based on that, a choice will be made for a particular understanding of a functional 
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method, inspired by Ralf Michaels (Section 2.5.5). Subsequently, in Section 2.6, 
I will discuss the research direction that follows from the constructive move as 
proposed by Michaels. In Section 2.6.1, the research direction of the first sub-
research question will be discussed. In Section 2.6.2, the direction of the second 
sub-research question will be explored, which involves further clarification on legal 
reasoning methods. In Section 2.6.3, the research direction of the third sub-research 
question will be discussed, and in Section 2.6.4 the approach concerning the three 
comparisons and evaluation will be explained. In Section 2.7, some concluding 
remarks will be made, and the structural layout of the book will be explained.
2.2 Comparative law methodology
Comparative law as an applied method is not a recent phenomenon.20 It has mostly 
been used for practical purposes such as transferring law to other legal systems 
(e.g. in a colonisation context), borrowing foreign law (e.g. in domestic law making 
processes), and unifying law (e.g. in the creation of European Union legislation). 
As a science however, often perceived to have emerged during the 1900 Congress 
for Comparative Law in Paris, comparative law has always been regarded with 
some suspicion, lacking a clear methodology,21 and operating somewhere on the 
edge of law, sociology, anthropology, political science, history and other fields 
of science, which may suggest that comparative law has a multi-disciplinary or 
even interdisciplinary flavour.22 For that matter, some authors prefer to classify 
comparative law only as a method, or consider only macro-comparison as a true 
science.23 If there has been an established scientific method for comparative 
law, this must have been the functional method, proposed by Zweigert and Kötz 
in a very short Chapter on methodology.24 While appearing to have had a sort 
of a monopoly position on a method for comparative law for many years, their 
functional method has been criticised by various authors, while it has not been 
replaced by a coherent theory on methodology yet. It can be said that comparative 
law as a science is going through a very interesting period, on the one hand lacking 
a clear method and therefore apparently an incomplete field of science, while 
on the other hand, as a result, very vivid and creative texts are published, with 
an open minded, positive and fresh approach to the future of comparative law.
20 C. Donahue, Introduction, comparative law before the Code Napoléon, in: M. Reimann and R. 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; 
K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 34.
21 E. Örücü, Chapter 2, Developing comparative law, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, 
a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
22 D. Nelken, Chapter 1, Comparative law and comparative legal studies, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
23 F. Gorlé, G. Bourgeois, H. Bocken, F. Reyntjens, W. de Bondt and K. Lemmens, Rechtsvergelijking, 
Mechelen: Kluwer, 2007, Section 24.
24 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 3.
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Regardless of the apparent lack of a coherent methodology for comparative law, 
some methodological issues are commonly discussed in literature, and need some 
further elaboration here as well, for determining in this research to which extent 
these discussions may contribute to the formulation of a suitable comparative 
legal method.
2.3 Purposes of comparative law
In most major works on comparative law, the need is felt to dedicate some special 
thoughts to possible purposes of comparative law. Comparative law can be used 
for many purposes, mostly depending on the aim or profession of the comparist. 
Zweigert and Kötz originally introduced five functions of comparative law: 
knowledge, an evaluative function, an interpretational function, an educational 
function and a function to unify law. This classification is still widely used amongst 
comparative lawyers.
Of course, firstly, knowledge is the primary aim of law comparison whereby the 
research aim is to gain insight in different (legal) solutions to a social problem. That 
would not be possible by (‘normal’) legal research that would not cross boundaries.25 
Although ‘knowledge’ as a purpose for a science is rather plain, some interesting 
thoughts can be dedicated to the matter, as will be demonstrated below when 
discussing Michaels’ view on functionalism. In this research, it is expected that the 
in-depth knowledge on the enforceability of the right to food in the Netherlands 
and Belgium will offer valuable insights in the relation between an international 
human rights standard and domestic legal influences on its enforceability in the 
national Courts, that would normally not be available for institutions in the global 
arena that strive for the realisation of this right, and contributes to the national 
debates on the enforceability of human rights. This objective of comparative law 
seems to be the most scientific one (or the least practical one if you like), and can 
be distinguished from most other functions that are generally introduced. These 
functions namely have a more practical background, and are in most literature 
described from the perspective of the Legislature (evaluative function), a judge 
(interpretational function), or international institutions (unifying law function).
A second function distinguished by Zweiger and Kötz is the evaluative function, 
mostly referred to as to determine the better law, often for legislative purposes: 
in the legislative process, a Legislator could choose to compare different legal 
solutions to a social problem, and use the superior solutions he/she finds in other 
legal systems as a guide for its own design for a legal solution.26 Zweigert and 
25 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 
2, Section I.
26 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 
2, Section II.
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Kötz even consider the evaluation of what has been discovered as a duty of the 
comparist. They consider that – despite the fact that evaluating is a subjective 
exercise – if the comparist is not doing it, probably no one will.27 Some authors 
consider such a purpose invalid. Glenn for instance, while referring to the two Latin 
words that are united in ‘compare’ (cum and pare), argues that literally, comparing 
means the bringing and keeping together of equals. In this light, he underlined 
that comparing should not be about determining the better law, but finding the 
similarities and differences in peacefully co-existing legal traditions.28 Michaels 
calls for restraint in determining the better law as well, arguing that if one wants 
to evaluate different legal solutions to a problem, the evaluation criteria should at 
least be different from the criteria the comparison is based on.29 In this research 
however, it is certainly one of the aims to critically evaluate the data that is found 
in both countries in view of the UN human rights system. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 1, this research was conducted from a strong belief that it is of the utmost 
importance to strive for better realisation of the human right to adequate food. 
Apparently, domestic enforcement of this right in the Netherlands and Belgium, 
both countries in which the realisation of this right should not constitute too big 
a problem, is hard to achieve. Only answering the question why this is the case 
would prove to be an interesting, but also an incomplete exercise: it is the ambition 
of this research to also critically evaluate the legal practice in both countries 
concerning the enforceability of the right to food in view of the UN human rights 
system, and make recommendations for the countries compared as well as the 
UN concerning the matter. Of course it will never be the intention to determine 
in abstracto which legal system is the better one,30 and as much as possible both 
compared countries will be considered to be equal. In that sense I will take heed 
of Glenn’s warning. But it is the belief of the author, in line with Zweiger and 
Kötz, that the job of a (comparative) lawyer is not only to make sense of legal data, 
but also to have an opinion on that legal data, in order to determine what both 
countries might learn from one another, and to contribute to the improvement 
of the effective realisation of the right to food through enforceability, by critical 
evaluation and recommendations.
A third function is the use of law comparison for the construction of Court rulings.31 
In this, the dialogic method discussed below is commonly used. Inspiration from 
rulings abroad may contribute to a broader view on the domestic interpretation 
27 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 
3, Section VII.
28 H.P. Glenn, Chapter 4, Comparing, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, a handbook, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
29 R. Michaels, Chapter 10, The functional method of comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
30 See also: R. Michaels, Chapter 10, The functional method of comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
31 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 
2, Section III.
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of legal rules. Also, concerning the interpretation of international law, it might 
lead to a more coherent application of these standards, or can be argued to result 
in ‘ius commune’ regarding the implementation of, for instance, human rights.32 
In this research, as will appear from Chapters 4 and 12, the legal reasoning of the 
Courts was hardly based on a dialogic method.
Fourth, Zweigert and Kötz argue that comparative law should play an important role 
in legal education, to broaden the student’s mind.33 May this research contribute 
to that goal!
Finally, law unification as a purpose of comparative law can be traced back to 
19th century ideas on natural law, where comparists used to set the aim to find 
universal or natural law through law comparison, a goal set for instance during 
the 1900 Congress for Comparative Law in Paris. Since the Second World War, 
such ideas on the existence of natural law were abandoned, most likely due to the 
formation of socialist countries and the decolonisation process. Instead, during the 
post-war period attempts were made to harmonise law in different international 
arenas concerning a variety of legal issues, in particular for maintaining peace 
and security.34 A highly developed example is the harmonisation of European 
economic law. The European Legislator frequently compares the national laws 
of the EU Member States preceding the adoption of a supranational standard, in 
a process of harmonising (economic) legislation amongst the Member States. Of 
course, also the worldwide adoption of several human rights instruments may be 
seen as a form of harmonising/unifying law, although the high moral content of 
these standards amongst human rights lawyers often leads to an opposite starting 
point in which the position is defended that instead of a process of unifying different 
legal standards, there is already a universal standard every human being should 
be able to invoke, simply because she/he was born. From that point of view all 
human rights, as if they were natural law, are the same throughout the world. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is some criticism on such universal approach of 
human rights amongst comparative lawyers, whose job it naturally is to determine 
differences and similarities in law: ‘Natural law thinking failed to appreciate that 
law is rooted less in a universal condition than in the specific conditions of different 
cultures.’35 And: ‘Similar legal concepts can mean different things in different contexts. 
The lesson for human rights lawyers is that they ignore the different institutions contexts 
in which interpretation takes place and the different power relations in these jurisdictions 
32 C. McCrudden, Chapter 16, Judicial comparativism and human rights, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
33 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 
2, Section IV.
34 F. Gorlé, G. Bourgeois, H. Bocken, F. Reyntjens, W. de Bondt and K. Lemmens, Rechtsvergelijking, 
Mechelen: Kluwer, 2007, Section 23.
35 R. Cotterrell, Chapter 6, Is it so bad to be different? in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, 
a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
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at their peril.’36 According to McCrudden, using law comparison to unify law in 
this context may lead to ‘persuasive comparison’, providing for arguments that 
justify a single undisputed interpretation of human rights,37 while despite the fact 
that most human rights instruments will sum up almost the same list of human 
rights in general terms, their specific meaning is definitely not understood in one 
undisputed way, and subject to local cultural particularities.38 This kind of criticism 
on a universal approach towards human rights offers a valuable explanation on 
why human rights might not work as universal as originally intended on the one 
hand, and gives some food for thought on the usefulness to strive for a similar 
understanding of this right. On the other hand, in the context of this research, it 
does little more than advising to be cautious not to err into persuasive comparison 
when trying to find out what specific domestic influences cause differences or 
similarities in the understanding of human rights amongst Courts. While the 
standard under investigation may be the result of an attempt to unify law, it is 
not necessarily the purpose of this research.
To conclude, in this research, as discussed in Chapter 1, it is the ambition:
•	 to gain knowledge about the enforceability of the right to food as embedded 
in international human rights instruments in the Netherlands and Belgium 
through law comparison; and
•	 where necessary to critically evaluate both approaches in view of the UN 
human rights doctrine regarding the enforceability of the right to food.
In comparative law terms the objective of this research could be classified as the 
function of knowledge and the evaluative function.
2.4 Choice of country
Another recurring topic in comparative legal literature is the choice of country. In 
this research, three entities are involved: a global institution in which global human 
rights are developed and its realisation is facilitated – the United Nations-, and two 
countries/legal systems that both agreed to take the responsibilities that come with 
the ratification of these human rights. One specific element of the responsibility 
to implement the right to food – enforceability in the Courts – in both countries 
will be compared with the authoritative interpretation on the matter shared in this 
global institution (see Chapter 3), and as a result, the enforceability of the right to 
food in both countries with one another. The choice to include the UN as a global 
institution in the comparison is obvious, for it is in the context of this organ that 
36 D. Nelken, Chapter 1, Comparative law and comparative legal studies, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
37 C. McCrudden, Chapter 16, Judicial comparativism and human rights, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
38 C. McCrudden, Chapter 16, Judicial comparativism and human rights, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
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the standard under discussion was created. Although there are – as will appear 
from Chapter 3 – regional conventions and charters that stipulate human rights 
as well, they are in principle excluded from this research. The regional human 
rights treaty ratified by the Netherlands and Belgium that is closest related to 
the right to food must be the European Social Charter.39 There are three reasons 
to exclude the ESC from this thesis. Firstly, although this Charter does recognise 
some related rights such as the right to social security and the right to benefit 
from social welfare services,40 the Charter does not stipulate the right to food. 
Secondly, since it will appear that in both the Netherlands and in Belgium the 
right to food is mostly invoked by non-European foreigners, the ratione personae 
of the ESC might be considered not to include them.41 Thirdly, including the ESC 
would also mean including the Council of Europe as a global institution, next 
to the United Nations, which would seriously complicate the establishment of a 
coherent tertium comparationis. The choice for the Netherlands and Belgium as 
legal systems in which the enforceability of this standard will be discussed needs 
some more explanation however.
When comparing law, the choice that is made for the compared legal systems 
must of course be well-founded, but also here, no coherent methodological clues 
can be found in literature on comparative law. Some authors claim that one will 
have to compare legal systems that show some resemblance,42 for instance legal 
entities that belong to the same family, culture, or tradition, while others challenge 
comparists instead to include differing legal systems to maximise the learning 
outcome.43 Another advice might be to include in the comparison at least legal 
systems that could be called a ‘parent system’, most clearly representing one legal 
family.44 But to be honest, mostly the advice comes down to using your common 
39 However, it will appear to be necessary to analyse Dutch case law and Parliamentary History 
on Article 6 ESC, to clarify the criterion used by the Dutch Courts to determine whether or not an 
international Provision has direct effect in view of Articles 93 and 94 CA (see especially Chapter 8).
40 European Social Charter (revised), 3 May 1996, Strassbourg, in: European Treaty Series 163, Articles 
12 and 14. See also more in detail Section 3.3.3.
41 See the preamble of the ESC, that stipulates ‘considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the 
achievement of greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and 
principles which are their common heritage and of facilitating their economic and social progress, in particular 
by the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ Furthermore, 
consideration 19 states that: ‘Migrant workers who are nationals of a Party and their families have the right 
to protection and assistance in the territory of any other Party.’ A good example is the Belgian ruling of the 
Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, consideration B.5.6. An illegally residing foreigner would 
not fall under the protection of the ESC, for the different treatment in casu was not based on nationality 
but on residence status.
42 D. Nelken, Chapter 1, Comparative law and comparative legal studies, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
43 G. Dannemann, Chapter 11, Comparative law: study of similarities or differences? in: M. Reimann and 
R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
44 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 
3, Section IV; W. Pintens, Inleiding tot de rechtsvergelijking, Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1998, 
Section 98.
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sense, and explaining the choices you make.45 Not surprisingly, from a practical 
point of view, it appears safe to say that the comparist must have some familiarity 
with the system that is under comparison, regarding issues as language, legal 
sources and culture; legal sources for instance can best be studied in its original 
form and language.46
In this research, the choice was made to include the Netherlands and Belgium for 
several reasons. Firstly, the inspiration for starting this research came from the 
comparison between two Court cases, one Dutch and one Belgian, in which the 
underlying facts and issues were rather similar, but the outcome was remarkably 
different. The alleged similarity of the facts at first glance, and the apparent 
difference between the Dutch and Belgium Courts’ reasoning regarding the 
enforceability of the right to food therefore needed to be questioned. Secondly, the 
research is specifically about the enforceability of the right to food. Enforceability 
implies that the right to food is not only a general right for all, discussed in the 
context of pressing global issues. It is a right for each, which makes the element of 
enforceable rights for individuals so important. Belgium and the Netherlands roughly 
show similarities on variables that are not directly part of this research, which 
enable a thorough investigation on enforceable rights for each. As demonstrated 
in Chapter 1, both countries have a relatively effective and accessible Judiciary, 
have rule of law, are democratic, are relatively prosperous, and have a domestic 
food production that exceeds the population’s need. In addition, there is no war, 
and there are no famines, or recent State-threatening disasters. These are all 
conditions that should theoretically not stand in the way of enforceability of 
the right to food in both countries for each individual. This would obviously be 
different when a country was included in the comparison that for instance would 
have no functioning Judiciary, would be very poor, and would be devastated by a 
famine. Also, as considered in Chapter 1, both countries report to the UN treaty 
bodies that they comply with the international obligations coming forth from 
recognising the right to adequate food, and are considered by the FAO studies to 
be countries in which this right is directly applicable. Thirdly, the author has the 
Dutch nationality, is familiar with both countries regarding their cultures and legal 
system, and speaks the languages used in the Belgian Judiciary (French, German 
and Dutch), which is – as mentioned above – a practical prerequisite to perform 
the research, and enables him to study all legal sources in its original language.
Within this context, in comparative law literature the question is frequently 
raised whether the legal entities that are compared should be determined by 
45 F. Gorlé, G. Bourgeois, H. Bocken, F. Reyntjens, W. de Bondt and K. Lemmens, Rechtsvergelijking, 
Mechelen: Kluwer, 2007, Section 44.
46 F. Gorlé, G. Bourgeois, H. Bocken, F. Reyntjens, W. de Bondt and K. Lemmens, Rechtsvergelijking, 
Mechelen: Kluwer, 2007, Section 58.
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the boundaries of a nation State.47 On the one hand, one might argue that state 
borders at least determine to a certain extent what jurisdiction, political reality 
and language(s) is/are common. In addition, this particular comparison is done in 
the context of the UN international human rights system, in which it is assumed 
that it are nation States that agree on the implementation of the human rights 
enshrined in the treaties they ratify. Therefore, using a State as a starting point 
for law comparison seems to be a reasonable approach. On the other hand, it 
is obvious that globalisation has a strong influence on the sovereignty of these 
States,48 especially in Europe, where law and policy are not only made by national 
Governments, but also by international institutions, such as the European Union, 
the WTO, UN institutions, and to a certain extent by international human rights 
bodies. At a decentralised (or ‘sub-national’) level, as we will see especially in the 
case of Belgium (the regions and communities), legislative or political decisions 
and its effect must not be overlooked either.49 For these reasons, some authors 
choose to use terms like ‘legal culture’ or ‘legal tradition’ to avoid a geographic 
limitation determined by the boundaries of a State. In this research however, the 
term ‘State’ will be used, for the reasons mentioned above. In the case of Belgium, 
the Regions, the Communities and the Federal State, have equal legislative powers. 
Therefore, throughout this research the State entity/entities that is/are relevant 
will of course be taken into consideration.
2.5 The functional method
2.5.1 The functional method proposed by Zweigert and Kötz
The functional method as proposed by Zweigert and Kötz was intended to be 
the methodological principle of comparative law, from which all other rules of 
comparative law would follow. The most important point made by Zweigert and 
Kötz is that when comparing legal rules, it only makes sense to compare (legal) 
rules that fulfil the same function. This approach helps the comparist to find the 
right rules to compare, and prevents him/her from looking for legal constructions 
in an alien legal system on places that would – from the perspective of his or her 
own legal system – be a logical place to look for them, thereby jumping to the 
wrong conclusions: a classic mistake made in comparative law. Zweigert and Kötz 
underlined that this ‘proposition rests on what every comparist learns, namely that 
the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these 
problems by quite different means though very often with similar results.’ And: ‘The 
question to which any comparative study is devoted must be posed in purely functional 
47 W. Twining, Chapter 3, Globalization and comparative law, and R. Cotterrell, Chapter 6, Is it so bad to be 
different? In: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
48 D. Nelken, Chapter 5, Defining and using the concept of legal culture, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
49 D. Nelken, Chapter 5, Defining and using the concept of legal culture, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
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terms; the problem must be stated without any reference to the concepts of one’s own 
legal system.’50 These propositions imply that firstly, the comparist needs to be 
capable of placing a legal construction outside the national circumstances and 
considering the construction purely in its neutral functional context – to prevent 
her/him to look at the construction without the constraints of looking from the 
perspective of one’s own (or another) legal system. Secondly, Zweigert and Kötz 
introduced the praesumptio similitudinis, meaning that: ‘different legal systems give 
the same or very similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life, despite 
the great differences in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style 
of operation.’51 In short: whereas the legal construction under comparison may 
differ significantly – although it has the same function in society – the solution 
to the social problem is mostly similar.
2.5.2 Criticism on the functional method
As stated above, the functional method as proposed by Zweigert and Kötz seemed 
to have had a monopoly position on methods in law comparison for a few decades, 
and is still proposed (perhaps slightly altered) by authors of handbooks on legal 
comparison.52 However, the method is increasingly contested amongst comparists, 
with a variety of credible arguments, but – unfortunately – without replacing it 
with one or more coherent methodological alternatives. I cannot do justice to all 
the creative work in which this method is respectfully criticised without having 
to write my own handbook on legal comparison. Here, I will concentrate on four 
common points of criticism on the functional method, as voiced by different 
authors. Firstly, the question can be raised whether it is a good idea to separate the 
functionally equivalent legal construction from its national background. Secondly, 
it can be questioned whether a functional approach enables the comparist to 
regard the compared function into sufficient detail and in its proper relation 
with society. Thirdly and fourthly, the presumption of universal problems that 
are mostly solved in equal manners (praesumptio similitudinis) can be criticised.
Firstly, Zweigert and Kötz advise to separate a legal solution to a social problem 
from its cultural background by comparing it without any reference to concepts 
of its own legal system, thereby striving for strict neutrality of the comparist. 
The tendency to strive for neutrality could possibly be explained by the fear 
of the influence of a political agenda in law comparison, such as the search for 
universal law before and after the Second World War. Some authors consider such 
an approach to be impossible and even undesirable. This can be argued from a 
subjective and an objective point of view. Subjective, because a comparist cannot 
50 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 34.
51 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 39.
52 F. Gorlé, G. Bourgeois, H. Bocken, F. Reyntjens, W. de Bondt and K. Lemmens, Rechtsvergelijking, 
Mechelen: Kluwer, 2007; W. Pintens, Inleiding tot de rechtsvergelijking, Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 
1998.
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neutrally consider foreign legal systems due to the simple fact that he or she is 
preconditioned by its own familiar legal system. Also, the choice of the comparist 
to compare certain legal constructions with certain criteria in certain countries is 
often a personal choice, depending on the interest, agenda and competences of 
the comparist, and thus never a neutral choice.53 Separating a legal construction 
from its culturally determined background will thus hardly lead to the desired 
result of more neutrality. Rather, it is better to put some effort in thoroughly 
explaining the choices made, instead of claiming to be neutral.54 In addition, from 
an objective point of view, it can be argued whether it makes sense to consider a 
legal construction without reference to a historical, political, cultural, traditional 
context, for those elements naturally influence law and legal practice,55 and 
allowing those elements in the research may offer valuable insights into the 
element that is under comparison. This last argument then often leads to extensive 
discussions on how to study or compare elements of legal cultures.56
Secondly, the abstraction of legal concepts that results from translating them into 
merely functionally equivalent solutions to the same problem can be considered 
to be an unanalysed assumption rather than a given fact,57 and could lead to an 
oversimplified (or even vague) impression of the compared legal construction. 
This approach may lack the concreteness necessary to be of use in scientific 
research. Also, the approach may easily ignore that it is not necessarily so that 
all societies choose to use law as a solution to a social problem, or even may have 
chosen a legal response that has no practical use in that society. Other elements, 
mostly culturally determined, may also respond to social problems, and should 
therefore be included in the research rather than being separated from it. Zweigert 
and Kötz already underlined that comparists sometimes will have to search for 
functionally equivalent solutions outside the law.58 In addition, the approach 
presupposes that there was a social problem first, and as a response to that came 
53 N. Jansen, Chapter 9, Comparative law and comparative knowledge, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; W. Devroe, 
Rechtsvergelijking in een context van europeanisering en globalisering, Leuven: Uitgeverij Acco, 2010.
54 N. Jansen, Chapter 9, Comparative law and comparative knowledge, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. See also: D. 
Nelken, Chapter 1, Comparative law and comparative legal studies, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
55 R. Cotterrell, Chapter 6, Is it so bad to be different? In: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, 
a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007; N. Jansen, Chapter 9, Comparative law and comparative 
knowledge, H. Muir Watt, Chapter 17, Globalization and comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; 
C.J.P. van Laer, The applicability of comparative concepts, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law Vol. 
2.2, August 1998.
56 R. Cotterrell, Chapter 6, Is it so bad to be different? In: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, 
a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
57 R. Cotterrell, Chapter 6, Is it so bad to be different? In: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, 
a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
58 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 39.
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a functionally equivalent (legal) concept that intends to solve the problem. This 
merely confirms the existence and comparability of the different (legal) solutions 
to a given social problem, but it reveals very little about the effect of the chosen 
(legal) solution. A solution may have unintended side-effects that have a certain 
effect on society or may even cause new social problems. Also, the solution 
might not be as effective as intended when adopted, or may be even completely 
ineffective. Therefore, this interconnection between society and legal solutions 
must not be overlooked too easily, and where relevant included in the research.
Thirdly, Zweigert and Kötz seem to suggest that all societies somehow face the 
same problems. The presumption that all legal systems need to respond to the 
same problems tends to imply that social problems are universal, an assumption 
that shows characteristics of legal naturalism. Also here, it can be argued that it 
is pointless not to consider a social problem in its proper cultural circumstances, 
since one needs to ‘bear in mind the extent to which ‘social problems’ are culturally 
constructed rather than given.’59
Fourthly, the praesumptio similitudinis is criticised because such an approach would 
favour or presuppose similarities over dissimilarities in law. Also here, the approach 
might be accused of showing characteristics of legal naturalism. A praesumptio 
similitudinis that is understood as presupposing, or even favouring similarities 
over dissimilarities is criticised by many authors for a variety of reasons.60 Some 
authors advocate a neutral attitude towards differences or similarities, and some 
even call to ‘celebrate dissimilarities.’ David Nelken argues that ‘instead of taking 
a position a priori in favor of similarity or difference, it may be more productive to ask 
why we expect to find one or the other.’61
2.5.3 Alternatives to functionalism?
Indeed, some alternate approaches were proposed, although without establishing 
a coherent and generally accepted method on comparative law. In this section, 
some examples will be discussed: the formation of ideal type solutions, a dialogic 
method, a factual method, a dogmatic approach, and a contrastive approach.
The formation of immanent concepts, or ideal type solutions in law comparison 
is an approach through which comparists formulate typical legal solutions in 
more abstract words, using these concepts as tools for comparison without the 
59 D. Nelken, Chapter 1, Comparative law and comparative legal studies, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
60 In Section 2.5.5 I will discuss Michaels’ understanding of a praesumptio similtudinis, which is different.
61 D. Nelken, Chapter 1, Comparative law and comparative legal studies, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
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need to cut the concept loose from its national circumstances.62 The approach 
indeed meets the criticism on the functional method that it is an unrealistic goal 
to cut a legal concept loose from its national background, and focuses on the 
comparability of legal concepts itself, without a reference to functional equivalence. 
Although I am inclined to favor an approach in which a legal system is studied 
and compared while using the same language as a lawyer originating from the 
compared country only would do, explaining legal concepts in a neutral language 
as such – so called second order language – may be a helpful approach to consider 
and explain foreign legal systems in a more descriptive way, and may facilitate a 
more empirical comparison.63 However, this method requires some similarities 
regarding the compared national concepts, for without those such an abstract 
immanent concept has limited use, and one may even propose to fall back on 
the functional method.64 In addition, for this research I see limited added value 
in abstracting a legal concept, using it almost as a tertium comparationis, while 
simultaneously the same concept should be regarded in its national legal context 
and be compared (almost) deliberately in a non-functional context, perhaps in 
the urge to find means to empirically compare these legal concepts. Since that 
comparison would only reveal the similarities and dissimilarities between legal 
systems in relation to an immanent concept, and not lead to a decent comparison 
in which it is explained how and why a certain legal concept is used.
In the context of human rights case law it is interesting to mention a dialogic 
approach. Also in this approach towards comparison, there is no need to separate 
a legal construction from its domestic context. This approach is based on an 
international dialogue between legal experts, and is in general increasingly used 
amongst judges worldwide: the method ‘often involves judges considering what occurs 
in other jurisdictions as well as their own in order to appreciate dimensions of the issue 
that might not otherwise have been as apparent.’65 Judges may use examples of other 
jurisdictions to reach conclusions in their own verdicts. This method allows judges 
to compare and learn from legal arguments and rulings, and to use elements, 
thoughts and ideas of foreign, domestic and international verdicts or legislation in 
their own legal culture if desired.66 According to McCrudden, ‘it is in the development 
of this dialogic method applied to the problem of incompletely theorized agreements in 
62 See for instance: C.J.P. van Laer, The applicability of comparative concepts, Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law Vol. 2.2, August 1998.
63 N. Jansen, Chapter 9, Comparative law and comparative knowledge, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
64 C.J.P. van Laer, The applicability of comparative concepts, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law Vol. 
2.2, August 1998.
65 C. McCrudden, Chapter 16, Judicial comparativism and human rights, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
66 In the context of constitutional law, see: D.S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, Minnesota Law Review, 
2005, volume 89:652; V.C. Jackson, Constitutional comparisons: convergence, resistance, engagement, 
Harvard Law Review, 2005, volume 119:109.
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human rights that the most fruitful role for judicial comparativism may lie.’67 In his 
view, it is the national Courts that contribute to a more coherent understanding 
of human rights through this method of comparative law.68 This method thus not 
necessarily starts from normative assumptions, but rather leaves room for cultural 
diversity in law, which is in contrast with a universalistic approach regarding 
human rights, or with the aforementioned ‘persuasive comparison.’ While this 
research starts from a normative assumption – which is: the right to food should 
be enforceable – this understanding of a comparative method applied on human 
rights challenges a too rigid top-down approach concerning the realisation of 
human rights. For further methodological purposes a dialogic method seems not 
usable in this research.
Another approach may be a more factual method, in which the idea of a functional 
relation is abandoned, and components in two or more different legal systems are 
merely compared in terms of similarity and dissimilarity. This approach broadens 
the possibility for comparison, for now literally everything can be compared, 
even the ‘number nine with Chicago.’69 This may have certain advantages, for 
there is no need for complex presumptions before starting the comparison, and 
may to a certain extent lead to knowledge that may be overlooked in the first 
place when using a method based on functionality. On the other hand, a factual 
method would be very casuistic, and strips the compared concepts partly from 
their meaning, for they are not put in a functional context: it remains unclear to 
what end a concept operates in society, and what its (cultural) background is.70
A dogmatic approach is usually mentioned in contrast to a functional approach. 
Where a dogmatic approach only considers formal legal sources, or ‘the law in 
the books’, the functional approach also includes ‘the law in action’, which differs 
greatly compared to law in formal sources. Therefore, the dogmatic approach is 
often portrayed as obsolete, leading to false results. Still, for a first impression of a 
legal system, a brief survey through merely formal legal sources may be helpful.71
In some handbooks, the contrastive approach is mentioned, an approach that 
presupposes such insurmountable differences between the compared systems, 
that it will only make sense to use a comparison to contrast the systems, to gain 
67 C. McCrudden, Chapter 16, Judicial comparativism and human rights, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
68 C. McCrudden, Chapter 16, Judicial comparativism and human rights, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), 
Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
69 H.P. Glenn, Chapter 4, Com-paring, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, a handbook, 
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
70 R. Michaels, Chapter 10, The functional method of comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
71 W. Pintens, Inleiding tot de rechtsvergelijking, Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1998, Section 91.
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more perspective. This is a method that was especially used to compare socialist 
legal systems with Western legal systems.72
All in all the above responses are interesting alternatives to a functional method, 
although in an attempt to meet the criticism on elements of the functional method 
as proposed by Zweigert and Kötz, the authors’ solutions also raise methodological 
questions that are not easily answered. While the current debates on methods in 
comparative law are very refreshing and extremely interesting, comparists seem 
to struggle to develop methodological tools that on the one hand do not exclude 
any relevant influences on the development of law, while on the other hand as 
a result do not become too vague or undefined for practical use.
2.5.4 Demarcations on functionalism in this research
To compare the legal reality of the Netherlands and Belgium concerning the 
enforceability of the right to food in the domestic Courts in view of the global 
human rights system, I will of course need a suitable comparative method. As 
demonstrated above, a method of functionalism proposed by Zweigert and Kötz 
is now increasingly criticised, while on the other hand hardly any coherent and 
usable methods are developed to replace this functional method – especially 
none suitable for this research. However, as will be discussed in this section, 
the research questions offer a demarcation in the research method in itself, and 
as set out below in Section 2.5.5, in that context a modernised understanding 
of functionalism seems to offer suitable methodological tools to perform the 
comparison in this research.
In this particular research, following from the research questions, important 
elements in the comparison are already predetermined, in line with the UN 
human rights system. If I would put this in terms of functionalism, both the social 
problem and responding institution are – at least formally and to a certain extent 
– predetermined, due to the fact that both countries signed and ratified the UN 
treaties in which the right to food is recognised, and thus have agreed formally 
that everyone should have the right to food. It is assumed that ratifying the right 
to food as a consequence means that the domestic Courts accept enforceability 
of this right. In a functional approach then, the social problem is that individuals 
must be able to enforce their right to food. The institutions that should respond to 
this are also, to a certain extent, predetermined by the UN human rights system: 
firstly it is the domestic Courts that should respond to this social problem by 
making the right enforceable. In addition, to ensure this enforceability in the 
global arena, a reporting system has been implemented, in which Governments 
72 W. Pintens, Inleiding tot de rechtsvergelijking, Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 1998, Section 94; W. 
Devroe, Rechtsvergelijking in een context van europeanisering en globalisering, Leuven: Uitgeverij Acco, 
2010, Section 63.
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of Member States have a duty to report on the implementation of the right to 
food, of which the enforceability is an element. Another institution therefore is 
the Governments that should respond to the social problem by reporting on the 
legal practice regarding the enforceability of the right to food.
In this research then, functionalism as a method will be useful only when 
applied in a more narrow way. Instead of using a method of functionalism in 
order to determine from a blank position which institutions in society respond 
to a certain problem in which particular manner, functionalism will rather be 
used to determine how and why the predetermined institutions respond to the 
shared social problem, in view of an international human rights system. This 
demarcation is most likely in contradiction with comparative methods, for – as 
demonstrated above – predetermining the institutions that are part of the research 
does not fit in with most approaches to comparative law, and especially not with 
functionalism. The determination of the institutions that respond to a social 
problem is in particular a fundamental step in the comparative process, which is 
now more or less being excluded. Nonetheless, there are some good reasons for 
that in this research. Firstly, this research is constructed from the perspective of 
an existing human rights system, and the countries compared are discussed in 
view of this system. As demonstrated above, this system obliges Member States to 
respond in a particular manner to a social problem using a particular institution. 
The focus of attention therefore is not necessarily on how particular institutions 
respond to the problem, although of course (especially in the context of Belgium) 
it needs to be clarified exactly which Courts or tribunals respond to the social 
problem. Instead, this research focuses on in which manner the institutes respond 
to the problem. Furthermore, the social response needs to be clarified. Since the 
reports are a translation in the global arena, provided for by the Governments, 
of the legal practice in the domestic legal order, the focus will be in this thesis 
to explain this response of the Courts. Of course, explaining the response of the 
Governments would be another interesting research focus, although it remains to 
be seen whether a legal thesis is a suitable place to do so. A method on comparative 
law in this research therefore should function firstly as a search tool for relevant 
data concerning how Courts and Governments respond to the enforceability of 
the right to food in view of the UN human rights system. In other words: to find 
out what countries do, what they say they do, and what they should do (sub-
questions 1, 2a and 3). Secondly, the method will be used to clarify the response 
of the social institutions (the Courts) to the social problem (sub-question 2b); and 
thirdly, as a tool for performing the comparisons (I, II, and III). As mentioned 
before, it is also the ambition of this research to make recommendations to both 
the compared countries and the UN regarding the enforceability of the right to 
food. A comparative method is thus required to structurally confront the compared 
entities, and learn from that process.
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But also from a methodological point of view the demarcation is interesting. The 
fact that such a demarcation in comparative law contradicts the most forward 
ideas on comparative law, mostly due to the fact that such an approach would 
overlook important domestic particularities, portrays but also leads to questions 
about the strict top-down approach of the UN system. Especially when within 
these predetermined elements of the comparison there appear to be profound 
differences in approach between the two compared countries. It is then the 
differences within the (given) similarities that are the most exciting to discuss in 
view of the evaluative purpose of this research.
2.5.5 Ralf Michaels’ reflections on the functional method
In his contribution to the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law,73 Ralf Michaels 
critically reviews the comparative method as proposed by Zweigert and Kötz, 
and introduces an interesting modern understanding of the method: a functional 
method based on equivalence functionalism and on an epistemology of constructive 
functionalism seems to offer adequate methodological tools in this research, as 
will be discussed in this section.
Before discussing Michaels’ view on functionalism, first some historic contextual 
remarks on functionalism in comparative law should be made. The functional 
method was introduced during a time in which comparative law basically focussed 
on private legal issues, usually comparing legal constructions from Western legal 
systems, while nowadays comparative lawyers increasingly focus on also non-
Western countries and other branches of law than private law. Perhaps, most of 
the criticism discussed above on the functional approach as proposed by Zweigert 
and Kötz can be traced back to this rather narrow approach towards comparative 
law. For instance, at first glance private legal solutions may not be as culturally 
determined as non-private legal issues, and therefore more easily distilled from 
their legal background.74 This is however a statement that can easily be contested, 
for also private legal solutions are of course culturally determined, albeit perhaps 
not always at first sight. Furthermore, it may be more convincing to conclude that 
only Western (European) countries face the same social problems and therefore 
ultimately look for similar (or equivalent) solutions than applying such theories 
of a praesumptio similitudinis on a worldwide scale. Also, shortly after a period 
of war over differences, the urge to unify and therefore stress similarities is 
understandable.75 Whatever the circumstances may have been for Zweigert and 
Kötz to define the functional method as they did, it is quite clear that the method 
73 R. Michaels, Chapter 10, The functional method of comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
74 G. Dannemann, Chapter 11, Comparative law: study of similarities or differences? in: M. Reimann and 
R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
75 R. Michaels, Chapter 10, The functional method of comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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as originally proposed is in need for a renewed understanding. This does not 
necessarily mean however that the general ideas behind such a functional method 
are invalid for further use in comparative law.
In the first half of his Chapter,76 Michaels underlines that the term ‘functionalism’ in 
itself needs some further elaboration, for the word is borrowed from other sciences, 
and may be understood in quite different meanings. Defining seven concepts of 
functionalism (finalism, adaptionism, classical functionalism, instrumentalism, 
refined functionalism, epistemological functionalism, and equivalence 
functionalism), Michaels argues that legal functionalists almost randomly choose 
parts of all these concepts and use them ‘regardless of their incompatibility.’ This 
may be caused by the fact that ‘the founders of the functional method were more 
pragmatically than methodologically interested.’ Michaels argues that equivalence 
functionalism seems to be the most fruitful concept for legal functionalism ‘both 
because it is the most robust concept in sociology and because it represents the central 
element of functionalist comparative law as developed by Rabel and Zweigert’ and 
explains its meaning: ‘functional equivalence means that similar problems may lead 
to different solutions; the solutions are similar only in their relationship to the specific 
function under which they are regarded.’ Crucial to Michaels’ understanding of this 
concept is firstly that by acknowledging that solutions to a problem are merely 
functionally equivalent, the classic understanding of the idea of a praesumptio 
similitudinis, and the urge to search for ideal types of solutions, or similar solutions 
to problems, is abandoned. Secondly and as a consequence, Michaels underlines 
that instead of merely describing causal relations (as demonstrated above, the 
criticism is that this might lead to oversimplified and unspecific perceptions of 
legal reality) equivalence functionalism recognises the uniqueness of a solution 
to a problem in a given society – ‘its decision for one against all other (functionally 
equivalent) solutions’ – which implies that the researcher needs to fully understand 
the background of this solution in society, instead of separating the solution from 
its background.
In the second half of the chapter,77 Michaels explains what in his opinion the 
purpose (he refers to this as a ‘function’) should be of this equivalence functionalism. 
He thoroughly discusses seven possible functions of functionalism, roughly based 
on the purposes and aims of comparative law as proposed by Zweigert and Kötz:78 
‘(1) the epistemological function of understanding law; (2) the comparative function of 
achieving comparability; (3) the praesumptive function of emphasizing similarity; (4) 
the formalizing function of system building; (5) the evaluative function of determining 
the better law; (6) the universalizing function of preparing legal unification; and (7) the 
76 R. Michaels, Chapter 10, The functional method of comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, Section II.
77 R. Michaels, Chapter 10, The functional method of comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, Section III.
78 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 1998, Chapter 2.
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critical function of providing tools for the critique of law.’ He concludes that regarding 
the last four functions one needs to be cautious, for they can be criticised from a 
methodological point of view. He proposes a focus on using comparative law as an 
explanatory tool, and therefore advocates the epistemological function, possibly 
complemented by a comparative and a presumptive function.
Michaels argues that the first function of functionalism is to ‘make sense of the 
data we find’, but contrary to for instance a factual method (as discussed above), 
epistemology in a functional method focuses on specific relations, that is the 
understanding of the relationship between a social problem and the solution 
provided for by this society in law (both dogmatic/law in the books and law in 
action) and outside law, including its cultural background. Indeed, Michaels here 
meets the criticism that a functional approach would not take into account the 
cultural background of a (legal) solution to a social problem. He explains that the 
interest of a functionalist in culture only differs from for instance a sociologist, 
in the sense that a functionalist will have the tendency to translate culture (or a 
part of it), among other things, into a functional relation, a process in which the 
perception of an ‘insider’ in that culture is not necessarily taken as a starting point: 
the perception of the functionalist plays an important role as well, depending 
on the researcher.
A second function of functionality is, according to Michaels, a comparative 
function, an approach that is certainly not unanimously supported.79 To be able 
to compare, one needs an invariant element to compare with, in comparative 
law often referred to as tertium comparationis. This suggests a certain universality 
(or at least a shared common feature) of either the response to a problem or 
the problem itself. In this light, as demonstrated above, some authors prefer to 
distinguish idealised solutions to problems, or a commonly shared vocabulary 
to more neutrally distinguish solutions to a problem which can even be used as 
tertium comparationis.80 Michaels thinks otherwise, since responses to a problem 
can hardly be considered to be of a universal nature; in his view, it is more likely to 
consider the shared social problem as a tertium comparationis. Also here, Michaels 
meets the criticism to the assumption of universal social problems. In the first 
place he argues that indeed some social problems, when they are formulated 
in abstract general terms could be considered to be universal problems, such as 
the need to survive. The more specific a problem is defined, the less universal it 
will be. Starting from a rather general common problem, results in obtaining a 
very complex, but also very rich comparison. Interestingly, Michaels adds that in 
79 For instance: H.P. Glenn: ‘Similar legal concepts can mean different things in different contexts. The lesson 
for human rights lawyers is that they ignore the different institutions contexts in which interpretation takes 
places and the different power relations in these jurisdictions at their peril.’ H.P. Glenn, Chapter 4, Com-
paring, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
80 For instance: K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An introduction to comparative law, Oxford University Press, 
1998, Chapter 3, Section VI.
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functional epistemology, it is not even necessary to start from shared universal 
problems, and argues that ‘once the formulation of a problem is understood as a 
constructive move rather than an empirical one, the universality of problems is likewise 
a constructive move rather than a mere representation of reality.’ He argues that a 
social problem not necessarily causes a social solution in that order, implying 
that it is therefore not always easy to find such a response. For that reason, he 
underlines that a solution needs to be identified from other possible solutions. 
In this lies the added value of comparison: functionally equivalent solutions may 
be revealed when compared to other legal systems. In comparing, one could also 
reveal the underlying social problem as a consequence: ‘this reasoning is of course 
circular – it goes from problems to functions and from functions to problems, and it 
appears justified for constructivist comparative law as interpretation because it mirrors 
the hermeneutic circle between the comparist and the legal systems observed that is 
characteristic of comparative law.’ The activity of functionalist comparison in itself 
is then a constructive move, ultimately leading to a better understanding of both 
the chosen solutions to a social problem and the construction of the underlying 
social problem, without the need to presume one of these elements.
The third function Michaels describes is the presumptive function. This function 
can be traced back to the short section mentioned above, as written by Zweigert 
and Kotz, and has been heavily criticised, basically due to the fact that such an 
approach would favour similarities over differences, and it implies universality of 
both solutions and the problem. According to Michaels, the concept of a praesumptio 
similitudinis as introduced by Zweigert and Kötz is not as presumptive as it seems, 
and often misunderstood. Regarding the presumed similarity of the solutions to 
a problem, Michaels argues that it only makes sense to compare functionally 
equivalent solutions to a problem (he refers to this as institutions), and therefore the 
compared institutions must be the same as regarding to their function. This however 
does not imply that the institutions are similar or dissimilar, and consequently, a 
praesumptio similtidunis does not favour similarity over dissimilarity: ‘functionalism 
leads to comparability of institutions that can thereby maintain their difference even 
in the comparison. It neither presumes, nor does it lead to, similarity.’ In this light, 
Michaels discusses the assumed universality of social problems: ‘if only functionally 
equivalent institutions are comparable, then by definition these institutions must be 
similar in the sense that they respond to the same problem.’ Again, Michaels underlines 
that functionalism should be considered to be a constructive step rather than an 
empirical one: ‘The claim of universality of a problem is a first interpretative step 
that can be challenged, but this is a fruitful way of making sense of one legal system 
in relation to another.’ According to Michaels, a universal problem may thus offer 
a starting point in doing comparative law research, but the researcher may find 
reason, along the way, to change this first assumption, depending on what he 
or she encounters in the compared legal systems. The process of comparing 
then leads to better understanding (epistemological function) of the compared 
legal systems, and the compared solutions may lead to a reformulation of the 
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 43 
Methods
underlying problem, and vice versa. So, also here, Michaels considers the activity of 
a constructive move as a hermeneutic circle that ultimately leads to knowledge. As 
demonstrated above, in this research, not only the social problem is predetermined, 
but also the institutions that respond to the social problem. The focus of attention 
is therefore not the search for in which manner institutions respond to a social 
problem, but how and why.
The comparative scheme as introduced by Michaels is a very flexible one with 
a continuous open end. In this research however, most elements of this scheme 
are predetermined. Despite this, a functional method based on equivalence 
functionalism and on an epistemology of constructive functionalism is a suitable 
methodological approach for several reasons. Firstly, it gives direction to the data 
finding process. Michaels proposes to start the research from a shared universal 
problem, but is cautious in holding on to the same universal problem throughout 
the entire research, which explains his hermeneutic approach. In this research, 
there is no need for reassessing the shared universal problem, for it is a given 
fact that both compared countries signed and ratified the same treaty Provisions. 
At most, the response to the given social problem (A) might instantaneously be 
a response to other related (or unrelated) social problems (B, C, etc.). Mapping 
this can offer valuable explanations of the precise background of the countries’ 
responses to the social problem (A), which may be overlooked when discussing 
the relation between a solution and one social problem only. In addition, while 
the institutions that respond to the social problem (the Courts through case law 
and the Governments through fulfiling inter alia its reporting duties), are given 
beforehand, it is the way how and why these institutions respond to the problem 
that is of interest here. To determine this, the constructive move, as thus labeled 
by Michaels, can be applied, albeit in a slightly different manner: not necessarily 
as a continuing hermeneutic circle, but as a way to find and explain facts within 
a given context. The constructive move has thus a rigid core that already puts 
the research into a certain direction. Therefore, it is not the question if it is the 
Courts or Governments that respond to the social problem, but rather how and 
why, which represents the non-rigid part of the constructive move. For instance, 
it will be beyond dispute that in both compared countries Courts respond in a way 
to the social problem that the right to food needs to be enforced. On the other 
hand, in a Court case, there is a complexity of legal facts that need to be judged 
upon, with different legal questions and interests that are at stake. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that a Court responses to one social problem only when the right to food 
is invoked. Following the constructive move, the legal reasoning patterns of the 
Courts may thus determine the subsequent research that is necessary to explain 
how and why the Courts respond the way they do (as will be discussed in Section 
2.6.2), and may also lead to the discovery of related (or unrelated) social problems 
the Courts respond to simultaneously. In this way, there is still a moving back and 
forth between social problem and social response in a hermeneutic background, 
while the rigid core that is the normative starting point of this research remains rigid.
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Second, the method offers a scheme in which the legal practice of both compared 
countries, the Governmental reporting on this practice and the tertium comparationis 
can be structurally contrasted and compared.
In a simple diagram, a simplified methodological overview looks like given in 
Figure 2.1.
While Michaels calls for cautiousness regarding a possible evaluative function of 
comparative law, he is not necessarily opposing such an approach as long as the 
criteria of evaluation are different from the criteria of comparability. He considers 
that a comparison is a more neutral and scientific activity, while evaluation is 
rather a ‘policy decision, a practical judgment, under conditions of partial uncertainty.’81 
In this research, enforceability of the right to food is supported, and evaluative 
considerations and recommendations will be aimed at the improvement of realising 
the right to food.
2.6 The constructive move into more detail
A functional method based on equivalence functionalism and on an epistemology of 
constructive functionalism can thus, as discussed above, be used as a constructive 
move to find and clarify data – the sources that must be explored in order to finally 
perform the comparison – albeit in this research with a rigid core, determined 
by the UN human rights system. The research question encompasses the social 
problem (the right to food is an enforceable right), the institutions that respond to 
81 R. Michaels, Chapter 10, The functional method of comparative law, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann 










Figure 2.1. A functional method.
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that problem in the Netherlands and Belgium (the Legislature and the Government), 
and the tertium comparationis (the right to food in the UN human rights system):
What legal factors explain the differences and similarities regarding the 
response of the Dutch and Belgium Judiciary and Government to the 
enforceability of the right to adequate food in view of the UN human rights 
system?
To answer this question, three sub-questions need to be answered:
1. To what extent is the right to adequate food perceived to be an enforceable 
right within the UN human rights system? (tertium comparationis)
2. What is the response of the national Judiciary of the Netherlands and Belgium 
when the right to food as stipulated in the UN human rights system is invoked 
by individuals, and how can this response be explained?(social institution 
responding to the social problem)
3. What do the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium communicate in 
their reports in the United Nations arena regarding the enforceability of the 
right to food in their domestic legal order? (social institution responding to 
the social problem)
In Sections 2.6.1-2.6.3, the research direction that follows from the constructive 
move in relation to data-finding in order to answer the sub-questions will be 
discussed. So far, mainly in view of the first research purpose: to gain knowledge about 
the enforceability of the right to food as embedded in UN human rights instruments in the 
Netherlands and Belgium through law comparison. In Section 2.6.4, the subsequent 
comparing and evaluating will be further discussed, mainly in view of the second 
purpose: where necessary critically evaluate both approaches in view of the UN human 
rights doctrine regarding the enforceability of the right to food.
2.6.1 The research direction of sub-question 1
It is the purpose of the first sub-question to specifically determine the constructed 
shared social problem, or the tertium comparationis in this research. An answer 
must be provided to the question: ‘To what extent is the right to food perceived to 
be an enforceable right within the UN human rights system?’ In Chapter 3, this sub-
question will be answered. Firstly, by making an inventory of the international, 
regional and national Provisions that stipulate the right to food, or are related to 
the right to food (and thereby are of importance to distract its exact meaning), as 
well as the points of view of the international institutions that respond to the need 
to further clarify the meaning of that right. These are basically UN or UN related 
bodies: (1) the treaty-based bodies that oversee inter alia the various reporting 
procedures; (2) the FAO that stimulates the effective realisation of the right to food 
by hosting inter alia intergovernmental summits and gatherings and by supporting 
extensive research on the matter; and (3) the thematic mandates concerning the 
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right to food: the Special Rapporteurs. The authoritative interpretation of these 
institutions will be used to analyse further. Secondly, by understanding the meaning 
of the phrase ‘adequate food’, especially in the context of the question whether 
the right to food is sufficiently precise to be an enforceable right in a domestic 
Court. Thirdly, by comprehending the exact obligations for Member States which 
are the result of ratifying the right to food. It is in that context that the matter of 
enforceability will be clarified.
2.6.2 The research direction of sub-question 2
The second sub-question is: ‘What is the response of the national Judiciary of the 
Netherlands and Belgium when the right to food as stipulated in the UN human rights 
system is invoked by individuals, and how can this response be explained?’
To this end, a thorough analysis of case law will be made in Chapter 4 (the 
Netherlands) and Chapter 12 (Belgium), to determine through what legal reasoning 
pattern the Courts respond to the enforceability of the right to food.
2.6.2.1 On legal reasoning
While there has scarcely been conducted thorough research to methods of legal 
reasoning,82 it is helpful to put the legal reasoning of the Courts in a more theoretical 
context to give further direction to the research process, especially by selecting 
relevant sources to examine with the purpose to explain these legal reasoning 
patterns applied by the Courts.
Peter Wahlgren – with a background in Scandinavian legal theory – is one of the 
few who constructed a methodological model on legal reasoning in which the 
legal reasoning of a Court regarding the application of a standard is structured and 
categorised. Scandinavian law is, like Dutch and Belgian law, in its core driven 
by Statutes, and not by case law. In that light, methodological essays on legal 
theory on the methods of legal reasoning with an Anglo/American background are 
presumably less relevant here, and therefore Wahlgren’s work is referred to as an 
example in this particular research. As demonstrated below, the methodological 
subdivision of the legal reasoning process as proposed by Wahlgren helps us 
further in the more detailed determination of the research direction concerning 
sub-question 2.
In essence, Wahlgren subdivides the legal reasoning process into six interrelated 
steps: (1) identification; (2) law-search; (3) interpretation; (4) evaluation; (5) 
formulation; and (6) learning. In short, it is assumed that a Court needs to ‘define 
82 P. Wahlgren, Legal reasoning, a jurisprudential model, Scandinavian Studies in Law, volume 40, 2000, 
pp. 199-282.
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a situation in a legally relevant way’, which is the process of identification. The 
identification stage then continues simultaneously with the law or standard search, 
since both stages are interdependent: while recognising relevant juridical facts, 
the standard search will develop and vice versa. Wahlgren explains that such a 
standard search is mostly determined by some kind of hierarchy of legal sources. 
He underlines that in continental jurisprudence mostly ‘prevailing legislation is 
almost always the most important. Thereafter, legislative preparatory materials may 
have to be inspected. In addition, case reports may supply examples on how a rule is 
to be applied in practice. Important legal knowledge may also be found in works of 
jurisprudence.’ Wahlgren underlines that the importance of sources may differ per 
country or area of law, making it impossible to formulate universal principles on 
the search for law based on the hierarchy of legal sources. Wahlgren argues that 
in modern-day law however, there will be hardly any rule that can be applied 
without further interpretation by the Courts, mainly because normally a rule does 
not equally apply to a specific case. The basic challenge then is how to deal with 
a certain degree of vagueness in written standards. Wahlgren distinguishes three 
approaches in jurisprudence concerning interpretation of written standards. Firstly, 
a contextual interpretation, in which a Court attempts to clarify a written standard 
in relation to a specific case by ‘finding explicit indicators from the legal system.’ This 
could be done by the search for definitional support elsewhere in law, in which 
through specification and generalisation through law in different hierarchical 
stages a better understanding is generated of the relevant standard (for instance the 
search for clarification of a Constitutional standard in substantive domestic law). 
Another manner is to look for intentional support, in which ‘it is sometimes possible 
to find explicit statements concerning intentions behind legal propositions within the 
legal system.’ Wahlgren suggests that the analysis of legislative preparatory material 
may lead to such knowledge. Also, the search for methodological support may 
result in a better contextual interpretation, in which the Court will comply with 
legal rules that offer guidance in how to interpret a standard. A second approach 
towards interpretation is classified by Wahlgren as supplementing interpretation: a 
method mostly used in case the legal system does not provide for clear indicators 
on how to interpret a standard. A Court then tries to settle a case by transforming 
legal constructions, for instance by comparing the underlying situation to previous 
ones, and when the previous solution applies analogously to the current case 
(analogous reasoning or reasoning a contrario). Another way of supplementing 
interpretation is the extensive or restrictive interpretation of a legal standard. A 
third approach distinguished by Wahlgren is the interpretation of priority: in case 
rules collide, Courts use rules of priority (such as lex superior legi inferiori derogate) 
to solve the matter, and decide what standard will be applied in what specific 
case. Wahlgren argues that the specific choice in approach and method made by 
the Court is in some cases rather obvious, especially when clear intentional or 
methodological support can be found. In other cases however, ‘interpretation is 
tied up with the process of evaluation and with the purpose of the legal system.’ In that 
case, the Court will weigh up the effect of alternate interpretation methods, and 
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choose an interpretation, led by evaluation goals. This already demonstrates the 
interrelation between the phase of interpretation and evaluation. A fourth step in 
legal reasoning is distinguished by Wahlrgen as rule of application, a step that ‘is 
performed when an individual case has been subsumed under a general description.’ But 
before the intended application of the rule is formulated, the Court will consider 
whether the consequences of the application are acceptable in law. The stage of 
rule of application then serves as a checkpoint whether the previous steps have 
been performed correctly. When application of a rule seems reasonable, the 
process will gradually move towards the next step of evaluation. When application 
of a rule leads to absurd outcomes, ‘another round of identification, interpretation 
and law-search may have to be initiated.’ According to Wahlgren, the process of 
rule of application is determined by accuracy and by formal rules. Accuracy then 
means that the standard application should be exact and correct, that follows from 
two meta-standards or fundamental principles in law: the principle of legality, 
meaning that all verdicts must be in accordance with the law, and the principle 
of justice or equality, meaning that ‘similar cases should be treated a similar way.’ 
Furthermore, formal rules are rules that ‘define when and where rules of substantive 
law may be applied’, (promulgation rules and rules concerning jurisdiction) and 
‘the appropriate legal forum and the necessary competence of legal decision makers’ 
(rules concerning competence). The close link between the phase of standard 
application with both the previous steps and the following evaluation phase shows 
that ‘rule application can thus be described as a recurring process in which a lawyer 
is able to specify more and more adequate rule-applications through the succeeding 
and recurring instances of identification, law-search, interpretation and evaluation. 
Rule application described in this way stresses the fact that many phases of the legal 
reasoning process depend on each other and are conducted in a more or less parallel 
way.’ Then, Wahlgren describes the evaluation phase, in which the effects of the 
legal decisions are evaluated and where needed be adjusted to the purpose of the 
law. This is also referred to as teleology. Although there are many resemblances 
between the interpretative phase and the evaluative phase, and therefore both stages 
cannot always be distinguished from one another in the legal reasoning process, 
the basic distinction is that in the interpretative stage ‘the objective is to relate a legal 
proposition to a legal rule’ through interpretation, while in the evaluative stage the 
entire legal decision is evaluated. There are different views on the legality of the 
effect of evaluation on the actual outcome of a decision. Wahlgren distinguishes 
between an objective teleological method and a subjective teleological method. 
In the first approach, the objective purpose of law needs to be discovered, which 
means that the Courts’ investigation goes beyond the intention of the Legislature 
only. The Courts may also ‘adjust the hypothesized original purpose to the succeeding 
social changes.’ In the latter approach, the ‘lawyer must try to find out about (and 
rely on) the intentions of the lawmaker such as the way they were when the law was 
formulated.’ An approach that shows much resemblance with the interpretation 
discussed before through intentional support. Ultimately, the final step in the 
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legal reasoning process is the phase of formulation, in which the Court’s verdict 
is ‘performed in speech or in writing, or even by means of combining the two.’
2.6.2.2 The research direction
It would appear that the Dutch Judiciary highly values the opinion of the Legislature 
regarding the enforceability of the right to food. The Dutch Courts struggle with 
a Constitutional construction that determines the relationship between the 
Legislature and the Courts regarding the decision on whether an international 
Provision has direct effect. Since the reasoning of the Court appears to be influenced 
by the Constitutional system in Articles 93 and 94 CA, that regulates the effect of 
international law in the domestic legal order. In Chapter 5, the background of this 
Constitutional construction will be explored in literature, since its exact meaning 
remains unclear. Remarkably, most authors who clarify the functioning of this 
Constitutional construction refer to the Parliamentary History of the Constitutional 
reforms in which this construction was introduced and altered, but appear to draw 
very different conclusions. Therefore, an analysis of this Parliamentary History 
will be conducted in order to relate the Courts’ response to the enforceability of 
the right to food to this Constitutional construction. Furthermore, in the analysed 
case law, more than once a reference is made to the Parliamentary History of 
the ratification of the relevant treaties, to underline the verdict of the Court. The 
Judiciary clearly is unwilling to oppose the views of the Legislature, and is very 
cautious not to exceed its legal function concerning the interpretation of treaty 
Provisions. The legal reasoning of the Dutch Courts is almost unanimous, and 
shows resemblances with the intentional support approach mentioned above, or 
subjective teleological method, depending on which stage one addresses the exact 
considerations of the Court. Therefore, the Parliamentary History of the adoption 
of human rights instruments (Chapters 6 and 7) will be explored in order to find 
data on why the Courts conclude that the law is not directly applicable.
In Belgium, the Courts reason differently: not once a reference was made to 
Parliamentary documents. The Courts technically do not deny the direct effect 
of the right to food, but instead seem to limit the ratione personae of the right. 
The case law is not as unanimous, due to the differences in function of the 
Courts (including the Courts of last instance): the Belgian Courts and Legislature 
are part of a very complex division of powers. Therefore, before analysing case 
law, a thorough analysis will be made of the Belgian Judiciary (Chapter 11). As 
it appears, the Courts respond with its case law-each from the perspective of its 
own function – to changes in legislation. In these verdicts, the right to food is 
not uncommonly invoked. To understand the Belgian case law on enforceability 
of the right to food, it is therefore necessary to consider this in the light of the 
actions of the Legislature, which will be dealt with altogether in Chapter 12. The 
verdicts of the Belgian Judiciary appear to show some resemblances with the 
aforementioned objective evaluative method, where the social desirability of a 
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verdict is often the core of the considerations of the Courts. In addition, at least 
the Constitutional Court, operating within the objective litigation, seems to also 
focus on the question whether a case is similar to previous cases, which shows 
resemblances with analogous (or e-contrario) interpretation, and the principle of 
justice (equality). This is caused by several developments concerning Constitutional 
reforms that increasingly assigned reviewing powers to the Constitutional Court. 
Therefore, in Chapter 11, a thorough analysis of the historical development of 
the Constitutional Court in the context of the Belgian Constitutional system is 
included to fully understand its legal reasoning.
2.6.3 The research direction of sub-question 3
The third sub-question is: ‘What do the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium 
communicate in their reports in the United Nations arena regarding the enforceability 
of the right to food in their domestic legal order?’ As discussed above, one part of the 
implementation of international human rights treaties is the duty of Governments 
to report on the progress made so far. These reporting procedures then were 
designed to support the progressive realisation of human rights. Also here, the 
institution that responds to the social problem is predetermined (Governments), 
and also the form in which the response is communicated is predetermined into 
detail, as will be discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5.8). Since the right to food is 
most clearly recognised in the ICESCR, the ICRC, and the CEDAW, an analysis of 
the reporting history of both countries and the subsequent discussions between 
the Governments, third parties (such as NGOs) and the UN bodies installed to this 
means, will focus on those three treaties, in particular on the enforceability of 
ECOSOC rights and the right to food. Also, the Universal Periodic Review reports 
will be analysed, since they generally discuss the human rights implementation of 
both countries. This will be done in Chapters 9 (the Netherlands) and 13 (Belgium).
2.6.4 Comparing and evaluating law
As stated in Chapter 1, next to answering the sub-questions in order to find and 
explain the relevant data, three comparisons are necessary to answer the main 
research question:
I. a comparison between the legal practice in Belgium and the Netherlands 
(what the countries really do);
II. a comparison with those legal practices and the reporting behaviour of both 
countries (what the countries say they do); and
III. a comparison between the legal practice and the interpretation on the 
enforceability of the right to food within the UN human rights system (what 
the countries should do).
Comparison II will be dealt with in conclusion of the country Section itself, that 
is Chapter 10 (the Netherlands) and Chapter 14 (Belgium), for in those Sections 
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the national legal practice is compared with the reporting behaviour of the same 
country, and this suits better in the part of the book dedicated to that country. Also, 
this comparison is of a different nature than the other two, since two responses of 
institutions to the same social problem are compared at that, whereas in comparison 
I the functionally equivalent social responses of both countries are compared, and 
in comparison III those social responses are compared to the tertium comparationis 
are. Therefore, comparisons I and III are interrelated, and need to be discussed 
together in one coherent Chapter. Comparison I and III will be performed after 
all the data has been found and evaluated in Chapter 15.
Furthermore, a second purpose of this research is to: 2) where necessary critically 
evaluate both approaches in view of the UN human rights doctrine regarding the 
enforceability of the right to food. Therefore, in Chapters 10, 14, and 15, an evaluative 
part will be included, in which the data that is found, as well as the comparison, 
will be summarised and evaluated.
Based on that, recommendations will subsequently be made to both the UN and 
the countries compared in order to improve the effective realisation of the right 
to food through enforceability in Chapter 16.
2.7 Conclusion and structure of the book
2.7.1 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this research is thus twofold. Firstly, to gain knowledge through 
a law comparison about the implementation of the right to food as embedded in 
international human rights instruments in the Netherlands and Belgium. Secondly, 
recommendations on the enforceability of the right to food will be made to the UN 
and the two countries compared. The methodological approach of the comparison 
will be a modern interpretation of functionalism – introduced by Ralf Michaels – 
that can be qualified as a functional method based on equivalence functionalism 
and on an epistemology of constructive functionalism. The constructive move 
that comes from this approach to functionalism will be used to determine the 
research direction regarding the sources that need to be examined and compared 
concerning the threefold question how Member States should respond, do respond 
and say they respond to the need of enforceability of the right to food. This 
constructive move is not as flexible as Michaels proposed, but has a rigid core that 
is determined by the UN human rights system. The countries’ social responses 
will be compared after that. The level of comparison will be on both micro and 
macro levels, as it is traditionally required in a (functionalistic) law comparison, 
with – naturally – a focus on Constitutional and administrative law.
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2.7.2 Structure of the book
Therefore, as discussed above, the structure of this book will be as follows (Figure 
2.2). This thesis consists of four parts.
Part one consists of Chapters 1-3. Chapter 1 introduces the research objectives 
and research questions, and explains the demarcations of the research, alongside 
with some remarks on terminology and the use of references. In Chapter 2, the 
methods used in this thesis are introduced and clarified. In Chapter 3, the first 
sub-question will be answered, determining the tertium comparationis needed for 
the law comparison.
Then, part two consists of Chapters 4-10, and discusses the Dutch part of this 
research. In Chapter 4, all relevant case law of the Dutch Judiciary will be analysed, 
answering sub-question 2A. Two main conclusions lead to further research. As it 
appears, firstly, the Courts struggle with the Constitutional structure as embedded 
in Articles 93 and 94 CA. Therefore, the effective functioning of those Articles 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. Secondly, the Courts seem to greatly value the 
opinion of the Legislature in deciding on the effect of the right to food in the 
domestic legal order. The opinion of the Legislature is analysed in Chapters 6 
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separately. It is still unclear however, what criteria are exactly used amongst the 
Courts to determine whether or not an international standard is directly applicable. 
Therefore, Chapter 8 addresses this issue into more detail, discussing the apparent 
sole exception to the rule that ECOSOC rights are not directly applicable: the right 
to strike as embedded in Article 6 ESC. Chapters 5-8 thus answer sub-question 
2B. In Chapter 9, the Dutch reports on the implementation of the right to food 
will be analysed, answering sub-question 3. In Chapter 10, conclusions will be 
drawn, evaluating and comparing the legal practice and the reporting behaviour 
(comparison II).
Part three consists of Chapters 11-14, and discusses the Belgian part of this research. 
In Chapter 11, the complex Constitutional structure of Belgium will be explored, 
in which the Belgian Judiciary operates. The analysis of the Belgian trias politica 
is necessary to fully understand the Belgian case law, and will turn out to mainly 
answer sub-question 2b. Therefore, this Chapter precedes Chapter 12, in which an 
analysis of relevant case law of the Belgian Courts will be made, with a focus on 
the case law of the Constitutional Court, answering sub-question 2a. In Chapter 
13, the Belgian reports on the implementation of the right to food will be analysed, 
answering sub-question 3. In Chapter 14, conclusions will be drawn, evaluating 
and comparing the legal practice and the reporting behaviour (comparison II).
Part four consists of Chapters 15 and 16. In Chapter 15, the legal practice of the 
Netherlands will be compared to the legal practice of Belgium (comparison I), 
and both will be compared to the interpretation on the enforceability of the right 
to food within the UN human rights system (comparison III). In Chapter 16, 
recommendations will be made.
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3.  The enforceability of the international 
human right to adequate food
3.1 Introduction
The right to adequate food is intensely embedded in the international human rights 
system that evolved in the period after the Second World War, but also strongly 
interrelated with complex matters – both from a global practical perspective and 
from a legal theoretical point of view – that are not easily solved. Therefore, it 
appeared to be not easy to give meaning to the content of the right to food, and 
to help Member States of the United Nations to implement this right in a suitable 
way in their national legal systems. It is no surprise then, that a large web of 
international institutions, each functioning within their own competences and 
mandates, are involved in the process of further developing the right to food. 
To establish a tertium comparationis for this research, it is necessary to discover 
what the right to food as a global right encompasses, especially on the matter of 
enforceability. To this end, this Chapter firstly provides a global historical overview 
of the most important steps in the legal development of the right to food since 
World War II (Section 3.2). Secondly, the right to food as it is embedded in the 
international, regional and domestic human rights systems will be discussed 
(Section 3.3). Thirdly, the full meaning of ‘adequate food’ will be explored (Section 
3.4), and fourthly, the state obligations implied by the human right to adequate 
food will be critically reviewed (Section 3.5).
3.2  The legal development of the concept of ‘right to 
food’ over time
After the Second World War, the United Nations were founded with as main 
objective to maintain peace and security. The UN Charter may be regarded as its 
Constitution,83 establishing the primary bodies of the UN – The General Assembly, 
the Security Council and The Economic and Social Council – and providing for 
procedures that enable these primary bodies to install secondary bodies. One of 
those secondary bodies was the Commission on Human Rights, established at 
the first meeting of the Economic and Social Council to help the Council fulfil 
their task.84 The Commission spent their first three years of existence writing 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the General 
Assembly on 10 December 1948.85 Article 25 UDHR stipulates the human rights to 
83 Charter of the United Nations, 1945.
84 Economic and Social Council Resolution 5 (I), 16 February 1946. The decision was Based on Article 
68 UN Charter: ‘The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields 
and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance 
of its functions.’
85 217 A (III), 10 December 1948, The universal declaration on human rights.
56 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 3
an adequate standard of living, including adequate food. Originally, the intention 
was to create a worldwide human rights system, consisting of three parts: a 
declaration, a binding treaty and a monitoring/accountability mechanism. However, 
due to different opinions between Eastern and Western countries on the one hand 
and developing and developed countries on the other,86 the choice was made to 
draw two Covenants instead of one: one Covenant containing civil and political 
rights (ICCPR), and the other economic, social and cultural rights (ICESCR). Article 
11 ICESCR stipulates the human rights with regard to an adequate standard of 
living, including food. It took some time, until 1966, before the Covenants were 
adopted by the General Assembly and opened for signature,87 and it took another 
decade before they were ratified by the required 35 States to enter into force.88 The 
third step of the international human rights system was integrated in these two 
Covenants: the State Parties of the ICESCR have the obligation to submit reports 
on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving 
the observance of the ICESCR rights.89 The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights was established in 1985,90 in order to monitor the implementation 
of the ICESCR. This UN body receives and considers the submitted country reports. 
To stimulate the further implementation of the ICESCR in the national legal 
systems of its Members, the Committee regularly writes General Comments to the 
treaty, clarifying in more detail the content of its Provisions and advising on how 
to implement the Covenant. In 2008, the General Assembly adopted an Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR to strengthen this monitoring system,91 establishing a 
procedure for individual communications, inter-state communications and an 
inquiry procedure. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights is 
also the competent body to receive those communications.
In 1974, The Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition 
was adopted at the World Food Conference.92 Increasing food production and 
sharing resources more adequately were considered to be key elements in order to 
combat hunger, a common responsibility to the international community. Due to 
the failure of reaching the goals of the World Food Conference, the FAO organised 
86 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Chapter one, Section II, Section 1.13 and 1.16, Section IV, Section 1.48-1.49.
87 Both adopted in the same resolution: A/RES/21/2200, 16 December 1966, International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights And Optional 
Protocol To The International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights.
88 The ICESCR entered into force on 3 January 1976 and the ICCPR entered into force on 23 March 1976.
89 A/RES/21/2200, 16 December 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
part IV.
90 Economic and Social Council Resolution 1985/17, 28 May 1985.
91 A/RES/63/117, 10 December 2008, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
And Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly.
92 Universal declaration on the eradication of hunger and malnutrition, adopted on 16 November 1974 
by the World Food Conference convened under General Assembly resolution A/RES/3180 (XXVIII) of 
17 December 1973; endorsed by General Assembly resolution A/RES/3348 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974.
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the World Food Summit in 1996, bringing together close to 10,000 representatives 
on the highest level from 185 countries, who reaffirmed ‘the right of everyone to 
have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food 
and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.’93 Without doubt, the 
most important ambition of the World Food Summit was to reduce the number of 
undernourished people to halve their level no later than by 2015.94 Furthermore, 
the participating States of the World Food Summit committed themselves ‘to clarify 
the content of the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be 
free from hunger, (…) and to give particular attention to implementation and full and 
progressive realisation of this right as a means of achieving food security for all.’ In 
response, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted General 
Comment 12 on the right to food. In this General Comment, the Committee defines 
the term ‘adequate food’ more precisely, and points out the different types of 
obligations of Member States resulting from the right to food: the duty to respect, 
protect and fulfil.95 In addition, with the same purpose, the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights convened expert consultations on the right to food.96
Once again on invitation of the FAO, a World Food Summit was held in 2001. The 
Summit was originally not foreseen, but had ‘been prompted by the concern that the 
target set in the 1996 Rome Declaration may not be achieved.’97 The summit resulted in 
another declaration: the declaration of the World Food Summit, five years later. It 
must be noted however that the developed countries were mostly not represented 
on the highest level, in contrast to most developing countries. The right to food was 
again reaffirmed, but not after difficult negotiations: some participating countries 
preferred the idea of ‘food security’ over a right-based approach.98 An important 
outcome was Section 10 of the declaration, that mandated the FAO to ‘establish 
an International Working Group (…) to draw a set of voluntary guidelines to support 
the Member States’ efforts to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to adequate 
food in the context of national food security’, in order to strengthen the respect for 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms.99
93 Rome declaration on world food security, 13 November 1996.
94 Rome declaration on world food security, 13 November 1996. Later, in the Millennium Goals, the goal 
was set to reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger by 2015. See the Millennium 
Goals, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000; A/55/L.2, 18 September 2000, General Assembly 
Resolution, Section 19.
95 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food.
96 Reports of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: E/CN.4/1998/21, 15 January 1998; E/
CN.4/1999/45, 20 January 1999; E/CN.4/2001/148, 30 March 2001.
97 H.E. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, President of the Italian Republic, 10 June 2002, inaugural ceremony of 
the World Food Summit, five years later, available at: http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/005/
Y7106E/Y7106E02.htm.
98 A/57/356, 27 August 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food to the General 
Assembly, Sections 7-21. See also: J. Ziegler, C. Golay, C. Mahon and S.-A. Way, The fight for the right to 
food, lessons learned, Geneva: The graduate institute, 2011, Chapter 1.
99 Declaration of the World Food Summit: five years later, 10-13 June 2002, Section 10.
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During their 123rd session, the FAO installed the Intergovernmental Working Group 
(IGWG) as requested. In the period March 2003 – September 2004, the IGWG 
held four sessions and an intersessional meeting. After harsh negotiations,100 the 
IGWG adopted the final version of ‘the voluntary guidelines to support the progressive 
realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security.’ The 
guidelines give practical guidance on 19 topics, based upon three underlying 
dimensions: adequacy, availability and accessibility.101
A third World Food Summit was held in November 2009: the World Summit on 
Food Security.102 In the final declaration, the goal that was set during the first 
World Food Summit to halve the number of people who suffer from hunger or 
malnutrition by 2015 was reaffirmed,103 and the declaration contained commitments 
and actions, that would lead to food security. A worrying decline in interest seemed 
to emerge: the participating representatives did not meet the amount and high 
level of representation compared to the first two Summits. The Declaration does 
little more than to generally reaffirm already existing targets and commitments.
Meanwhile, the Commission on Human Rights had mandated several working 
groups to investigate human rights situations. In this light, Jean Ziegler has 
functioned as Special Rapporteur on the right to food in the period 2000-2008.104 
Since 2008, his position was replaced by Olivier de Schutter,105 and another Special 
Rapporteur, Catarina de Albuquerque, was appointed to examine the right to safe 
drinking water and sanitation.106 The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights107 also installed mandates on the right to food and 
the right to water. Mr Asbjørn Eide108 has functioned as Special Rapporteur on the 
right to food, and Mr El Hadji Guissé as Special Rapporteur on the right to drinking 
100 A/59/385, 27 September 2004, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food to the 
General Assembly, Chapter III, in particular Section 27. See also A. Oshaug, Chapter 6, The Netherlands 
and the making of the voluntary guidelines on the right to food, in: O. Hospes and B. van der Meulen (eds.), 
Fed up with the right to food, Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2009.
101 The voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context 
of national food security, adopted by the 127th session of the FAO Council, November 2004.
102 FAO Doc. WSFS 2009/2, Rome, 16-18 November 2009, Declaration of the world food summit on food 
security.
103 FAO Doc. WSFS 2009/2, Rome, 16-18 November 2009, Declaration of the world food summit on food 
security, objective 7.1.
104 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/10, 17 April 2000, Section 10.
105 Mr O. de Schutter was appointed Special Rapporteur on the right to food on March 26, 2008, by the 
Human Rights Council, his mandate was extended for another three years in: A/HRC/RES/13/4, 14 
April 2010, Human Rights Council Resolution.
106 A/HRC/RES/7/22, 28 March 2008, Human Rights Council Resolution. The mandate was extended 
for another three years in: A/HRC/RES/16/2, 8 April 2011, Human Rights Council Resolution.
107 Before also named: ‘Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.’
108 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12, 28 June 1999, Updated study on the right to food, submitted by Mr A. Eide in 
accordance with Sub-Commission decision 1998/106.
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water.109 In their reports and activities, the Special Rapporteurs contributed to 
the development and realisation of the right to food.
The Commission on Human Rights was replaced by the Human Rights Council 
in 2006,110 and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights was replaced by the Advisory Council in 2007.111 All previous resolutions 
adopted by the UN organs concerning the right to food were reaffirmed,112 including 
the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food.113
To conclude, it appears that – very roughly – three pillars can be distinguished 
within UN context that contribute to the further development of the right to food 
since World War II (Figure 3.1). The first pillar seems to be the general human 
rights treaties and the ICESCR related Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
109 Reports submitted by Mr El Hadji Guissé: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/7, 10 June 1998; E/CN.4/Sub2/2004/20, 
14 July 2004; E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/25, 11 July 2005.
110 A/res/60/251, 3 April 2006, 3 April 2006, Human Rights Council, Section 6.
111 A/HRC/RES/5/1, Human Rights Council Resolution, 18 June 2007, and A/HRC/RES/6/102, 27 
September 2007, Human Rights Council Resolution.
112 A/HRC/RES/7/14, 27 March 2008, Human Rights Council Resolution.
113 A/HRC/RES/6/2, 27 September 2007, Human Rights Council Resolution., Section 2, Mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on the right to food. For a previous description of the mandate as written by the Human 
Rights Council, see Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 2000/10, 17 April 2000, Sections 8-12, 
and 2001/25, 20 April 2001, Section 11.
Figure 3.1. The right to food and its three pillars (Wernaart, B.F.W., 2010. The plural wells of 
the right to food. In: Hospes, O. and Hadiprayitno, I. (eds.) Governing food security, law, policies 
and the right to food. Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands).
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rights. The second pillar that could be distinguished is the work done within FAO 
context: the adoption of the World Food Summit declarations and the work that 
resulted from these summits, such as the adoption of the voluntary guidelines. 
The third pillar would be the work done by the Special Rapporteurs. Needless to 
say, that the delineation between these three pillars is somewhat arbitrary as the 
proposed pillars are closely interrelated with each other, but distinguishing them 
may help to better understand the way the right to food has been developed so 
far. Also, it needs to be noted here that the specified treaties for the protection of 
particular groups are not included in this overview.
3.3  The right to food in international, regional and 
domestic human rights systems
The right to food is mostly discussed in the context of Article 11 ICESCR. Limiting 
the right to food to the interpretation of this Article only would however do no 
justice to the full meaning of the right to food. A survey through international 
human rights instruments shows that the right to food is also recognised directly 
in other documents that mostly aim at the protection of a particular group of 
individuals (Section 3.3.1), and is furthermore inextricably linked to other human 
rights or human rights-related issues (Section 3.3.2). Also, the right to food is 
recognised outside the UN context on a regional level (Section 3.3.3). Finally, it 
is the purpose of international human rights to be implemented in the domestic 
legal order of states. To this end, referring to FAO research on its domestic 
implementation worldwide,114 the right to food might be recognised directly or 
indirectly in Constitutions or used as a directive principle (Section 3.3.4).
3.3.1 The right to food stipulated as independent right
The freedom from want is mentioned in the preamble of some international human 
rights documents, being one of the considerations that lead to the adoption. The 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights are such documents. Also, the right to food is recognised as an 
independent right in documents that aim at the protection of a particular group of 
individuals. In this light, reference can be made to Article 27 of the International 
Covenant for the Rights of the Child,115 Article 28 of the Convention on Persons 
with Disabilities,116 and in the context of healthcare and pregnancy, Article 12 
(2) of The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
114 L. Knuth and M. Vidar, Constitutional and legal protection of the right to food around the world, Right to 
food Studies, Rome: FAO, 2011.
115 A/RES/44/25, 20 November 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 27.
116 A/RES/61/106, 24 January 2007, The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 28.
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Women,117 and Article 24 (2) of the International Covenant for the Rights of the 
Child.118 Furthermore, the right to food is stipulated in several Articles of the 
Geneva Conventions and protocols119 on humanitarian law that stipulate the right 
to food in the specific context of the beneficiaries of the treaties.120
3.3.2 The right to food in relation to other human rights
The Vienna declaration underlines that ‘all human rights are universal, indivisible 
and interdependent and interrelated.’121 Indeed, the right to food is inextricably 
linked to other human rights122 and is therefore frequently mentioned in their 
context, by stressing the importance of adequate food in realising the other human 
rights and vice versa.
First and foremost, non-discrimination Provisions are often at the core of human 
rights instruments and usually not restricted by exception clauses. Therefore, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pointed out with regard 
to the ICESC that ‘discrimination in access to food…constitutes a violation of the 
Covenant.’123 The right to food may be an important issue in case of persistent 
discrimination of a particular group of people, and is therefore also recognised in 
117 A/RES/34/180, 18 December 1979, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Article 12(2).
118 A/RES/44/25, 20 November 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 27.
119 Geneva Conventions and Protocols that include references to the right to food are: First Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, 12 August 1949, Articles 32 (2) jo Article 27; Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, Articles 20, 26, 28, 46, 51, 72; Fourth Geneva Convention relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Articles 15, 23, 49, 50, 55, 59, 76, 
87, 89, 100, 108, 127; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Articles 54, 69, 70; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Articles 5, 14, 18.
120 In the four Geneva Conventions and their three protocols the human right to adequate food is 
recognised for the following groups of persons: medical personnel of a neutral country assisting one 
of the parties to a conflict, prisoners of war in general, prisoners of war who are being evacuated or 
transferred, civilians, detained civilians, and persons whose liberty is restricted. The starvation of civilians 
as means of pressure is forbidden in national and international armed conflicts, as well as the deliberate 
destruction of foodstuffs and drinking water. Forced displacements of civilians leading to starvation are 
prohibited. There are also international rules concerning the protection of humanitarian assistance in 
occupied territories and during non-international armed conflicts. Also shipment/delivery of means of 
existence – including food – for prisoners of war or detained civilians should be allowed. In case of the 
establishment of a neutralised zone, the delivery of food supplies for (among others) the wounded and 
sick combatants or non-combatants and civilians should be agreed upon amongst the conflicting parties.
121 A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, the world conference on human rights, Vienna declaration and 
programme of action.
122 See also A. Eide, Chapter 11, Adequate standard of living, Section 5, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. 
Sivakumaran (eds.), D. Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford University Press, 2010.
123 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Sections 18 and 
19. See also: E/C.12/GC/20, 10 June 2009, CESCR, General Comment 20, Non-Discrimination in Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2, Section 2), in particular Sections 6, 23, and 30.
62 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 3
human rights treaties for specific groups, as demonstrated above. The principle 
of non-discrimination thus strengthens the right to food.
There is furthermore a strong interconnection between the right to self 
determination and the realisation of human rights in general: ‘the right to self 
determination is of particular importance because its realisation is an essential condition 
for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the 
promotion and strengthening of those rights. It is for that reason that States set forth 
the right of self-determination in a Provision of positive law in both Covenants and 
placed this Provision as Article 1 apart from and before all of the other rights in the 
two Covenants.124 In order to realise the right to food, State Parties must comply 
with the Provisions recognising the right to self-determination. The right is most 
often addressed in relation to the accessibility of food, and in this regard frequently 
mentioned in a problem-specific context, such as land access in rural areas,125 
or access to resources in poor fishing communities.126 Access to resources is 
reported as particularly problematic for indigenous people127 and woman.128 They 
often experience difficulties in gaining access to resources that are necessary for 
food production, mostly as a result of discriminatory circumstances, which also 
demonstrates the interrelationship with non-discrimination Provisions.
In addition, there is a clear link between the right to health or healthcare and the 
right to food. Unhealthy eating habits or malnutrition lead to bad health, and bad 
health may prevent an individual from consuming adequately.129 The right to 
healthcare is of particular importance for weaker groups in a society. For these 
groups, access to adequate nutrition is of vital importance for the realisation of 
124 The Human Rights Committee, 13 March 1984, General Comment 12, The right to self-determination 
of peoples (Article 1), Section 1.
125 A/57/356, 27 August 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food to the General 
Assembly, Chapter III.
126 A/59/385, 27 September 2004, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food to the 
General Assembly, Chapter IV.
127 For instance: A/RES/61/295, 2 October 2007, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples; A/HRC/RES/7/14, 27 March 2008, Human Rights Council Resolution, Section 12; A/
RES/62/164, 13 March 2008, General Assembly Resolution, Section 12; A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1.), 
Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, Agenda 21, Chapter 26: Recognising and strengthening the role of indigenous 
people and their communities; The voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to 
adequate food in the context of national food security, adopted by the 127th session of the FAO Council, 
November 2004, preamble, Section 8.1; A/60/2005, 12 September 2005, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food to the General Assembly, Chapter III. See also L. Knuth, The right to food 
and indigenous people, how can the right to food help indigenous people? Rome: FAO, 2009, especially 
Section 1.3.1.
128 For instance: A/58/330, 28 August 2003, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food 
to the General Assembly, especially Section 22; A/CONF.177/20, Beijing, China, 4-15 September 1995, 
Report of the fourth world conference of women; A/HRC/RES/7/14, 27 March 2008, Human Rights Council 
Resolution, Sections 4-5.
129 See for instance: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the World 
Health Organisation, factsheet no. 31, The right to health, Geneva: UN, 2008.
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their right to health or healthcare, especially with regard to women and young 
children.130 In this context the right to breast-feeding is of utter importance.131 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explained that ‘the right 
to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions 
in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants 
of health, such as food and nutrition, access to safe and potable water…’132 In their 
view, the obligations of States include at least: ‘to ensure access to the minimum 
essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from hunger 
to everyone.’133
In some circumstances, the right to food may be considered to be a prerequisite 
to fulfil the right to life. Although the ICCPR is not too often viewed in the context 
of economic, social and cultural rights, Article 6 ICCPR implies, according to the 
Human Rights Committee, a duty for Member States to ‘take all possible measures to 
reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures 
to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.’134 Furthermore, to withhold (access to) 
food with the purpose to destroy life is a clear violation of Article II (c) of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.135
It will be no surprise that there is a close relationship between the right to food 
and the right to social security. This can clearly be demonstrated when one 
considers the meaning of Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. Article 26 ICRC stipulates that the State Parties ‘shall recognise for every 
child the right to benefit from social security (…) the benefits should (…) be granted, 
taking into account the resources and the circumstances of the child and persons 
having responsibility for the maintenance of the child…’136 Article 27 ICRC states that 
‘parents or other responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure, 
within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for 
the child’s development.’ The State Parties ‘shall take appropriate measures to assist 
parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case 
130 For instance: A/RES/34/180, 18 December 1979, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, Article 12; A/RES/44/25, 20 November 1989, Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, Article 24 (c); A/CONF.177/20, Beijing, China, 4-15 September 1995, Report of the fourth world 
conference on women, especially Chapter IV C.
131 For instance: European Social Charter (revised), Strassbourg, 3.V.1996, Article 8; A/RES/44/25, 20 
November 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 24 (e). See also: Arun Gupta, Chapter 5, 
International Obligations for Infants’ Right to food, in: G. Kent (ed.), Global obligations for the right to food, 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2008.
132 E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, CESCR, General Comment 14, The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, Section 4.
133 E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, CESCR, General Comment 14, The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, Section 43 (b).
134 UN Human Rights Committee, 30 April 1982, General Comment 6: Article 6, Right to Life, Section 5.
135 A/RES/260 (III) (A), 9 December 1948, International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide.
136 A/RES/44/25, 20 November 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 26.
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of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard 
to nutrition, clothing and housing.’137 The realisation of the right to food is thus a 
primary responsibility for parents or others responsible for the child. The State 
Party has the obligation to assist those who are primarily responsible for the child 
when they fail to meet with their responsibilities. It is a small step to see this in 
the context of social security, when social security should be granted taking the 
resources and circumstances of the persons who are responsible for the child into 
account. On the other hand, when we take a closer look at the country reports 
submitted by the Member states of the ICESCR, it appears that while discussing 
Article 11 of this Covenant, the level of social security is sometimes used as a way 
to express to what extent the Member state complies with the realisation of the 
right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to food.138 The validity 
of such arguments is not self-evident: the right to social security is recognised in 
Article 9 of the same Covenant, and both rights should not be lumped together 
too easily. Although there is an obvious link between the right to food and the 
right to social security, access to the benefits of a social security system does not 
automatically lead to access to food. Therefore, the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights held that the right to social security must at least provide the 
benefited with access to a minimum life standard, in accordance with Article 11 
ICESCR.139 In this light, it is interesting to note that the right to social security is, 
more often than the right to food, recognised in international non-discrimination 
treaties, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination,140 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women,141 the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees,142 the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families,143 and, as already mentioned 
above, the Convention on the Rights of the Child.144
Another interesting relationship lies between the right to food and the right to 
education. According to the CESCR, education should fulfil the requirements of 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. The Committee underlined 
137 A/RES/44/25, 20 November 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 27.
138 For instance, the Dutch Government states in its third periodic report while discussing Article 11 
that: ‘the Netherlands have a comprehensive system of social benefits guaranteeing its citizens an adequate 
minimum income.’ See: E/1994/104/add.30, 23 August 2005, Third periodic reports submitted by State 
Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, Addendum, the Netherlands, Section 329.
139 E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008, CESCR, General Comment 19, The Right to Social Security (Art. 9). See 
in particular Sections 18, 22, 28, and 59.
140 A/RES/2106 (XX), 21 December 1965, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Article 5 (e) (iv).
141 A/RES/34/180, 18 December 1979, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Article 11 (e).
142 A/RES/429 (IV), 14 December 1950, Draft Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 24 (1) (b).
143 A/RES/45/158, 18 December 1990, The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Article 27.
144 A/RES/44/25, 20 November 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 26.
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that the availability at least includes, amongst others, sanitation for both sexes and 
clean drinking water.145 It is often argued that the right to food and the right to 
education go hand in hand when it comes to the development of a country.146 On 
the one hand, hunger may affect the learning abilities of the student, especially 
on a young age when the child is in a crucial stage of development, which has a 
devastating long term effect on both the individual, but also on a larger scale of the 
economic possibilities of a region. On the other hand, school meals may stimulate 
class attendances and therefore generally increase the level of education of a 
region, which may have positive long term effects on the economic achievements 
of this region.147
Also, the right to food is often interrelated with a specific matter or a problem that 
involves a combination of human rights. For example, the CESCR underlined the 
importance of the right to food in the specific context of the relationship between 
economic sanctions and respect for economic social and cultural rights.148 The 
Special Rapporteur on the right to food usually gives a sound overview in his 
reports on the most topical issues with which the right to food and possibly other 
human rights are interrelated.149
Noteworthy here, in the context of emergency food aid, is the Food Assistance 
Convention, adopted in London on 12 April 2012 which will enter into force on 1 
January 2013.150 Although it does not stipulate the right to food, and the instrument 
is far from perfect, the Convention aims to ‘save lives, reduce hunger, improve food 
security, and improve the nutritional status of the most vulnerable populations.’151
3.3.3 The right to food in regional documents
Since the creation of a global human rights system, the need was felt in many parts 
of the world to also adopt a regional human rights system parallel to the global 
system, which would take the more specific needs, historical context, values and 
culture of a specific region into account. In these regional human rights systems, 
the right to adequate food is also embedded.
145 E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999, CESCR, General Comment 13, The Right to Education (Art.13), 
Section 6.
146 See for instance: S. Vivek, Chapter 8, Global Support for School Feeding, in: George Kent (ed.), Global 
obligations for the right to food, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2008.
147 The benefits of school meals for development and peace are fiercely underlined by G. McGovern in: 
Third freedom, ending hunger in our time, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2001.
148 E/C.12/1997/8, 12 December 1997, CESCR, General Comment 8, The relationship between economic 
sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights, Section 3.
149 The reports of O. de Schutter are available at: www.srfood.org; the reports of J. Ziegler are available 
at www.righttofood.org.
150 The Food Assistance Convention, adopted on 12 April 2012, London.
151 See especially the commentary of the International Red Cross, at: www.ifrc.org.
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3.3.3.1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted on the initiative 
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) – since 26 May 2001 the African Union 
(AU) – in 1981 and entered into force in 1986.152 The right to adequate food is 
not specifically recognised in the Charter, although Article 21 stipulates that ‘all 
peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.’
A protocol to the Charter on Human Rights concerning the rights of women does 
however explicitly recognise the right to food security for women.153 Furthermore, 
in 1990, the OAU adopted the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child154 that stipulates the right to adequate food in Articles 14 and 20. Also, 
in 2009, the AU adopted the African Union Convention for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention).155 In 
this convention the States Parties pledge themselves to provide internally displaced 
persons with adequate humanitarian assistance, including food and water.156 Also, 
Members of armed groups ‘shall be prohibited from denying internally displaced 
persons the right to live in satisfactory conditions of dignity, security, sanitation, food, 
water, health and shelter…’157
The Charter established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
to protect and promote human rights and advise on the interpretation of the 
Charter.158 Article 62 establishes a reporting procedure, obliging the Member 
States to submit a report on the implementation of the rights enshrined in the 
Charter every two years, which are made public and (on invitation) discussed 
in public meetings with the Commission.159 In 1998 however, the monitoring 
mechanisms of the African human rights system was significantly strengthened 
by the adoption of an additional protocol that installed the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, a Court that is mandated to make legally binding 
152 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, June 1981, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.
153 Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Rights of Women 
in Africa, 11 July 2003, Article 15.
154 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, July 1990, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
155 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala Convention), 22 October 2009.
156 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala Convention), 22 October 2009, Article 9 (2) (b).
157 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala Convention). 22 October 2009, Article 7 (5) (c).
158 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, June 1981, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, part II.
159 See: www.achpr.org for the website of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. On 
this website, all periodic country reports are published.
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decisions160 and is competent in considering all cases that concern the human rights 
recognised in the African Charter and any other relevant human rights instrument 
ratified by the States concerned.161 The Commission, State Parties and African 
Intergovernmental Organisations may submit a case to the Court.162 In addition, 
Member States may accept the competence of the Court to receive cases submitted 
by NGOs or individuals.163 The Court’s jurisdiction thus includes economic, social 
and cultural rights, and possibly also the right to food, a development which was 
praised by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food.164 However, it remains 
to be seen whether the Court will produce effective case law,165 since so far the 
Court only ruled in a limited number of cases as of 2008. Also, it often rules that 
it has no jurisdiction in the matter.166
3.3.3.2 The Asian Human Rights Charter
Asia is the only region in the world without a regional treaty on human rights 
broadly adopted by its Governments. However, several non-governmental initiatives 
were taken to stimulate regional recognition of human rights. For instance, a 
large group of NGOs and individuals created the Asian Human Rights Charter, a 
document with the intention to ‘deepen the Asian debate on human rights, to present 
the peoples’ views on human rights as against those of some Asian leaders who claim 
that human rights are alien to Asia and to promote political, social and legal reforms 
for ensuring human rights in the countries of the region.’167 The Charter recognises 
the right to food in Article 7.1, and underlines in Article 14.2 that: ‘arbitrary arrests, 
detention, imprisonment, ill-treatment, torture, cruel and inhuman punishment are 
common occurrences in many parts of Asia. Detainees and prisoners are often forced 
to live in unhygienic conditions, are denied adequate food and healthcare and are 
prevented from having communication with, and support from, their families.’
160 Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 10 June 1998, Article 28-30.
161 Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 1998, Article 3.
162 Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 1998, Article 3.
163 Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the establishment of 
an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 1998, Article 34 (6) jo. 3.
164 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 64.
165 G. Mukundi Wachira, African court on human and peoples’ rights: ten years on and still no justice, 
Minority Rights Group International, 2008.
166 See the official website of the Court: www.african-court.org.
167 Asian Human Rights Charter, a peoples’ charter, declared in Kwangju, South Korea, 17 May 1998, 
preface.
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3.3.3.3 The Arab Charter on Human Rights
In the Arab world, several human rights instruments have been adopted throughout 
the past decades. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,168 adopted 
in 1990, can be seen as a reaction to the UN human rights mechanisms that were 
based on the UDHR. A group of Muslim countries felt insufficiently involved in 
the creation of the UDHR, and therefore adopted their own declaration on human 
rights. The right to adequate food is recognised in case of armed conflict, for 
children, and for every individual in Articles 3, 7, and 17. The Declaration had a 
predecessor that also recognised the right to adequate food.169 Both declarations 
are heavily criticised for the fact that they affirm that Shari’ah law is the only legal 
source.170 In 2004, the League of Arab States adopted a stronger legal instrument, 
the Arab Charter on Human Rights,171 in which both the foremost UN human 
rights treaties and the Cairo declaration are reaffirmed.172 The right to food is 
recognised in Article 38, and Article 39 recognises the right to health, which 
includes the obligation for Member States to take measures that include the 
‘Provision of the basic nutrition and safe drinking water for all.’ Furthermore, the 
right to self-determination is underlined in the preamble, the equality between 
men and women is recognised (especially Article 3 (3)), and special protection 
is embedded for children (especially Article 34 (3)) and disabled persons (Article 
40). The implementation of the Charter is monitored by the Arab Human Rights 
Committee through a reporting system. Every Member State has the obligation 
to submit an initial report within one year from the date on which the charter 
entered into force, and from then on a periodic report every three years.173 Since 
the Charter entered into force in 2008, its effect on the realisation of human rights 
has to be awaited.174
3.3.3.4 The Charter of the Organisation of American States
In 1948, the Organisation of American States (OAS) adopted the Charter of the 
Organisation of American States. Article 34 of the Charter states that proper 
168 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 August 1990, adopted at the Nineteenth Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers.
169 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, 19 September 1981, adopted by the Islamic Council, 
Article XVIII.
170 See for instance Articles 24-25 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 August 1990, 
adopted at the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.
171 Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, League of Arab States. See also: M. Amin Al-Midani, 
M. Cabanettes (translation) and S.M. Akram (revision), Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004, Boston 
University International Law Journal, Volume 24, Fall 2006, Number 2, pp. 147-164.
172 Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, League of Arab States, preamble.
173 See Articles 45-47 for the installment procedure of the Committee; see Articles 48-49 for the reporting 
procedure.
174 See for the most recently updated information on the Arab Human Rights Committee: www.
arableagueonline.org.
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nutrition and modernisation of rural life and land reforms are basic goals in order 
to support inter alia equality of opportunity, elimination of poverty and equal 
distribution of wealth and income.
In 1969, the American Convention on Human Rights was adopted by the OAS, 
and entered into force on 1978.175 The Convention has a strong focus on civil and 
political rights, and goes no further than obliging States to guarantee a progressive 
development of the economic, social and cultural rights (Article 26). The Inter 
American Court of Human Rights supervises a State complaint procedure (Chapter 
VIII), while the Commission may receive individual petitions or communications of 
alleged human rights violation by a Member State, and supervises a corresponding 
friendly settlement procedure (Chapter VII). The Committee furthermore promotes 
the respect for human rights through inter alia make recommendations and prepare 
reports and studies, and ‘to request the Governments of the Member states to supply 
it with information on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights.’176 
There is thus no formal reporting system through which the implementation of 
the rights is supervised.
The San Salvador Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights, adopted in 1988, does however stipulate economic, social and cultural 
rights, and recognises the right to adequate food in Article 12. Furthermore, the 
protocol has a non-discrimination Provision (Article 3), recognises the right to 
just, equitable, and satisfactory conditions of work (Article 7), the right to social 
security (Article 9), and the right to health (Article 10). Special protection is 
underlined for the family (Article 15), children (Article 16), the elderly (Article 
17) and persons with a handicap (Article 18). The protocol includes a monitoring 
procedure that involves the obligation of Member States to submit periodic reports 
on the implementation of the Protocol, and a very limited procedure for complaints 
regarding trade union rights and the right to education, both supervised by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.177 The Member States have an 
obligation to adopt measures ‘to the extent allowed by their available resources, and 
taking into account their degree of development, for the purpose of achieving progressively 
and pursuant to their internal legislations, the full observance of the rights recognised 
in this Protocol’178, and to enact domestic legislation if the rights are not already 
guaranteed by domestic law ‘in accordance with their Constitutional processes and 
175 The American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, adopted at the Inter-American 
Specialised Conference on Human Rights.
176 The American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, adopted at the Inter-American 
Specialised Conference on Human Rights, Article 41.
177 The San Salvador Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, November 
1988, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States, Article 19.
178 The San Salvador Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, November 
1988, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States, Article 1.
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the Provisions of this Protocol, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary 
for making those rights a reality.’179
3.3.3.5 The European Social Charter
The European Social Charter was adopted in 1961,180 and revised in 1991.181 The 
ESC is the counterpart of the European Convention on Human Rights, is strongly 
based on ILO legislation, and has therefore a focus on labour-law. Perhaps due to 
this focus, the Charter contains no Provision that specifically recognises the right 
to food, although in Article 8, the right for employed woman to have sufficient time 
to nurse (including breast-feeding) their infant is recognised. Nevertheless, some 
Provisions may contribute to the realisation of the right to food, such as the right 
to safe and healthy working conditions (Article 3), the right to a fair remuneration 
sufficient for a decent standard of living for themselves and their families (Article 
4), the right to protection of health (Article 11), the right to social security (Article 
12), the right to social and medical assistance (Article 13) and the right to benefit 
from social welfare services (Article 14). Also, the rights of children (Article 7), 
women (Article 8), the family (Article 16), and migrant workers (Article 19) receive 
additional protection in the Charter.182 The European Committee of Social Rights 
(ECSR) supervises the monitoring of the implementation of the legal obligations 
of the Charter through a reporting system183 and, under an additional protocol, 
through a collective complaint procedure.184
3.3.4 The right to food in national Constitutions
In several countries, the right to food is recognised in the national Constitutions. 
According to an FAO right to food study in 2011,185 the right to food is recognised 
explicitly in the Constitution of 23 Countries. In addition, the right is recognised 
implicitly, for instance by means of a broader right or by a directive principle, 
in the Constitutions of 33 countries. Due to the direct effect of international 
Provisions, the right to food has effect in at least another 51 countries. Overall, 
the right to food is thus legally applicable in 107 countries. As already mentioned 
179 The San Salvador Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, November 
1988, adopted by the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States, Article 2.
180 European Social Charter, 18 October 1961, Turin, in: European Treaty Series 35.
181 European Social Charter (revised), 3 May 1996, Strassbourg, in: European Treaty Series 163.
182 The Articles referred to are numbered in this manner in the 1991 Charter. It must be noted however 
that some countries only ratified the 1961 edition, which is organised differently.
183 Originally embedded in part IV of the 1961 Charter, later altered in the Amending Protocol of 1991 
reforming the supervisory mechanism, 21 October 1991, Turin, in: European Treaty Series 142, and 
currently referred to in Section IV, Article C of the 1991 Charter.
184 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, 
9 November 1995, Strassbourg, in: European Treaty Series 158.
185 Lidija Knuth and Margret Vidar, Constitutional and Legal Protection of the Right to food around the World, 
Right to food Studies, Rome: FAO, 2011.
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in Chapter 1, the Netherlands and Belgium are amongst those Countries. The 
research however seems to be based on a dogmatic law comparison, and certainly 
not on a functional one, which is understandable, considering the enormous scope 
of the research. The actual impact of the human right to food however can only 
be assessed by more intense analysis of national case law in which human rights 
Provisions are invoked, in relation to the Constitutional structure in which the 
national Judiciary operates.
3.4 The meaning of ‘adequate food’
When exploring the meaning of the right to adequate food, and the obligations for 
States that follow from ratifying the right, it appears that this is most often discussed 
in the context of Article 11 ICESCR. Most likely because in this Provision the right 
was stipulated as a global legal right for the first time, and not specifically focussed 
on a particular vulnerable group. Thus it has the broadest scope. Therefore, in 
this section and in Section 3.5, the right is primarily discussed in view of Article 
11 ICESCR.
One argument to reject the enforceability of the right to food is that the formulation 
of the right in especially Article 11 ICESCR is too imprecise to be applied directly by 
domestic Courts without the adoption of further domestic legislation in which the 
right is specified.186 To this end, various attempts were made in the international 
arena to further clarify the content of the right to food. In this process, the 
meaning of ‘adequate food’ as well as the content of the State Duties implied by 
the right to food was elaborated. The first will be discussed in this section, the 
latter in Section 3.5.
Article 11 of the ICESCR was written in cooperation with the FAO, which proposed 
sub Section (b), to provide for a legal basis for their ‘freedom from hunger campaign’ 
that was set up in 1960. It explains why sub (a) refers to ‘the right to adequate food’, 
and sub (b) refers to ‘freedom from hunger.’187 During the negotiations that led to 
the final draft of the ICESCR in the early nineteen sixties, the content of Article 
11 was debated heavily. For instance, the Dutch Delegation stated that the Article 
‘was too detailed, covered many matters which went beyond the competence of the 
Third Committee, was not consistent with the bald statements relating to the rights of 
housing and clothing, was more appropriate as a declaration than a legally-binding 
instrument.’188 Together with a group of other Member States, this Government 
believed that food-related problems were so diverse that different approaches 
were required. They considered that the formulation of the Provisions in Article 
186 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 35.
187 See also the contribution from P. Alston, in: P. Alston and K. Tomasevski (eds.), The right to food, 
International Studies in Human Rights, Utrecht: SIM, 1984.
188 A/C.3/SR.1266, 1963, Section 57-63.
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11 was too specific to be compatible with that requirement. Article 11 ICESCR is 
therefore – as well as many other ICESCR Provisions – a compromise between 
countries who favoured a strong wording including clear obligations and countries 
that preferred a larger margin of discretion for Member States to implement the 
right in a way that suits best considering the particularities of the specific country.
In its final form, Article 11 ICESCR stipulates that:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement 
of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to 
ensure the realisation of this right, recognising to this effect the essential 
importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognising the fundamental 
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and 
through international co-operation, the measures, including specific 
programmes, which are needed:
a. To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution 
of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, 
by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by 
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve 
the most efficient development and utilisation of natural resources.
b. Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-
exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food 
supplies in relation to need.
In Section 2, the Provision specifies the right to food on several aspects. In the first 
place, the right to adequate food means that people should be free from hunger. 
It is widely understood that the right to food implies both the absence of hunger 
and the absence of malnutrition. Hunger (also referred to as undernourishment or 
undernutrition) means that a person lacks a diet of an adequate quantity, meaning 
that the person has no access to a sufficient amount of calories. Malnutrition means 
that a person lacks a diet of an adequate quality, meaning that the person has no 
access to a sufficiently varying diet that includes all necessary substances to lead 
a healthy life.189 These concepts have been further defined by institutions such as 
the FAO, WFP, WHO and UNICEF.190 In the second place, Section 2 mentions that 
the right to food should be realised by States individually and through international 
co-operation, and further explains how this should be done.
189 See for instance: E/CN.4/2001/53, 7 February 2001, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to food, Section 16; J. Ziegler, C. Golay, C. Mahon and S.-A. Way, The fight for the right to food, lessons 
learned, Geneva: The graduate institute, 2011, Chapter 1; G. Kent, Freedom from want: The human rights 
to food, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005, Chapter 1.
190 See for further information the websites of these organisations, for instance: www.wfp.org/hunger.
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In Section 1, the right to adequate food is recognised as part of an adequate 
standard of living. The CESCR underlined in General Comment 12 that: ‘the right 
to adequate food is realised when every man, woman and child, alone or in community 
with others, has physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means 
for its procurement.’191 According to the Committee, the meaning of ‘adequate food’ 
encompasses the concept of ‘availability’ and ‘accessibility’, and thus the right to 
food implies: ‘The availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy 
the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within 
a given culture.’ And also: ‘The accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable 
and that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights.’192 The CESCR 
argued that the right to food implied that food should be ‘adequate’ which is ‘to 
a large extent determined by prevailing social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological 
and other conditions’ and ‘sustainable’, which ‘incorporates the notion of long-term 
availability and accessibility.’193
It is generally accepted that the right to adequate food includes the right to 
water.194 The CESCR underlined that ‘the right to water clearly falls within the 
category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of living, particularly 
since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival.’195 According to the 
Committee, the meaning of adequate water may vary in different situations, 
but in all circumstances, the factors of availability, quality and accessibility are 
applicable.196
Furthermore, as already discussed in Section 3.3.2, the right to food implies the 
right to breast-feeding, as stipulated in Article 24 (2) ICRC.
It is obvious that it is not possible to exactly define what adequate food is for each 
individual in each specific situation. On the other hand, the work done in the 
international arena to further clarify the concept of the right to food provides for 
some general sub-elements of the right to food, that makes it easier to apply the 
right to food in specific situations. Besides it seems reasonable to at least recognise 
191 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 6.
192 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 8.
193 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 7.
194 The Commission on Human Rights requested the Special Rapporteur on the right to food in 2001 ‘to 
pay attention to the issue of drinking water, taking into account the interdependence of this issue and the right to 
food’. See: Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/25, 20 April 2001. See furthermore: A/56/210, 
23 July 2001, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food to the General Assembly, 
Chapter IV; E/CN.4/2003/54, 10 January 2003, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food, Chapter II. See also: E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, CESCR, General Comment 15, The Right to 
Water. Furthermore, see the works of the Special Rapporteurs on the right to water: Mr El Adji Guissé for 
the sub-commission on human rights, and Mrs C. de Albuquerque for the Human Rights Commission.
195 E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, CESCR, General Comment 15, The Right to Water, Section 3; see 
also (earlier) E/1996/22, annex IV at 97 (1995), 24 November 1995, CESCR, General Comment 6, The 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons, Section 32.
196 E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, CESCR, General Comment 15, The Right to Water, Section 12.
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a core content of the right to food that implies specific State obligations, as will 
be discussed below. As Vlemminx pointed out, it seems rather odd to claim that 
Article 11 ICESCR is too vague to apply in a particular case when it is quite clear 
that in the underlying case, the individual who invokes the Provision has no 
access to housing, clothes and food at all.197
3.5 State obligations regarding the right to food
Rights imply duties, but it has never been easy to reach universal consensus on 
what State duties are recognised in the global Human Rights system, especially 
regarding ECOSOC rights. This section will therefore discuss the difficulties in 
determining what duties are implied by economic, social and cultural rights in 
general, and the right to food in particular. Section 3.5.1 will focus on the question 
why States are responsible for the realisation of human rights, and Section 3.5.2 
will discuss the matter of universality of human rights, and the extent to which 
states are bound to realise these human rights. Section 3.5.3 will focus on the 
interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights, and will in that context 
discuss the classical division of human rights in civil and political rights on the one 
hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand. Furthermore, 
a frequently proposed typology of State duties that can be applied on all human 
rights will be introduced. In this light, Article 2 ICESCR will be discussed in Section 
3.5.4, mostly explaining why this Article cannot be understood as an unlimited 
and ‘duty free’ margin of discretion for States to realise the rights enshrined in 
the ICESCR. In Section 3.5.5, the domestic enforceability of ECOSOC rights in 
general will be discussed, and the domestic enforceability of the right to food will 
be explored in Section 3.5.6. Furthermore, Section 3.5.7 will discuss the matter 
of State reservations that can be made to human rights instruments. Finally, 
Sections 3.5.8 and 3.5.9 will introduce and discuss the different monitoring systems 
(reporting procedures and complaint mechanisms) that are embedded in or later 
added to the different international human rights treaties.
3.5.1 Human rights and the State
Legal instruments in which human rights are embedded are usually aimed at 
States, which then have certain responsibilities towards the realisation of these 
rights. Naturally, the realisation of human rights is not the sole responsibility of 
a Government: all actors in society should contribute to the realisation of human 
197 F.M.C. Vlemminx, Een nieuw profiel van de grondrechten, een analyse van de prestatieplichten ingevolge 
klassieke en sociale grondrechten, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2002b, Chapter 5, Section 9, 
referring to: District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 6 September 2000, Rawb 2001, p. 55.
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 75 
 The enforceability of the international human right to adequate food
rights,198 starting with the individual who seeks to enjoy human rights.199 However, 
the role of non-governmental actors is not so often discussed in the context 
of legal obligations. Besides some soft legislation such as non-legally binding 
declarations,200 the role of non-governmental actors is sometimes referred to in 
preambles of human rights treaties,201 or occasionally specifically addressed, such 
as Article 27 (2) ICRC that stipulates that it is the primary responsibility of the 
parents or others who are responsible for the child ‘to secure, within their abilities 
and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child’s development.’ 
Mostly however, international human rights documents are addressed to its Member 
States: ‘At its core, a human right is a claim against the Government, a claim the 
Government must do or desist from doing specific things to further human dignity.’202
198 G. Kent, Freedom from want: the human rights to food, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2005, Chapter 6. In this Chapter, Kent introduces the ‘rings of responsibility’, involving all relevant actors 
in society.
199 A. Eide, Chapter 11, Adequate standard of living, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), D. 
Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford University Press, 2010.
200 For instance: OECD, OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises, OECD Publishing, 2011, available 
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en, especially part I, Section IV; E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12, 
26 August 2003: Draft standards on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights; Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 
204th Session (Geneva, November 1977) as amended at its 279th (November 2000) and 295th Session 
(March 2006); and in more than one occasion in: The voluntary guidelines to support the progressive 
realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security, adopted by the 127th session 
of the FAO Council, November 2004. See also: General Assembly, resolution 42/115, 7 December 1987, 
The impact of property on the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms; UN Commission 
on Human Rights, Resolution 1987/18, 10 March 1987, On the impact of property on the economic and 
social development of Member States; E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to 
Adequate Food, Section 20; E/CN.4/2004/10, 9 February 2004, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food, especially Chapter III; A/58/330, 28 August 2003, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food to the General Assembly, especially Chapter III; E/CN.4/2006/44, 16 March 
2006, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Chapter III, Section D; A/HRC/7/5, 
10 January 2008, 10 January 2008, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food to the 
Human Rights Council, Chapter III, Section D. See also M. Brady, Chapter 4, Holding Corporations 
Accountable for the Right to food, in: G. Kent (editor), Global obligations for the right to food, Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2008.
201 For instance, the preambles of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR mention that the State Parties agree 
upon the Articles, ‘Realising that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to 
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognised 
in the present Covenant…’
202 See for instance the contribution of E. Bates, Chapter 1, History, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. 
Sivakumaran (eds.), D. Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010. See furthermore: G. Kent, Freedom from want: the human rights to food, Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005, p. 80.
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3.5.2  Universality of human rights and State consent to be bound by 
them
An interesting question in this context is whether a State has to ratify a human 
rights treaty first before it is bound to it. The usual approach in international law 
is to respect the State’s sovereignty and free will, and thus a State cannot be bound 
to a treaty without its consent, which reflects a positivistic legal point of view. 
On the other hand, one could argue that all States have human rights obligations, 
even without ratifying the treaties in which these rights are recognised, due to 
the universality of human rights, in line with the naturalism principle that people 
have human rights simply because they were born. There seems to be tension 
between defining and recognising human rights in declarations and treaties under 
the wings of international positive law on the one hand, and presenting it as 
universal or even natural law on the other hand. It is no secret that the UDHR was 
not universally accepted at the time of its declaration, and the UN human rights 
treaties are not unanimously ratified. Also, States frequently made reservations 
to human rights treaties, as will be discussed below. In addition, without willing 
to generalise too easily, the fact that the need was felt to regionally adopt human 
rights treaties with an equivalent content to the global treaties for more suitable 
and better accepted implementation, at least suggests that there is no (entirely) 
universally accepted understanding of human rights. Would this mean that human 
rights are thus not universal and only effective in the countries that ratified the 
treaties, to the extent of the content to which they are willing to commit to? Or 
in the words of Christopher McCrudden: ‘This is the issue of whether the obligations 
that human rights impose depend on the State for their existence or exist irrespective of 
State recognition.’ This resembles the classic discussion between legal positivism 
and natural law: ‘Are human rights legal rights because they are incorporated into 
positive law, or are they legal rights irrespective of whether they have been incorporated 
into any particular legal system, because they are already included in what we consider 
foundational to any legal system?’203
Frédéric Mégret argues that human rights treaties are not normal international 
treaties, due to the fact that such a treaty is not primarily about commitments 
between states. Instead, she considers that human rights are about a commitment 
from a State towards individuals, and may in certain aspects even be about a 
commitment ergo omnes towards the international community. Also, the content 
of the treaties are of a high moral value that stands ‘above and beyond States’ 
consent to be bound by them.’ Therefore, balancing between naturalism and legal 
positivism, Mégret argues that ‘human rights obligations have a life of their own that 
takes over as soon as States have manifested their initial commitment to be bound. 
(…) States are solemnly committing to something which they were already, at least 
203 C. McCrudden, Chapter 16, Judicial comparativism and human rights, in: E. Örücü and D. Nelken 
(eds.), Comparative law, a handbook, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007.
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morally or philosophically, obliged to recognise.’204 As appealing as this may sound, 
it does not alter the fact that the form in which human rights are formulated is 
that of international treaties which need to be ratified before they enter into force 
between States, whereas the content concerns the primary prerequisites for an 
individual to lead a dignified life. This ‘high moral value’ transcends State borders 
from a lot of perspectives and makes it a global issue. But the legal mechanisms 
that exist in the international arena seem to be – for other valid reasons such as 
the respect for cultural diversity, state sovereignty and the principle of legality 
– incapable of giving human rights a true universal meaning. Therefore, in the 
previous Chapter, I already argued that instead of discussing the possibilities 
or impossibilities of universal human rights, it may be more fruitful to explain 
similarities and differences on the implementation of these human rights between 
legal cultures. This knowledge may be more helpful in building a more coherent 
global human rights system, with a more realistic attitude towards similarities 
and differences, than continuing this debate on the universality of human rights.
3.5.3  The interdependence and indivisibility of human rights and 
State Duties
Although it is often stressed that all human rights are interdependent and 
indivisible, history shows that on a global level civil and political rights were 
developed differently compared to economic, social and cultural rights. As stated 
above,205 due to differences of opinion amongst the UN Member States, the civil 
and political rights on the one hand, and the economic, social and cultural rights 
as declared in the UDHR on the other hand, were introduced in two separate 
treaties: the ICCPR and the ICESCR. While Western countries emphasised the 
civil and political rights, advocating freedom from the State, the socialist countries 
favored the economic, social and cultural rights, considering that freedom is to 
be ensured by an active State providing for basic needs.206 This mindset has led 
to different perceptions of State obligations concerning the two types of rights, or 
even to classifications as ‘generations of rights’, in which the differences, or perhaps 
even a hierarchy between civil and political rights (first generation), economic, 
social and cultural rights (second generation) and sometimes also solidarity rights 
(third generation) is emphasised.207 In this context, civil and political rights are 
traditionally linked to negative State duties to refrain from intervention, and 
204 F. Mégret, Chapter 6, The Nature of state obligations, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), 
D. Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford University Press, 2010.
205 Especially in Section 3.2.
206 A. Eide, in his contribution to: O. Hospes and I. Hadiprayitno (eds.), Governing food security, law, 
policies and the right to food, Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2010, Chapter 4; M. 
Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009, 
Chapter one, Section II, Section 1.13 and 1.16, Section IV, Section 1.48-1.49.
207 For the first time introduced by K. Vasak, Human rights: a thirty-year struggle: the sustained efforts to 
give force of law to the universal declaration of human right, UNESCO Courier 30:11, Paris: United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation 1977.
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economic, social and cultural rights are linked to positive State obligations, in 
which States have a duty to progressively realise the rights concerned. This has 
led to a somewhat undifferentiated view amongst some Member States. They 
assume that civil and political rights require immediate implementation and entail 
enforceable rights, while economic, social and cultural rights leave Member States 
a margin of discretion to progressively realise the rights through policy over time. 
They consider that the latter are not as clearly formulated as civil and political 
rights, and therefore are of a non enforceable nature.208
This view can be questioned not only from a substantive point of view (as will be 
done below), but also based on other historical developments on human rights law. 
In the first place, in UN treaties recognising human rights for specific groups of 
beneficiaries, both civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights are present. In the second place, on a regional level, only in Europe and 
America the choice was made to adopt separate human rights treaties equivalent 
to the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
the Asian Human Rights Charter, and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in 
Islam recognise civil and political rights alongside with economic, social and cultural 
rights.209 So, historically the division between rights is not necessarily a globally 
accepted practice, but it clearly has had extensive consequences. As Ssenyonjo 
puts it: ‘Although the division reflected essentially the contrasting interests of the Cold 
War division between the West and the East, it continues to impact negatively on the 
realisation of ESC rights. This means that any right not considered a ‘first generation’ 
civil or political right is not given the same value by the international community, 
and, as such, violations of ‘lesser’ valued ‘second or third generation’ human rights 
are more tolerated.’210
For decades, the subordination of economic, social and cultural rights to civil 
and political rights is opposed by many scholars211 and UN institutions212 whose 
field of interest contains ECOSOC rights. Through studies and interpretative 
declarations, attempts were made to further clarify the meaning of ECOSOC 
208 In literature, see for instance: P.W.C. Akkermans, C. Bax and L. Verhey, Grondrechten, grondrechten 
en grondrechtsbescherming in Nederland, Heerlen: Kluwer, 2005, especially Sections 3.4 and 3.9.
209 See Section 3.3.3.
210 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Section 1.13.
211 For instance: P. Alston and K. Tomasevski (eds.), The right to food, International Studies in Human 
Rights, Utrecht, 1984; G. Kent, Freedom from want: the human rights to food, Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2005, especially Chapters 4-7; M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in 
international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009, especially part I; F. Vlemminx, Een nieuw profiel van 
de grondrechten, een analyse van de prestatieplichten ingevolge klassieke en sociale grondrechten, Den Haag: 
Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2002b; G. Maes, De afdwingbaarheid van sociale grondrechten, Antwerp: 
Intersentia 2003.
212 See for instance the many reports of the Special Rapporteurs on the right to food and the General 
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Country Reports.
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rights, and to differentiate between the typology of State obligations, in order to 
make the rights ‘more solid law’ and ultimately to facilitate national applicability 
and enforceability as much as possible.213
Rather than civil and political rights implying negative obligations and ECOSOC 
rights implying positive obligations, most UN institutions prefer to apply three 
different types of State Obligations on all sorts of human rights: the duty to respect, 
the duty to protect and the duty to fulfil. A typology that was introduced in the 
early eighties by various authors,214 and applied to the right to food by Asbjørn 
Eide when he introduced this typology in the UN system in his capacity as Special 
Rapporteur.215 The typology is now being used by most UN institutions that deal 
with ECOSOC rights, such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in its General Comments, and the Special Rapporteurs in their reports.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights summarised the State 
duties and applied it for the first time to an ECOSOC right in their General 
Comment 12, regarding the right to food: ‘The obligation to respect existing access to 
adequate food requires State’s parties not to take any measures that result in preventing 
such access. The obligation to protect requires measures by the State to ensure that 
enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food. 
The obligation to fulfil (facilitate) means the State must pro-actively engage in activities 
intended to strengthen people’s access to and utilisation of resources and means to 
ensure their livelihood, including food security. Finally, whenever an individual or 
group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food 
by the means at their disposal, States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right 
directly. This obligation also applies for persons who are victims of natural or other 
disasters.’216 The duty to fulfil is subdivided, as already suggested by Asbjørn Eide,217 
in a duty to facilitate and a duty to provide. In General Comment 15 on the right 
to water, the Committee added a third element to the duty to fulfil – the duty to 
promote – that obliges ‘the State Party to take steps to ensure that there is appropriate 
education concerning hygienic use of water, protection of water sources and methods 
to minimise water wastage.’218 In literature, additional duties are suggested, but 
not widely used in practice, for example the duty to assist, and its counterpart, 
213 G. Kent, Freedom from want: the human rights to food, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2005, Chapter 5.
214 The earliest reference to such a typology found by the author was in various contributions to: P. Alston 
and K. Tomasevski (Eds.), The right to food, International Studies in Human Rights, Utrecht, 1984; see 
especially the contributions of H. Shue: ‘The interdependence of duties,’ and G.J.H. van Hoof: ‘The legal 
nature of economic, social and cultural rights: a rebuttal of some traditional views.’
215 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12, 28 June 1999, Updated study on the right to food, submitted by Mr A. Eide in 
accordance with Sub-Commission decision 1998/106.
216 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 15.
217 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/12, 28 June 1999, Updated study on the right to food, submitted by Mr. Asbjørn Eide 
in accordance with Sub-Commission decision 1998/106, Section 53.
218 E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003, CESCR, General Comment 15, The Right to Water, Section 25.
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the duty to seek and use effectively international assistance in the context of 
international development aid.219
In a traditional explanation, one might conclude that ICCPR rights basically 
imply obligations to respect, and ICESCR rights obligations to fulfil, portraying 
the difference between freedom from the State, and freedom through State actions. 
This typology of duties however opens the possibility to further nuance the State 
obligations when they are applied to the right in both the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
For example, Article 7 ICCPR stipulates that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall 
be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.’ To fully 
realise this right, States should indeed refrain from torturing, but should also 
protect right holders from being tortured by private parties. In addition, the State 
should act to shape the conditions of a torture-free society through the adoption 
and execution of law and policy. In comparison, the Committee demonstrated in 
General Comment 12 that all three obligations are of importance to fully realise 
the right to food.220
This approach can even be further differentiated, as Vlemminx shows us,221 by 
applying positive and negative obligations to all types of State Duties. For instance, 
refraining from torturing is only an effective right if there is a clear law that 
prohibits torturing, and victims from torturing can defend their rights through 
effective juridical remedies. States thus have a duty to provide for this legislation 
and judicial system in order to be able to respect the right. Granting a right holder 
social benefits in order to enable him – or herself to obtain adequate food is from 
a right-based point of view meaningless, if the State can withdraw this benefit 
at any time. The benefits would resemble charity rather than being a right. The 
State should thus abstain from withdrawing the social benefits arbitrarily.
Nuancing this typology of duties may lead to two conclusions. In the first place, 
the fear of many States that right holders could claim that the State has to provide 
them with these rights endlessly – thus creating a disproportional financial burden 
for the State – seems to be unnecessary. The duty to provide is only required when 
all other duties seem to be ineffective, and would normally only be necessary 
as a ‘safety net’.222 This would be perfectly in line with the purpose of a human 
right, as considered in Chapter 1. In the second place, the margin of discretion 
that is implied by progressively realising rights does not exclude the existence of 
219 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Sections 2.56-2.66.
220 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 15.
221 F.M.C. Vlemminx, Een nieuw profiel van de grondrechten, een analyse van de prestatieplichten ingevolge 
klassieke en sociale grondrechten, Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2002b.
222 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 15.
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minimum core obligations that need to be realised immediately, to not deprive 
the treaty Provisions of its ‘raison d’être.’223 Not all duties described above require 
a realisation through policy in the longer term. Some duties imply immediate 
action and specific entitlements, such as the duty to provide in case of emergency.
3.5.4 The meaning of Article 2 (1) ICESCR
It is often understood by States that from Article 2 ICESCR, it follows that the 
substantive rights stipulated in the ICESCR merely imply the duty to progressively 
realise these rights, leaving a wide margin of discretion for the States to choose 
a suitable way to do so, taking into account the specific needs of a country, and 
as a result implying no enforceable rights. The exact wording of Article 2 (1) is: 
‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’ The meaning of 
this Article has been further clarified by the authoritative interpretation of the 
CESCR in their General Comment 3.224
In General, the CESCR observed that too often the differences between Articles 2 
ICCPR225 and 2 ICESCR were emphasised, while there were also similarities between 
the Covenants. Referring to the work of the International Law Commission,226 the 
CESCR argued that the rights embedded in the ICESCR ‘include both what may be 
termed…obligations of conduct and obligations of result.’227 In this understanding, the 
obligation to conduct means ‘to take steps’ to work towards ‘achieving progressively the 
full realisation of the rights’, which might be understood as the obligations of result. 
The Committee argued that the meaning of the phrase ‘to take steps’, especially 
considering its French and Spanish translation – ‘s’engage à agir’ (to act) and ‘a 
adoptar medidas’ (to adopt measures) – at least implies that ‘within a reasonably 
223 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations, especially Section 10.
224 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3: The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations.
225 Article 2 (1) ICCPR stipulates that: ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’
226 The International Law Committee adopted both The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, published in: E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex 
and Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.9 (1989), pp 122-135; and The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 22-26, 1997. Especially in Section 7 of the 
Maastricht Guidelines, the obligations of conduct and result are discussed.
227 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, Section 1; see also: The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 22-26, 1997, Section 7.
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short time after the Covenant’s entry into force’ measures should be taken by the 
State to realise the full implementation that is ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted as 
clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognised in the Covenant.’228 
In other words: doing nothing is a violation of the Covenant. Furthermore, the 
Committee indeed recognises that there is a difference between Article 2 ICCPR, 
requiring immediate recognition of all rights embedded in the ICCPR, and Article 
2 ICESCR, requiring a progressive realisation, in the sense that ICESCR rights ‘will 
generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time.’ On the other hand, it 
can be argued that also elements of the rights embedded in the ICCPR need to be 
progressively realised. As Ssenyonio explains, the guarantee of humane treatment 
in detention, as recognised in Article 10 ICCPR, may require ‘the construction of 
a sufficient number of detention Centres and the development of alternative measures 
to imprisonment…’229 The other way around, it can be defended that the rights 
embedded in the ICESCR do imply obligations that are of a more immediate nature. 
The CESCR argued that the obligation to progressive realisation should ‘not be 
misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content.’ This means that 
the States have the duty to ‘move as expeditiously and effectively as possible’ towards 
full realisation of the ICESCR rights, and ‘any deliberate retrogressive measures in 
that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully 
justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the 
context of the full use of the maximum available resources.’230 The Committee goes 
even further by stating that after careful consideration of the State reports of over 
a decade, ‘it is of the opinion that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon 
every State Party.’231 Failing to achieve this would be a violation of the Covenant. 
According to the Committee, a lack of available resources is no excuse to not 
guarantee these core obligations, unless the State has proven to have undertaken 
every effort, ‘as a matter of priority’ to guarantee these minima. Regarding the right 
to food, the Committee underlined that ‘a State claiming that it is unable to carry out 
its obligations for reasons beyond its control therefore has the burden of proving that 
this is the case and that it has unsuccessfully sought to obtain international support 
to ensure the availability and accessibility of the necessary food.’232 Furthermore, 
the right to food is violated when there exists ‘discrimination in the access to food, 
as well as to means and entitlements for its procurement…with the purpose or effect 
of nullifying or impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of economic, social and 
228 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, Section 2.
229 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Section 2.23.
230 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, Section 9.
231 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations, especially Section 10.
232 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 17.
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cultural rights.’233 Also, the CESCR argued that violations can occur through the 
direct actions of the State, but also through the action of ‘other entities insufficiently 
regulated by States.’234
Summarising, it appears to be the case that the CESCR understands Article 2 
(1) ICESCR in a way that it implies immediate core obligations, obligations of 
conduct that are of an immediate nature in the sense that the State has to start 
immediately with moving towards the final goal, which is the full realisation of 
the Human Right (Figure 3.2).
3.5.5 ECOSOC rights and domestic enforceability
Much has been written about the enforceability of ECOSOC rights in the domestic 
legal orders of the Member States of the treaties that recognise these rights. The 
CESCR discussed the matter frequently, basically by giving their interpretation of 
the phrase ‘by all appropriate means’ as stipulated in Article 2 (1) ICESCR. In this 
context three issues will be discussed. Firstly, the rights must be implemented 
in the domestic legal order. According to the CESCR, this implies secondly that 
effective legal remedies must be ensured to those whose rights are violated; and 
thirdly, the rights must have some juridical effect in the Courts, which is often 
referred to as ‘justiciability’. In their General Comments, the CESCR frequently 
addressed the issue.
With regard to the implementation in the domestic legal order, the CESCR stressed 
that although the ICESCR did not specify how the rights of the Covenant should be 
implemented and that this is up to the States to decide, ‘the means used should be 
appropriate in the sense of producing results which are consistent with the full discharge 
233 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 18.
234 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 19.
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Figure 3.2. State obligations regarding ECOSOC rights.
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of its obligations by the State Party.’235 The CESCR observed that the ICESCR Member 
States use various approaches in their implementation of the CESCR. According 
to an analysis of the CESCR, some States did not do anything to implement 
the Covenant, other States adjusted their domestic legislation to implement the 
Covenant, but did not invoke the specific treaty Provisions, and yet again other 
States did incorporate the ICESCR in their domestic law by ‘giving formal validity 
in the national legal order’ to the Covenant.236 The last two approaches pretty much 
resemble a dualistic and a monistic approach towards the effect of international 
law in the domestic legal order. Although one might ask whether the CESCR 
should form an authoritative legal interpretation of the Constitutional form of its 
Member States, the CESCR expressed their preference for a monistic approach, 
because ‘direct incorporation avoids problems that might arise in the translation of 
treaty obligations into national law, and provides a basis for the direct invocation of 
the Covenant rights by individuals in national Courts.’237 Furthermore, ‘whatever 
the preferred methodology’, the CESCR argued that the means used by the State 
to implement the Covenant must be ‘adequate to ensure the obligations under the 
Covenant’. The CESCR underlined that ‘The need to ensure justiciability…is relevant 
when determining the best way to give domestic legal effect to the Covenant rights.’238 
Furthermore, the CESCR argued that it was the responsibility of the State to use 
the means ‘which have proved to be most effective in the country concerned in ensuring 
the protection of other human rights.’239 If a country would choose to use significant 
different methods to ensure the ICESCR rights compared to other human rights 
instruments, the country should justify these differences.240
Concerning the need for effective juridical remedies, the CESCR underlined that 
Article 8 UDHR stipulates that ‘everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
the Constitution or by law.’ The Committee argued that those countries who were 
also Member State to the ICCPR already obliged to ensure an effective remedy 
for persons whose rights or freedoms are violated under inter alia Article 2 (3) 
(b) ICCPR, and that despite the fact that the ICESCR had no counterpart to this 
Provision, the phrase ‘all appropriate means’ in Article 2 (1) ICESCR would imply 
‘the Provision of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance with 
235 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 5.
236 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 6.
237 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 8.
238 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 7.
239 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 7.
240 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 7.
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the national legal system, be considered justiciable.’ The CESCR warned that a State 
that failed to provide these legal remedies, would have to demonstrate that these 
remedies were not ‘appropriate means’ or ‘unnecessary’, and added that ‘it will be 
difficult to show this and the Committee considers that, in many cases, the other “means” 
used could be rendered ineffective if they are not reinforced or complemented by judicial 
means.’241 According to the CESCR, an effective remedy does not necessarily 
need to be a judicial remedy per se: administrative remedies for instance might 
also be adequately effective, as long as they are ‘accessible, affordable, timely and 
effective’, although the possibility to finally appeal to a Court is favoured by the 
Committee.242
Having the right to juridical remedies is not very useful if the rights under dispute 
cannot be invoked. Therefore, the CESCR stressed the importance of justiciability 
of ICESCR rights. The Committee held that ‘In relation to civil and political rights, 
it is generally taken for granted that judicial remedies for violations are essential. 
Regrettably, the contrary assumption is too often made in relation to economic, social 
and cultural rights. This discrepancy is not warranted either by the nature of the rights 
or by the relevant Covenant Provisions.’ In this light, the CESCR underlined that ‘there 
is no Covenant right which could not, in the great majority of systems, be considered to 
possess at least some significant justiciable dimensions.’ The Committee distinguished 
justiciability, meaning that a matter can be properly resolved by a Court, from 
self-executing, meaning that a Provision can be applied by a Court ‘without further 
elaboration.’243 Regarding the latter, the Committee considered that: ‘The Covenant 
does not negate the possibility that the rights it contains may be considered self-executing 
in systems where that option is provided for. Indeed, when it was being drafted, attempts 
to include a specific Provision in the Covenant to the effect that it be considered “non-
self-executing” were strongly rejected. In most States, the determination of whether or 
not a treaty Provision is self-executing will be a matter for the Courts, not the executive 
or the Legislature. In order to perform that function effectively, the relevant Courts and 
tribunals must be made aware of the nature and implications of the Covenant and of 
the important role of judicial remedies in its implementation. Thus, for example, when 
Governments are involved in Court proceedings, they should promote interpretations of 
domestic laws which give effect to their Covenant obligations. Similarly, judicial training 
should take full account of the justiciability of the Covenant. It is especially important 
to avoid any a priori assumption that the standards should be considered to be non-
241 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 3.
242 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 9.
243 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 10. The exact phrase was: ‘It is important in this regard to distinguish between justiciability 
(which refers to those matters which are appropriately resolved by the Courts) and standards which are self-
executing (capable of being applied by Courts without further elaboration). While the general approach of each 
legal system needs to be taken into account, there is no Covenant right which could not, in the great majority 
of systems, be considered to possess at least some significant justiciable dimensions.’
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self-executing. In fact, many of them are stated in terms which are at least as clear and 
specific as those in other human rights treaties, the Provisions of which are regularly 
deemed by Courts to be self-executing.’It is unclear to what end the Committee made 
the distinction between justiciable and self-executing rights. However, it is my 
understanding that the CESCR here expresses that some ICESCR Provisions, or 
elements of the rights they recognised, can have an direct effect when they are 
invoked because the right is self-executing. A possibility that is greatly depending 
on the Constitutional structure of a State, and the considerations of the national 
Courts. Justiciability on the other hand, can have a broader meaning, in the sense 
that ICESCR Provisions when invoked in Court can somehow be used by the 
Courts as a guideline or a direction for their verdict. It is however clear that the 
CESCR considers at least some Provisions to be self-executing, considering that 
‘many of them are stated in terms which are at least as clear and specific as those in 
other human rights treaties, the Provisions of which are regularly deemed by Courts 
to be self-executing.’244 The Committee listed ‘by way of example’,245 and thus not 
exhaustively, some ICESCR Provisions that ‘would seem to be capable of immediate 
application by judicial and other organs in many national legal systems.’246 These 
Provisions are: 3, 7 (a) (i), 8, 10 (3), 13 (2) (a), (3) and (4), and 15 (3) ICESCR. The 
Committee underlined that it deemed arguments that would indicate that these 
Provisions were not self-executing ‘difficult to sustain.’247
In addition, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 9 and 13, the CESCR, but also 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child and The Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women, frequently address the issue of enforceability 
when assessing the submitted country reports, stating that the treaties should 
be enforceable in the domestic Courts. During the reporting cycles however, the 
enforceability of the treaty standards is discussed in general, and mostly not per 
Article.
3.5.6 The right to food and domestic enforceability
In General Comment 12, the CESCR expressed its authoritative legal interpretation 
of the right to food, as recognised in Article 11 ICESCR. According to the Committee, 
in implementing the right ‘every State will have a margin of discretion, in choosing 
its own approaches, but the Covenant clearly requires that each State Party will take 
whatever steps are necessary to ensure that everyone is free from hunger and as soon 
244 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 11.
245 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 10.
246 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, Section 5.
247 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, Section 5.
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as possible can enjoy the right to adequate food.’248 Therefore, ‘a national strategy to 
ensure food and nutrition security for all’, is required.249 Also, the CESCR stressed 
that States should set ‘verifiable benchmarks for subsequent national and international 
monitoring’, and, in this connection, ‘States should consider the adoption of a framework 
law as a major instrument in the implementation of the national strategy concerning 
the right to food.’250 In addition, States ‘shall develop and maintain mechanisms to 
monitor progress towards the realisation of the right to adequate food for all…’.251
Article 11 ICESCR was not amongst the Articles listed by the CESCR in General 
Comment 3,252 and later quoted in General Comment 9,253 that were considered 
to be self-executing. Since this list was provided ‘by way of example’, this does 
not automatically mean that Article 11, or some of its elements, cannot be self-
executing or justiciable. On this, the CESCR is not so specific. The Committee 
reaffirms in the specific context of the right to food the requirement of ‘effective 
judicial or other appropriate remedies’, and stresses that victims of a violation of 
the right should be entitled to ‘adequate reparation.’254 The CESCR also argued 
that domestic incorporation of international instruments recognising the right to 
food ‘can significantly enhance the scope and effectiveness of remedial measures…’. 
And: ‘Courts would then be empowered to adjudicate violations of the core content of 
the right to food by direct reference to obligations under the Covenant.’255 As it seems, 
the CESCR is somewhat cautious to hold that the right to food is self-executing. 
On the one hand, the Committee argues that victims of a violation of the right to 
food should have effective juridical means and should be compensated, which 
suggests that the right to food does play some juridical role in such situations. On 
the other hand, the CESCR encourages States to further implement the right, so 
that Courts will be empowered to directly refer to the ICESCR Provisions in their 
verdicts, which might suggest that the right is self-executing without the need 
for further implementation. As it appears, the CESCR tries to balance between 
stressing that the right to food as such is a justiciable right in the sense that it can 
play some role in Court cases – respecting the State’s margin of discretion – and 
urging States to implement the right so that it can become self-executing.
The former Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, in his reports 
strongly supported the content of General Comment 12, and even considered 
248 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 21.
249 The CESCR’s view on such a strategy is further elaborated in Sections 21-28, E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 
1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food.
250 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 29.
251 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 31.
252 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, Section 5.
253 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 10.
254 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 32.
255 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 33.
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that the principles set out in this General Comment should be adopted in binding 
legal standards.256 He was of the opinion that ‘achieving justiciability of the right 
to food is a prime objective of the Special Rapporteur.’257 Therefore, he defended the 
position that the right to food is a justiciable right in somewhat stronger words, 
emphasising the equality between Civil and Political Rights on the one hand, and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in nature and justiciability on the other 
hand. In this light, the enforcement mechanisms of ECOSOC Rights should equal 
those of Civil and Political Rights.258 Ziegler strongly opposed the view of some 
Western countries that ECOSOC rights would not be justiciable because of its very 
nature. Ziegler summarised this view, developed somewhere during the Cold War 
period, by portraying four arguments to deny justiciability of these rights: ‘firstly, 
the right to food was imprecise; secondly, the right to food was subject to the limit of 
progressive realisation; thirdly, the right to food required resources to be provided; 
and fourthly, that, in the absence of precise national legislation on the right to food, 
it was difficult for the Judiciary to fill the gap that properly belonged to the legislative 
branch of the State.’259 Ziegler opposed these arguments by stating that the right to 
food was actually quite precise, considering the wording of Article 11 ICESCR.260 
Furthermore, he reminded that there are limits to the application of the concept 
of progressive realisation as demonstrated by the CESCR in its General Comment 
12,261 and that minimum core obligations existed, as demonstrated in General 
Comment 3.262 He argued furthermore that the obligation of non-discrimination 
is not subject to the limitation of progressive realisation.263 Ziegler opposed to 
the view that the realisation of the right to food only required resources to be 
provided, by supporting the more differentiated typology of State duties, widely 
used in the UN system.264 Finally, Ziegler explained that there were examples 
in a number of countries in which ECOSOC rights could be invoked in Courts, 
quoting the case of ‘Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Irene Grootboom and 
256 E/CN.4/2001/53, 7 February 2001, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 91.
257 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 30.
258 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Sections 32-34.
259 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 35.
260 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 38.
261 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 39.
262 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Sections 40, 42-43.
263 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 41.
264 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Sections 44-45.
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others’.265 In this light, he referred to General Comment 9,266 in which the CESCR 
argued that putting ECOSOC rights beyond the reach of the Courts is ‘arbitrary 
and incomparable with the principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible 
and interdependent.’267 Taking this all into consideration, he concluded that ‘the 
right to food can be considered as justiciable by its very nature, and is therefore equal 
to civil and political rights.’268 Zieglers successor, Olivier de Schutter, also strongly 
expressed the view that the right to food should be a justiciable right, and argued 
that states should adopt a framework legislation ‘ensuring that the right to food is 
justiciable before national Courts or that other forms of redress are available…’ The 
obligations implied by the right to food were then more precisely formulated, 
which would encourage ‘Courts or other monitoring mechanisms, such as the human 
rights institutions…to contribute to ensure compliance with the right to food.’269
It must however be noted that in other UN related institutions in which a more 
intergovernmental decision-making procedure is maintained, and mostly decisions 
are based on unanimous consent between the participating countries, there is 
a more cautious approach towards the enforceability of the right to food. These 
decisions are often made in the above introduced ‘second pillar’ in which the 
FAO hosted the World Food summits, and the resulting Voluntary Guidelines. In 
no WFS declaration, the enforceability of the right to food is mentioned, or the 
nature of the right in terms of self-executing or justiciability is recognised. The 
voluntary Guidelines do reaffirm the typology of duties in which a Country has to 
respect, protect and fulfil the right to food,270 but concerning the implementation 
of the right rather cautiously ‘invite’ states ‘to consider…whether to include Provisions 
in their domestic law (…) that facilitates the progressive realisation on the right to 
food in the context of national food security’271, or ‘to include Provisions…to directly 
implement the progressive realisation of the right to food.’272 It is obvious that ‘inviting 
to consider to include Provisions to’ is not the same as ‘having an obligation to’273 
265 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Sections 47-48.
266 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 37.
267 E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 10.
268 E/CN.4/2002/58, 10 January 2002, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Section 49.
269 A/HRC/9/23, 8 September 2008, O. de Schutter, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food to 
the Human Rights Council, Section 18.
270 The voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context 
of national food security, adopted by the 127th session of the FAO Council, November 2004, Section 17.
271 The voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of 
national food security, adopted by the 127th session of the FAO Council, November 2004, guideline 7.1.
272 The voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context 
of national food security, adopted by the 127th session of the FAO Council, November 2004, guideline 7.2.
273 As demonstrated above, a position defended by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the Special Rapporteurs on the Right to food.
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implement the right to food. Regarding the enforceability of the right to food through 
juridical remedies, the guidelines stipulate that ‘administrative, quasi-juridical and 
judicial mechanisms to provide adequate, effective and prompt remedies accessible, in 
particular, to Members of vulnerable groups may be envisaged.’274 And: ‘States that 
have established a right to adequate food under their legal system should inform the 
general public of all available rights and remedies to which they are entitled.’275 Also 
here, it is clear that ‘remedies may be envisaged’ and ‘inform the public of remedies 
to which they are entitled’ is not the same as ‘the right to food is justiciable before 
national Courts’276 or ‘effective judicial or other appropriate remedies are required.’277 
Of course one must not forget that the purpose of the Voluntary Guidelines is to 
give practical guidance to countries on how to implement the right to food in its 
domestic legal order, and not an authoritative legal interpretation of the right to 
food. Especially different opinions on the matter of clear State obligations and 
accountability mechanisms were cause for stiff and harsh negotiations, even 
ending up in a negotiation breakdown. The Special Rapporteur, emphasising a 
right-based approach regarding the Voluntary Guidelines earlier,278 strongly voiced 
his disappointment about ‘the strong resistance of some other Governments, from 
developed and the developing world, which worked hard to water down the language 
of the text on the political and legal obligations implied by the right to adequate food. 
Many phrases are rendered almost meaningless by the number of caveats introduced 
by non-committal language, especially in relation to accountability.’279 Later however, 
the Special Rapporteur showed more positivism, perhaps due to the agreement of 
better objectives elsewhere in the final text, or perhaps due to a realisation that 
there would be no better outcome considering the difficult negotiation process. 
The Special Rapporteur on the Right to food hailed the final outcome of the ‘ground 
breaking’ Voluntary Guidelines due to the fact that inter alia the right to food was 
now defined by one worldwide definition, included the obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil, the right to food was addressed in an international dimension, 
the responsibility of Non-State actors was underlined, and practical guidance was 
given on the implementation and accountability aspects of the right.280
274 The voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context 
of national food security, adopted by the 127th session of the FAO Council, November 2004, guideline 7.2.
275 The voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context 
of national food security, adopted by the 127th session of the FAO Council, November 2004, guideline 7.3.
276 In the line of reasoning of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food Mr J. Ziegler.
277 In the line of reasoning of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General 
Comment 12.
278 E/CN.4/2003/54, 10 January 2003, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Chapter I, especially Section 24.
279 A/59/385, 27 September 2004, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food to the 
General Assembly, Chapter III.
280 E/CN.4/2005/47, 24 January 2005, J. Ziegler, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Chapter IV.
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3.5.7 Reservations
Reservations are allowed under international law,281 although there is tension 
between the idea of human rights as natural law with a universal working, and 
the very rich use by States of reservations to human rights treaties. It could also 
very well be that the goal of striving for the highest number of Member States 
to a human rights treaty as possible in the urge to promote human rights in the 
widest possible way, could lead to easier acceptance of reservations.282 In this 
light, the International Court of Justice considered, contrary to the usual approach 
regarding an international treaty, that to a certain extent a reservation to a human 
rights treaty, even if other States Countries object to this reservation, cannot 
exclude the Party from that treaty.283 In addition, it is questionable whether State 
Parties are willing to object on one another’s reservations,284 due to the fact that 
the reservation of one State has no or limited effect on the other285 or, perhaps 
even more likely, out of political motives.286 This is clearly demonstrated by the 
reluctance of States to make use of existing State communications procedures 
under human rights treaties.287 It is also broadly accepted that a new international 
human rights treaty will enter into force if its meets the requirement of the agreed 
number of ratifications, even if the ratifying countries have adopted reservations 
to the treaty.288 Of course the aim to spread human rights as widely as possible 
through the world is an admirable one, but it must be noted that the approach 
mentioned above does not stimulate Member States to ratify international human 
rights treaties without reservations, or to withdraw existing reservations.
Considering the practice sketched above and the human rights nature of the 
treaties, the Member States will not be the ones to judge whether reservations 
are in conformity with the human rights treaty in question. The treaty bodies, 
281 See Articles 19-23 of the Vienna Covenant on the Law of Treaties, adopted on 23 May 1966, entered 
into force on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.
282 F. Mégret, Chapter 6, The Nature of State Obligations, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), 
D. Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
283 International Court of Justice, advisory opinion of 28 May 1951, Reservations to the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
284 A possibility that is recognised in Article 20 (5) of the Vienna Covenant on the Law of Treaties, 
adopted on 23 May 1966, entered into force on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, p. 331: ‘a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection 
to the reservation or by the end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the 
date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.’
285 F. Mégret, Chapter 6, The nature of state obligations, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), D. 
Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
286 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Section 1.65.
287 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Section 1.65.
288 F. Mégret, Chapter 6, The nature of state obligations, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), D. 
Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
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which – among others things – receive and comment to the State reports, seem 
to be the ones most capable to do so. Perhaps from a ‘normal’ international law 
point of view the treaty bodies’ authority to do so can be discussed, since it would 
normally be up to the other State Parties of an international treaty to value a State’s 
reservation.289 However, the treaty bodies indeed started to discuss the reservations 
made by the Member States during the reporting procedure. As it appears, the 
treaty bodies usually choose to diplomatically and carefully address the issue 
of Reservations.290 The soft approach might be explained by the rather limited 
accounting mechanisms that exist on human rights law, or perhaps the fear that 
by condemning ratifications in a too harsh way, the State might withdraw from the 
entire treaty.291 There is little coordination amongst the treaty bodies on how to 
respond to reservations. Regarding the ICESCR, the question of reservations has 
not been dealt with into detail by the CESCR, and therefore, Ssenyonjo rightfully 
urges the CESCR to adopt a General Comment on the matter.292 But with or 
without a coordinated and clear approach towards reservations, it may come to 
no surprise that it is the general view of the treaty bodies that Member States 
should strive for the ratification of human rights treaties without any reservations.
There are various motivations for a State to make a reservation to a human 
rights treaty. As Frédéric Mégret observes ‘A typical reservation is one whereby a 
state purports to interpret an internationally protected right only in accordance with 
its domestic, often Constitutional or religious, law.’293 As will be demonstrated in 
especially Chapters 9 and 13, both the Netherlands and Belgium made this kind 
of reservations to international human rights treaties containing ECOSOC rights.
However, Article 19 (c) of the Vienna Covenant on the Law of Treaties prohibits 
as a general rule reservations that are not in compliance with the object and the 
purpose of the Treaty.294 Similar Provisions are enshrined in most human rights 
treaties, except for, remarkably, the ICESCR.295 The prohibition of a reservation 
that is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty seems a difficult 
to interpret rule due to its general wording, although it suggests at least that a 
reservation should not affect the raison d’être of a treaty.
289 See for a more detailed explanation: M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international 
law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009, Sections 5.15-5.23.
290 As will be considered into more detail in Chapters 9 and 13.
291 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Section 5.21.
292 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Section 5.05-5.05.
293 F. Mégret, Chapter 6, The nature of state obligations, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), D. 
Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
294 Article 19 (c), Vienna Covenant on the Law of Treaties, adopted on 23 May 1966, entered into force 
on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.
295 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Section 5.08-5.13.
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3.5.8 Reporting procedures
Usually, a body of experts is installed for each UN human rights treaty in order 
to monitor the implementation of the treaty in the domestic legal orders of its 
Member States. Generally, the competences of these bodies are inter alia to receive 
and consider the periodic reports submitted by the Member States on the progress 
that was made on the implementation of the right enshrined in the treaty, and 
to recommend on the interpretation of the Provisions.
All States have the obligation to submit a general ‘Core Document’ that should 
contain ‘information of a general and factual nature relating to the implementation 
of the treaties to which the reporting State is party and which may be of relevance 
to all or several treaty bodies.’296 The States also submit treaty-specific reports, 
starting with an initial report, which should mostly be submitted within one year 
after ratification of the treaty, and from then on periodic reports, in which the 
State reports ‘on the measures, including legislative, judicial, administrative or other 
measures, which they have adopted in order to achieve the enjoyment of the rights 
recognised in the treaty.’297
The usual report cycle starts with the submission of the State Report. The report is 
then considered by the competent Committee that usually sends a ‘List of Issues’ to 
the Member State, containing questions about the report, or requests for additional 
data. The Member State concerned will then answer to these written questions 
and requests by submitting formal ‘replies to List of Issues’. After this, the Member 
State sends a Delegation to the Committee, usually seated in Geneva once a year, 
and discusses the report with the Committee in a ‘constructive dialogue’ during a 
couple of sessions. Summaries of these sessions are usually published under the 
name ‘Summary Record’. Finally, although this was not a general practice during the 
earlier reporting cycles,298 the Committee submits a final document on the report 
containing Concluding Observations, in which the Committee usually highlights the 
‘positive aspects’ of the reporting cycle, names the ‘factors and difficulties impeding the 
implementation of the Covenant’, and expresses its ‘principal subjects of concern and 
suggestions and recommendations’. These Concluding Observations may then serve 
as a guideline for the further implementation of the rights enshrined in the treaty 
in the upcoming reporting period. Increasingly, there is a role for NGOs during 
this process, which can sometimes formally submit so-called ‘shadow-reports’ to 
the treaty bodies, in which the NGOs report on the implementation of the human 
rights that are discussed from their point of view. Also, NGO representatives are 
sometimes present during or even participate in the dialogue between the State 
296 HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, 3 June 2009, Compilation of guidelines on the form and content of reports to be 
submitted by State Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, Section 27.
297 HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, 3 June 2009, Compilation of guidelines on the form and content of reports to be 
submitted by State Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, Section 2.
298 For instance, the CESCR started to submit Concluding Observations to State Reports since 1992.
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Delegation and the Treaty Body. Since 2000, increasingly, committees started to 
appoint one or two of their Members as a country rapporteur, who prepare(s) 
the List of Issues, receive(s) information from NGOs, and lead(s) the sessions on 
behalf of the Committee.299
In general, States that ratified most UN human rights treaties have a very extensive 
reporting duty, which often leads to delay in the submission of the reports.300 To 
facilitate timely submission of periodic reports, the UN Treaty Bodies attempted 
to harmonise the treaty-specific reporting guidelines.301
Under Articles 16 and 17 ICESCR, Member States have the obligation to submit 
periodic reports ‘on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made’ 
in achieving the ICESCR rights. Article 16 ICESCR authorises the ECOSOC to 
consider these reports, and thus no specific treaty body was installed. However, 
the ECOSOC did install the CESCR to assist in their task,302 and in practice, the 
CESCR receives and considers these periodic reports submitted by the Member 
States. In their General Comment 1, the CESCR further clarified the reporting 
objectives.303 Furthermore, they adopted reporting guidelines to ‘advise States 
Parties on the form and content of their reports, so as to facilitate the preparation of 
reports and ensure that reports are comprehensive and presented in a uniform manner 
by States Parties.’304 The States are requested to submit an initial report within two 
years after ratification, and from then on a periodic report every five years.305
More or less comparable reporting procedures exist under the ICRC and the 
CEDAW. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, installed directly by Article 
43 ICRC, overviews the reporting procedure on the implementation of the ICRC. 
The Member States are obliged to submit an initial report within two years after 
ratification and from then on a periodic report every five years (Art. 44 ICRC). The 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, installed directly 
by Article 17 CEDAW, overviews the reporting procedure on the implementation 
of the CEDAW. The Member States are obliged to submit an initial report within 
299 See for instance regarding the CESCR: E/C.12/2000/6, 7 July 2000, Substantive issues arising in the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Section II C. See also 
the working methods of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, available via: http://www2.ohchr.
org/english/bodies/crc/workingmethods.htm.
300 This is certainly the case with the Netherlands and Belgium, as discussed in Chapters 9 and 13.
301 HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6, 3 June 2009, Compilation of guidelines on the form and content of reports to be 
submitted by State Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties.
302 Economic and Social Council Resolution 1985/17, 28 May 1985.
303 E/1989/22, annex III at 87 (1989), 24 February 1989, CESCR, General Comment 1, Reporting by States 
parties.
304 E/C.12/2008/2, 24 March 2009, Guidelines on treaty-specific documents to be submitted under Articles 
16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
305 Economic and Social Council Resolution 1988/4, 24 May 1988, Section 6.
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one year after ratification and from then on a periodic report every four years 
(Art. 18 CEDAW).
The effect of these reporting procedures ha been debated more than once. One 
might argue that through reporting and the subsequent debate with the various UN 
Committees and the more recent involvement of NGOs, human rights violations 
might be exposed, and through naming and shaming a contribution can be made to 
improve the implementation of human rights in a country.306 On the other hand, 
one might consider the reporting systems to be weak. Firstly, the supervising bodies 
lack the power to make real changes, since these bodies are fully depending on the 
willingness of the Member States to cooperate, whereas their General Comments 
are hardly binding. Secondly, there are hardly any possibilities to complain about 
violations of human rights of an individual or a group through an international 
legal remedy in a monitoring system.
3.5.9 Complaint mechanisms
Part of a monitoring/accountability mechanism, the originally foreseen third step 
in the establishment of a global human rights mechanism, could be the installation 
of complaint procedures. In human rights treaties, a monitoring procedure is 
usually embedded, but a complaint mechanism is not always integrated,307 and is 
often installed much later through an Optional Protocol, usually preceded by long 
and difficult negotiations. For instance, the ICESCR entered into force in 1976, but 
only since 1990, attempts were made by the Committee to formulate an Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR.308 These attempts did not lead to the desired outcome, 
mostly due to a lack of response and cooperation of States.309 Therefore, on the 
advice of the independent expert Professor Hatem Kotrane,310 the Commission on 
Human Rights installed the Open-ended Working Group on the OP-ICESCR some 
years later in 2002,311 whose mandate was extended in 2006.312 Their first draft of 
306 See for instance the contribution to the preface by Kenneth Roth, at the moment of writing Executive 
Director of Human Rights Watch, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), D. Harris (cons. ed.), 
International human rights law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
307 Although in for instance Article 41-43 ICCPR a (voluntary) State complaints procedure is embedded.
308 See for instance E/CN.4/1997/105, 18 December 1996, Draft Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.
309 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009, 
especially Sections 1.57-1.58.
310 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/30, 20 April 2002.
311 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2002/24, 22 April 2002.
312 A/HRC/1/L.10, 29 June 2006, Human Rights Council Resolution 2006/3.
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an Optional Protocol was finished in 2007.313 The General Assembly adopted the 
finalized Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in 2008,314 containing three procedures. 
Firstly, ‘communications…by or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, 
under the jurisdiction of a State Party, claiming to be a victim of a violation of any 
of the…rights set forth in the Covenant by that State Party’ may be submitted.315 
Secondly, a procedure for ‘communications’ from Member States ‘that claim that 
another State Party is not fulfiling its obligations under the Covenant’ is embedded 
in the Protocol.316 Thirdly, an inquiry procedure was adopted, authorising the 
Committee to examine alleged violations of the ICESCR ‘if the Committee receives 
reliable information indicating grave or systematic violations by a State Party of any 
of the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant.’317 At the time 
of writing, the protocol had 42 signatories of whom 10 Member States actually 
ratified,318 which is exactly the number of ratifications necessary to enter into force, 
which took place on 5 May 2013.319 The structure of an individual communications 
procedure, an inter-State communications procedure and an inquiry procedure 
is widely used for Optional Protocols to UN human rights treaties, for instance 
in the Optional Protocols to the CEDAW and the ICRC. The Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women is the competent body to receive 
complaints under the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW,320 and the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child will be the competent body to receive complaints under 
the Optional Protocol to the ICRC on a communications procedure when 10 States 
have ratified the Protocol.321 It is for this research relevant to know that at the 
time of writing, the Netherlands and Belgium signed the Optional Protocol to 
313 A/HRC/6/WG.4/2, 23 April 2007, draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; A/HRC/8/WG.4/2, 24 December 2007, revised draft Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; A/HRC/8/WG.4/3, 25 March 
2008, (second) revised draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.
314 A/RES/63/117, 10 December 2008, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly.
315 A/RES/63/117, 10 December 2008, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly, Articles 2-9.
316 A/RES/63/117, 10 December 2008, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly, Articles 10-14.
317 A/RES/63/117, 10 December 2008, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly, Articles 11-12.
318 See for an official overview of signatories, accessions and ratifications of all UN human rights treaties: 
http:/treaties.un.org.
319 A/RES/63/117, 10 December 2008, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, adopted by the General Assembly, Article 18.
320 A/RES/54/4, 15 October 1999, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women.
321 A/RES/66/138, 27 January 2012, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure, Article 19. See the preparatory work: A/HRC/17/36, 16 May 2011, Report of 
the Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to 
provide a communications procedure, annex (Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child to provide a communications procedure). See Article 19 for the entry into force Provision. 
At the moment of writing, 37 States signed, while only 6 had ratified the Protocol.
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the ICESCR, signed and ratified the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW, and only 
Belgium signed the Optional Protocol to the ICRC.
Considering the legal practice, there is little experience in the effect of individual 
complaints concerning ECOSOC rights so far, and there is little enthusiasm amongst 
States to ratify these procedures. Inter-State procedures are rarely used, which could 
be explained by several reasons. Firstly, the nature of human rights may play a 
role: basically, human rights establish a legal relationship between an individual 
and a State, and not primarily between States. This may explain the reluctance 
to complain about another State’s behaviour when the individuals whose rights 
are violated do not fall within the State’s own jurisdiction.322 Another explanation 
could be of a more political nature. When one State complains about the behaviour 
of another State, the complaining State might fear retaliation complaints about 
its own behaviour.323
3.6 Conclusion
This section shows that since World War II, considerable but also difficult progress 
was made to develop the right to food in the international human rights arena, which 
involved many actors who, from their different perspectives and out of different 
expertise contributed to this. Three pillars can be distinguished to categorise the 
work that has been done to further clarify the right to food, especially in view 
of Article 11 ICESCR: the first pillar is the work done by the treaty bodies, such 
as the CESCR. The second pillar is the work done within FAO context, which 
includes the World Food Summits and the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines. 
The third pillar is the work done in the context of the Human Rights Council, 
basically involving the works of the Special Rapporteurs.
The right to food is not an isolated human right, but inextricably linked to other 
human rights and therefore broadly embedded in the international and regional 
human rights instruments. Regarding the status of enforceability of the right to 
food, there is a need to thoroughly analyse the respective case law per country, 
in their proper Constitutional context, as will be done in this research regarding 
the Netherlands and Belgium.
As it appears, the content of the right to food is often discussed in the context of 
developing countries. The relevant articles and explanatory documents written 
in UN context seem to offer enough guidance to at least come to a minimum 
specification of what ‘adequate food’ means as a substantive right.
322 F. Mégret, Chapter 6, Section 7, The nature of obligations, in: D. Moeckli, S. Shah, S. Sivakumaran (eds.), 
D. Harris (cons. ed.), International human rights law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
323 M. Ssenyonjo, Economic, social and cultural rights in international law, Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2009, Section 1.65.
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In this light, notwithstanding the fact that the realisation of human rights is a 
responsibility for all, the international human rights system addresses States to 
realise human rights. There is tension between the concept of universality of human 
rights on the one hand, and State sovereignty implying a free choice to be bound 
by treaties, and to how the treaties should be implemented on the other hand.
The traditional distinction made between civil and political rights on the one hand, 
implying negative state obligations, and economic, social and cultural rights on 
the other hand, implying positive state obligations has been criticised for decades 
now. There are many valid arguments to oppose to such a distinction both from a 
practical point of view and from a legal theoretical perspective. Instead, a typology 
of duties applied to all human rights seems to do more justice to the meaning 
of human rights. Such a typology consists of a duty to respect, protect and fulfil. 
It demonstrates that ECOSOC rights do not leave States an undefined margin of 
discretion in the realisation of these rights.
According to the CESCR, Article 2 ICESCR implies that there is a minimum core 
obligation regarding ECOSOC rights, which requires immediate realisation. In 
addition, there are immediate obligations of conduct to move as expeditiously 
and effectively as possible towards the full realization of the right. Ultimately, 
this is an obligation of result. This suggests thus that States that do nothing 
or little to implement the rights also violate the Convention. Also, the CESCR 
underlined that discrimination in the access to food constitutes a direct violation 
of the ICESCR. Furthermore, the phrasing ‘by all appropriate means’ implies the 
Provision of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance 
with the national legal system, be considered justiciable.
It is difficult to establish whether in the UN context the right to food is unanimously 
considered to be an enforceable right, and if so, what it exactly means, for the 
UN can hardly be considered to be one single entity speaking with one voice. In 
general, no evidence could be found that immediate obligations of conduct are 
enforceable. The discussion on enforceability focuses more on the States’ core 
obligations. While the CESCR did not put Article 11 ICESCR on their list of Provisions 
that would by nature be self-executing rights in their General Comments 3 and 9, 
it seems to consider in General Comment 12, with some more caution, that the 
implementation of the right to food implies the requirement of effective judicial or 
other appropriate means. Furthermore, the Committee had stressed in general that 
putting ECOSOC rights beyond the reach of Courts is arbitrary and incomparable 
with the principle that human rights are indivisible and interdependent, and 
seems to emphasise this consistently in their assessment of submitted country 
reports. The Special Rapporteurs on the right to food however, are much more 
specific in their viewpoints. For instance, Ziegler argued that a core content of 
the right to food is certainly justiciable, and, in line with the CESCR, underlines 
that non-discrimination does not fall under the scope of progressive realisation, 
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suggesting that discrimination could be dealt with directly by national Courts. 
On the other hand, in the UN fora in which intergovernmental decision-making 
procedures are used, the enforceability seems to be hardly supported.
The latter is also reflected in the lack of sincerity of Countries ratifying human 
rights treaties, considering the rich use of the possibilities to make reservations to 
human rights treaties. It is hard for treaty bodies to oppose to these ratifications, 
due to a lack of binding power. The same can be said of the various reporting 
procedures that are part of the monitoring systems for the human rights treaties. 
Although the treaty bodies usually recommend on the reports, and more generally 
adopt General Comments on the interpretation of the rights enshrined in these 
treaties, the bodies lack the power to seriously change a State’s behaviour if the 
State is not cooperative. To this end, complaint procedures have been established 
to the various human rights instruments. However, there is reluctance amongst 
States to ratify these procedures, and actually make use of them. The system 
through which these human rights are developed thus strongly depends on the 
willingness of countries to be successful, and countries are not easily prepared 
to give up sovereignty. This tension causes a problem that is difficult to solve 
regarding the realisation of international human rights, and leaves the hope for 
effective and enforceable human rights in the hands of the domestic Courts.
To conclude, and come to a tertium comparationis, it seems thus that the specialised 
bodies of the UN, basically the CESCR and the Special Rapporteurs, consider 
with sound arguments that ‘the right to food and ECOSOC rights in general can be 
understood to imply immediate state obligations that should be enforceable through 
domestic Courts. There seems to be at least a core content, consisting of a minimum 
substance without whom the right would be stripped of its raison d’être, and a non-
discrimination principle, that should be justiciable, or even self-executing’. However, 
it is questionable whether this view is largely shared amongst the Member States 
of the UN, considering their behaviour in the intergovernmental decision-making 
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4.  Dutch case law on the enforceability of 
the right to adequate food
4.1 Introduction
In general, it must be concluded that no evidence could be found that there are 
differences of any significance between the case law of the Courts on the one 
hand, and the administrative tribunals on the other hand, regarding the direct 
applicability of the right to food, or other ECOSOC standards. Furthermore, in Dutch 
literature, in describing case law, it is not unusual to refer to both the case law of 
the Courts and the tribunals, in all layers combined. Therefore, in this Chapter, 
no specific distinction is made between the Courts types, but rather between the 
types of invoked standards. Where necessary, differences in approach between 
the types of Courts are of course discussed.
In this chapter, firstly the organisation of the Dutch Judiciary will be discussed 
(Section 4.2). Then, an analysis will be presented of the case law concerning the 
direct applicability of international Provisions stipulating or related to the right to 
food, that is, Article 11 ICESCR (Section 4.3), Article 24, 26, and 27 ICRC (Sections 
4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively) and Article 12 CEDAW (Section 4.7). Finally, some 
conclusions will be drawn (Section 4.8).
4.2 The Dutch Judiciary
The competences of the Dutch Courts and tribunals are regulated in Chapter 
6 of the Constitution: in short, Article 112 sub 1 CA entrusts competence to 
the Judiciary on matters concerning civil rights and obligations and Article 113 
CA on matters of criminal law. Article 112 (2) CA stipulates that by statutory 
regulation the competence to judge in cases regarding administrative law may 
be entrusted to either the Judiciary, or organs that are not part of the Judiciary 
(tribunals). In addition, Article 115 CA stipulates the possibility (by statutory 
regulation or delegated law) to open appeal procedures against administrative 
decisions before administrative appeal bodies, a possibility that is now rarely used. 
The organisational structure of the Judiciary is rather different compared to the 
organisational structure of administrative tribunals, although most safeguards for 
an independent and impartial Judiciary also apply to those tribunals. In practice 
however, the term Judiciary is used to cover also the tribunals and appellate bodies 
that rule in matters of administrative law, especially since the Administrative 
Court of First Instance is now a Section of the District Courts.324
324 See for instance the official website of the Dutch Judiciary: www.rechtspraak.nl.
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Since 2008, the Judiciary is organised in three layers of Courts. Mostly, the Court 
of First Instance is one of the nineteen District Courts. These Courts consist of 
three different sections, that administer justice in private law, criminal law, and 
administrative law, and a section that previously was a separate Court of law: the 
subdistrict section. In the latter, cases concerning labour conflicts, debts, traffic 
fines, tenancy law and fines concerning offences in criminal law that concern no 
more than 25,000 Euros are dealt with. Then, there are five Courts of Appeal that 
are competent to rule in all the matters that are open for appeal judged by the 
District Courts, except for administrative legal issues. Finally, one could turn to a 
Court of Last Instance, the Supreme Court that serves as the Court of Cassation. 
Since 1 January 2013, the judicial organisation was reformed once again, mainly 
reducing the amount of Courts to eleven District Courts and four Courts of Appeal. 
Since this thesis only concerns the period to and including 2012, the latest judicial 
reform will not be of any relevance in this Chapter.325
The administrative tribunals are organised differently. Firstly, it needs to be noted 
that also the Judiciary might be competent in ruling on matters of administrative 
law, as long as no tribunal has specifically been attributed the competence to rule 
on the matter (Article 112 (2) CA). These procedures then mostly start with the 
section on private law matters of the District Courts. Secondly, as demonstrated 
above, the Administrative Courts of First Instance have been incorporated in the 
structure of the District Courts. From there on, the appeal procedures are different. 
Depending on the case, the Central Court of Appeal, the Administrative judicial 
Division of the Council of State, and the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal are 
the competent appeal bodies for Administrative issues. All three bodies are, with 
some minor exceptions,326 also the Court of Last Instance.327
As it will appear below, most cases in which the right to food are invoked concern 
asylum-seekers and other foreigners, or matters related to social security and 
social benefits. Competent in those cases are the Administrative Courts of first 
instance, and the appellate body is the Central Court of Appeal.
325 See for instance the official website of the Dutch Judiciary: www.rechtspraak.nl.
326 For instance, in certain cases involving tax regulations, it is possible to appeal against a decision of 
the Central Court of Appeal, or the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal before the Supreme Court. See 
for further details: Regulation of Internal Service of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands pursuant 
to Article 75 Section 4 of the Law on the judicial Organisation. Original title in Dutch: Reglement 
van Inwendige Dienst van de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden ex Artikel 75 lid 4 Wet op de Rechterlijke 
Organisatie. Available on: www.rechtspraak.nl.
327 In this Section, we gratefully made use of the terminology and explanation offered in: L. Prakke 
and C. Kortmann (edt.), Constitutional law of 15 EU Member States, Deventer: Kluwer, 2004, especially 
p. 632-636.
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4.3 Article 11 ICESCR
4.3.1 Rejecting direct applicability
Apart from some summary trial procedures, in which the Courts decided that 
the question of direct applicability of Article 11 ICESCR is ‘too complex’ to be 
answered in such a procedure,328 or did not use the invoked Provision in their 
considerations,329 the Dutch Courts unanimously seem to reject the direct 
applicability of Article 11 ICESCR. To this end the Courts merely seem to consider 
that the Provision:
From the wording of Article 11 ICESR follows that it does not contain standards 
the Courts can apply directly as yardstick to judge decisions of administrative 
authorities, because this Provision is insufficiently concrete for such use. 
Therefore it first needs to be elaborated in national legislation.330
The Central Court of Appeal, Court of Last Instance in many aliens’ procedures, 
ruled that:
The Court considers that this appeal is ineffective, for these Provisions cannot 
be regarded as binding to all persons, as stipulated in Articles 93 and 94 of 
the Constitutional Act. Given the wording and scope of both Provisions, 
it rather concerns generally formulated social objectives, with regard to 
which the State Parties have committed themselves to pursue and realise 
those by regulations, rather than a right recognised by those State Parties, 
that can be invoked by citizens. In this context, reference must be made 
to the Explanatory Memorandum to the ratification Bill on the ICESCR 
(Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13 932, No. 3) it is stated that the 
Provisions of this Convention “in general” will have no direct effect.331
328 District Court of Haarlem, 11 July 2007 LJN BB0998 (summary trial procedure).
329 See for instance: District Court of Haarlem, 21 June 2007, LJN BA9025 (summary trial procedure); 
29 July 2008 LJN BE9491 (summary trial procedure); 29 March 2012, LJN BW2431; Central Court of 
Appeal, 18 June 2009, LJN NI9928; Council of State, 22 December 2010, AB 2011, 169.
330 Council of State of 19 April 2007, LJN BA4289.
331 Central Court of Appeal, 25 May 2004, USZ 2004, 241. Original text in Dutch: ‘is de Raad van oordeel dat 
dit beroep geen doel treft nu deze bepalingen niet kunnen worden aangemerkt als een ieder verbindende bepaling 
als bedoeld in de artikelen 93 en 94 van de Grondwet. Gelet op de bewoordingen en strekking van bedoelde 
bepalingen is daarin veeleer sprake van algemeen geformuleerde sociale doelstellingen, tot het nastreven en 
verwezenlijken waarvan in hun regelgeving de verdragsstaten zich hebben verbonden, dan van een door die 
verdragsstaten erkend recht, waarop burgers zich in hun nationale rechtsorde zonder meer kunnen beroepen. In 
dit verband verdient vermelding dat in de Memorie van Toelichting bij de wet tot goedkeuring van het IVESCR 
(Bijl. Hand. II 1975-1976 13 932, no. 3) is opgemerkt dat de bepalingen van dit verdrag “in het algemeen” geen 
rechtstreekse werking zullen hebben.’ See for a similar consideration: Central Court of Appeal, 1 November 
2005, LJN AU5600; 26 January 2010, LJN BL1686; 2 November 2010, LJN BO3025; 14 March 2011, NJB 
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Summarising, it seems that the Courts find their arguments to deny direct effect 
of Article 11 ICESCR in the fact that:
•	 the Article is not binding on all persons, as stipulated in Articles 93 and 94 CA;
•	 the Article is not precise enough for concrete use, and therefore further national 
legislation is required;
•	 the Legislature, in their ratification Bill, already pointed out that ICESCR rights 
in general would have no direct effect.
It is remarkable that mostly the Courts deal quickly with the matter of direct 
applicability, and use one of the aforementioned standard considerations without 
discussing the particularities of the case. Furthermore, in some cases, the Courts 
do not even refer to the specific Articles invoked by the claimant, but simply state 
that the complete ICESCR has no direct effect.332
4.3.2 The ICESCR cases
Not surprisingly, most cases in which Article 11 ICESCR is invoked, concern 
people on low incomes, prisoners, elderly, disabled persons and asylum-seekers. 
Generally, Article 11 ICESCR is invoked to support demands for social benefits, 
providing the claimant with minimum means of subsistence. As it appears, Article 
11 ICESCR cases come in two categories. The first consist of the cases in which 
the level of social benefits is under discussion. In these cases, the claimant enjoys 
social benefits, but s/he considers these benefits to be inadequate and thus not 
guaranteeing minimum means of subsistence.333 Here, the right to food is seldom 
explicitly an issue: the focus is on Dutch legislation and procedures concerning 
social benefits. The second category consists of cases in which the claimant has 
no access to social benefits at all, and, consequently, has no means of subsistence 
that are provided for by the Government. The claimants are mostly asylum-
seekers residing in the Netherlands.334 A majority of the Article 11 ICESCR cases 
concern this last category.
2011, 755; District Court of Arnhem, 25 May 2007, LJN BA6562. In Central Court of Appeal, 18 June 
2004, JB 2004, 303, also a reference was made to the Explanatory Memorandum on the ratification Bill 
of the ICESCR, when denying direct effect to Article 9 ICESCR.
332 For instance: 21 November 2007, LJN BB9625; District Court of Amsterdam, 3 December 2008, LJN 
BG7017, consideration 2.3.4.
333 For instance: Central Court of Appeal, 1 November 2005, LJN AU5600, 9 May 2006, LJN AX2177, 1 
October 2008, LJN BF4589.
334 For instance: Central Court of Appeal, 25 May 2004, USZ 2004, 241; 8 July 2005, LJN AT910211; 11 
October 2007, LJN BB5687; 21 November 2007, LJN BB9625; District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 30 August 
2000, LJN AA6959; 23 January 2006, LJN AV0548; District Court of Arnhem, 25 May 2007, LJN BA6562; 
District Court of Rotterdam, 19 September 2007, LJN BB5715; 24 December 2007, LJN BC0852; District 
Court Haarlem 8 April 2008 LJN BD3399 (summary trial procedure); District Court of Amsterdam: 4 
August 1999, LJN AA4043; 13 March 2001, LJN AB0942.
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Once again, two situations can be distinguished in which an asylum-seeker invokes 
Article 11 ICESCR. In the first situation, the asylum-seeker stays rightfully in the 
Netherlands (Article 8 Aliens Act), while awaiting a final decision concerning a 
residence permit (Article 8f-g Aliens Act 2000), or concerning certain administrative 
procedures (Article 8h Aliens Act 2000). In this situation, the asylum-seekers ‘are 
housed in one of a number of reception centres scattered throughout the country’335, 
but have generally no further rights concerning income support or other social 
benefits.336 In the second situation, the asylum-seeker stays illegally in the 
Netherlands, and has generally no access to social benefits,337 or possibility 
to stay in a reception centre.338 The above is based on the so-called ‘Linkage 
Act’339, an Act that partly excludes asylum-seekers without residence permit 
from entitlements to general social benefits in the Netherlands, with the main 
objective to restrict immigration. The Courts generally rule that this Act does not 
conflict with international law, and is not disproportionate (it is a suitable means 
to reach its legitimate purposes).340 Therefore, in general, this means that an 
asylum-seeker, unlawfully residing in the Netherlands, or lawfully residing but 
not having a residence permit, cannot make a successful claim to most general 
social benefits, and thus also cannot make a successful appeal to a right to food.341
4.3.3  Article 11 ICESCR and the authoritative interpretation of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in their various Comments 
and Observations on the implementation of the ICESCR defends the position that 
some ICESCR Provisions, including Article 11, should be justiciable or even self-
executing.342 This was also brought before the Central Court of Appeal to support 
claims based on inter alia the right to an adequate standard of living.
In a case in 2007, an asylum-seeker, awaiting a decision on his application for a 
residence permit, appealed to the decision of the local Public Centre for Social 
Welfare not to grant certain social benefits that would enable him to provide for 
himself and his younger brother. One of the arguments he put forward was that 
the State has the duty to provide at least some care, because he was residing 
335 Quote from: E/1994/104/Add.30; 23 August 2005, Section 373.
336 For instance, District Court of Amsterdam, 13 March 2001 LJN AB0942.
337 For instance, Central Court of Appeal, 21 November 2007 LJN BB9625.
338 District Court of Amsterdam, 13 March 2001, LJN AB0942.
339 In Dutch: Koppelingswet.
340 Central Court of Appeal, 26 June 2001, LJN AB2324.
341 For instance: Central Court of Appeal, 25 May 2004, USZ 2004, 241; 8 July 2005, LJN AT9102; 11 
October 2007, LJN BB5687; 21 November 2007, LJN BB9625; District Court of ´ s-Gravenhage, 30 August 
2000, LJN AA6959; 23 January 2006 LJN AV0548; District Court of Arnhem, 25 May 2007, LJN BA6562; 
District Court of Rotterdam, 24 December 2007, LJN BC0852; District Court of Haarlem 8 April 2008, 
LJN BD3399 (summary trial procedure); District Court of Amsterdam: 4 August 1999, LJN AA4043.
342 See Sections 3.5.5. and 3.5.6.
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lawfully in the Netherlands. His Attorney, anticipating the standard considerations 
with regard to the invoked Articles 9, 11, and 13 ICESCR, argued that in 1986 the 
Central Court of Appeal had considered with regard to Article 7 ICESCR that it 
would be incorrect to assume that direct applicability would never be possible.343 
In response, the Court seems to consider Article 7 ICESCR on equal treatment of 
women and man an exceptional Provision in the Covenant,344 and argued in the 
first place that Article 7 ICESCR is quite concrete, unlike Articles 9, 11, and 13 
ICESCR. In the second place, the Court stated that the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights of the United Nations stated in one of their General 
Comments that some of the Provisions of the ICESCR, including Article 7 ICESCR, 
are suitable for direct applicability. Apparently, the Court is referring to General 
Comment 3. In Section 5, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
lists 6 ICESCR Provisions that ‘would seem to be capable of immediate application by 
judicial and other organs in many national legal systems.’345 This reference by the 
Court to General Comment 3 is hardly convincing. Firstly, the list in this General 
Comment not only mentions Article 7, but also includes Article 13 (2) (a) (3), 
one of the Provisions that were invoked in this case.346 Secondly, if the General 
Comments are to carry weight, it is at the least remarkable that General Comment 
12, concerning the right to adequate food,347 was not taken into consideration. 
In this General Comment, the Committee clarifies inter alia that ‘any person or 
group who is a victim of a violation of the right to adequate food should have access 
to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and international 
levels. All victims of such violations are entitled to adequate reparation, which may 
take the form of restitution, compensation, satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition. 
National Ombudsmen and human rights commissions should address violations of 
the right to food.’348
343 Central Court of Appeal, 3 July 1986, TAR 1986, 215. It must be remarked, however, that the Court had 
already withdrawn somewhat from this position in a later ruling in which it ruled that direct applicability 
of one of the provisions of the ICESCR would be ‘a total exception from the Covenant’s general character.’ 
As will be demonstrated in 8.1., the Provision is later used as an interpretative norm, or simply denied 
direct effect, except for one incidental case from 1984, in which the Provision was granted direct effect.
344 Article 7 ICESCR contains inter alia the principle guaranteeing women conditions not inferior to 
those enjoyed by men, with equal remuneration for equal work.
345 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations, Section 5.
346 Along with Articles 3, 7(a)(i), 8, 10, and 15(3) ICESCR.
347 In General Comment 12, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, responds to 
Objective 7.4. of the World Food Summit, ‘To clarify the content of the right to adequate food and the 
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, and as stated in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and other relevant international and regional instruments, and to give particular 
attention to implementation and full and progressive realisation of this right as a means of achieving food 
security for all.’
348 E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May 1999, CESCR, General Comment 12, Right to Adequate Food, Section 32.
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In another case, in 2008, an appellant invoked Article 13 ESC and Articles 11 
and 12 ICESCR.349 He argued that the rights embedded in those Articles could 
be directly invoked by an individual. With regard to the direct applicability of 
the ICESCR Provisions, this interpretation was not only based on the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural rights’ General Comments, but also on their 
Concluding Observations concerning the second and third periodic report on the 
implementation of the ICESCR. In these observations, the Committee expressed 
their concern with regard to the fact that the Courts deny the direct applicability 
of the ICESCR Provisions.350 For instance, ‘It urges the State Party to ensure that 
the Provisions of the Covenant are given direct effect by its domestic Courts, as defined 
in the Committee’s General Comment 3, and that it promotes the use of the Covenant 
as a domestic source of law. It invites the State Party to include, in its fourth periodic 
report, information on case-law concerning the rights recognised in the Covenant.’351 
The Central Court of Appeal however rejected direct applicability using a standard 
consideration, and considered that the documents referred to by the appellant 
did not provide for sufficient basis to deviate from this reasoning.352
4.3.4 A substantial right to food?
Despite the rejection of direct applicability of the right to food, there are examples 
in which the Courts show some compassion for the requesting party, albeit not 
based on a legal standard. For example, one ruling was given in a dispute between 
on the one hand a refugee from Somalia with her 23-months’ old child and on 
the other hand the COA.353 COA is the Dutch agency charged with care for and 
housing of asylum-seekers. To this end they operate so-called reception centres. In 
this case the woman appealed to a decision taken by the COA to deny her access 
to such a reception centre. The reason was that her request for a residence permit 
had been denied, and it was the COA’s policy only to house people awaiting a 
first decision. However, she was awaiting the decision on a second request. In 
her argument she took recourse to inter alia Article 11 ICESCR. She argued that 
denying her and her child shelter in a reception centre, in combination with the 
circumstance that she was not allowed to work in the Netherlands, left her without 
(adequate) means of subsistence and fully dependent on charity-help.354 The 
349 Central Court of Appeal, 22 December 2008, LJN BG8789.
350 Central Court of Appeal, 22 December 2008, LJN BG8789, Section 3.2.
351 E/C.12/NLD/CO/3, 24 November 2006, Section 19.
352 Central Court of Appeal, 22 December 2008, LJN BG8789, Section 4.2.
353 Freely translated an abbreviation for: Central Organ for Reception Service for Asylum-seekers.
354 Remarkably, in another case, the provision of charity aid was held against the claimant: the fact that 
an asylum-seeker received shelter in a care facility owned and operated by a charity organisation, was 
one of the arguments based on which the summary trial Court of Haarlem judged that the municipality 
of Haarlem rightfully rejected an application for housing. See: District Court of Haarlem, 29 July 2008, 
LJN BE9491 (summary trial procedure). In contrast, in the discussed case ruled by the District Court of 
Amsterdam, the dependence on charity aid, is taken into account to establish the severe circumstances 
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case was decided by the District Court in Amsterdam.355 The Court first rejected 
direct applicability of Article 11 ICESCR using wordings along the lines quoted 
above. This did not, however, keep the Court from ruling in favour of the claimant. 
The applicable policy guidelines required COA to take account of distressing 
humanitarian circumstances. In the light of the circumstances of the case, among 
which the fact that the claimant did not have sufficient means of subsistence – 
including food – to provide for herself and her child, the reasoning given by COA 
did not convince the Court that COA had sufficiently taken account of distressing 
humanitarian circumstances. The District Court of Amsterdam quashed the COA’s 
decision, and ruled that it had to reassess the case. As it seems, while the direct 
applicability of Article 11 ICESCR has been denied, and not considered in the 
verdict, the absence of an adequate standard of living was clearly a reason for the 
Court to rule in favour of the applicant, while this argument was not explicitly 
substantiated with a legal Provision of any kind.
4.3.5 Further developments in the denial of direct applicability
On the 3rd of March 2008, then Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen 
held a speech at the Human Rights Council.356 Verhagen proudly announced 
‘here today that the Netherlands will join the group of countries who have recognised 
the right to water as a human right.’ Shortly after this proud announcement and 
explicitly referring to it, the local Court of Heerlen recognised direct applicability 
of Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR. In casu, a water provider (practically having 
a monopoly in the province) shut down the water supply to a customer, whose 
payments were overdue. The Court ruled that in doing so the water provider 
violated the customer’s right to water and health as codified in Articles 11 and 
12 of the ICESCR. Article 11 ICESCR was thus directly applied. This was done 
on the initiative of the Court itself (no Article 11 ICESCR claim was made by the 
customer).357 However, the water provider appealed against the judgment, and the 
Court of Appeal overruled the ruling of the local Court of Heerlen on 2 February 
2010, based on arguments mainly concerning national legislation.358 With regard to 
Articles 11 and 12, the Court of Appeal considered that in line with the reasoning 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights in its General Comment 
15, the right to water did not automatically mean a right to free water, but rather 
the claimant is facing (District Court of Amsterdam, 13 March 2001, LJN AB0942). In yet another ruling, 
the dependence on charity aid was considered to be of no influence on existing lawful claims on social 
entitlements. See: District Court of Haarlem, LJN BC6101 (Article 27-ICRC case).




357 District Court of Maastricht (Section Heerlen), 25 June 2008, LJN BD5759.
358 Court of Appeal, ’s-Hertogenbosch, 2 February 2010, LJN BL6583.
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the right to affordable water.359 A remarkable consideration, since it was obvious 
that the consumer could not afford the water. The Court ruled furthermore that 
no successful claim could be based on the invoked ICESCR Articles and that 
therefore there was no need to determine whether those Articles were directly 
applicable.360 Since the ruling of the Court of Appeal, the Dutch Courts have not 
shown any sign of changing their minds, and keep denying direct applicability 
of the right to water, and most other ICESCR Provisions.361
4.4 Article 24 ICRC
In general, it must be concluded that Article 24 has no direct effect.362 Some 
Courts decided not to take the invoked Article into consideration,363or ruled that 
the Provision was clearly not violated.364 Occasionally, the Article is used as an 
interpretative standard.365 In Dutch case law, this standard seems to play hardly 
any role of significance.
359 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated in General Comment 15 that ‘water, 
and water facilities must be affordable for all. The direct and indirect costs and charges associated with securing 
water must be affordable, and must not compromise or threaten the Covenant rights.’ See: E/C.12/2002/11, 
20 January 2003, CESCR, General Comment 15, The Right to Water, Section 12 (c)(ii).
360 Court of Appeal, ’s-Hertogenbosch, 2 February 2010, LJN BL6583, Section 4.10-4.11.
361 Central Court of Appeal, 1 October 2008, LJN BF4589; 22 December 2008, LJN BG8776; 22 December 
2008, LJN BG8789; 21 May 2009, LJN BI8400; 11 June 2009, LJN BI9325; 30 March 2010, USZ 2010, 166; 
14 April 2010, LJN BM3583; 19 April 2010, LJN BM0956; 11 May 2010, LJN BM6748; 28 September 2010, 
LJN BN9571; 2 November 2010, LJN BO3025; 14 March 2011, NJB 2011, 755; Council of State, 29 June 
2011, AB 2011, 327; District Court of Amsterdam, 3 December 2008, LJN BG7017; 12 December 2008, LJN 
BG6963; 12 December 2008, LJN BG6965; 2 June 2009, LJN BJ3914; 3 May 2011, LJN BQ9532; District 
Court of Haarlem, 6 May 2009, LJN BI3326 (summary trial procedure); 14 June 2010, LJN BM9368 
(summary trial procedure); 29 March 2012, LJN BW2431; District Court of Leeuwarden, 05 July 2010, 
LJN BN0391 (summary trial procedure).
362 See for instance: Council of State, 12 April 2007, LJN BA3394; Central Court of Appeal, 23 May 2012, 
www.rechtspraak.nl, 30 May 2012; District Court of Alkmaar, 20 July 2005, LJN AT9598; District Court of 
’s-Gravenhage, 24 July 2008, LJN BF0906; 2 March 2010, LJN BM2383; District Court of Zwolle-Lelystad, 
19 April 2011, LJN BQ3967; 9 June 2011, LJN BR3569 (summary trial procedure).
363 See for instance: Council of State, 26 February 2003, JV 2003, 164; 27 April 2007, LJN BA4654; District 
Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 25 March 2004, LJN AO6655; District Court of Groningen, 14 July 2010, LJN 
BN2935 (summary trial procedure).
364 See for instance: District Court of Haarlem, 29 August 2007, LJN BB3043 (summary trial procedure).
365 See for instance: District Court of Amsterdam, 19 December 2005, AWB 04/19508.
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4.5 Article 26 ICRC
In general, it must be concluded that due to the Dutch reservation to Article 26 
ICRC,366 minors have no direct entitlement to social security.367 Some Courts 
considered instead that, due to its general wording, Article 26 ICRC has no direct 
effect.368 Other Courts ruled that the Provision was not violated,369 or the invocation 
inadequately substantiated.370
4.6 Article 27 ICRC
Where case law on Article 11 ICESCR could not be clearer and more consistent on 
the rejection of direct effect, a very different approach can be found on the effect 
of Article 27 ICRC.371 The case mentioned in Section 4.3.4 revealed that the needs 
of children present a special circumstance that justifies a more kind approach, 
compared to the standard legal practice. While in some cases in which Article 27 
ICRC was invoked, the Courts chose to not further include the Provision in their 
366 The Dutch reservation to Article 26 ICRC: ‘The Kingdom of the Netherlands accepts the Provisions 
of Article 26 of the Convention with the reservation that these Provisions shall not imply an independent 
entitlement of children to social security, including social insurance.’ See: http://treaties.un.org.
367 See for instance: Central Court of Appeal, 29 March 2005, LJN AT3468; 8 April 2005, LJN AT4112; 
24 January 2006, JB 2006, 66; 7 April 2008, LJN BD0221; 10 July 2008, LJN BD8630; 23 July 2010, LJN 
BN2492; 5 August 2011, LJN BR4268; Council of State, 13 June 2007, LJN BA7088. See also: District 
Court Zwolle-Lelystad, 21 April 2011, LJN BQ9140; District Court of Haarlem, 17 May 2005, LJN AT6534 
(summary trial procedure); District Court of Dordrecht 23 April 2009, LJN BI8643 (summary trial 
procedure); 27 May 2011, LJN BR5744 District Court of Leeuwarden 28 November 2005, LJN AU7449; 
District Court of Zwolle-Lelystad, 21 April 2011, LJN BQ9140; District Court of Arnhem, 13 November 
2012, www.rechtspraak.nl, 22 November 2012.
368 District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 6 September 2000, JV 2000, 224, 2 October 2006, LJN AY9546 
(summary trial procedure); Council of State, 13 June 2007, LJN BA7088; 9 April 2008, LJN BC9087; 
District Court of Zutphen, 12 December 2008, LJN BJ1349. See also: Supreme Court, 23 November 
2012, JV 2013, 115, in which the Court ruled that inter alia from Article 26 ICRC no individual right to 
child allowances could be distilled.
369 Central Court of Appeal, 21 June 2011, LJN BR0385.
370 District Court of Amsterdam, 18 February 2011, LJN BQ5256.
371 It must be noted that in writing this Chapter, although it overlapped for the major part with our own 
data, we thankfully made use of the data collected by J.H. de Graaf, M.M.C. Limbeek, N.N. Bahadur 
and N. van der Mey, who analysed all Court rulings on the direct applicability of ICRC Provisions in the 
period 2002-2011. See: J.H. de Graaf,. M.M.C. Limbeek, N.N. Bahadur and N. van der Mey, De toepassing 
van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten van het Kind in de Nederlandse Rechtspraak, Nijmegen: 
Ars Aequi Libri, 2012.
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ruling,372 considered that the invocation was not adequately substantiated,373 
or obviously not violated,374 there had been uncertainty concerning the direct 
applicability of this Provision,375 since the Dutch Government had not mentioned 
this Provision in their list of ICRC Provisions they considered directly applicable in 
its explanatory memorandum.376 Also, the question had not explicitly been dealt 
with by the Central Court of Appeal.377 Therefore, there was little coherence in case 
law amongst the lower Courts. For instance, the District Court of ’s-Gravenhage 
ruled in a case in 2000 that inter alia Article 11 ICESCR and 27 ICRC were not directly 
applicable, due to the general wording of both Articles. The Court considered that 
the Provisions could not be applied without further national legislation, and that it 
was not the competence of the Court to further specify the invoked international 
Provisions. In this case thus, direct applicability of Article 11 ICESCR and 27 ICRC 
was denied using the same consideration.378 The District Court of Almelo however, 
had ruled that Article 27 had direct effect, and could be invoked on behalf of an 
illegally residing child, resulting in the granting of social benefits to cover the 
costs of maintenance for the child.379 Some District Courts did not explicitly rule 
on the direct applicability of Article 27 ICRC, but considered that it stipulated an 
372 Council of State, 11 June 2012, www.rechtspraak.nl, 18 June 2012; District Court of Zwolle-Lelystad, 
29 April 2009, LJN BJ5171; 3 May 2011, LJN BQ5114; District Court of Haarlem, 23 November 2006, LJN 
AZ4222 (summary trial procedure); District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 08 November 2007, LJN BB8838 
(although Article 27 ICRC was not explicitly invoked, the claimant stated that a child needs to eat, in 
view of the ICRC. The Court considered that Article 2 ICRC was not directly applicable, and did not 
further address the issue of food); Central Court of Appeal 20 October 2010, JLN BO3581; 26 April 2011, 
LJN BQ3795; 13 March 2012, USZ 2012, 101. The fact that the District Court of Amsterdam did not 
motivate a rejection of certain child allowances while the applicant had invoked the first protocol to 
the ECHR and Article 27 ICRC, was reason for the Central Court of Appeal to quash the verdict, and 
redirect the case to the District Court for a new ruling. See: Central Court of Appeal, 6 September 2007, 
LJN BB6188.
373 Supreme Court, 3 June 2005, LJN AT3445; District Court of Haarlem, 21 June 2007, LJN BA9025 
(summary trial procedure); 11 July 2007, LJN BB0998 (summary trial procedure); 18 February 2011, LJN 
BQ5256; Court of Appeal, ’s-Gravenhage, 16 August 2011, LJN BR6656; District Court of Dordrecht, 23 
April 2009, LJN BI8643 (summary trial procedure); Central Court of Appeal, 18 June 2009, LJN NI9928.
374 District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 1 August 2002, AWB 02/54360 and 02/54358; District Court of 
’s-Gravenhage, 1 August 2002, AWB 02/54362 and 02/54361; District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 21 March 
2008, AWB 07/28996; District Court of Haarlem, 29 August 2007, LJN BB3043 (summary trial procedure); 
Central Court of Appeal 25 August 2005, LJN AU1850; 21 June 2011, LJN BR0385.
375 See: C.H. Slingenberg, Illegale kinderen en recht op bijstand in het licht van het IVK, in: Migratierecht 
2006-02, p. 54-57.
376 Parlementaire Geschiedenis, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, Chapter I, Section 6A. Also in Dutch 
literature, this ‘list’ of the Government was underlined. See for instance: G.C.A.M. Ruitenberg, Het 
internationaal kinderrechtenverdrag in de Nederlandse rechtspraak, IVRK-reeks 1, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij 
SWP, 2003, p.35-37; Margrite Kalverboer and Elianne Zijlstra, Kinderen uit asielzoekersgezinnen en het recht 
op ontwikkeling, het belang van het kind in het Vreemdelingenrecht, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij SWP, 2006 p.16. 
See in this light also District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 14 August 2003, LJN AM3133, also referring to this 
list in deciding on the direct effect of Article 3 ICRC. In casu, the Court decided that Article 3 should be 
taken into serious consideration as an interpretative standard.
377 Central Court of Appeal, 24 January 2006, LJN AV0197.
378 District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 6 September 2000, JV 2000, 224.
379 District Court of Almelo, 28 November 2005, LJN AU7003.
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important standard that needed to be taken into account seriously, and therefore 
used the Provision as an interpretative standard in their rulings.380
Since 2005, the Central Court of Appeal was occasionally confronted with appeals 
on Article 16 (1) of the Work and Social Assistance Act, stipulating that: ‘to a 
person not entitled to assistance, the Mayor and Municipal Executive may, taking into 
consideration all circumstances, notwithstanding this Section, provide assistance if so 
required due to very urgent reasons.’381 The Court ruled that inter alia Article 27 ICRC 
needs to be taken into account in assessing whether or not there was a very urgent 
reason in casu in view of this Provision. Mostly, the Court considered a situation 
to be urgent when it was obvious that there were inadequate resources to cover 
the costs of maintenance of the child. First, this was ruled in cases concerning 
Dutch children,382 and later also regarding legally residing foreign children.383 
Regarding the latter category, it is interesting to notice that on 8 August 2005, 
the Court came to this conclusion after considering ‘the text of Articles 2, first and 
second Section, 3, first and second Section, and 27, third Section, of the ICRC and the 
comments on these Articles of the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The in the 
treaty stipulated English wording “without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of 
the child’s or his or her parents’ or legal guardians’...status” in Article 2, first Section, 
of the Convention, in conjunction with the other aforementioned Provisions, indicate 
that the Linkage principle does not constitute a decent justification to completely exclude 
the possibility of granting benefits solely on behalf of the minor children in a situation 
in which their parents who are not entitled to social benefits but request for such 
assistance are unable to cover the costs of food, clothing and other essential costs, 
necessary for the minor children.’384 Similar reasoning can be found in the case of 
380 For instance: District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 29 August 2002, LJN AF2534; District Court of Zwolle, 
17 February 2003, LJN AF4890, and 19 March 2003, LJN AF6351 and AF6354.
381 Original text in Dutch: ‘Aan een persoon die geen recht op bijstand heeft, kan het college, gelet op alle 
omstandigheden, in afwijking van deze paragraaf, bijstand verlenen indien zeer dringende redenen daartoe 
noodzaken.’
382 Central Court of Appeal, 29 March 2005, LJN AT3468 (summary trial procedure); 14 June 2005, LJN 
AT8038; 5 July 2005, LJN AT9963; 13 February 2007, LJN AZ8596; 29 May 2007, LJN BA6523; 2 May 
2012, USZ 2012, 158 (although the social benefits were rejected in casu). See for the lower Courts: District 
Court of Dordrecht, 25 September 2008, LJN BG3517 (summary trial procedure); 21 December 2009, LJN 
BL9388 (summary trial procedure); District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 23 December 2009, LJN BL2473.
383 Central Court of Appeal, 8 August 2005, LJN AU0687; 24 January 2006, LJN AV0197; 6 October 
2009, LJN BK0734; 20 July 2010, LJN BN3318. See for the lower Courts for instance: District Court 
of Amsterdam, 8 November 2007, LJN BF 1926; 9 February 2010, LJN BL6113; District Court 
’s-Hertogenbosch, 22 January 2008, LJN BC4003; District Court of Haarlem, 28 February 2008, LJN 
BC6101; District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 20 April 2011, LJN BQ3199 (summary trial procedure).
384 Central Court of Appeal, 8 August 2005, LJN AU0687 (summary trial procedure). Original text in 
Dutch: ‘De tekst van de artikelen 2, eerste en tweede lid, 3, eerste en tweede lid, en 27, derde lid, van het 
IVRK en op de op deze artikelen verschenen commentaren van het Comité voor de rechten van het kind. De 
in de Engelse verdragstekst voorkomende woorden “without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the 
child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardians’ (…) status” in artikel 2, eerste lid, van het IVRK, bezien in 
samenhang met de andere zojuist genoemde bepalingen, wijzen er op dat het koppelingsbeginsel geen voldoende 
rechtvaardiging kan vormen voor het geheel uitsluiten van de mogelijkheid om uitsluitend ten behoeve van de 
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24 January 2006, in which the Court ruled that despite the fact that according 
to Article 27 (2) ICRC the parents or others responsible for the child have the 
primary responsibility to secure the conditions of living necessary for the child’s 
development, all Government institutions should act in accordance with Article 
3 jo 27 (3) ICRC. This means that when decisions must be made that somehow 
affect the conditions of living of the child – in casu the rejection of a claim to 
social benefits – the best interests of the child should be the first consideration for 
these institutions.385 However, Article 16 (2) of the Work and Social Assistance Act 
excludes illegally residing aliens from the exception to provide for social benefits 
in case of urgent circumstances. The Central Court of Appeal considered that also 
in case of illegally residing children, this exclusion was a proportionate means to 
achieve the goal as established in the ‘Linkage-Act’ to restrict immigration, and 
merely ruled that Article 27 had no direct effect.386 Only occasionally, the Council 
seems to consider whether the illegaly residing foreigner was in the absolute 
impossibility to leave Dutch territory, suggesting that this might be an exception 
to the general exclusion of social benefits.387
The view of the Central Court of Appeal to use ICRC Provisions as an interpretative 
standard was understood by the Minister of Justice as a recognition of the direct 
applicability of the entire ICRC. This prompted the Minister to broaden the scope 
of persons entitled to certain social benefits: also children without a residence 
permit, but legally remaining in the Netherlands had entitlements to income 
support.388 In late 2007, the District Court of Rotterdam was led by this assumption 
of the Minister. In this case, after rejecting direct applicability of Article 11 ICESCR, 
the Court considered that ‘after all, Article 27, third Section, of the ICRC is a directly 
effective Provision.’389 The District Court of Rotterdam ruled that in a situation in 
which the parents of a child, who are awaiting a decision on their application 
for a residence permit, and who are receiving a monthly allowance from the 
minderjarige kinderen bijstand te verlenen in een situatie dat hun om deze bijstand vragende niet-rechthebbende 
ouders zelf niet in staat zijn de kosten van voeding, kleding en andere essentiële, voor de minderjarige kinderen 
noodzakelijke kosten te betalen.’
385 Central Court of Appeal, 24 January 2006, LJN AV0197. See also the annotation to this verdict of 
C.H. Slingenberg, Illegale kinderen en recht op bijstand in het licht van het IVK, in: Migratierecht 2006-02, 
p. 54-57; see also the annotation of G. Vonk, Ongewenste kinderen, opmerkingen naar aanleiding van CRvB 
24 januari 2006, Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid, 2006, 131-134.
386 See for instance: Central Court of Appeal, 9 October 2006, LJN AY9940; 7 April 2008, LJN BD0221; 
14 July 2010, LJN BN1274. See in this light also: Central Court of Appeal, 22 December 2008, LJN 
BG8776 (although Article 27 was not evaluated by the Court, it denied direct effect of inter alia Article 
11 ICESCR).
387 See for instance, Central Court of Appeal, 9 October 2006, LJN AY9940.
388 Adaption on the regulation on the provision of certain categories of aliens; Regulation of the 
Minister of Justice of 22 December 2006 no. 5458886/06/DVB. Original text in Dutch: Wijziging 
Regeling verstrekking bepaalde categorieën vreemdelingen; Regeling van de Minister van Justitie van 
22 December 2006, no. 5458886/06/DVB. See also: District Court of Haarlem, 28-02-2008, LJN BC6101 
and District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 10-04-2008, LJN BC9445. See in particular Article 4 (e).
389 Original text in Dutch: ‘Immers, artikel 27, derde lid, van het IVRK is een rechtstreeks werkende bepaling.’
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Government, can prove that it does not have sufficient money to provide for 
himself (in casu food and housing), the amount of the monthly allowance should 
be reviewed.390
Some Courts did follow the lead of the Central Court of Appeal’s ruling, using Article 
27 (3) ICRC (sometimes combined with Article 2 or 3 ICRC) as an interpretative 
standard.391 In this light, an interesting development must be noted, starting with 
a verdict of the Court of Appeal of ’s-Gravenhage in a summary trial procedure, 
where three illegally residing children invoked Articles 2, 3, 27, and 37 ICRC, 
when they were removed from the facilities of a COA. The Court considered 
‘that the State, as a result of the ratification of the treaties to which these Provisions 
are part, have the legal duty, to the extent that such Provisions have direct effect, 
to respect this working, and, to the extent those Provisions only imply instructional 
standards, through regulations, administrative decisions and measures, and actions, 
to create a legal and factual situation in which the rights and interests of children who 
are in the territory of the State are protected and safeguarded in accordance with these 
Provisions’392 Therefore, the COA was not allowed to remove the minors from 
their facilities. This was confirmed by the Supreme Court in cassation, although 
the Court added that, especially due to the fact that the mother of the minors did 
not want to cooperate in leaving the territory, this would not constitute a right to 
social support that is exactly similar compared to the benefits received before.393 
An interesting verdict, for here also the Supreme Court seems to accept that the 
invoked ICRC Articles need to be taken into consideration as an interpretative 
standard. However, in another case, the Court considered that Articles 2, 3, 26, 
390 District Court of Rotterdam, 19 September 2007 LJN BB5715.
391 For instance: District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 22 May 2006, LJN AX4451; 8 November 2007, LJN 
BB9819; 7 December 2007, LJN BC2933; 10 April 2008, LJN BC9445; 23 December 2009, LJN BL2473; 
20 April 2011, LJN BQ3199; Court of Appeal, ’s-Gravenhage, 27 July 2010, LJN BN2164; District Court 
of Amsterdam, 19 April 2007, LJN BA6900; 8 November 2007, LJN BF1926; 9 February 2010, LJN 
BL6113; District Court of Haarlem, 28 February 2008, LJN BC6101; District Court of Dordrecht, 25 
September 2008, LJN BG3517; 6 October 2009, LJN BK0734; 21 December 2009, LJN BL9388; District 
Court of ’s-Hertogenbosch, 22 January 2008, LJN BC4003; District Court of Assen, 10 April 2012, www.
rechtspraak.nl, 25 May 2012. In District Court of Haarlem, 21 November 2008, LJN BG6130, the Court 
considered that Article 27 ICRC was, among other things, adequately taken into account when reducing 
certain social benefits to a family as a penalty for the refusal to work.
392 Court of Appeal, ’s-Gravenhage, 27 July 2010, LJN BN2164 (summary trial procedure), consideration 
3.6. Original text in Dutch: ‘dat op de Staat, als gevolg van de ratificatie van de verdragen waarvan deze 
bepalingen deel uitmaken, de rechtsplicht rust om, voor zover deze bepalingen rechtstreekse werking hebben, 
die werking te eerbiedigen, alsook om, voor zover deze bepalingen slechts instructienormen bevatten, door 
middel van regelgeving, bestuurlijke beslissingen en maatregelen, en door feitelijke handelingen een zodanige 
juridische en feitelijke toestand te creëren dat de rechten en belangen van kinderen die zich op het grondgebied 
van de Staat bevinden overeenkomstig deze bepalingen worden beschermd en geborgd.’
393 Supreme Court, 21 September 2012, NJ 2013, 22. M.M.C. Limbeek understands that in another case, 
the Supreme Court, on 12 February 2010, LJN BI9729, indirectly rejected the direct effect of inter alia 
Article 27 ICRC by deciding that all other legal remedies could not lead to cassation. However, this 
verdict rather seems to resort under the category of rulings in which a Court simply does not decide 
on the matter.
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and 27 would not lead to any individual rights to child allowances in case of aliens 
awaiting a decision on their application for a residence permit.394
Other Courts however followed a different path,395 inspired by the permanent 
case law of the Council of State, Section administrative law, who consequently 
rejected direct applicability of Article 27 ICRC. The Council usually offers not 
much further clarification than that due to the nature and wording of the Article 
direct applicability was not possible.396 Remarkably, in some cases the Central 
Court of Appeal seems to come back from their previous approach, and merely 
considered that Article 27 ICRC had no direct effect without using the Provision 
as an interpretative standard. The cases concerned besides the above mentioned 
denial of social benefits to illegally residing children,397 disputes on the amount of 
social benefits granted,398 the refusal to grant child allowances,399 the withdrawal of 
social benefits due to work in illegality,400 the refusal to grant orphan’s benefits,401 
and the export of child allowances in case of a child living abroad.402 In this light, 
a remarkable consideration can be found in a case of 23 July 2010,403 in which the 
Central Court first ruled that Article 27 ICRC had no direct effect. Furthermore, 
on request of the plaintiff, the Court considered that the earlier case of 24 January 
2006,404 in which Article 27 ICRC was used as an interpretative standard, concerned 
an Act that regulated certain social benefits which would provide for a basic 
minimum. In casu however, the case concerned an Act that provided for general 
social benefits, and was therefore not comparable with the case in 2006, and thus 
the principles of that case could not be applied here. This case reflects a certain 
394 Supreme Court, 23 November 2012, JV 2013, 115.
395 District Court of Zwolle/Lelystad, 7 June 2006, LJN AY8861; 16 April 2009, LJNBI1369; 21 April 2011, 
LJN BQ9140; District Court of ’s-Gravenhage, 2 October 2006, LJN AY9546; 22 August 2007, LJN BC0745; 
20 December 2007, LJN BC1047; 24 January 2008, LJN BC2955; 25 September 2009, LJN BK7090; 7 
October 2009, LJN BK3052; 2 March 2010, LJN BM2383; District Court of Amsterdam, 23 April 2009, LJN 
BJ1021; 30 January 2009, LJN BH4457 (summary trial procedure); 1 June 2012, www.rechtspraak.nl, 15 
June 2012; District Court of Arnhem, 29 March 2012, www.rechtspraak.nl, 13 April 2012; 13 November 
2012, www.rechtspraak.nl, 22 November 2012.
396 See for instance: Council of State, 1 March 2005, JV 2005/176; 13 September 2005, JV 2005, 409; 
15 February 2007, LJN AZ9524; 13 June 2007, www.rechtspraak.nl, 13 June 2007; 26 November 2007, 
www.rechtspraak.nl, 2 January 2008; 08 October 2010, LJN BO0685; 13 October 2010, LJN BO0794; 22 
February 2012, JV 2012, 200.
397 Central Court of Appeal, 9 October 2006, LJN AY9940; 7 April 2008, LJN BD0221; 14 July 2010, LJN 
BN1274.
398 Central Court of Appeal, 12 June 2007, LJN BA7026; 26 January 2010, LJN BL1686; 30 March 2010, 
USZ 2010, 166.
399 Central Court of Appeal, 10 July 2008, LJN BD8630. Although Article 27 was not invoked, see in this 
light also: Central Court of Appeal, 15 July 2011, JV 2011, 393.
400 Central Court of Appeal, 2 November 2010, LJN BO3025.
401 Central Court of Appeal, 13 April 2012, USZ 2012, 161.
402 Central Court of Appeal, 5 August 2011, LJN BR4248; LJN BR4268 and LJN BR4785.
403 Central Court of Appeal, 23 July 2010, LJN BN2492. See for a similar reasoning: District Court of 
Zwolle-Lelystad, 21 April 2011, LJN BQ9140.
404 Central Court of Appeal, 24 January 2006, LJN AV0197.
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unspoken basic principle that seems to emerge in Dutch case law, that foreign 
children should have access to at least their basic needs, mostly through social 
benefits granted to their parents or legal guardian. However, this principle seems 
not to apply to illegally residing children as can be demonstrated by the case law 
of the Central Court of Appeal. Furthermore, considering the above case law, it is 
difficult to assess whether this principle is uniformly adopted in a coherent way, 
for there are different approaches amongst the Courts regarding the granting of 
social benefits that are applied in a seemingly random way. A clear indication on 
what factors could be decisive in choosing to deny direct applicability of Article 
27 ICRC, or (in)directly allowing it to have some weight in the verdicts cannot be 
distinguished. The Judiciary seems to muster a casuistic approach, which leads 
to rather contradicting verdicts.
4.7 Article 12 CEDAW
No cases could be found in which the direct applicability of Article 12 CEDAW was 
considered. Regarding the CEDAW, the Courts did not yet frequently rule on direct 
applicability of the CEDAW rights. Only recently, several Courts, including the 
Supreme Court, granted direct effect to Article 7 CEDAW (on the discrimination 
against women in the political and public life).405 Also, one example was found in 
which the Supreme Court reviewed against Articles 1 and 2 CEDAW, concerning non-
discrimination in general, albeit amongst many other international Provisions.406 
Both the Supreme Court and the Central Court of Appeal rejected the possibility 
of direct effect of Article 11 (2) CEDAW (discrimination against women on the 
grounds of marriage or maternity).407 It is noteworthy, that the Supreme Court 
considered that it does not appear from the Explanatory Memorandum on the 
ratification Bill of the CEDAW whether or not Article 11 CEDAW was not directly 
applicable. No verdicts in which economic, social and cultural rights as embedded 
in the CADEW were explicitly invoked could be found.
4.8 Concluding observations
At this point, some observations can be made. Firstly, it seems obvious that 
in case of the right to food, or more generally in case of economic, social and 
cultural rights, the role of the Legislature should not be underestimated. The 
Central Court of Appeal, as a Court of Last Instance, more than once referred to 
the Parliamentary History on the ratification Bill on the ICESCR, when rejecting 
405 Court of Appeal, ’s-Gravenhage, 7 September 2005, NJ 2005, 473; Court of Appeal, ’s-Gravenhage, 20 
December 2007, NJ 2008, 133; Council of State, 5 December 2007, AB 2008, 35; Supreme Court, 9 April 
2010, LJN BK4549; all concerning cases against the State regarding the position of the Dutch Political 
Reformed Party (SGP) on women.
406 Court of Appeal, ’s-Gravenhage, 30 October 2007, NJF 2007, 532.
407 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, LJN AC9402; 1 April 2011, JB 2011, 115; 21 September 2012, NJ 2013, 
22; Central Court of Appeal, 30 December 2011, USZ 2012, 58.
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direct applicability of Article 11 ICESCR, and the statement of a Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the international arena led to a remarkable verdict of one of the lower 
Courts, accepting direct applicability of the right to water. Apparently thus, the 
opinion of the Legislature seems to be highly valued. Also, but to a lesser extent, 
the list of the Government included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
ratification Bill of the ICRC seems to play a role in the assessment of direct effect 
of ICRC Provisions. This will be discussed in-depth in Chapters 6 and 7.
Secondly, the Constitutional structure of Articles 93 and 94 CA seems to play a 
role of significance. In deciding on right to food cases, often a reference is made to 
these Constitutional Provisions, stating that the invoked international standard does 
not match the criterion of being binding on all persons. However, in determining 
when a Provision is binding on all persons, it seems that the assessment on direct 
applicability is not based on the same criteria each time. Especially regarding the 
effect of Article 27 ICRC, it is completely unclear what the criteria are. It seems 
thus that the Courts are struggling with the Constitutional Structure as embedded 
in Articles 93 and 94 CA. This matter is further discussed in Chapter 5.
Thirdly, it appears that the Judiciary is under circumstances willing to take a 
somewhat milder approach when Article 27 ICRC is invoked, compared to Article 
11 ICESCR. While direct effect is denied, Article 27, alongside with other ECOSOC 
rights enshrined in the Treaty, is used as an interpretative standard by the Courts, 
in a balancing of interests between the urgent situation of the individual and the 
Linkage principle. In these cases, the international Provisions invoked seem to 
have a significant effect on the verdict, on top of the domestic legislation. However, 
this milder approach does not apply to illegally residing children.
Fourthly, it appears from one case that even when formally the direct applicability 
of the international right to adequate food is rejected, substantially the right may 
still play a role in the final decision of the Court, although it is not necessarily 
portrayed as a right or international standard. However, this makes it an obscure 
non-formal legal standard that is impossible to invoke by a claimant, and can only 
be voluntarily applied by a Court.
Fifthly, in general it can be concluded that in cases in which international Provisions 
stipulating the right to food are invoked, the Courts prefer to solve the matter by 
applying domestic law, and are hesitant in considering legal opinions expressed 
in the international arena on the application of international standards.

The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 121 
5.  Dutch monism and the Constitutional 
reforms of Article 93 and 94 CA
5.1 Introduction
As concluded in Chapter 4, the Dutch Judiciary seems to struggle with the 
interpretation of the system that is stipulated in Articles 93 and 94 of the 
Constitutional Act (CA), in relation to the effect of the internationally embedded 
right to food in the domestic legal order. It appears that the Parliamentary History 
of the ratification Acts of those treaties is an important source for the Courts 
to reach a verdict. As discussed in Chapter 2, in terms of legal reasoning, this 
could be referred to as the use of intentional support approach, or a subjective 
teleological method.408 The constructive move will therefore be naturally leading 
us to perform a full analysis of this Constitutional system in this Chapter, as well 
as an analysis of the Parliamentary History of treaties that relate to the right to 
food in Chapter 6.
In this Chapter I will first study the relevant literature on this matter. It will appear 
that the Dutch Constitutional system in which the applicability of international 
standards is regulated can be characterised as a qualified monistic system. However, 
the exact meaning of this is unclear (Section 5.2), and therefore has led to a rather 
technical discussion amongst Dutch legal scholars (Section 5.3). This discussion 
results into several interesting questions with regard to the functioning of this 
system (Section 5.4). The leading authors on Constitutional law refer unanimously 
to the Parliamentary History of three Constitutional reforms in defending their 
position regarding the meaning of Articles 93 and 94 CA. Therefore, after shortly 
introducing the procedures in Parliament regarding the adoption of law (Section 
5.5), I will analyse the Parliamentary Documents on those reforms in Sections 
5.6-5.8. I will then as a conclusion discuss what was originally foreseen by the 
Constitutional Legislator when the system of Articles 93 and 94 Constitutional 
Act was adopted (Section 5.9).
5.2 Qualified monism
In Constitutional legal studies, one traditionally distinguishes between two different 
Constitutional concepts through which an international standard can have effect 
in the domestic legal order: monism and dualism. In monistic Constitutions, the 
international standard is automatically applicable in the domestic legal order, 
without the need of a domestic transformation of the international standard. 
In dualistic Constitutions, a transformation of the international standard into a 
408 P. Wahlgren, Legal reasoning, a jurisprudential model, Scandinavian Studies in Law, volume 40, 2000, 
pp. 199-282.
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domestic standard is required before the international standard will have any 
effect in the domestic legal system.
However, it seems unlikely that a Constitutional system will ever be fully monistic 
or dualistic, and it would do more justice to legal reality to consider monism and 
dualism as two extremes on one axis. Although it is unanimously accepted that 
the Netherlands have a monistic Constitution, the monism is often considered 
to be limited, or moderate. The Dutch Government used the phrase ‘qualified 
monism’ in its first Universal Periodic Report.409 The exact meaning of this Dutch 
monism however, is not clear and greatly depends on the interpretation given to 
Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitutional Act.
In Article 93 Dutch Constitutional Act is elaborated that: ‘Provisions of treaties 
and of resolutions by international institutions which may be binding on all persons 
by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been published.’410
In Article 94 Dutch Constitutional Act is stated that: ‘Statutory regulations in force 
within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with 
Provisions of treaties or of resolutions by international institutions that are binding 
on all persons.’411
The debate on the exact meaning of the system laid down in both Articles almost 
exclusively focuses on the meaning of the phrase ‘binding on all persons’. This 
phrase is often considered to be a limitation to monism, and thus may have some 
serious consequences for the application of international treaty Provisions in the 
domestic legal order. Also, as a consequence, the relationship between the two 
Articles (containing both the same disputed phrase) is under dispute.
5.3  Dutch scholars on the meaning of Articles 93 and 94 
Constitutional Act
Amongst Dutch scholars there is certainly no agreement on the exact meaning 
of the system laid down in Articles 93 and 94 Constitutional Act. In this section, 
an analysis is made of the interpretation of the foremost authors on the matter.
409 A/HRC/WG.6/1/NLD/1, 7 March 2008, The Netherlands, first Universal Periodic Report, Sections 
17-19.
410 Original text in Dutch: ‘Bepalingen van verdragen en besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties, die 
naar haar inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden, hebben verbindende kracht nadat ze zijn bekendgemaakt.’ 
Translation of the Dutch text quoted from: http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl, a website related 
to the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
411 Original text in Dutch: ‘Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, 
indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met een ieder verbindende bepalingen van verdragen en van 
besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties.’ Translation of the Dutch text quoted from: http://www.
denederlandsegrondwet.nl, a website related to the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations.
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5.3.1  Bellekom, Heringa, Van der Velde and Verhey412
In the tenth edition of the ‘Compendium van het Staatsrecht’, the authors argue 
that Article 93 Constitutional Act determines what international standards have 
direct effect in the domestic legal order – those which are binding on all persons 
– and that those Provisions can be applied by the domestic Courts. Article 94 
Constitutional Act then determines basically the hierarchical relation between 
international standards that are binding on all persons (and thus directly applicable) 
and national standards: international standards that are binding on all persons are 
superior to domestic law. This imllies that domestic Courts may review national 
standards against these superior international standards.
According to the authors, it is solely for the Courts, and not for the Legislature, to 
decide whether an international standard is binding on all persons. This would 
follow from the famous railway-strike ruling, where the Supreme Court, contrary 
to the view expressed by the Legislature, held that the right to strike, as recognised 
in Article 6 (4) ESC, was directly applicable.413 The authors argue that the Judiciary 
mostly uses two approaches in determining whether an international Provision 
is directly applicable. Firstly, the Court may focus on the question whether the 
Provision literally recognises a right for the individual. Secondly, the Court may 
focus more on the content of the Provision. The Court, inspired by the Van 
Gend en Loos ruling of the European Court of Justice,414 determines whether the 
invoked Provision is by its nature capable to bind all persons. In other words: is 
the Provision specific enough to be applied by a Court without the intervention 
of the Legislature?415
As a consequence, the Judiciary may not review national law against international 
Provisions that are not binding on all persons. According to the authors of the 
Compendium, the Constitutional Act remains silent about the (hierarchical) relation 
between international customary law and domestic standards, but argue that 
it appears from case law that the Courts are competent to apply international 
customary law, as long as it does not review national law against these standards.416
412 Th.L. Bellekom, A.W. Heringa, J. van der Velde en L.F.M. Verhey, Compendium van het staatsrecht 
(10e druk), Deventer: Kluwer, 2007.
413 Th.L. Bellekom, A.W. Heringa, J. van der Velde en L.F.M. Verhey, Compendium van het staatsrecht (10e 
druk), Deventer: Kluwer, 2007, no. 29. Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling).
414 Court of Justice of the European Union, 05-02-1963, 26/62 (Van Gend en Loos Ruling).
415 Th.L. Bellekom, A.W. Heringa, J. van der Velde en L.F.M. Verhey, Compendium van het staatsrecht 
(10e druk), Deventer: Kluwer, 2007, no. 29.
416 The authors refer to the Nyugat ruling, in which the Supreme Court held that it was not competent 
to review a national standard against international customary law: Supreme Court, 6 March 1959, NJ 
1962, 2.
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5.3.2 Burkens, Kummeling, Vermeulen and Widdershoven417
A slightly different view on the matter is expressed by the authors of ‘Beginselen 
van de democratische rechtstaat’. They argue that it appears from customary 
Constitutional law that the Netherlands have a monistic system regarding the 
applicability of international standards. They refer to the ‘grenstractaat Aken’ 
ruling, in which the Supreme Court considered that, without reference to a specific 
(Constitutional) Provision, international law has direct effect in the domestic legal 
order without the need for transformation into domestic law first.418 The later 
adopted Articles 93 and 94 Constitutional Act are therefore not the recognition of 
a monistic system, but rather a limitation to already existing monism. In the first 
place, because Article 93 Constitutional Act states that it is required to publish an 
international standard first before it can be directly applicable. In the second place, 
because Article 94 Constitutional Act stipulates that the Judiciary (and also the 
administrative power), may only review national standards against international 
Provisions that are binding on all persons.
According to the authors, the system embedded in Articles 93 and 94 Constitutional 
Act only concerns a specific part of international law, and mainly instructs the 
Judiciary and administrative powers on how to treat that particular part of 
international law. This part only concerns the international standards that have 
been published and are binding on all persons. Therefore, international standards 
that are not binding on all persons have direct effect in the Netherlands, based 
on the aforementioned customary law, but may not be reviewed against. In this 
understanding, Article 94 Constitutional Act does not authorise the Judiciary to 
review against certain international standards, but rather restricts an already 
existing right in customary law to review against international standards in general 
to a specific group of international standards. Evidence that the international 
standards that may be reviewed against is indeed limited was found by the authors 
in the harmonisation Act ruling419 in which the Supreme Court held that it was not 
authorised to review national standards against international standards that were 
not binding on all persons, and in the Nyugat ruling, in which the Supreme Court 
ruled that it was not authorised to review against international customary law.
The authors argue that it is for the Courts to decide whether an international 
standard is binding on all persons, although this decision is not always easy to 
make. The authors consider that while there might be several approaches for 
the Courts in determining whether an international standard is binding on all 
persons, in reality the Courts will only look at the nature and content of the 
417 M.C. Burkens, H.R.B.M. Kummeling, B.P. Vermeulen and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Beginselen van de 
Democratische rechtstaat, inleiding tot de grondslagen van het Nederlandse staats- en bestuursrecht (5e druk), 
Deventer: Tjeenk Willink, 2001.
418 Supreme Court, 3 March 1919, NJ 1919, p. 371 (‘Grenstractaat Aken’-ruling).
419 Supreme Court 14 April 1989, AB 1989, 207/NJ 1989, 469 (harmonisation Act ruling).
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invoked standard: ‘a rule of international law is binding on all persons if the Provision 
is that precise and concrete that further elaboration in national law is unnecessary 
for domestic application’420 The authors underline that there is hardly any use for 
Courts to consider the intentions of the contracting parties regarding the direct 
applicability of the Provisions, for in most treaties both countries with dualistic 
and monistic Constitutional systems are involved. This makes it unlikely that 
matters of direct applicability – something that is hardly relevant for countries 
with a dualistic Constitutional system – are discussed in the negotiating process 
preceding the adoption of the treaty, or are mentioned in the text of a treaty. As 
an example, the authors refer to a famous passage of the railway-strike ruling: 
‘Whether or not the contracting States intended to grant direct effect to Article 6 ESC 
is not relevant, whereas neither from the text, nor the history of the formation of the 
treaty follows that they have agreed that Article 6 ESC is directly applicable. In that 
situation, according to Dutch law, only the content of the Provision is decisive (…).’421 
The authors then conclude that the intention of the contracting States is of almost 
no importance for the Dutch Courts in determining whether a treaty Provision 
is binding on all persons. Therefore, the Courts are bound to base their decision 
on the matter solely on the nature and content of the invoked treaty Provision. 
It is remarkable however, that in another passage, the authors recognise that 
the Courts quite often are led by the results of the Parliamentary discussion 
preceding the ratification of the treaty involved on the direct applicability of the 
international standard. The opinion of the Legislature is not decisive, but is taken 
into consideration by the Courts.
The basic criterion when determining whether an international standard is directly 
applicable is thus that a Court must be capable of applying a Provision without 
the need for intervention of the Legislature, which has to adopt further national 
legislation to elaborate the international standard. As a rule of thumb, the authors 
suggest that the Provisions recognising the so-called classic human rights are 
directly applicable, and the Provisions recognising social human rights are not. 
Main reason for this is that social rights often imply Government action, including 
the adoption of further national legislation, which would make direct applicability 
unlikely. According to the authors, this does not mean that Provisions containing 
social human rights would have no effect at all in the domestic legal order. The 
authors argue that Provisions containing social rights might have a ‘standstill’-
effect, meaning that in case a State causes a situation that deprives people of 
420 Original text in Dutch: ‘Een bepaling van internationaal recht is een ieder verbindend indien de bepaling 
dusdanig precies en concreet is dat uitwerking in nationale regelgeving niet nodig is om haar rechtstreeks in 
het nationale recht te kunnen toepassen.’
421 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling), consideration 3.2. Original text in 
Dutch: ‘Of verdragsluitende Staten al dan niet hebben beoogd aan artikel 6 ESH directe werking toe te kennen, 
is niet van belang nu noch uit de tekst, noch uit de geschiedenis van de totstandkoming van het verdrag valt af 
te leiden dat zij zijn overeengekomen dat aan artikel 6, vierde lid, die werking niet mag worden toegekend. Bij 
deze stand van zaken is naar Nederlands recht enkel de inhoud van de bepaling beslissend (…).’
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previous benefits that are embedded in a social right, the standstill effect of this 
right might be reason for a Court to still apply the social human right, even if it 
would normally be considered to be a Provision that is not directly applicable. 
Also, the authors refer to Article 7 (a) (i) ICESCR, that despite the fact that it 
recognises a social human right, was used by the Supreme Court to give a certain 
interpretation to Article 26 ICCPR.
5.3.3 Van der Pot (adapted by Elzinga and De Lange)422
The authors of ‘Van der Pot, Handboek van het Nederlandse Staatsrecht’ also 
start from the point of view that the Dutch Constitutional system is of a monistic 
nature. In their view, evidence of this can be found in the Supreme Court’s verdict 
‘Grenstractaat Aken’423, an approach that later, after some Parliamentary discussion, 
was reaffirmed in Article 93 Constitutional Act. During the Constitutional reforms 
of 1953, it was unclear whether treaty Provisions that were ratified before the 
adoption of Article 93 Constitutional Act were also superior to national Provisions. 
Originally, it was the intention of the Government not to decide on this during 
the Constitutional reforms, but rather to leave the matter to the Judiciary (who 
until then also did not specifically decide on the matter). Despite this, Article 
94 was added to the Constitution by the amendment Serrarens and co424 to give 
a more detailed description of the Courts’ obligation to review national law 
against international standards. Consequently, according to the authors, on the 
one hand the Courts now had an obligation to also review national legislation 
against international Provisions that were ratified before the adoption of Article 
93 Constitutional Act. The Courts are thus obliged to review national legislation 
against all international standards that are binding on all persons. On the other 
hand the Supreme Court understood Article 94 Constitutional Act as a prohibition 
to review national standards against legal standards that would fall outside the 
scope of Article 94 Constitutional Act, including international customary law and 
standards that are not binding on all persons. Evidence for this was found in the 
aforementioned Nyugat ruling.425
422 C.W. Van der Pot (adapted by D.J. Elzinga and R. De Lange), Handboek van het Nederlandse Staatsrecht 
(15e druk), Deventer: Kluwer, 2006.
423 Supreme Court, 3 March 1919, NJ 1919, p. 371 (‘Grenstractaat Aken’ ruling).
424 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 32.
425 Supreme Court, 6 March 1959, NJ 1962, 2. The authors quoted: ‘dat blijkens de geschiedenis van 
artikel 66 met dit artikel bepaaldelijk bedoeld is den strijd te beslechten over de vraag, in hoeverre de 
Nederlandse rechter het Nederlandse recht op strijd met het internationale recht mag toetsen, en deze toetsing 
uitdrukkelijk heeft willen beperken tot de gevallen van de in dat artikel vermelde zelfwerkende bepalingen van 
overeenkomsten.’ Freely translated: ‘that, according to the history of Article 66, it was intended to definitely 
settle the question to what extent the Dutch Court can review Dutch law against international law by this 
Article, and this review has explicitly been limited to the cases of Articles that are self-operating Provisions.’
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 127 
 Dutch monism and the Constitutional reforms of Article 93 and 94 CA
The authors are of the opinion, following from the railway-strike ruling,426 that 
the Courts determine whether an international Provision is binding on all persons 
purely based on the interpretation of the invoked treaty Provision, and mostly not 
based on other criteria, such as the intention of the contracting States. According 
to the authors, this approach resulted in permanent case law, in which as a rule 
of thumb Provisions of the ECHR and ICCPR are considered to be binding on all 
persons, and Provisions of the ESC and ICESCR are not. However, the authors 
claim that at this, it is not the particular treaty in which the Provision is embedded 
that determines whether the Provision is binding on all persons or not, but the 
content of the Provision itself. To demonstrate this, they underline that there 
appear to be exceptions to this rule of thumb. As an example, they refer to the 
fact that the Dutch Courts generally deny direct effect to Articles 14 ECHR and 3, 
15 (5), and 23 (4) ICCPR, and grant direct effect to Articles 6 (4) ESC and (under 
certain conditions) Article 7 (a) (i) ICESCR. In this context, the authors furthermore 
argue that Provisions of the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention Against Torture will probably not be binding 
on all persons, and direct effect of certain Provisions of the CEDAW and ICRC is 
not unthinkable.
5.3.4 Kortmann427
In his work ‘Constitutioneel Recht’, Kortmann argues that the Dutch Constitutional 
system is of a monistic nature. Evidence for this cannot be found in the Constitution 
itself, but in case law, especially in the ‘Grenstractaat Aken’ ruling.428 In this verdict, 
the Supreme Court decided that an international standard has a double effect. 
Firstly, on State level, it binds the Dutch State in relation to other countries, and 
secondly, in domestic law, the Dutch citizen may invoke the standard. According 
to Kortmann, the function of Article 93 Constitutional Act is not to embed monism 
in the Dutch Constitution, but only to oblige all public offices (not only the Courts) 
to apply all international Provisions that are binding on all persons, and only if the 
international standard has been published. Due to this publication requirement, 
Kortmann considers that Article 93 Constitutional Act introduces an element 
of dualism in the Constitution. Since this prerequisite only applies to directly 
applicable standards, other international standards still have an automatic direct 
effect according to case law, although they cannot be applied by public offices 
in their relation to citizens. Therefore, the Dutch Constitutional system is of a 
monistic nature, but not fully concerning standards that are binding on all persons.
According to Kortmann, it is in the end the Judiciary that decides whether an 
international standard is binding on all persons, using the wording, nature, purpose 
426 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (Railway strike ruling).
427 C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel Recht (6e druk), Deventer: Kluwer, 2008.
428 Supreme Court, 3 March 1919, NJ 1919, p. 371 (‘Grenstractaat Aken’-ruling).
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and legislative history of the standard as leading criteria. In rare occasions, the 
Court may pay some attention to the national legal context in which the standard 
should operate. Also, occasionally, the views expressed in Parliamentary History 
may influence the decision on the matter, but are certainly not binding to the Court.
Article 94 Constitutional Act then stipulates that the Courts are bound not to apply 
a national standard that is in contradiction with an international standard that is 
binding on all persons. Furthermore, Kortmann makes some additional remarks 
on the exact meaning of the Constitutional Provision. Firstly, he considers that 
Article 94 Constitutional Act not only entails an obligation to review national 
standards against international standards that are binding on all persons, but also 
a prohibition to review national standards against international standards that are 
not binding on all persons or international customary law. Secondly, Kortmann 
considers the relation between international standards and domestic law. He 
argues that strictly speaking Article 94 Constitutional Act has no effect on the 
relation between international standards and domestic law, for the Courts should 
only review in a specific situation the application of a national standard in concreto 
against an international standard that is binding on all persons, and not against 
the standard in abstracto, although he observes that, in some cases, the Courts 
seem to review the standard in general. If the Court rules that application of a 
domestic standard is not in accordance with the disputed international standard 
binding on all persons, the Court has the obligation to disregard the domestic 
standard. However, it may also occur that a Court decides that the Court finds 
that the application of a national standard is in contradiction to an international 
standard, but does not want to rule on the matter, for then the Court would 
exceed its competences in a trias politica, and act as lawmaker instead of a Court. 
Thirdly, Kortmann underlines that Article 94 Constitutional Act concerns all 
national legislation, regardless of the position in the hierarchy of legal rules in 
the Dutch legal order or the time of adoption. Finally, Kortmann argues that 
Article 94 Constitutional Act is not addressed to Courts specifically, and thus, as 
a consequence, to everyone in a public capacity who is competent in applying 
national standards.
Summarising the above, Kortmann argues that based on case law, the Dutch 
Constitution is of a monistic nature. Article 93 Constitutional Act limits this monism 
slightly by introducing the prerequisite of publication for domestic application of 
international standards that are binding on all persons. Article 94 Constitutional 
Act obliges the Courts (and other competent bodies) not to apply domestic law 
that is in contradiction with these international standards binding on all persons.
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5.3.5 Vlemminx and Boekhorst429
Completely different from the above is the interpretation given by Vlemminx 
and Boekhorst to the Constitutional system embedded in Articles 93 and 94 
Constitutional Act. Also Vlemminx and Boekhorst base their interpretation of 
both Articles on Constitutional history. The authors underline that during the 
Constitutional Reforms of 1953, the current Article 94 Constitutional Act was 
not included in the original Bill. The then-Government was of the opinion that a 
predecessor of the current Article 93 Constitutional Act needed to be included in 
the Constitution, to ensure legal security for citizens regarding the direct effect 
of international standards. The main purpose of including Article 93 in the 
Constitution was thus to ensure that citizens would be aware of directly applicable 
international standards before they would be applied to them. It is in this light that 
Vlemminx and Boekhorst stress that the original focus of Article 93 Constitutional 
Act was to ensure legal security for citizens concerning duties that are embedded 
in directly applicable international standards. According to the authors, the review 
of national standards against international treaty Provisions was a different issue. 
It was the original intention of the then-Government to leave this matter to the 
development in case law, instead of regulating it by a Constitutional Provision. 
Nevertheless, by Amendment Serrarens and co, the predecessor of the current 
Article 94 was adopted, albeit without the term ‘binding on all persons’. Main 
motivation for introducing Article 94 Constitutional Act appeared to be the fear 
for uncertainty concerning the judicial review against international standards. 
According to Vlemminx and Boekhorst, the term ‘binding on all persons’ was 
later (during the Constitutional reform of 1956) added to Article 94, mainly to 
express that the Courts should show some restraint in reviewing national law 
against international standards. It is unclear however why the choice was made 
to use this particular phrasing.
Considering the above, Vlemminx and Broekhorst underline that historically, the 
functions of Articles 93 and 94 Constitutional Act differ fundamentally. In this light, 
the adding of the term ‘binding on all persons’ to Article 94 Constitutional Act, 
while the very same term is also used in Article 93, causes uncertainty about the 
meaning of this term, and the relation between Articles 93 and 94 Constitutional 
Act. According to the authors, the meaning of the concept ‘binding on all persons’ 
can be understood in two ways: either the term has an identical meaning in both 
Articles, or the term must be understood differently, depending on the Article 
in which it is embedded.
According to the authors, an identical understanding of the term, although 
generally accepted, leads to nothing good. In this understanding one starts from 
429 F.M.C. Vlemminx and M.G. Boekhorst, in: A.K. Koekoek (eds.), De grondwet, een systematisch en 
artikelgewijs commentaar (3e druk), Deventer: Tjeenk Willink, 2000.
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the function of Article 94 Constitutional Act, that is to regulate the application 
of international law by the Judiciary, which concerns both duties and rights for 
citizens. Consequently, Article 93 Constitutional Act would then also concern 
rights and duties, and not merely duties, as originally intended. Such an identical 
interpretation leads to difficulties. In the first place, the authors argue that it was 
originally intended that due to its function Article 93 only concerned Provisions 
that were directly addressed to private persons.430 On the other hand, the Judiciary, 
based on Article 94 CA, appears to be willing to grant direct effect to treaty 
Provisions that are not necessarily addressed to private persons. These different 
approaches to the term ‘binding on al persons’ are difficult to match. Furthermore, 
an identical interpretation leads to two methods of determining whether or not an 
international standard has direct effect in the domestic legal order. Firstly, based 
on Article 93 CA, the Government needs to decide beforehand and in abstracto 
whether or not to publish the standard, while secondly, it appears more convincing 
to decide in concreto whether a standard is binding on all persons based on Article 
94 CA. Inevitably, tension between the two approaches exists. Although there 
seems to be agreement on the fact that it is up to the Courts to have a final say 
in determining whether a standard is directly applicable, legal practice proves 
otherwise. According to Vlemminx and Boekhorst, in the past, Governments did 
not hesitate to unbind a treaty that has been judged binding on all persons by the 
Judiciary in contrast to the opinion of the Government. In addition, theoretically, 
a Government could deny direct effect of an international Provision simply by not 
publishing the standard. This would be not much of a problem if the international 
standard would stipulate duties for citizens, but if Article 93 is understood as 
also concerning rights, it could lead to a situation in which a Government could 
(deliberately or not) deny these rights to citizens, and as a consequence, Article 93 
may work against the citizens instead of ensuring legal security. The Government 
thus might have a strong influence in the discussion whether an international 
Provision is binding on all persons or not, which affects the divisions of power 
in trias politica, and might cause serious problems considering the increasing 
importance of international law.
As an alternative to this generally accepted identical interpretation, Vlemminx and 
Boekhorst suggest giving a different meaning to ‘binding on all persons’ per Article, 
based on the originally intended function in the first reading of the Constitutional 
reforms in 1953. In this understanding, Article 93 CA only concerns duties for 
citizens, and Article 94 both rights and duties. As a consequence, the Judiciary 
430 To underline this point of view, F.M.C. Vlemminx en M.G. Boekhorst refer to Parliamentary Reports, 
II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, p. 7. Although the following nuance does not necessarily detract from their 
main argument, it is unclear to us how it appears from the Explanatory Memorandum that the then-
Government indeed referred to treaty Provisions that were literally addressed to private persons. The 
Government merely underlined that ‘private persons are not bound to international agreements insofar they 
have not been published in any way.’ Original text in Dutch: ‘private personen niet aan een internationale 
overeenkomst zijn gebonden, voor zover deze niet op een of andere wijze is bekend gemaakt.’
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and the Government do not obstruct one another. The Government will decide 
in abstracto when a treaty Provision that stipulates duties is specific enough that 
it is binding on all persons, doing justice to the principle of legality. The Courts 
may decide, without Governmental interference, whether an invoked treaty 
Provision has direct effect in a particular Court case. This would do most justice 
to the division of powers and leads to more coherence regarding the functioning 
of international law in the domestic legal order.
According to Vlemminx and Boekhorst, the identical interpretation led to confusion 
regarding the direct applicability of international standards. Courts are especially 
cautious at reviewing national standards against ECOSOC rights embedded in 
international treaties, for they are well aware of the Government’s aversion against 
review against treaties that imply financial obligations for the Government. In 
addition, the authors observe that the case law appears to be inconsistent and 
confusing. It is therefore not surprising that in literature scholars struggle to 
capture the exact meaning of Article 94 CA, and its case law.
In addition, Vlemminx and Boekhorst argue that regarding international customary 
law, the Dutch Constitutional system is of a monistic nature, based on case law.
5.4 Questions
There appears to be a variety of opinions amongst de Dutch scholars on the 
exact meaning of the Constitutional system concerning the effect of international 
standards in the national legal order. There seems to be in particular uncertainty 
about the following issues: firstly, the origin of Dutch monism is unclear. Some 
authors claim that monism appears from case law, while others claim that monism 
was introduced by or reaffirmed in Article 93 CA. Secondly, the nature of monism 
is disputed: although most authors agree that Articles 93 and 94 CA somehow 
limit monism or introduce dualistic elements, they do not agree on the exact 
consequences of this. Thirdly, whereas most authors agree on the fact that the 
Courts have a final say in determining whether an international Provision is 
directly applicable, it is unclear what the exact relation is between Articles 93 
and 94 CA, and thus the exact relation between the Legislature (Government) 
and the Judiciary. Fourthly, in this context, it is debated what legal sources the 
Courts then use in determining whether an international standard is binding on 
all persons. The railway-strike ruling appears to be an influential verdict here, 
especially when ECOSOC rights are involved, but is quoted in different contexts, 
basically to demonstrate that the intention of the contracting parties concerning 
direct effect of an international Provision hardly plays a role, and instead, the 
Courts consider the nature and content of the Provision. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, legal practice regarding the right to food shows a different approach.
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As mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, it is the purpose of this Chapter 
to fully understand how the Constitutional system of Articles 93 and 94 CA works. 
The authors of the most prominent literature on the matter appear to understand 
the Constitutional Provisions most differently, although there is some similarity 
in sources their conclusions are based on. Most authors quote the Parliamentary 
History of the three Constitutional reforms that finally resulted in the current 
Articles 93 and 94 CA: the reforms of 1953, 1956, and 1983. Therefore, in the next 
sections, an analysis of this Parliamentary History will be made, to try to reach a 
more unambiguous conclusion regarding the first three questions. The matter of 
the sources that Courts usually use to determine whether an international standard 
is directly applicable will be addressed further in this book, for it will appear 
that this is closely related not only to the exact relation between the Legislature 
and the Judiciary, but also intertwined with the considerations expressed in the 
Parliamentary History of the ratification Bills of international treaties. This will 
be explained more thoroughly in Chapters 7 and 8.
5.5 On parliamentary history/the legislative process
In the Netherlands, both the States General and the Government are involved in 
the legislation process. The States General has a bicameral system, consisting of 
a directly chosen House of Representatives and an indirectly chosen Senate, and 
their Parliamentarians are representing the people of the Netherlands. Although 
both the Government and the House of Representatives have the right to present 
a bill, in most cases this is done by the Government, who can use the expertise of 
its Ministries, and normally can count on a majority in both Chambers that will 
approve of the Bill. A Bill that ratifies an international treaty however, is naturally 
proposed by the Government, due to the fact that the treaty was negotiated for and 
signed in the international arena by (representatives of) the Government. Before 
the Government presents the Bill to Parliament, the supreme advisory body of 
the Crown (the Council of State) will give its recommendation on both the draft 
and the related Explanatory Memorandum, which may lead to some alterations 
in the proposed texts. The Government then will present both documents to the 
House of Representatives. Firstly, a committee consisting of a handful of Members 
of the House of Representatives (but a proportional representation of the political 
parties) will carry out the preparatory examinations of the Bill, and in a Preliminary 
Report formulate written questions to the Government, which will reply in writing 
as well. Sometimes two or three rounds of written communication between this 
committee and the Government are deemed necessary. Secondly, the Bill will be 
discussed in and by the House of Representatives. The regular procedure is that 
one (and sometimes two) representative(s) of each political party express(es) the 
opinion of the whole party, and ask(s) further questions to the Government. All 
Members of the House of Representatives and the Government have the right to 
amend the Bill. Finally, the present Members of the House of Representatives 
vote on the bill and the submitted amendments. After the Bill has passed the 
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House of Representatives, it will be presented to the Senatese. Now, a committee 
consisting of Members of the Senate will carry out the preparatory examinations. 
Thereafter, the Bill will be discussed in the Senate, and will be voted on. Members 
of the Senate have no right to make amendments however. All documents are 
publicly available, and published as Parliamentary Documents. The procedure for a 
Constitutional reform is similar to the above, although the Government is regularly 
not only advised by the Council of State, but also by a Commission of State, and 
occasionally by special advisory bodies that are temporarily established for that 
specific purpose. Also, a Constitutional reform must pass the States General twice. 
The first time with a normal majority, after which the House of Representatives 
will be dissolved and replaced through elections by a new one. The States General 
will have to adopt the reform a second time (without the possibility of the House 
of Representatives to make amendments) with a two-third majority.431
5.6 The Constitutional reform of 1953
In the explanatory documents written by the Dutch Government on the first 
reading of the Constitutional reforms of 1953, some contextual remarks were made 
concerning Dutch international relations.432 According to the Government, there 
was a worldwide tendency to increase international cooperation. The Netherlands 
appeared to be more active in investing in international relations as well, and 
became a Member of, among others, the Western European Union, the NATO, 
the BENELUX, and the UN. The Government considered that the increasing 
international cooperation would eventually result in significant international rights 
and duties, which could possibly also affect the domestic legal order. Also, the 
Government did not preclude the possibility that in the near future international 
bodies with a Parliamentary nature would be installed, which was expected 
especially within the Council of Europe. These circumstances constituted the 
cause for the Dutch Government to propose a Constitutional reform regarding 
international relations.433
In the first draft, the Government only proposed to adopt a predecessor of the 
current Article 93 CA,434 while the predecessor of the current Article 94 CA was 
adopted by amendment.435 The debates in Parliament on the draft Bill mainly 
focussed on the question whether the Legislature or the Judiciary should decide 
whether an international Provision had direct effect.
431 In this section, we thankfully made use of the terminology and explanation offered in: L. Prakke 
and C. Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional law of 15 EU Member States, Deventer: Kluwer, 2004, especially 
p. 621-625.
432 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 2.
433 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, in particular p. 2.
434 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 2, draft bill, Article 60d.
435 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 17, later replaced by no. 32.
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5.6.1  The predecessor of Article 93 CA during the Constitutional 
reform of 1953
Originally, the Dutch Government proposed to adopt only the following Provision:
Agreements are binding on citizens only insofar as they have been published. 
The law provides rules concerning the publication.436
De Preparatory Committee argued that it was difficult to exactly determine what 
individuals would fall under the scope of ‘civilian’, and therefore recommended 
to replace the term ‘civilian’ with ‘all’,437 in line with an earlier report of the 
Constitutional Commission-Van Eysinga.438 This suggestion was later accepted 
by the Government in a letter of amendment, replacing the original draft:
The law provides rules concerning the publication of agreements. Agreements 
are binding on all persons insofar as they have been published.439
The Government however, offered no further explanation on the exact scope of 
the term ‘civilian’ or ‘all.’
It seems that with this draft Bill the Government chose to introduce a monistic 
system in the Dutch Constitution, by underlining in its Explanatory Memorandum 
that: ‘the Government thus rejects the view that international agreements can only bind 
citizens through a law.’440 On the other hand, the Government considered that it 
would not be desirable when a civilian or any private party could be bound to 
an international agreement while this agreement was not published first. In line 
with Vlemminx and Boekhorst,441 it appears that the Government proposed the 
adoption of this Article to avoid a situation in which citizens and private persons 
would not be aware of the fact that they are bound by international treaties that 
impose duties on them. In the Preparatory Committee there were some doubts 
436 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 2 Original text in Dutch: ‘Overeenkomsten verbinden 
de burgers slechts voor zover zij zijn bekend gemaakt. De wet geeft regels omtrent de bekendmaking.’
437 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9, Preliminary Report, p. 26.
438 The official Dutch name fort this committee was: ‘Commissie nopens samenwerking tussen regering 
en Staten-Generaal inzake het buitenlandse beleid,’ freely translated: ‘Committee concerning the cooperation 
between Government and Parliament on foreign policy.’ See the committee’s final report: ‘Eindrapport van de 
commissie nopens de samenwerking tussen Regering en Staten-Generaal inzake het buitenlandse beleid,’ 9 July 
1951, NL-HaNA, BuZa/Code-Archief 45-54, 2.05.117, inv.no. 27297, p. 24. Available at: www.historici.nl.
439 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 26, letter of amendment, submitted on 18 
March 1952. Original text in Dutch: ‘De wet geeft regels omtrent de bekendmaking van overeenkomsten. De 
overeenkomsten verbinden een ieder, voorzover zij zijn bekend gemaakt.’
440 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 7. Original text 
in Dutch: ‘De regering verwerpt derhalve het standpunt, dat internationale overeenkomsten slechts via een 
wet de burgers kunnen binden.’
441 F.M.C. Vlemminx and M.G. Boekhorst, in: A.K. Koekoek (ed.), De grondwet, een systematisch en 
artikelgewijs commentaar (3e druk), Deventer: Tjeenk Willink, 2000.
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on whether such a Provision would not stand in the way of the proper functioning 
of the international legal order. Especially when international Provisions would 
only have effect in the domestic legal order under certain conditions, in this 
case the prerequisite of publication. The Government responded that it was not 
the intention to limit the effect of international agreements between States, but 
merely to regulate the liability of the citizen towards the State. The Government 
argued that it would object to a situation in which ‘nationals of the State could be 
bound to rules whose existence they could not know of’442, which would follow from 
the primacy of international law over domestic legislation without restrictions. 
Therefore, the Government responded that it would rather restrict the effect of 
international law to protect the legal security of the individual, than ‘to deny the 
general principle of law that citizens cannot be considered to be bound to standards 
that are not known to them.’
5.6.2  The predecessor of Article 94 CA during the Constitutional 
reform of 1953
5.6.2.1 The position of the Government
While there appeared to be hardly any disagreement on the primacy of international 
law over national law in general, the competence of the Judiciary to review 
anterior national legislation against international standards adopted later,443 and 
the general prohibition of judicial review against the Constitution,444 there was 
a fierce discussion on the question whether it should be the Legislature or the 
Judiciary who decides whether a subsequent domestic law is contrary to an earlier 
adopted international standard.
As stated above, in the first draft of the Constitutional reform proposed by the 
Government, no predecessor of the current Article 94 CA was included, which 
was in contradiction to the recommendations of both the Committee-Van Eysinga 
and the Constitutional Committee.445 For instance, the Committee-Van Eysinga 
suggested adding a Provision that would stipulate that ‘The thus proclaimed treaties 
are binding for everyone even if (domestic) regulations deviate.’446 Although the 
Government was of the opinion that the ‘existing Constitutional rules give rise to 
442 Original text in Dutch: ‘onderdanen van de Staat gebonden zouden kunnen zijn aan regels van welker 
bestaan zij geen kennis hebben kunnen nemen.’
443 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9, p. 19; Parliamentary Documents, I 1951-1952, 
2374, no. 113, p. 3.
444 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 7, letter of amendment: ‘The Judiciary shall not 
enter into the review of the Constitutionality of agreements.’ Original text in Dutch: ‘De rechter treedt niet in 
de beoordeling van de grondwettigheid van overeenkomsten.’ A view that is now expressed in Article 120 
Constitutional Act.
445 Both committees were installed to advise the Government on the draft of Constitutional reforms.
446 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, p. 3. Original text in Dutch: ‘De aldus afgekondigde 
verdragen zijn voor een ieder verbindend ook indien wettelijke voorschriften ervan afwijken.’
136 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 5
disagreement regarding the primacy of an international agreement over a subsequently 
adopted (national) law and that it would therefore in itself be considered desirable to 
to explicitly regulate this by Constitution’447, it considered that it would be too early 
to take a fundamental decision on the matter. Especially due to the fact that 
within the Constitutional Committee there was certainly no agreement on the 
recommended Provision, which was expressed by a minority memorandum of 
some of its Members who did not agree with the proposed Article; a view that 
was apparently also widely supported outside the arena of the Committee. Also, 
until then the Judiciary seemed to be reluctant in taking a clear position on the 
matter.448 The Parliamentary discussion therefore mainly focussed on the question 
whether it should be the Legislature or the Judiciary who decides whether a 
subsequent domestic law is contrary to an earlier adopted international standard, 
while the Government persisted to abstain from taking a position, considering 
the deep and fierce Parliamentary debates.449
5.6.2.2  The review of anterior national law against posterior international 
standards
The Parliamentary debate between those against and those in favour of judicial 
review can be subdivided into four main issues:
447 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, p. 3. Original text in Dutch: ‘…dat bestaande 
Grondwetsvoorschriften aanleiding geven tot meningsverschil omtrent de voorrang van een internationale 
overeenkomst boven een later tot stand gekomen wet en dat het op zichzelf beschouwd derhalve wel gewenst 
zou zijn dit punt in de Grondwet uitdrukkelijk te regelen.’
448 The Preparatory Committee underlined that so far only in one verdict a Court ruled on the matter 
whether international law should have primacy over subsequent domestic law: the Special Council of 
Cassation held that ‘in cases of doubt, the Court has the duty to determine whether a law is compatible with 
the international agreement, also in cases when the latter was adopted before the first.’ (Special Council of 
Cassation, 12 January 1949, NJ 1949, no. 87, ‘Rauter’ ruling; Original text in Dutch: ‘de rechter in geval 
van twijfel heeft te onderzoeken, of de wet met de overeenkomst verenigbaar is, ook indien de laatste van een 
vroegere datum is dan de eerste’. The Supreme Court however structurally refrained from ruling on the 
matter. See: Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9, p. 19; Parliamentary Documents, II 
1951-1952, 2374, no. 10, p. 28.
449 For instance, Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 10, p. 28. However, it appeared that 
for a short moment Minister Beel broke with that attitude, by referring – albeit very cautiously – to a 
conclusion of Attorney-General Langemeyer. In this conclusion, it was argued that the basic idea of a 
prohibition on Constitutional review was that ‘in case of serious doubt concerning the legality of a certain 
act of legislation, it is the Legislator who is best suited to settle the doubt, and there is in principle no room 
for judicial review. The Attorney-General finally concludes that the review of the law against international 
standards would only be appropriate in case of the absence of a serious review by the Legislator.’ In addition, 
the Minister argued that it would not be easy to interpret international standards due to the often vague 
formulation and the inclusion of a restriction clause that allows for deviation from international law. 
While instantly adding that due to the very different visions concerning the matter, the Government 
did not want to take a final decision, the Minister appeared to favour review of international standards 
by the Legislator over judicial review, or at least in cases in which the Legislator did not express an 
unambiguous view on direct effect of a Provision. See: Minister Beel, House of Representatives, 61st 
meeting, 14 March 1952. Mr Anema argued in the Senate that such an approach from a practical point 
of view would not be feasible. See: Mr Anema, Senate, 40th meeting, 6 May 1952.
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Firstly, the question was raised how and to what extent judicial review and review 
by the Legislature would affect (national or international) legal security.
In Parliament, some supporters of a system of judicial review argued international 
legal security could not be guaranteed when Governments could intentionally, 
but more likely unintentionally in complex legal situations, undo the effect of 
treaty Provisions by adopting contradicting legislation.450 In this light, the question 
was raised whether a Legislator can be aware of all the current international 
standards when adopting a domestic law.451 The prohibition of judicial review 
of domestic law against international standards would then lead to case law in 
which the Court would continuously have to speculate about the intention of the 
Legislature. A wrong interpretation of the international standard then could lead 
to subordination of Dutch citizens to citizens of countries in which judicial review 
against treaty Provisions is allowed and such interpretation could be contested 
in Court.452 Another consequence would be that the Dutch Judiciary applied the 
international standard differently – that is: as understood by the Dutch Legislature 
– compared to the understanding of this standard elsewhere. This would then 
lead to international legal insecurity, or inequality.453 Nonetheless, according to 
some Parliamentarians, the argument that national judicial review of international 
standards in itself could also lead to legal insecurity by unequal application of 
the law not under dispute, but some Parliamentarians explicitly considered that 
international legal security was more important than national legal security.454 
In addition, it was considered that the assurance of justice was more important 
than the assurance of legal security: a Legislator would in its review be led by 
policy and State-interest arguments, while a Court would only be led by legal rules. 
In that light, it would be a better option to choose for judicial review instead of 
review by the Legislature.455
Supporters of review by the Legislature however argued that national legal 
security would best be guaranteed when the Legislature would review national 
law against international law, for it would result in an unambiguous nationally 
binding interpretation of the national law that was established before.456 In case 
of judicial review, the Legislature, especially in case of any doubts concerning 
the compliance of an anterior domestic standard with a posterior international 
Provision, would only adopt that domestic law if it is most certainly in line with the 
450 For instance, Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, p. 3.
451 See for instance: Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, p. 3; Parliamentary Documents, 
II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9, p. 19.
452 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, p. 3.
453 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9, pp. 19 and 20.
454 See for instance: Serrarens, House of Representatives, 60th meeting, 13 March 1952; Mr Bruins-Slot, 
House of Representatives, 62nd meeting, 18 March 1952; Mr Wijers, Senate, 40th meeting, 6 May 1952.
455 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9, p. 19; Parliamentary Documents, I 1951-1952, 
2374, no. 113, p. 4, see also Mr Bruins-Slot, House of Representatives, 60th meeting, 13 March 1952.
456 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9, p. 20.
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international Provision in order to establish legal security. This could however lead 
to a situation in which the treaty Provisions are understood in a much broader way 
than was originally intended by the contracting parties.457 Also, it was argued that 
national Legislators would easier come to a uniform understanding of international 
standards than national Courts, due to the fact that the national Governments are 
more capable to discuss the understanding of an international standard compared 
to (independently operating) national Courts.458 Another argument was that the 
international legal system consisted of an obscure mixture of international bodies 
that produce different kinds of international standards, which makes it difficult 
to determine what standards exactly would fall under the scope of international 
law. judicial review then would lead to more national legal insecurity.459
Secondly, the question was raised whether or not the national ban on Constitutional 
review, currently embedded in Article 120 CA,460 could be applied analogously 
to international law.
A group of Parliamentarians who were in favour of judicial review argued that 
analogous application of a national ban on Constitutional review in accordance with 
international standards would be incorrect, for there were too many differences 
between national and international law. For instance, it was underlined that the 
existing ban on Constitutional review was developed only within the national 
context, and had a historic background that was not comparable to the international 
situation.461 In addition, it was argued that law development at an international 
stage could not be compared with national law development, and therefore, an 
analogous ban on judicial review of domestic law against international standards 
could not be justified by arguments based on the assumption that the ban on 
reviewing law against the Constitution encompasses a general principle.462 In 
that light, Parliamentarian Weijers was of the opinion that a ban on Constitutional 
review not necessarily encompassed a basic idea not to review lower legal standards 
against higher legal standards, but rather that Constitutional review was not 
comparable with review against international standards. He considered that firstly a 
Constitution represents a relatively small set of rules which the Legislature is quite 
familiar with and therefore most capable of reviewing its own legislation against, 
while the Legislature is usually less familiar with international law. Secondly, a 
Constitution should be a rigid set of rules, not altered or differently understood, 
and therefore the review by the Legislature is the best option, while international 
law should be more flexible, in line with international developments. Thirdly and 
most importantly, the draft of a Constitution and other legislation completely 
457 Parliamentary Documents, I 1951-1952, 2374, no. 113a, p.8.
458 Mr Oud, House of Representatives, 62nd meeting, 18 March 1952.
459 Mr Burger and Mr Oud, House of Representatives, 60th meeting, 13 March 1952.
460 During the Parliamentary discussion Article 124 CA.
461 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9, p. 19.
462 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9. p. 20.
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falls under the authority of the Legislature, whereas the draft of international 
Provisions instead limits the sovereignty of the Legislature.463 While Mr Weijers 
defended the position against a review ban against international law based on 
arguments that underlined the differences between national law and international 
law, Mr Romme defended the same position by analogously applying the national 
review competences of the Courts to the international setting. He argued that 
according to Dutch law, a Court was allowed to review a posterior law against an 
anterior law, and the lower legal standard against the higher legal standard. When 
applied to international law, this would thus imply that also here the Courts are 
competent to review the lower, posterior domestic law against the higher, anterior 
international Provision.464
Those supporting the idea of a review by the Legislature, as recommended by 
the Constitutional Commission,465 argued inter alia that the existing ban on 
Constitutional judicial review could very well be applied analogously to the 
situation in which a posterior law was reviewed against an anterior international 
standard, due to the high degree of similarity between both situations.466 It was 
argued that the ban on Constitutional review encompassed one of the pillars of 
Dutch Constitutional law and should therefore not be put aside too easily. Judicial 
review against international Provisions would be contrary to that principle.467 
Mr Oud explained that the principle embedded in the ban on Constitutional 
review implied that in a national setting, it is explicitly the competence of the 
Legislature to review its own legislation against the Constitution, and not of the 
Judiciary, effectively establishing immunity of the law. The increasing adoption 
of international Provisions that have effect in the domestic legal order does not 
change this principle, and also in this relation the law should be immune, and thus 
it should be the Legislature that reviews a national law against a treaty Provision.468 
Mr Oud disagreed with the analogous application of the review competences 
of the Judiciary as suggested by Mr Romme, arguing that in the Netherlands 
there is no such principle as the competence of the Judiciary to review a lower 
standard against a higher standard. He stated that there was rather the principle 
that it is normally the Court that belongs to the community that adopted the 
higher standard that is competent in reviewing the lower standard against the 
higher standard. In case of international law, such a Court that belongs to the 
international community did not yet exist. According to Mr Oud, it is preferable 
463 Mr Wijers, Senate, 40th meeting, 6 May 1952.
464 Mr Romme, in the House of Representatives, 61st meeting, 14 March 1952.
465 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 8.
466 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, p. 3. See also: Mr Oud, House of Representatives, 
62th meeting, 18 March 1952.
467 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9. p. 20.
468 Mr Oud, House of Representatives, 62th meeting, 18 March 1952.
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to also apply the principle of law immunity to the relation between national law 
and international law, until such international Court exists.469
Thirdly, the question was raised whether the Judiciary or the Legislature would 
be most competent to review against international Provisions.
Those supporting judicial review argued that in case of a legal dispute the Legislature 
would not be very competent to perform an interpretative function regarding 
treaty Provisions.470 Some Parliamentarians expressed great confidence in the 
interpretative capacity of the Judiciary.471 Also, it was argued that when review 
competences would be entrusted to the Legislature, it would practically rule on its 
own case,472 especially when the case concerned a duty of the Government towards 
a citizen. In that case, the citizen should be capable to enforce the proper fulfilment 
of that duty, in line with the international Provision.473 In addition, it was argued 
that the Judiciary would be more competent to review against international law 
instead of a Legislator, who would be more driven by nationalist considerations.474
Those defending review by the Legislature argued that in matters regarding the 
review against international law not only concerned matters of law, but also 
matters of policy, which should normally be decided on by the Legislature and 
not by the Judiciary.475
Fourthly, the aforementioned discussions must be placed in the context of the 
perception of international law at the time. There were some huge expectations 
about the future development of international law: it was argued that in the long 
term eventually an international Court would be installed that would be authorised 
to rule on matters of international law. The question then was whether in the 
meantime the Legislature or the Courts would be responsible for the interpretation 
of international standards.476
Fifthly, among those who defended review by the Legislature, occasionally the 
fear was expressed that citizens might abuse the legal system when posterior 
469 Mr Oud, House of Representatives, 62th meeting, 18 March 1952.
470 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 9. p. 19.
471 Mr Wijers, Senate, 40th meeting, 6 May 1952.
472 Mr Bruins Slot, House of Representatives, 60th meeting, 13 March 1952.
473 Mr Molenaar, Senate, 40th meeting, 6 May 1952.
474 Mr Anema, Senate, 40th meeting, 6 May 1952.
475 An argument for Minister Beel to defend the Government’s position to advise against the adoption 
of the amendment proposed by Serrarens, which would accept judicial review against international 
Provisions. See: Minister Beel, House of Representatives, 61st meeting, 14 March 1952.
476 For instance (favouring judicial review): Mr Romme, in the House of Representatives, 61st meeting, 
14 March 1952; see also: Mr Wijers, Senate, 40th meeting, 6 May 1952. Expecting on the long term 
an international Judiciary but opposing judicial review by the national Legislator: Mr Oud, House of 
Representatives, 62nd meeting, 18 March 1952.
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national standards could be reviewed against anterior international standards by 
the Judiciary, which could lead to an overload of the Courts’ capacity.477
5.6.3 The Serrarens and co amendment
The discussion above was finally put to an end by the adoption of the Serrarens 
and co amendment, in which judicial review was recognised. Originally, the 
amendment was formulated as:
In case of violation against legal rules in force within the Kingdom, the 
Provisions of agreements shall precede.478
In his (short) explanation during the Parliamentary debate in the House of 
Representatives, Serrarens argued under reference to the debate in which Mr 
Romme and Mr Oud already thoroughly defended the positions in favour or against 
judicial review, that he and his co-submitters were of the opinion that review 
against international standards should be entrusted to the Judiciary. Remarkably 
however, Serrarens and co decided to alter the text of the amendment on the 
day it was put to the vote in the House of Representatives. The earlier text was 
replaced by:
Legal rules in force within the Kingdom do not apply if they are not compatible 
with agreements that are published, either before or after the enactment of 
the regulation, in accordance with Article 60f.479
The choice for the renewed text was deemed necessary ‘to take away ambiguity 
concerning the interpretation of the original amendment (…).’480 Apparently, although 
Serrarens only briefly motivated the renewed version of the amendment, the 
ambiguity that is referred to was the question whether anterior international 
standards would have precedence over posterior national regulations as well.481 
Considering the preceding Parliamentary discussion it is remarkable that 
Serrarens observed ambiguity on that particular question: in Parliament, it was 
not significantly contested that international standards would have precedence over 
later adopted national regulations, but rather on whether it is the Legislature or 
the Judiciary that should review those national standards against the international 
477 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 3, p. 3.
478 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 17. Original text in Dutch: ‘In geval van strijd met 
binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften hebben de bepalingen van overeenkomsten de voorrang.’
479 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 32. Original text in Dutch: ‘Binnen het Koninkrijk 
geldende wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, wanneer deze niet verenigbaar zijn met overeenkomsten, 
die hetzij voor, hetzij na de totstandkoming der voorschriften zijn bekend gemaakt overeenkomstig artikel 60f.’
480 Parliamentary Documents, II 1951-1952, 2374, no. 32. Original text in Dutch: ‘om twijfel aan de 
interpretatie van het oorspronkelijke amendement weg te nemen (…).’
481 Mr Serrarens, House of Representatives, 63rd meeting, 19 March 1952.
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Provision. After the submission of the new version of the Amendment, a short 
and rather unstructured discussion was held in the House of Representatives in 
which the new text was discussed, from which does not follow that the adoption 
was well-considered. The amendment was adopted with a small majority only: 
46 voted for, and 40 against.482
Until the amendment was put to the vote, the Government obviously was not 
supporting the adoption, and even discouraged the Parliament to introduce judicial 
review against international standards in the Constitution. It recommended 
considering the matter more thoroughly during the next Constitutional reform.483 
Only when the amendment was adopted, the Government was willing to express 
its trust in the Judiciary: ‘In the meanwhile, the Government trusts (…) that the Dutch 
Judiciary will wield the exceptional powers given here in such manner that the risk of 
legal uncertainty will be reduced to the smallest possible proportions (…).’484 Due to the 
fact that this predecessor of Article 94 CA was not designed by the Government, 
it cannot be distilled from the first reading of the Constitutional reform how the 
Government exactly understood the content of the Provision. However, during 
the second reading, the Government clarified its understanding of the Provision 
at some points. Until now, the discussion on the proposed Constitutional Articles 
focussed on the question whether the Judiciary or the Legislature should review 
domestic law against international standards. For the first time, the question was 
raised to what extent a civilian could extract rights from international standards 
through the Constitutional construction that was adopted in the first reading.485 The 
Government responded that not all international standards would grant subjective 
rights to civilians, but a distinction should be made between international standards 
that implied instruction standards to the Legislature, and directly applicable 
standards, that would indeed imply subjective rights for civilians. In answer to 
the question who would have to determine whether a standard would be directly 
applicable or not, the Government underlined that it would not be desirable ‘to 
regulate by law, (…), whether an agreement shall be deemed to include instructional 
standards, or have direct effect towards civilians. Ultimately, this concerns a question of 
interpretation, which the Court will have to decide on, who on the basis of Article 60e, 
and not the Legislature, will be able to bindingly interpret an agreement. Nevertheless, 
especially with regard to Article 60e, the Government will, in case of doubt, be able to 
make clear in its explanatory notes which intention it had during the adoption, for it 
482 House of Representatives, 63rd meeting, 19 March 1952.
483 Minister Beel, House of Representatives, 63rd meeting, 19 March 1952.
484 Parliamentary Documents, I 1951-1952, 2374, no. 113a, p. 8. Original text in Dutch: ‘Inmiddels 
vertrouwt de regering (…) dat de Nederlandse rechter de hem hier gegeven uitzonderlijke bevoegdheid op 
zodanige wijze zal hanteren, dat het gevaar voor rechtsonzekerheid tot de kleinst denkbare proporties zal 
worden teruggebracht (…).’
485 Parliamentary Documents, I 1952-1953, 2700, no. 63.
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can be assumed that the Judiciary will assign great significance to such statements.’486 
On the other hand, the Government recognised the possibility that the Judiciary 
would have an opposing view on the enforceability of an international standard 
to the intention of the Legislature. Also, the Government was of the opinion 
that it was the responsibility of the Judiciary not only to not apply domestic 
legislation that is contradicting internationally directly applicable standards, but 
also, following from Article 60f (the predecessor of Article 93 CA), to apply the 
international standard.487
5.7 The Constitutional reform of 1956
Only three years after the Constitutional reform of 1953, the then-Government 
decided to propose another Constitutional reform that also concerned the 
predecessors of Articles 93 and 94 CA. The Government emphasised that it was 
not the intention to alter the legal principles that were adopted in the previous 
Constitutional reform, but merely to amend the Constitution on some textual 
details.488 The Government proposed to adopt the following Articles:489
V. Article 65 of the Constitution reads:
Provisions of agreements which may be binding on all persons by virtue of 
their contents shall become binding after they have been published. The 
law provides rules on the publication of the agreements.490
486 Parliamentary Documents, I 1952-1953, 2700, no. 63a, p. 3. Original text in Dutch: ‘bij de wet, (…), vast 
te leggen, of de overeenkomst moet worden geacht instructienormen te behelzen, dan wel directe werking heeft ten 
opzichte van burgers. Uiteindelijk betreft het hier een interpretatievraag, die door de rechter zal moeten worden 
beslist, nu op de voet van artikel 60e deze en niet de wetgever overeenkomsten bindend zal kunnen interpreteren. 
Dit neemt niet weg, dat de regering, juist met het oog op artikel 60e, in twijfelgevallen in de toelichting op 
overeenkomsten zal kunnen duidelijk maken, welke bedoeling bij de totstandkoming heeft voorgezeten, aangezien 
mag worden aangenomen, dat de rechter aan zodanige uitlatingen grote betekenis zal toekennen.’
487 Parliamentary Documents, I 1952-1953, 2700, no. 63a, p. 3.
488 Parlementaire Geschiedenis II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 3, memorie van toelichting, p. 3; 
Parlementaire Geschiedenis II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 7, memorie van antwoord, p. 1.
489 Parlementaire Geschiedenis II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 2, ontwerp van rijkswet, p. 1.
490 Original text in Dutch: ‘V. Artikel 65 van de Grondwet wordt gelezen: Bepalingen van overeenkomsten, 
welke naar haar inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden, hebben deze verbindende kracht nadat zij zijn bekend 
gemaakt. De wet geeft regels omtrent de bekendmaking van overeenkomsten.’
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VI. Article 66 of the Constitution reads:
Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if 
such application is in conflict with Provisions of agreements that are binding 
on all persons that are adopted either before or after the enactment of the 
regulations.491
The most important differences compared to the Provisions adopted during the 
Constitutional reform of 1953 are threefold: firstly, the sequence of the Provisions 
was reversed. The Government was of the opinion that the Constitution should 
first stipulate to what extent a treaty is binding on citizens, before the relation 
between a treaty and national law is clarified after that.492
Secondly, the words ‘binding on all persons’ were added to the predecessor of 
Article 93 CA, to underline that ‘the binding of contracts to everyone only relates to 
agreements which by its nature are eligible for direct application.’493 The Government 
explained that this was frequently pointed out during the Constitutional reforms 
of 1953, and therefore the Provision should be understood this way. From this, it 
would reasonably follow that a similar addition would be adopted in the predecessor 
of Article 94 as well. The Government underlined that in case of not adding 
‘binding on all persons’ to that Provision, it would attribute an improper task to the 
Judiciary, when the primacy of international law over national law would also 
be applied by the Judiciary in case of Provisions addressed to national executive 
powers or the Legislature. In that case, the Judiciary would fulfil duties that were 
originally imposed on a Legislator or executive powers. It appears here that the 
Government wanted to confirm the more narrow understanding of the effect of 
international Provisions for only those that are directly binding already discussed 
in 1953, but also wanted to suggest a similar understanding of the phrase ‘binding 
on all persons’ in both Articles.494 In this context, the question was raised who 
would have a final say in determining whether a treaty Provision is binding on 
all persons, considering this predecessor of Article 94 CA.495 The Government 
responded that ‘the decision on whether Provisions of agreements are binding on 
all persons by virtue of their contents ultimately shall be made by the Judiciary. The 
focus of this Provision is that it instructs the judge to review national laws against 
491 Original text in Dutch: ‘VI. Artikel 66 van de Grondwet wordt gelezen: Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende 
wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, wanneer deze toepassing niet verenigbaar zou zijn met een 
ieder verbindende bepalingen van overeenkomsten, die hetzij vóór, hetzij na de totstandkoming der voorschriften 
zijn aangegaan.’
492 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 3, pp. 4-5.
493 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 3, p. 5. Original text in Dutch: ‘het verbindend 
zijn van overeenkomsten voor een ieder slechts betrekking heeft op overeenkomsten die naar haar aard voor 
rechtstreekse toepassing in aanmerking komen.’
494 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 3, p. 5.
495 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 6. p. 6.
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international agreements, which implies that the judgment of the Court, and not that 
of the Legislature, is decisive.’496
Thirdly, the phrase ‘agreements’, was replaced by ‘Provisions of agreements’. 
The Government agreed with the reasoning of the Advisory Committee,497 that 
there ‘are agreements in which some Provisions have a self-executing nature while 
others have not.’498
During the Parliamentary debates on the proposed Constitutional reform, the 
proposed amendments to the system that is currently embedded in Articles 93 
and 94 CA were hardly discussed, and were adopted without further amendments.
Only once it was suggested that ‘the amendments proposed by the Government 
grammatically considered might imply more than just a technical amendment, which 
is a restriction to the judicial review.’499 The Government merely answered that: 
‘the proposed amendment was not of a principal nature (…) for it is of the opinion 
of the undersigned that the current text already implied a restriction.’500 It must be 
concluded then that it was not the intention to principally alter the meaning of 
the Constitutional system by adding the phrase ‘binding on all persons.’
5.8 The Constitutional reform of 1983
For the third time, the Constitution was amended on the Provisions that regulate 
foreign relations. The Government remarked that it was the purpose of the 
Constitutional reform of 1953 to fulfil the need that existed after the Second World 
War to regulate the Dutch foreign relations in the Constitution. The reform of 1956 
was deemed necessary, ‘partly to meet some concerns, which had arisen meanwhile’.501 
An interesting point of view, for this clearly does not match the intentions that 
were formulated in the Parliamentary documents of the Constitutional reform of 
1956 to only alter the text on some technical points. In this light, the purpose of 
496 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 7, p.4. Original text in Dutch: ‘de beslissing 
over de vraag of er sprake is van bepalingen van overeenkomsten, die naar hun inhoud een ieder kunnen 
binden, uiteindelijk bij de rechter ligt. Het zwaartepunt dezer bepaling ligt vooral daarin, dat zij de rechter 
opdraagt de wetten aan overeenkomsten te toetsen, hetgeen meebrengt, dat het oordeel van de rechter en niet 
dat van de wetgever beslissend is.’
497 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 3, p. 5.
498 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 4. p. 14. Original text in Dutch: 
‘overeenkomsten zijn waarvan sommige bepalingen een self-executing karakter hebben en andere niet.’
499 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 6, p. 6. Original text in Dutch: ‘de door de 
regering voorgestelde wijzigingen naar de letter wellicht meer betekent dan alleen een technische verbetering, 
namelijk een beperking van het toetsingsrecht van de rechter.’
500 Parliamentary Documents II, 1955-1956, 4133 (R 19), no. 7. p. 4. Original text in Dutch: ‘de voorgestelde 
wijziging is niet van principiële aard (…) daar naar het oordeel der ondergetekenden ook de strekking van de 
huidige tekst reeds beperkt was.’
501 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 5. Original text in Dutch: ‘mede om tegemoet 
te komen aan enige bedenkingen die inmiddels waren gerezen.’
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the Constitutional reform of 1983 might be read with some suspicion: ‘Because the 
scope of those Articles is quite generally perceived as satisfactory, there is no reason to 
propose such changes that would change the principles of the present regime. However, 
an attempt is made to make a number of clarifications, especially from a terminology 
and editorial point of view, while an effort was made to grant the Legislature more 
leeway.’502 The Government explained that in its proposal the order of the Provision 
was reversed, and ‘profoundly shortened by omitting unnecessary details.’503 The 
Government proposed the following amendments to the predecessor of Articles 
93 and 94 CA:
Article 5.2.2.a.:
Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international institutions which 
may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become 
binding after they have been published.504
Article 5.2.2.b.:
Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if 
such application is in conflict with Provisions of treaties or of resolutions by 
international institutions that are binding on all persons.505
At first glance, there are four minor changes compared to the amendments of the 
Constitutional reform of 1956.
Firstly, in both Provisions, the word ‘agreements’ was replaced by the word ‘treaties’ 
for this word was regularly used in legal practice to refer to ‘agreements that are 
binding to the State according to international law criteria, regardless of the form.’506 It 
was not the intention to alter the content or scope of the Provision by this alteration. 
The words ‘agreement’ and ‘treaty’ therefore have exactly the same meaning.507
502 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 5. Original text in Dutch: ‘Omdat de strekking 
van die artikelen vrij algemeen als bevredigend wordt ervaren, bestaat geen aanleiding zodanige wijzigingen 
voor te stellen dat een verandering zou worden aangebracht in de uitgangspunten van de huidige regeling. Wel 
is gepoogd een aantal verduidelijkingen aan te brengen, met name in terminologisch en redactioneel opzicht, 
terwijl ernaar is gestreefd aan de wetgever meer armslag te geven.’
503 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 5. Original text in Dutch: ‘sterk bekort door 
weglating van overbodige details.’
504 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 2, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘Artikel 5.2.2a. 
Bepalingen van verdragen en besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties, die naar haar inhoud een ieder 
kunnen verbinden, hebben verbindende kracht nadat ze zijn bekendgemaakt.’
505 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 2, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘Artikel 5.2.2.b. 
Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, indien deze toepassing niet 
verenigbaar is met een ieder verbindende bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke 
organisaties.’
506 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 6.
507 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 7, p. 6.
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Secondly, before the Constitutional reform of 1983, a separate Provision stipulated 
the analogous application of the former Article 65 (currently Article 93 CA), 
mutatis mutandis to resolutions of international institutions. In the Constitutional 
amendments of 1983 the separate Provision was deleted and embedded in the 
aforementioned amending Articles 5.5.2.a. and 5.5.2.b., resulting in a shorter 
wording but with the same content.508
Thirdly, a minor change in Dutch grammar was made, in which an unnecessary 
conjunction was omitted in the amending Article 5.5.2.a., that was already lost 
in the English translation.509
Fourthly, the phrase ‘either before or after the enactment of the regulations’ was 
deleted, for ‘this phrase was incorporated in 1953, in order to establish beyond doubt 
that a subsequent law cannot detract from a treaty. This is now sufficiently clear and 
also appears from the wording of the (proposed [B.W.]) Provision.’510
Apparently thus the Government proposed only textual changes, without the 
ambition to alter the principles embedded in the existing Constitutional system. 
Nevertheless, the proposed amendments were cause for an extensive debate in 
Parliament regarding the exact meaning of the content. This was mainly due to 
the differences of opinion between the Commission of State-Cals/Donner, the 
Council of State (both advising the Government) and the Government on the 
exact wording of the amending Provisions. In Parliament, three major issues 
were debated.
First, the Commission of State had recommended to delete the phrase ‘by virtue 
of their contents’, in the predecessor of Article 93 CA, for it was unnecessary and 
incorrect, ‘because the answer to the question whether a treaty Provision is generally 
binding – by virtue of the wordings, intentions of the parties, or scope – depends on 
the treaty itself and will be addressed during the interpretation of the treaty.’511 The 
Commission of State argued that by leaving the phrase ‘by virtue of their contents’ 
in the text, unjustly a standard would be created that should be reviewed against 
when deciding whether a treaty Provision is binding on all persons or not. In 
the original draft of the Constitutional reform, the Government had adopted the 
508 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 10.
509 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 10, the Dutch word ‘deze’ was deleted in 
the phrase ‘hebben deze verbindende kracht nadat zij zijn bekend gemaakt.’
510 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 14. Original text in Dutch: ‘deze zinsnede 
werd in 1953 ten overvloede opgenomen, ten einde buiten twijfel te stellen, dat ook een latere wet geen afbreuk 
kan doen aan een verdrag. Dit staat thans wel voldoende vast en blijkt ook uit de redactie van de bepaling.’
511 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 11. Original text in Dutch: ‘omdat het 
antwoord op de vraag of een verdragsbepaling algemeen verbindend is – krachtens tekst, partijbedoeling of 
strekking – afhangt van het verdrag zelf en bij de interpretatie van elk verdrag aan de orde komt.’ See also 
the original draft of the Explanatory Memorandum: Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), 
no. 4, p. 32.
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proposed Provisions by the Commission, and thus omitted the discussed phrase, and 
even combined the content of the current Articles 93 and 94 CA in one Provision:
Statutory regulations do not apply, if such application is in conflict with 
Provisions of treaties or with resolutions by international institutions that 
are binding on all persons, after they are announced.512
On the advice of the Council of State however, the Government renounced the 
original draft. The Council was of the opinion that ‘In particular, the omission of the 
phrase in the current Article 65 concerning Provisions of treaties that shall be binding by 
virtue of their contents, meets objections with the Council. The purpose of that Provision 
is not to establish a standard “that could be reviewed against, to determine whether a 
treaty is binding on all persons” as the Explanatory Memorandum (old text, not the 
final [B.W.]) states, but to establish that treaty Provisions, which can be (by virtue of 
their contents) substantially and generally binding, really possess that quality when 
certain conditions relating to their publication are fulfilled. The Council considers that 
this Provision is essential, because it is an important principle of Dutch Constitutional 
law that is not accepted in several other countries, for example in Great Britain.’513 
The Government agreed with this reasoning of the Council of State, and almost 
literally copied the quoted passage in its final Explanatory Memorandum.514 This 
reasoning is rather confusing, for it does not necessarily explain why ‘by virtue of 
their contents’ is deemed to be a necessary phrase in the Constitution, but it rather 
(and somewhat cryptically) argues why the phrase ‘binding on all persons by virtue 
of their contents shall become binding after they have been published’ – almost the 
entire proposed amending Article 5.2.2.a. – is indispensable in the Constitution. 
If I understand this rather cryptic passage correctly, the purpose of the phrase 
‘by virtue of their contents’ is to make sure that when a treaty has been published, 
the question whether it is also binding on all persons must only be determined 
by grounds based on its content. Regarding this assumption, no further evidence 
to the contrary is available.
512 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 4, p. 29, Article 5.1.10, mainly in line with the 
proposition of the Commission of State (Article 73 of that proposition, see: Parliamentary Documents 
II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 4, p. 27). Original text in Dutch: ´ Wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing, 
indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met een ieder verbindende bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten 
van volkenrechtelijke organisaties, nadat deze bekend zijn gemaakt.’
513 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 4, p. 17-18. Original text in Dutch: ‘Met name 
het weglaten van de in het bestaande artikel 65 voorkomende passage omtrent bepalingen van verdragen, die 
naar hun inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden, ontmoet bij het college bezwaren. De strekking van die bepaling 
is niet zozeer een standard te geven, «waaraan getoetst zou kunnen worden, of een verdrag ieder bindt», zoals 
de memorie van toelichting stelt, doch om vast te stellen, dat verdragsbepalingen, die materieel (naar hun 
inhoud) algemeen verbindend kunnen zijn, die kwaliteit ook werkelijk bezitten, wanneer is voldaan aan een 
aantal voorwaarden met betrekking tot hun bekendmaking. De Raad acht deze bepaling onmisbaar, omdat 
daarin een belangrijk beginsel van Nederlands Constitutioneel recht wordt neergelegd, dat in verschillende 
andere landen – bijvoorbeeld in Groot-Brittannië – niet wordt aanvaard.’
514 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 11.
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 149 
 Dutch monism and the Constitutional reforms of Article 93 and 94 CA
Some Members of the Preparatory Committee expressed their concern about the 
phrase ‘binding on all persons by virtue of their contents’. Firstly, the Supreme Court 
had given this phrase – that was added to the Constitution in 1956 – a very limited 
meaning in several cases, while in one other case the phrase was understood 
somewhat broader. Therefore, this wording had led to uncertainty in case law, and 
might therefore be ill-chosen.515 The Government disagreed, argued that it could 
not see how the disputed phrase would lead to difficulties in case law, and referred 
to a case in which the Supreme Court clearly granted only a limited meaning to 
the words, an approach the Government also had in mind.516 Secondly, Members 
of the Preparatory Committee argued that the case law of the European Court 
of Justice had shown a much broader understanding of the concept of directly 
applicable Provisions than was expected during the Constitutional reform of 1956: 
not only did the Court grant direct effect to treaty Provisions that were directly 
aimed at citizens, but also this effect was granted to regulations and decisions 
that were addressed to States. In that light, it was the opinion of the Members of 
the committee that it was unwise to maintain a standard in the Constitution that 
regulates the direct effect of an international legal standard, and it proposed to 
leave this matter to the Judiciary instead.517 According to the Government, the 
disputed phrase would not stand in the way of such a broad interpretation, and 
the Dutch Judiciary is authorised, based on the proposed amending Articles, to 
consider the direct applicability of every international legal standard in every 
specific case.518 Thirdly, with reference to the phrase quoted in the previous 
section, it was asked whether the phrase ‘binding on all persons by virtue of their 
contents’ did not imply a standard that should be reviewed against by the Courts.519 
The Government answered that it was the intention to establish such a standard, 
but to make sure that an international Provision that is binding on all persons can 
only bind these persons ‘after they have been published’. The Provision thus has a 
guardian function, to prevent international standards to be binding on persons 
before they have been published, a reasoning that reminds us of the original 
function of Article 93 CA when it was adopted in 1953. The Government added 
that this did not imply that the Dutch Constitution would determine from what 
moment on a treaty Provision that is binding on all persons would have binding 
powers. Instead, this would be determined by international law and the treaty 
itself, albeit with consideration of the general legal principle of publication. The 
Government argued that with this principle of publication embedded in the Dutch 
Constitution only the meaning of treaty Provisions that are binding on all persons 
in the Dutch legal order is underlined.520 It was thus not the purpose of the phrase 
515 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 6, p. 13.
516 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 7, p.16.
517 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 6, p. 13.
518 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 7, pp.16-17.
519 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 6, pp. 13-14.
520 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 11, and Parliamentary Documents II, 
1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 7, p. 17.
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‘binding on all persons by virtue of their contents’ to provide for a standard that the 
Courts would have to review against. However, the Government did underline that 
‘we consider it desirable to explicitly embed a point of reference for the Courts in the 
Constitution’.521 This was mainly considered in cases in which a treaty Provision 
explicitly obliges the Legislature to adopt measures within a certain time frame 
was under dispute.522 The Government considered that it would be undesirable 
when Courts would rule in these matters, thereby disregarding the Legislature. 
On the other hand, the Government agreed that it ‘was indeed not intended that 
only directly applicable Provisions would have binding power.’523 The fact that the 
phrase ‘binding on all persons’ in relation to the role of the Courts was also (and 
even mostly) discussed in view of the current Article 93 CA at least suggests that 
the meaning of that phrase is similar in the current Article 94 CA, and thus based 
on the most resent Parliamentary History, there is no reason to understand the 
phrase in both Articles differently.524
Thus, also in the context of the current Article 94 CA, the phrase ‘binding on 
all persons’ was discussed. The Government did not adopt the proposal of the 
Advisory Commission on International Legal Issues,525 who advised to delete the 
words: ‘By deleting the words..., new problems arise. When deleting the words “binding 
on all persons” also statutory regulations would be inapplicable if they are considered 
incompatible with Provisions of treaties and decisions of international organisations 
that are clearly intended to only bind the Government in its relation to other States.’526 
This would appear inter alia problematic when such Provision requires further 
elaboration in domestic law. The Government therefore argued that ‘deleting the 
phrase referred to may imply the risk that one assumes that there is no limitation at 
all regarding the nature of the Provisions of international law that are to be applied.’527 
On the other hand, the Government nuanced this point of view by stating that in 
the end, the Judiciary has a final say in the matter: ‘It may occur that the national 
Court, despite the fact that an implementation of the international legal Provisions 
521 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 7, p. 17. Original text in Dutch: ‘Wij achten het 
gewenst uitdrukkelijk in de Grondwet in deze zin een aanknopingspunt voor de rechter te vermelden.’
522 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 10, p. 10.
523 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 7, p. 17. Original text in Dutch: ‘inderdaad niet 
bedoeld is dat alleen rechtstreeks werkende bepalingen van verdragen verbindende kracht hebben.’
524 As demonstrated above, F.M.C. Vlemminx and M.G. Boekhorst propose to understand the phrase 
differently, in line with the original purposes of the two Articles.
525 Dutch name: de Commissie van Advies in Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken.
526 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, pp. 11-12. Original text in Dutch: ‘Door het 
schrappen van deze woorden (…) zouden nieuwe problemen rijzen. Bij het vervallen van de woorden ‘een ieder 
verbindende’ zouden immers wettelijke voorschriften ook buiten toepassing blijven, indien zij onverenigbaar 
zouden moeten worden geacht met bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties 
welke duidelijk bestemd zijn om alleen de overheid te binden in haar betrekking tot andere staten.’ See for a 
similar reasoning: Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 7, p. 20.
527 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 7, p. 20. Original text in Dutch: ‘Het doen 
vervallen van de bedoelde uitdrukking zou het risico kunnen meebrengen, dat de gedachte postvat dat aan de 
aard van de toe te passen bepalingen van geschreven internationaal recht geen enkele beperking is gesteld.’
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seems to be suitable, still considers that the Provision has direct effect in the national 
legal order.528 It appears that the Government struggled to find a proper balance in 
maintaining freedom for the Courts to rule on direct applicability of international 
standards, but simultaneously preventing the Courts to apply unlimitedly standards 
that should be further implemented by the Legislature.
Furthermore, in the context of the proposed amending Article 5.2.2.b., the 
Government declared that this phrase should not be explained grammatically, 
for it would encompass more than only duties to citizens: the phrase would cover 
‘also the granting of entitlements to all persons.’529
One Member of Parliament (House of Representatives), Brinkhorst, submitted 
an amendment in which he proposed inter alia to delete the phrase ‘binding on 
all persons’ in the predecessor of Article 94 CA.530 He argued that firstly, legal 
practice showed a discrepancy between the broad interpretation of Provisions that 
are binding on all persons by the European Court of Justice, and the more narrow 
interpretation of other international Provisions by the national Courts. According 
to Brinkhorst, this discrepancy could be reduced by removing the phrase. Secondly, 
he underlined that also the Government had recognised the possibility that a Court 
could rule that a Provision has direct effect, even when it is not binding on all 
persons. The added value of such a standard in a Constitution then is unclear. And 
thirdly, he observed that the Netherlands had established a tradition of taking a very 
long time at ratifying a treaty. He considered that the Dutch Legislature is usually 
very keen on making sure that adequate implementation legislation is adopted to 
avoid a legal gasp when the treaty Provisions are ratified. Brinkhorst suggested 
a causal link between the long period before ratification and the phrase ‘binding 
on all persons’, and argued that the deletion of these words would contribute to a 
more relaxed an open attitude towards the implementation of treaties.531 However, 
in the subsequent meeting of the House of Representatives, Brinkhorst withdrew 
his amendment, due to the fact that he had to conclude that he overlooked the 
fact that also in the predecessor of Article 93 the words ‘binding on all persons’ 
were embedded, and should also be removed for in order to establish a coherent 
Constitutional system. He also observed that he would not convince a majority 
of the House of Representatives, and wanted to prevent his amendment to be 
528 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 12. Original text in Dutch: ‘Het kan zijn, 
dat de nationale rechter ondanks het feit, dat een implementatie van de internationaalrechtelijke bepalingen 
aangewezen lijkt, niettemin een rechtstreekse ‘binding’ van die bepaling voor de nationale rechtsorde aanwezig 
acht.’
529 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 3, p. 11. Original text in Dutch: ‘ook het toekennen 
aan een ieder van aanspraken’.
530 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 14.
531 Mr Brinkhorst, House of Representatives, 62nd meeting, 18 March 1980.
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counterproductive when it would be rejected and as a result, the phrase ‘binding 
on all persons’ would be reaffirmed perhaps even more firmly than before.532
In the context of the effect of international standards in the domestic legal order, 
another extensive discussion was held on the question to what extent unwritten 
international standards were also binding in the Dutch legal order. The Government 
argued that unwritten international standards were binding in the Dutch legal 
order. However, it was added that the Constitution did not imply that national 
regulations that were contradictory to unwritten international standards would 
not be applied, in line with the recommendation of the Council of State.533 The 
Government underlined that firstly, this would be unpractical, for unwritten 
international law would mostly be vague. Secondly, it would be undesirable if 
treaties that were not yet ratified were considered to be unwritten international 
law, and thus be applied accordingly. And thirdly, the Government argued that 
unwritten international law is often difficult to recognise for citizens.534 The matter 
was extensively discussed during the subsequent Parliamentary discussions.535
A final conclusion was drawn by the Government, who summarised the 
Constitutional system of the current Articles 93 and 94 CA: the Legislature reviews 
the Constitution against international law, and (national) statutory regulations 
against unwritten international law. The Judiciary is competent to review inferior 
national legal rules against superior national legal rules, and (national) statutory 
regulations against international Provisions that are directly binding.536
5.9 Conclusion
As it appears from the above analysis of the Parliamentary History of the three 
Constitutional reforms that finally resulted in the current system embedded in 
Articles 93 and 94 CA, the Constitutional Legislature made certain fundamental 
choices regarding that system in 1953. Since then, it was not the ambition of the 
Legislature to alter the earlier adopted Constitutional principles, but merely to 
make some technical amendments. Despite this, it was deemed necessary to further 
enlighten the functioning of the Constitutional system and clarify some of its wordings 
in especially the Constitutional reform of 1983. The following conclusions on the 
meaning of Articles 93 and 94 CA as considered by the Legislature can be drawn:
•	 Monism
In 1953, the Constitutional Legislator made an explicit choice for a monistic 
system regarding the working of international legal standards in the national 
532 Mr Brinkhorst, House of Representatives, 73rd meeting, 23 April 1980.
533 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 4. p. 19.
534 Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 10, pp. 10-11.
535 House of Representatives, 62nd meeting, 18 March 1980, 66th meeting, 25 March 1980, 73rd meeting, 
23 April 1980.
536 See especially: Parliamentary Documents II, 1977-1978 (R 1100), no. 19. pp. 1-3.
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legal order. Basically, this monism was not intended to be ‘qualified’ in any way, 
and with regard to the working of international standards in the domestic order 
not limited at all. The working of international standards in the domestic legal 
order even includes international customary law or other unwritten standards. 
However, when it comes to judicial review, domestic statutory regulations that 
are in contradiction with international standards do not apply only then when 
they have been published and are binding on all persons. According to the 
Legislature, this is not a limitation to monism as such, but is experienced as a 
limitation in literature, which explains the use of the term ‘qualified monism’.
•	 The function of Articles 93 and 94 CA
The above analysis of the Parliamentary History of the Constitutional reforms 
shows that there can be no misunderstanding regarding the functions of Articles 
93 and 94 CA. Article 93 determines what international standards are binding 
to citizens. Article 94 CA determines how these binding standards relate to 
domestic law. As a result, the Judiciary has the competence to review statutory 
regulations against these international standards that are binding on all persons, 
and has the obligation not to apply a conflicting national standard. In addition, 
as pointed out during the Constitutional reform of 1953, the Judiciary may 
– based on Article 93 CA – even apply the international standard instead. A 
point of view that has not been discussed ever since.
•	 ‘Binding on all persons’
The phrase ‘binding on all persons’ was embedded in both Articles 93 and 94 CA 
in 1956. The amendment was perceived then to be a technical change only, 
and not as an amendment to the Constitutional principles adopted earlier in 
1953. Already during the reforms of 1953, it was made clear that a national 
standard could only be not applied when it was in conflict with an international 
standard that is self-executing. Therefore, adding the phrase ‘binding on all 
persons’ in both Articles did not change that principle. Although ‘self-executing 
standards’ and ‘standards that are binding on all persons’ might be understood 
slightly differently, it appears that throughout the years the Legislature did 
not intentionally differ between those terms. The fact that according to the 
Legislature from the introduction of the phrase in Article 93 CA it naturally 
followed that the same phrase was also added to Article 94 CA. Especially 
during the 1983 reform the phrase was explained as one concept in both 
Articles, suggesting that there is no significant difference in understanding 
those words in the context of each particular Article. The phrase ‘binding on all 
persons’ was understood as a protection of the division of powers in the Dutch 
trias politica, and implies a basic principle – not a specific norm – that should 
be taken into consideration by the Courts when reaching a verdict, in order 
to prevent the Judiciary from implementing standards that are addressed to 
the Legislature. It is however, according to the Legislature, without doubt that 
the Judiciary has a final say in determining whether a standard is binding on 
all persons and consequently directly applicable.
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•	 From duties to entitlements
Originally, the purpose of the Constitutional system regarding the working 
of international law in the national legal order was to regulate the effect of 
international standards that would impose duties on citizens, and more or 
less expand the principle of legality to the territory of international law as 
well by implementing a publication demand. Gradually, this focus on duties 
for citizens shifted to a focus on both duties and entitlements for citizens in 
1983. Legal practice however shows a strong focus on international standards 
that stipulate entitlements only.
•	 The Legislature, the Judiciary and trias politica
During the Constitutional reform of 1953, the explicit choice was made to 
embed judicial review of national standards against international law in the 
Constitution, instead of review by the Legislature. The Government did not 
intend to regulate this at all in its original draft, but judicial review was adopted 
by a small majority by amendment, after an extensive debate in which both 
defenders of judicial review and defenders of review by the Legislature argued 
why the Constitution should not remain silent on the matter. The amendment 
was altered by the submitters on the same day as it was put to the vote, followed 
by a brief, hasty and unstructured Parliamentary discussion. Only a small 
majority voted for the amendment. During the Parliamentary discussion, two 
questions were most frequently addressed, and were also discussed during 
the subsequent Constitutional reforms, especially the 1983 reform. Firstly, 
the question was raised against what standards exactly the Judiciary was 
competent to review. It can be concluded that on national level, the Court 
reviews inferior statutory regulations against superior statutory regulations 
(including acts of Parliament), the Legislature reviews its own legislation 
against the Constitution. Concerning international law, the Judiciary reviews 
national statutory regulations (except for Constitutional Provisions) against 
international standards that are binding on all persons. The Legislature reviews 
the Constitution against international standards, and all national statutory 
regulations against unwritten international law. Implicitly, it can be concluded 
that the Legislature thus also reviews statutory regulations against international 
standards that are not binding on all persons. This leads to the second question, 
which is: who decides whether an international Provision is directly applicable 
or not? Already during the Constitutional reform of 1953 it was made quite 
clear that it is the Judiciary, and not the Legislature, who has a final say on 
determining whether a treaty Provision is directly applicable. However, there 
are two limitations to this embedded in the Constitution: firstly, the Provision 
must be published before it can have effect in the national legal order. This 
principle was embedded as a safeguard to prevent citizens from being bound 
by treaty Provisions unknowingly: a sort of principle of legality. Secondly, the 
Provision must be binding on all persons. This principle was not adopted to 
express a clear standard the Judiciary should review against before applying an 
international standard, but rather to express a point of reference to the Courts, 
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and underline that international law cannot be directly applicable without 
any limits. The Constitutional system thus uncomfortably balances between 
recognising the final judgment of the Judiciary on the direct applicability of 
international Provisions, and not unlimitedly broadening these review powers 
resulting in Court verdicts that interfere with the competences of the Legislature.
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6.  Dutch Parliamentary History on the 
right to adequate food
6.1 Introduction
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Courts frequently refer to Parliamentary History 
in their considerations when deciding on individual appeals to the right to food, and 
seem to greatly value the opinion of the Legislature on the matter. The question 
whether the right to food is directly applicable or not is however not specifically 
discussed in Parliamentary History. Rather, in the Explanatory Memoranda and 
subsequent documentation, the obligation coming from ratifying the right to 
food was discussed per Provision, whereas the matter of direct applicability of 
ECOSOC rights in general is considered separately. Therefore it is the purpose 
of this Chapter to determine and analyse how Dutch Legislature interpreted the 
obligations that are implied when ratifying Provisions that stipulate the right to 
food, and in Chapter 7, the opinion of the Legislature on direct applicability of 
ECOSOC rights as expressed in Parliamentary History will be analysed.
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, the right to food is embedded in various ways in 
the international human rights system. In some treaty Provisions, the right is 
recognised as a more or less independent right. That means basically – considering 
the ratifications of the Netherlands – Article 11 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Section 6.2),537 and in the treaties that aim 
at the protection of certain groups of individuals especially Article 27 (Section 
6.5).538 Furthermore, in the field of healthcare and pregnancy, the right to food is 
stipulated in Articles 12 (2) of The Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Discrimination against Women (Section 6.6) and 24 of the International Covenant 
for the Rights of the Child (Section 6.3).539 Therefore, naturally the Parliamentary 
History of the ratification Bills will be analysed when it concerns these Provisions.
Besides, there is reason to also include the Parliamentary History on Article 26 in 
the analysis. The Netherlands made a reservation to Article 26, in which it stated 
that the Article ‘shall not imply an independent entitlement of children to social security, 
including social insurance.’540 The reservation was a reflection of the general idea of 
the Dutch Government regarding the treaty: children cannot derive independent 
rights directly based on the treaty, for the Dutch legislation is thus formulated 
that children generally have only indirect entitlements, via the parents or legal 
537 A/RES/21/2200, 16 December 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Article 11.
538 A/RES/44/25, 20 November 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 27.
539 A/RES/34/180, 18 December 1979, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Article 12(2).
540 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 2, Article 2.
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guardians. This approach was more than once debated during the Parliamentary 
debates, also in the context of Article 27 ICRC. Also, the Government referred to 
the Dutch system of social security to substantiate the Dutch compliance with 
the obligations coming forth from Articles 26 and 27 ICRC in its Explanatory 
Memorandum. Therefore, the analysis of Parliamentary History on Article 26 
ICRC cannot be excluded from this thesis (Section 6.4).
6.2 Article 11 ICESCR
Article 11 ICESCR stipulates:
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone 
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement 
of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to 
ensure the realisation of this right, recognising to this effect the essential 
importance of international cooperation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognising the fundamental 
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and 
through international co-operation, the measures, including specific 
programmes, which are needed:
•	 To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution 
of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, 
by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by 
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve 
the most efficient development and utilisation of natural resources.
•	 Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-
exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food 
supplies in relation to need.
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government merely clarified why the 
Netherlands at the moment of ratification already fulfilled its duties that are implied 
in Article 11 ICESCR. Regarding the right to food, it was stated that no general 
regulation existed in the Netherlands that would regulate food supply, although 
there was a common EC policy on agriculture in place. In that light, Article 39 of 
the EEC treaty stipulated the goal to secure the food supplies within the EU. To 
this end, the organisation of the common market offered several instruments. 
Furthermore, a reference was made to emergency law on food supply.541 
Regarding the ensuring of food quality, a reference was made to the Quality Law 
541 In Dutch: Noodwet Voedselvoorzieningen (Stb. 1935, 793); Hamsterwet (Stb. 1962, 542).
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on Agriculture,542 the Commodities Act,543 and the Product Board Regulation.544 
Also, a reference was made to agricultural education and research, offered and 
conducted by several institutions, some of them subsidised by the Government. 
In addition, the Government considered that the Netherlands contributed to the 
realisation of Article 11 ICESCR by supporting several programmes and institutions 
in the international arena, in the field of development cooperation.545
The Members of the Preperatory Committee of the Dutch political party Democratic 
Socialists ’70 (DS ’70) asked whether the general idea expressed in the Article of 
‘the continuous improvement of living conditions’ was a realistic goal that could be 
strived for endlessly, for ‘the Treaty Provision on the continuous improvement of 
living conditions collides with the acquired insights on the limits to growth.’546 To this, 
the Government replied that ‘This idea is indeed based on beliefs and expectations 
from the years in which the Treaties were drawn, while these beliefs and expectations 
in most recent years have changed, in which it has been understood at the global 
level that unlimited growth will not be unlimited.’547 The Government emphasised 
that especially for developing countries the continuous improvement of living 
conditions was an absolute necessity. Regarding developed countries however, the 
Government argued that ‘if in developed countries limits must be imposed on growth, 
or if there should be a possible decline in the enjoyment of economic and social rights, 
the second Section of Article 2 and Article 4 of this Treaty then should be a guideline.’548 
From this, it appears that the goal as stipulated in Article 11 ICESCR to continuous 
improvement of living conditions was understood by the Dutch Government as a 
goal for especially developing countries, while developed countries would have 
the obligation to justify any restrictions to the enjoyment of ECOSOC rights based 
on Articles 2 (2) and 4 ICESCR.
542 In Dutch: Landbouwkwaliteitswet (Stb. 1971, 371).
543 In Dutch: Warenwet (Stb. 1935, 793).
544 In Dutch: Productschapsverordening.
545 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 50-51.
546 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 7, p. 16. Original text in Dutch: ‘De 
verdragsbepaling inzake steeds betere levensomstandigheden botst met de verworven inzichten inzake de 
grenzen van de groei.’
547 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 8, p. 26. Original text in Dutch: ‘Deze 
gedachte is inderdaad gebaseerd op opvattingen en verwachtingen uit de jaren waarin de Verdragen zijn 
opgesteld en welke opvattingen en verwachtingen in de meest recente jaren, waarin het besef is doorgedrongen 
dat er op wereldniveau geen sprake kan zijn van onbegrensde groei, tot een kentering zijn gekomen.’
548 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 8, p. 26. Original text in Dutch: ‘Indien in 
de ontwikkelde landen grenzen moeten worden gesteld aan de groei, of indien sprake zou moeten zijn van een 
eventuele teruggang in het genot van economische en sociale rechten, zullen hierbij het tweede lid van artikel 
2 en artikel 4 van het onderhavige Verdrag tot richtsnoer moeten dienen.’
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During the subsequent debates in Parliament, Article 11 ICESCR was hardly 
discussed.549
6.3 Article 24 ICRC
Article 24 ICRC stipulates that:
1. States Parties recognise the right of the child to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment 
of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure 
that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such healthcare 
services.
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in 
particular, shall take appropriate measures:
•	 to diminish infant and child mortality;
•	 to ensure the Provision of necessary medical assistance and healthcare 
to all children with emphasis on the development of primary 
healthcare;
•	 to combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of 
primary healthcare, through, inter alia, the application of readily available 
technology and through the Provision of adequate nutritious foods and 
clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of 
environmental pollution;
•	 to ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal healthcare for mothers;
•	 to ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and 
children, are informed, have access to education and are supported 
in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the 
advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation 
and the prevention of accidents;
•	 to develop preventive healthcare, guidance for parents and family 
planning education and services.
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view 
to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-
operation with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the 
549 In the Senate, B. De Gaay Fortman (MP for the Dutch political party PPR, cf. Rainbow/Radical 
Party; now merged into a green party) acknowledged that ECOSOC rights do not encompass individual 
entitlements. However, he opposed the idea that the ICESCR would be promotional only. He argued 
for promotional duties, which oblige a Government to promote access for the individual to what he 
is entitled to, regardless of the economic situation. In this context De Gaay Fortman, particularly 
referred to the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to be free from hunger. He made the 
observation that: ‘it seems as though we are now treading water with regard to the obligations the ICESCR 
bring us.’ See: B. de Gaay Fortman (PPR), Senate, 5th meeting, 21 November 1978. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Het lijkt erop alsof wij thans pas op de plaats willen maken in de verplichtingen die dat voor ons meebrengt.’
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right recognised in the present Article. In this regard, particular account 
shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government only briefly discussed the 
contents of Article 24 ICRC, since it considered the contents to be equivalent to 
Article 12 ICESCR, which was already extensively discussed in the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the ICESCR.550 The Government merely referred to the Collective 
Prevention of Public Health Act,551 which entrusted the Communities with various 
responsibilities in the field of health prevention, especially regarding minors. 
Food-related issues were not discussed. The Government considered the contents 
of Article 24 ICRC to be equivalent to the contents of Article 12 ICESCR, 11 ESC 
and 22 (1) CA.552
6.4 Article 26 ICRC
Article 26 ICRC stipulates that:
1. States Parties shall recognise for every child the right to benefit from 
social security, including social insurance, and shall take the necessary 
measures to achieve the full realisation of this right in accordance with 
their national law.
2. The benefits should, where appropriate, be granted, taking into account 
the resources and the circumstances of the child and persons having 
responsibility for the maintenance of the child, as well as any other 
consideration relevant to an application for benefits made by or on behalf 
of the child.
The Government stated that Article 9 ICESCR, 12 and 13 ESC and 20 CA stipulated 
corresponding rights.553 In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government gave 
an overview of social security law, and underlined that children had mostly 
access to social benefits through their parents or legal guardians.554 Therefore, 
a Reservation was proposed to Article 26 ICRC: ‘The Kingdom of the Netherlands 
accepts the Provisions of Article 26 of the Convention with the reservation that these 
Provisions shall not imply an independent entitlement of children to social security, 
550 In its Explanatory Memorandum on the ratification Bill of the ICESCR, the Government had indeed 
more extensively discussed the implementation of Article 12 ICESCR, mainly by referring to the 
various existing legislation in the field of prenatal care, health care, and a healthy living and working 
environment. Nutrition-related issues were not mentioned. See Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 
13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 51-52.
551 In Dutch: Wet Collectieve Preventie van Volksgezondheid.
552 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 34.
553 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, third attachment, pp. 55-56.
554 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3. pp. 35-36.
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including social insurance.’555 In this context the Government had generally stated 
in its Explanatory Memorandum that the treaty does not imply any mechanisms 
through which the child could effectuate its rights individually, and that such a 
mechanism was also not necessary, for in principle, the parents or legal guardians 
would be responsible for the effectuation of the child’s rights.556 Despite this 
assumption, the Government explained that the reservation was deemed necessary 
for the wordings of Article 26 ICRC might imply that a child would have an 
independent right to social security, which is in contradiction with Dutch social 
security law: ‘While in the Kingdom the child, in some cases, in the capacity of an 
employee or resident, may have independent claims to benefits under social security 
regulations, in practice usually the social security for the child is derived from the 
social security that belongs to the parents. The height of the latter is hereby determined 
so that the parental care and maintenance obligations towards children can be met. 
Independent social security benefits for the child only exist in the Netherlands to a limited 
extent, and there are no future plans to change this. Therefore, to preclude a different 
interpretation, it is proposed to make a Reservation for the Kingdom, meaning that the 
Government considers that Article 26 does not imply an independent right to social 
security for children, including social insurance.’557 In the Preparatory Committee 
however, both the Labour Party and Liberal Party raised the question whether 
such a Reservation would be necessary, for the wordings of Article 26 in itself 
would not imply an obligation to grant the child individual entitlements to social 
security. Furthermore, it was assumed by the Liberal Party that almost all other 
countries that signed the ICRC would have social security systems that were far 
less advanced compared to the Dutch system. Therefore, in those countries, the 
idea that a child would have individual entitlements would not even be considered, 
as long as adults would not yet have proper entitlements to social security.558 The 
Government replied that it was unaware of the interpretation of other countries 
of the Article, and underlined that in some countries a dualistic system was 
embedded in their Constitution, and thus entitlements of citizens could only be 
555 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 2, Article 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘Het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden aanvaardt het bepaalde in artikel 26 van het verdrag, onder het voorbehoud dat 
deze bepaling niet verplicht tot een zelfstandig recht van kinderen op sociale zekerheid, daarbij inbegrepen 
sociale verzekering.’
556 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 12.
557 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, pp. 35-36. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Hoewel in het Koninkrijk het kind in voorkomende gevallen, in de hoedanigheid van werknemer of als 
ingezetene, zelfstandige aanspraken kan hebben op prestaties krachtens de sociale zekerheid komt het er in de 
praktijk veelal op neer dat de sociale zekerheid voor het kind is afgeleid van de sociale zekerheid die toekomt aan 
de ouders. De hoogte van de aan laatstgenoemden verstrekte sociale zekerheidsuitkeringen is hierbij zodanig 
vastgesteld dat aan de ouderlijke zorg- en onderhoudsverplichtingen jegens de kinderen kan worden voldaan. 
Zelfstandige sociale zekerheidsaanspraken voor het kind bestaan in Nederland slechts in beperkte mate en er 
bestaan geen voornemens hierin voor de toekomst verandering te brengen. Derhalve wordt, teneinde een andere 
opvatting ter zake uit te sluiten, voorgesteld voor het Koninkrijk een voorbehoud te maken, inhoudend dat de 
regering van mening is dat artikel 26 niet verplicht tot een zelfstandig recht van kinderen op sociale zekerheid, 
daarbij inbegrepen sociale verzekering.’
558 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 19.
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derived from domestic legislation. Regarding the wordings, the Government stated 
that ‘In our opinion, however, neither the wordings of Article 26, nor the “travaux 
préparatoire” provide sufficient certainty to conclude that from Article 26, no independent 
rights to social security for children, including social insurance, could result. It is also 
particularly uncertain whether the Dutch Court could come to such a conclusion.’559 
The fact therefore that the Courts could decide on the applicability of the Article 
was a reason for the Government to maintain the Reservation. The Government 
explained, on a request of the Preparatory Committee for the Senate,560 that the 
Reservation was not unnecessary, or an expression of timorousness, for ‘also in 
view of experiences with other international instruments’ it was obvious ‘to critically 
consider new obligations.’561 From the subsequent debates in Parliament, it can 
be deduced that especially the broad interpretation of the ECHR and the ICCPR 
amongst the Courts had not been expected by the then-Government, and was 
reason for caution regarding the ratification of the ICRC.562 The Government 
stated that with this Reservation, the Netherlands could clearly express their 
interpretation of the Article, but also, it could be prevented that any undesired 
situation, especially in financial terms, would occur when the Courts would rule on 
the Provision, considering the system embedded in Articles 93 and 94 Constitutional 
Act, implying that the Courts have the sole authority to give a final interpretation 
on the meaning of international Provisions.563 During the Parliamentary debates 
on the ratification Bill of the ICRC, the Reservation was a permanent cause for 
discussion, in which Articles 26 and 27 were sometimes linked to one another. 
559 Parliamentary Documents, II 1993-1994, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 31. Original text in Dutch: ‘Naar 
ons oordeel echter geven noch de tekst van artikel 26, noch de “travaux préparatoire” voldoende zekerheid om te 
kunnen concluderen dat er voor kinderen geen zelfstandig recht op sociale zekerheid, met inbegrip van sociale 
verzekeringen, uit artikel 26 zou kunnen voortvloeien. Het is met name ook onzeker of de Nederlandse rechter 
niet tot een dergelijke conclusie zou kunnen komen.’ See for a similar reasoning by the Government: House 
of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994, second note.
560 Parliamentary Documents, I 1994-1995, 22855 (R1451), no. 22, p. 1, question posed by the CDA 
(Christian Democratic Appeal) fraction in which the Government was asked to respond to a letter of 
Defence for Children (NGO), of 26 September 1994.
561 Parliamentary Documents, I 1994-1995, 22855 (R1451), no. 22a, p. 1.
562 See for instance the contribution of Mrs Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn (CDA, Christian Democratic 
Appeal), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994 (regarding the ECHR), and Mr Koekoek 
(CDA, Christian Democratic Appeal), House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994, regarding 
the ICCPR. Koekoek stated with regard to Article 26 ICCPR that: ‘The highest Court on social security 
has decided for many years that this Article is not binding on all persons, but at one point ruled that it had 
lasted long enough, and therefore the Article was now binding on all persons. This has cost the public treasury 
millions. We are thus warned. It is therefore wise to indeed make the reservation.’ Original text in Dutch: 
‘De hoogste sociale-zekerheidsrechter heeft hiervan vele jaren gezegd dat dit artikel niet een ieder verbindend 
was, maar op een gegeven moment heeft hij gezegd dat het nu lang genoeg geduurd had en dat het artikel nu 
wel een ieder verbindend was. Dat heeft de schatkist miljoenen gekost. Wij zijn dus gewaarschuwd. Het is dus 
verstandig om het voorbehoud wel te maken.’ See also the Note of the Government on direct effect: House 
of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994, second note.
563 Parliamentary Documents, I 1994-1995, 22855 (R1451), no. 22a, p. 1. See also: House of Representatives, 
84th meeting, 30 June 1994, second note.
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Two Members of Parliament proposed an amendment in order to withdraw the 
Reservation.564 The Government advised not to support this Amendment.565
In the House of Representatives, some Members pleaded against maintaining the 
Reservation. Van der Burg (PvdA, Labour Party), argued that the reasoning of the 
Government was incorrect, and it was clear that Article 26 ICRC would not imply 
any direct entitlements to social security of the child. Firstly, she underlined that 
Article 27 ICRC clearly stipulates that the parents or legal guardians are primarily 
responsible for the child, and need to be enabled to take that responsibility, which 
is then a duty of the Member State. Only in occasional situations, a minor may 
apply for social benefits in the Netherlands, although it cannot be deduced from 
the Treaty that a child has an independent right to such social security. A strong 
interrelationship between Articles 26 and 27 is thus assumed. Secondly, Van 
der Burg could not understand the precaution of the Government regarding the 
reviewing competences of the Judiciary, and reminded the Government that they 
were of the opinion that ‘the review competences of the judge in this case are not so 
obvious, because it is primarily the responsibility of a democratically elected Government 
to assess the possibility, taking into account the national circumstances and financial 
situation (…).’566Apparently, she referred to the earlier replies of the Government 
to questions from the Preparatory Committee, in which the Government had 
stated that: ‘Formulations in treaty Provisions that oblige States Parties to undertake 
appropriate measures to facilitate the implementation of the rights in accordance with 
national conditions and with the available resources, first and foremost intend to make 
clear that a Member State is not bound to the impossible. Such Provisions are without 
prejudice to the responsibility of the democratically elected Government, but rather 
appeal to its primary responsibility to do what is reasonably possible, considering the 
national (especially financial) situation. This is exactly why in these cases judicial 
review is unlikely.’567 Thirdly, Van der Burg was surprised that the Government 
anticipated to a possible direct effect of Article 26 regarding independent rights 
of minors, while the Netherlands had signed and ratified Treaties with a similar 
content, in some cases with even more extensive wordings compared to Article 
564 Parliamentary Documents, II 1993-1994, 22855 (R1451), no. 10, submitted by Van den Burg and 
Versnel-Schmitz on behalf of the PvdA (Labour Party) and D’66 (Democrats ’66).
565 House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994, second note.
566 Mrs Van der Burg (PvdA, Labour Party), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994. 
Original text in Dutch: ‘de toetsingstaak van de rechter in dit geval niet voor de hand ligt, omdat het primair de 
taak is van een democratisch gekozen bestuur om te kunnen beoordelen of het mogelijk is, gelet op de nationale 
omstandigheden en de financiële situatie (…).’
567 Parliamentary Documents, II 1993-1994, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 9. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Formuleringen in verdragsbepalingen die verdragsstaten verplichten passende maatregelen te nemen om te 
helpen rechten te verwezenlijken in overeenstemming met de nationale omstandigheden en met de middelen die 
hen ten dienste staan, beogen eerst en vooral duidelijk te maken, dat een verdragsstaat niet tot het onmogelijke 
is gehouden. Dergelijke bepalingen doen dus niet af aan de verantwoordelijkheid van het democratisch gekozen 
bestuur, doch appelleren veeleer aan diens primaire verantwoordelijkheid ter zake te doen wat redelijkerwijs 
mogelijk is, gelet op de nationale (vooral financiële) situatie. Juist daarom ligt in dezen een toetsingstaak van 
de rechter niet voor de hand.’ See for a further context of this phrase: Section 7.6.2.
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26 ICRC, without a Reservation. She referred to the ICESCR and ESC, and stated 
that these treaties stipulated rights to everyone, including children.568
Also De Vries (VVD, Liberal Party), later supported by Van der Burg (PvdA, Labour 
Party),569 emphasised the interrelation between Articles 26 and 27. She underlined 
that Article 26 (1) ICRC stipulated that States Parties shall recognise for every 
child the right to benefit from social security, including social insurance, and 
shall take the necessary measures to achieve the full realisation of this right in 
accordance with their national law, while in Aricle 26 (2) ICRC it was recognised 
that those benefits should be granted, taking into account the resources and the 
circumstances of the child and persons having responsibility for the maintenance 
of the child. Article 27 then explicitly stipulates the State’s obligation to provide for 
material assistance to enable parents to realise an adequate standard of living for 
their child. In general, she remarked that the Treaty starts from the assumption 
that the parents are primarily responsible for their children. Considering all this, 
De Vries could not see how the Treaty would imply then independent rights 
for the child in the field of social security, and therefore, the Reservation could 
be withdrawn. In addition to that, she referred to the fact that countries with a 
similar level of social security did not make such a reservation to the treaty.570 
Mrs Versnel-Schmitz (D’66, Democrats ’66) had a similar view on the interrelation 
between Articles 26 and 27 ICRC, and added that ‘it is clearly intended in Articles 
26 and 27 to work indirectly via the parents. In that sense, Article 26 does not oblige 
to establish an independent right.’571
Other Members of Parliament however agreed with the Government, and 
especially the confessional parties underlined that the wordings of Article 26 did 
not sufficiently preclude that States were obliged to guarantee an independent 
right of the child to social benefits, and that such an independent right would be 
a violation of parental authority.572 The fact that the ICRC specifically focussed 
on the rights of the child was considered to be a possible factor that could lead to 
an easier recognition of an independent right for children, contrary to the earlier 
ratified general human rights treaties: although in those treaties similar rights 
were recognised, the treaties had a much broader scope (each individual, instead 
of children), and consequently there would be more room for interpretation in 
the context of the national systems of social security, and thus also more room to 
568 Mrs Van der Burg (PvdA), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
569 Mrs Van der Burg (PvdA), House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994.
570 Mrs De Vries, House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
571 Mrs Versnel-Schmitz (D’66, Democrats ’66), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994. 
Original text in Dutch: ‘Het is ook duidelijk de opzet van de artikelen 26 en 27 om via de omweg van de ouders 
te werken. Artikel 26 verplicht in die zin niet tot een zelfstandig recht.’ See also her contribution to the House 
of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994.
572 See for instance the contribution of Mrs Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn (CDA, Christian Democratic 
Appeal), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994; Van den Berg (SGP, Political Reformed 
Party), House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994.
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respect parental authority.573 Also, the Government underlined that there would 
be a larger margin of appreciation for the Administration when a Provision was not 
aimed at a specific group.574 Minister Kosto underlined as well that the ICRC was 
aimed at a specific group and ‘because of that, the Courts could decide to recognise 
direct effect sooner than in case of a convention that is addressed to everyone.’575 
The Government stated that despite the fact that they were of the opinion that 
Article 26 would not be suitable for direct effect, the Courts had a final say in that 
matter, and used their own criteria to determine the possibility of direct effect. 
To avoid a possible interpretation that would grant independent entitlements to 
social security to children, the Reservation was deemed necessary, and therefore 
not withdrawn.576
The Dutch Judiciary since then consistently ruled – line with the Reservation 
– that children had no direct entitlements to social benefits based on Article 26, 
and therefore most claims based on Article 26 were rejected. Consequently, the 
Courts did hardly rule on the possibility of direct applicability of the Provision.577
6.5 Article 27 ICRC
Article 27 ICRC stipulates that:
1. States Parties recognise the right of every child to a standard of living 
adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development.
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary 
responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, 
the conditions of living necessary for the child’s development.
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their 
means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others 
responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of 
need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly 
with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery 
of maintenance for the child from the parents or other persons having 
financial responsibility for the child, both within the State Party and from 
573 See for instance the contribution of Mrs Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn (CDA, Christian Democratic 
Appeal), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
574 House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994, second note.
575 Minister Kosto, House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994. Original text in Dutch: 
‘waardoor eerder dan bij verdragen die zich tot een ieder richten, een rechter tot erkenning van rechtstreekse 
werking kan besluiten.’
576 House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994, second note. See also the contribution of 
Minister Kosto during the same meeting.
577 See Section 4.5.
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abroad. In particular, where the person having financial responsibility for 
the child lives in a State different from that of the child, States Parties shall 
promote the accession to international agreements or the conclusion of 
such agreements, as well as the making of other appropriate arrangements.
The Government stated in its Explanatory Memorandum that Article 27 ICRC 
stipulated equivalent rights compared to Article 11 ICESCR and Article 22 CA.578 
According to the Government, the added value of ratifying Article 27 ICRC on top 
of the already ratified Article 11 ICESCR was that the ICRC Provision recognises 
that children also, and in particular, have a right to an adequate standard of living, 
‘taking into account the specific needs of the child: the standard of living should indeed 
be sufficient in view of the physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development 
of the child.’579 The Government emphasised that Article 27 (2) ICESCR stipulates 
that it is primarily the responsibility of the parents (or other legal guardians) to 
secure, within their ability and financial capacities, the conditions of living for 
the child. Only when the parents or legal guardians are not capable to take that 
responsibility, Article 27 (3) ICRC stipulates that it is the obligation of a Member 
State to take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the 
child to implement this right, in accordance with national conditions and within 
their means, by providing material assistance and support programmes, particularly 
with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.580 According to the Government, 
from the wording of Article 27 ICRC therefore, contrary to Article 26, it cannot be 
deduced that a child would have direct entitlement to social benefits.581 Article 
27 (4) ICRC then gives an international dimension to the rights enshrined in 
Article 27. In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government basically refers to 
domestic legislation through which the State obligations enshrined in Article 27 
were already fulfilled by the moment of ratification, such as the Social Assistance 
Act,582 regulations regarding financial support for youth care (including the Youth 
Care Act583) and legislation to guarantee the maintenance of children abroad.584
As mentioned above, it is noteworthy here that a group of Parliamentarians who 
advised not to adopt a Reservation to Article 26 ICRC argued that from Article 27 
ICRC, it already appeared that the parents or the legal guardians were primarily 
responsible for the adequate standard of livings of the child. Therefore, when 
reading Article 27 in conjunction with Article 26, it could be concluded that 
578 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, third attachment, pp. 55-56.
579 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 37. Original text in Dutch: ‘rekening 
houdend met de specifieke behoeften van het kind: de levensstandaard moet immers toereikend zijn voor de 
lichamelijke, geestelijke, intellectuele, zedelijke en maatschappelijke ontwikkeling van het kind.’
580 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 37.
581 Parliamentary Documents, II 1993-1994, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 31.
582 In Dutch: Algemene Bijstandswet.
583 In Dutch: Wet op de Jeugdzorg (before: Wet op de Jeugdhulpverlening).
584 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, pp. 37-38.
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the child has no direct entitlement to social security based on the Convention. 
Instead, it was the obligation of the Member State to only support those parents 
who could not take their primary responsibility. A child therefore has only indirect 
entitlement to social security, via its parents or legal guardians.
6.6 Article 12 CEDAW
Article 12 CEDAW stipulates:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of healthcare in order to ensure, on a basis 
of equality of men and women, access to healthcare services, including 
those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the Provisions of Section 1 of this Article, States Parties 
shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, 
confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where 
necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.
With regard to the first Section, the Government emphasised in its Explanatory 
Memorandum that men and women had equal access to healthcare, although a 
majority of the medical staff in the Netherlands was male, which was a point for 
improvement. Furthermore, the Government concluded that women had adequate 
access to contraceptives, whose quality was sufficiently guaranteed through national 
legislation (e.g. the Drug Provision Act, and the Medical Device Act585).
With regard to the second Section, the Government stated that the services in 
connection with pregnancy and pre- and post-natal care were of a high quality 
in the Netherlands. The costs of these services are covered by insurances, or by 
the persons concerned, who could – if necessary – apply for financial assistance. 
With regard to adequate nutrition, the Government stated that: ‘The attending 
physician or midwife and maternity assistant give due attention to adequate nutrition 
during pregnancy and the period in which the infant is fed by the mother. Also the 
clinics for baby and nursery care provide information on the subject.’586
During the subsequent debates in Parliament, Article 12 CEDAW was not 
significantly discussed.
585 In Dutch: Wet op de Geneesmiddelenvoorziening; Wet op de Medische Hulpmiddelen.
586 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3. Original text in Dutch: ‘Aan passende 
voeding gedurende de zwangerschap en de periode waarin de zuigeling door de moeder wordt gevoed, wordt 
door de behandelende arts c.q. verloskundige en kraamhulp de nodige aandacht besteed. Ook geven de 
consultatiebureaus voor zuigelingen- en kleuterzorg voorlichting ter zake.’
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6.7 Conclusion
From the above it can be concluded that in general, when ratifying the various 
international human rights treaties, the Government considered that the 
Netherlands already, and generously, fulfilled its obligations coming forth from 
Provisions that stipulate (or are related to) the right to adequate food. Especially 
in view of Article 11 ICESCR it was underlined that a country cannot be expected 
to continuously improve the standard of living of its population, and such duties 
were especially addressed to developing countries. Naturally, the Provisions in the 
specified treaties that relate to the right to food are discussed from the perspective 
of the target group and in the related context, although also here, the conclusion 
is drawn that the Netherlands fulfil their human rights obligations regarding the 
right to food. From this, it can be deduced, that the Netherlands, already at the 
moment of ratification, expressed hardly any ambition to improve its legislation 
or policies regarding the implementation of the right to food.
In view of Articles 26 (and also 27) ICRC, it was the clear intention of the 
Government that children would have no direct entitlement to social security. 
Although regarding both Articles the Government underlined that the Dutch social 
security system was of a high level and the obligations stipulated in the Articles 
were thus fulfilled, a Reservation to Article 26 ICRC was deemed necessary, for 
this Article did not – unlike Article 27 ICRC – stipulate that it was the primary 
responsibility of the parents or legal guardians to provide for an adequate standard 
of living, and therefore it might be understood by the Courts that children would 
have an independent right to social benefits. Some Parliamentarians considered 
the contents of Articles 26 and 27 complementary to one another. It is unclear 
whether this vision was shared by the Government.
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7.  Dutch Parliamentary History on the 
enforceability of human rights
7.1 Introduction
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Courts frequently refer to Parliamentary 
History in their considerations when deciding on individual appeals to the right 
to food, and seem to greatly value the opinion of the Legislature on the matter. 
Therefore, in this Chapter these viewpoints will be explored by analysing the 
relevant Parliamentary History. From the literature survey in Chapter 5, as well 
as from the analysis below, it appears that the Legislature (mostly represented 
by different Governments through the years) hardly expressed its view on the 
possibility of direct effect of the right to food in particular. Rather, human rights 
are subdivided in two categories: civil and political rights on the one hand, and 
economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand. The direct applicability is 
discussed for each category of rights altogether. Since the right to food is usually 
categorised as a right falling under the scope of economic, social and cultural 
rights, the analysis below will include all ratification Bills on international treaties 
that stipulate this category of rights, for in the Explanatory Memorandum of the 
Governments, and the subsequent Parliamentary debates, the matter of direct 
applicability of economic, social and cultural rights has been discussed several 
times into more detail. Also the ESC is included, since whereas in the treaty the 
right to food is not literally recognised, many rights that are stipulated are related. 
In addition, analysing the Parliamentary History on the ESC concerning the matter 
of direct effect contributes to a better understanding of the overall attitude of the 
Legislature towards direct applicability of ECOSOC rights. Both the ICESCR and 
the ESC have a counterpart that stipulates civil and political rights. It is especially 
the contrast between the viewpoints of the Legislature on the possibility of direct 
effect of civil and political rights on the one hand, and of economic, social and 
cultural rights on the other hand that leads to a better understanding. Therefore, 
ratification Bills to the treaties that stipulate both types of rights (the CEDAW and 
the ICRC) are especially important, for in that context, the Governments were 
forced to further clarify their viewpoints on the matter. Also, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR were discussed based on the same ratification Bill, which had consequently 
a similar contrasting effect regarding the debate on direct applicability. To this 
end, the ratification Bill of the ECHR was included in the analysis as well, in 
order to be able to contrast this with the ratification Bills of the ESC (original and 
revised version). This analysis thus includes in chronological order – so that also 
the development in the debate over time can be observed – the ratification Bills 
of the ECHR, the ESC, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the CEDAW, the ICRC and the 
revised version of the ESC.
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In the analysis below, three recurring elements are permanently included per 
discussed treaty. Firstly, the motivation or perceived added value of the treaty in 
question will be discussed, and is included in the analysis. This gives an impression 
of the future expectations regarding the ratification of the treaties. In this light, 
to understand the context of the Bills better, I also felt the need to put those in 
their historical context as expressed in the Explanatory Memoranda. Secondly, 
of course the possibility of direct applicability of the treaty Provisions will be 
discussed. Furthermore, complaint procedures were frequently the center of fierce 
discussions. In that light, thirdly, the desirability of a complaint procedure, and – 
where relevant – individual complaint procedures, will be debated and is included 
in the analysis, for it tells us something about the viewpoints of the Legislature on 
the possibility to stimulate the effectuation of rights in the international human 
rights system. Finally, conclusions will be drawn.
7.2 The ECHR
The European Convention on Human Rights was signed by its first Member States 
on 4 November 1950587 and the first Optional Protocol on 20 March 1952.588 Both 
documents were discussed and ratified simultaneously by Dutch Parliament in 
the period 1952-1954.
7.2.1 Background and added value of the ECHR
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government explained some of the 
backgrounds of the drafting of the ECHR. While the treaty was inspired by the 
content of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, it was the ambition to embed 
those rights in a convention with the characteristics of a multilateral agreement 
between States. It was the global intention to also create such agreements based 
on the UHDR, but during that period, these negotiations did not proceed very 
well,589 and the need was felt to regionally adopt a legally binding instrument, 
including a monitoring procedure, at an earlier stage.590 The fact that the ECHR 
was a convention instead of a declaration was portrayed by the Government as 
the most important added value for the Dutch legal order,591 a vision that was 
generally shared by Parliament.592
587 European Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950, Rome, in: Council of Europe Treaty 
Series, no. 5.
588 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 20 March 
1952, Paris, in: Council of Europe Treaty Series, no. 9.
589 Parliamentary Documents, I 1952-1953 3043, no. 162, p. 2; see: Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-
1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 9.
590 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 2.
591 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 2.
592 See the discussions in general, held in: House of Representatives, 48th meeting, 3 March 1954; 
House of Representatives, 49th meeting, 4 March 1954; Senate, 50th meeting, 27 July 1954. See also: 
Parliamentary Documents, I 1952-1953 3043, no. 162, p. 2.
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In the Preliminary Report, the observation was made that both the substantive 
and geographical scope of the ECHR were not as broad as the UDHR. In that 
context, especially the fact that the draft did not stipulate any ECOSOC rights, was 
underlined,593 which was later also criticised in the House of Representatives by 
some Parliamentarians,594 and discussed in the Preliminary Report of the Senate.595 
The Government explained that at that time, it was possible to reach an agreement 
on the wordings of the ECHR rights, but not yet on ECOSOC rights. However, the 
Government pointed out that in the context of the Council of Europe the possibility 
was explored to come to a European Social Charter, that ‘in the field of social policy 
should complement of the present Convention.’596 Already here, a difference can be 
distinguished between civil and political rights, which are explicitly embedded in 
a legally binding Convention, and ESOCOC rights, which are possibly embedded 
in a Charter, and are seen as social policies, instead of rights.
The Government informed that during the negotiations preceding the final draft 
of the ECHR, there were two points of contention. The first issue was the question 
whether the rights enshrined in the treaty had to be defined into detail, or merely 
generally listed.597 The Government had held the position that the rights should 
be clarified into detail, to ensure that Member States knew what the scope would 
be of the obligations they agreed upon.598 During the negotiations, a compromise 
text was finally adopted, in which an attempt was made to find a balance between 
specifically defined rights and more general descriptions, and the acceptance of 
the jurisdiction of a Court of Human Rights was optional. On some rights it was 
harder to reach an agreement, and to avoid further delay they were not included 
in the Convention, but in an Optional Protocol. The rights involved were mainly 
the right to the protection of property, the right to education and the right to 
free elections.599 It is in this light interesting to notice, especially with the later 
attitude of Dutch Governments towards ECOSOC rights in mind, that regarding 
the right to education, the Dutch representative – in line with the reasoning of 
the Government – had declared during the negotiations preceding the adoption 
of this Optional Protocol, that a right to parents to raise their children should not 
only imply the respect for this right, but a State should also ‘ensure the possibility 
of exercising those rights by appropriate measures.’600 The second matter was the 
question whether a European Court for Human Rights should be installed, besides 
the already existing European Commission for Human Rights (the original treaty 
593 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 2.
594 See especially the contribution of: Mr Vink, Mr Welter and Mrs Lips-Odinot, House of Representatives, 
48th meeting, 3 March 1954.
595 Parliamentary Documents, I 1952-1953 3043, no. 162, p. 2.
596 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 6. p. 3.
597 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 2.
598 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 6. p. 2.
599 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 3.
600 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 3.
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body).601 Originally, the Government was of the opinion that one supervisory 
body would be sufficient, but later agreed on the installation of a European Court 
for Human Rights.602
7.2.2 Direct applicability of the ECHR
During the Parliamentary debate on the ratification of the ECHR, for the first 
time since the Constitutional reform of 1953, the matter of direct applicability of 
human rights was addressed. Members of the Preparatory Committee had raised 
the question how the national Courts would have to judge whether the national 
Legislature did not exceed its competence in limiting the rights enshrined in the 
ECHR as recognised in the limitation clauses. In particular, the question was raised 
how the phrase ‘necessary in a democratic society’ – an expression used in those 
limitation clauses – relates to the review competences of the Judiciary, while it is 
the Legislature who usually decides by adopting national statutory regulations on 
what is deemed necessary in a democratic society.603 The Government responded 
that: ‘The undersigned acknowledge that the standards laid down in Articles 8 through 
11 are vague, so with regard to the content different opinions are possible. They doubt 
whether it is possible, in a general regulation as the present one, to come to more 
specific formulations that would be acceptable to all Member States. They confirm in 
general that as suggested by the Committee Members the hypothesis that the national 
law, established in a democratic polity like ours, is the expression of what is “in a 
democratic society is needed.” This will indeed generally come down to a situation in 
which the national Court will accept a considered judgment of the national Legislature 
on whether or not an exception may have been made. However, also in view of the 
new Constitutional Provisions, the national Court remains in principle authorised to 
pass a judgment dissenting of the national Legislature. Still, the undersigned think that 
the Court in such case may only verify whether the exception rule in general may be 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of safety, public order, etc., without 
being allowed to enter into the question whether the exception in the case is opportune. 
Indeed, in the opinion of the undersigned, the review duty of the judge, resulting from 
Article 65 of the Constitution Act, may in no way imply that the Courts rule in matters 
of opportuneness.’604
601 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 2.
602 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 6. p. 2.
603 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 5, p. 2.
604 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 6. p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘De ondergetekenden 
geven toe dat de normen gesteld in artikelen 8 t/m 11 vaag zijn, zodat omtrent de inhoud daarvan verschil 
van mening mogelijk is. Zij betwijfelen echter of het mogelijk is, in een algemene regeling als de onderhavige, 
tot meer concrete formuleringen te komen, welke aanvaardbaar zouden zijn voor alle aangesloten landen. 
Zij beamen in het algemeen de door de aan het woord zijnde leden geopperde stelling, dat de nationale wet, 
tot stand gekomen in een democratisch staatsbestel als het onze, de uitdrukking is van datgene wat ‘in een 
democratische samenleving nodig is.’ Dit zal inderdaad in het algemeen hierop neerkomen, dat de nationale 
rechter zich zal neerleggen bij een weloverwogen oordeel van de nationale wetgever over de vraag of al dan niet 
een uitzonderingsregel mocht worden gemaakt. Mede gelet op de nieuwe grondwetsbepalingen blijft echter de 
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The Government was of the opinion that the duties stipulated in the ECHR would 
not play a role of any significance, for it was assumed that the Netherlands already 
fulfilled these duties. In the Preperatory Committee, the question was raised 
whether the ratification would lead to any amendments in national legislation.605 
The Government responded that ‘there is no reason for this, since they consider 
that the complex regulations of Dutch law, (…), offer sufficient guarantees that in our 
country these principles will find respect.’606 Minister Beyen even considered that: 
‘Despite the limited meaning that the convention, which we now discuss, obviously 
has, the Government considers the realisation of this Convention an important and 
gratifying fact.’607 A viewpoint that was criticised in Parliament more than once.
As already demonstrated above, one of the arguments for not recognising an 
individual complaints procedure, was the fact that according to the Government, 
individuals could adequately invoke the ECHR rights in the Courts. A second, 
parallel, complaint procedure would therefore be unnecessary, and would mostly 
lead to the abuse of such a procedure.608 This approach seems to imply that it 
was assumed that the Provisions of the ECHR have direct effect in the domestic 
legal order.609
7.2.3 Individual complaints procedures
The Government informed that there was another matter that had led to extensive 
debates during the negotiations preceding the final text of the ECHR, namely the 
possibility to implement an individual complaints procedure. Member States could 
recognise the competence of the Commission of Human Rights to receive and 
nationale rechter in beginsel bevoegd om een van de nationale wetgever afwijkend oordeel te geven. Toch menen 
de ondergetekenden dat de rechter in zulk een geval slechts mag nagaan of de uitzonderingsregel in het algemeen 
in een democratische samenleving in het belang van veiligheid, openbare orde e.d. noodzakelijk zou kunnen 
zijn zonder dat hij mag treden in de vraag of de betrokken uitzonderingsregel in het concrete geval doelmatig 
is. Immers, naar het oordeel van de ondergetekenden houdt de toetsingplicht van de rechter, voortvloeiende uit 
artikel 65 van de Grondwet, geenszins in dat de rechter zou moeten treden in doelmatigheidsvragen.’
605 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 5, p. 2.
606 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 6. p. 3. Original text in Dutch: ‘dat hiertoe geen 
aanleiding bestaat, aangezien zij van oordeel zijn dat het complex regelingen van de Nederlandse wet,…, 
voldoende waarborgen biedt dat deze beginselen in ons land eerbiediging zullen vinden.’
607 Minister Beyer, House of Representatives, 48th meeting, 3 March 1954. Original text in Dutch: 
‘ondanks de beperkte betekenis, die de conventie, waarover wij thans beraadslagen, uiteraard heeft, acht de 
Regering het tot stand komen van deze conventie toch een belangrijk en verheugend feit.’
608 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 4; Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 
3043, no. 6. p. 4; See also Minister Beyen, House of Representatives, 49th meeting, 4 March 1954.
609 Mrs Vink even literally concluded this in Parliament (House of Representatives, 48th meeting, 
3 March 1954), a view that was not contested: ‘Ultimately, the individual is currently already offered a 
reasonable certainty that his rights and freedoms enshrined in the convention will be respected by the Court, 
due to the judicial review competences that are attributed to the Judiciary under Article 65 of the Constitution.’ 
Original text in Dutch: ‘Uiteindelijk wordt het individu op dit moment reeds door het toetsingsrecht, dat de 
rechter krachtens artikel 65 van de Grondwet toekomt, een behoorlijke zekerheid geboden, dat zijn rechten en 
vrijheden in de conventie neergelegd, door de rechter zullen worden geëerbiedigd.’
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consider individual complaints by an official statement, as was stipulated in the 
former Article 25 of the ECHR.610 This procedure existed besides a complaints 
procedure for States that was embedded in Article 24 ECHR, and not optional.611 
The Government had great expectations concerning the complaints procedure for 
States, but rejected, as will be demonstrated below, the possibility of an individual 
complaints procedure.612
By signing the ECHR the Member States had to make some choices. The complaints 
procedure for States and the competences of the European Commission on Human 
Rights were automatically recognised while signing the ECHR, but in addition, 
States could voluntarily recognise the individual complaints procedure and the 
competence of the European Court of Human Rights. According to the Government, 
the purpose of the Commission was to facilitate the friendly settlements of disputes, 
before a case was brought before the Court.613 Another choice to be made was the 
recognition of the above mentioned Optional Protocol, in which the rights were 
stipulated that could not be agreed on during the negotiations. The Government’s 
position was that the Netherlands should recognise the competences of the Court 
of Human Rights and ratify the Optional Protocol, but not recognise the individual 
complaints procedure.614 Regarding the latter, the Government explained that 
firstly, in the domestic legal system, citizens could adequately invoke the rights 
embedded in the Convention, and therefore there was no reason to simultaneously 
open the possibility for individual complaints in an international forum. Secondly, 
the Government did not expect that such an individual complaints procedure 
would contribute to the realisation of the purpose of the treaty, while it could 
lead on the other hand to a cumbersome and expensive procedure. And thirdly, 
the Government called for cautiousness, for it should be taken into account that 
such a procedure might be abused because ‘individuals or groups of persons could 
systematically attempt to provoke complaints.’615 Interesting detail in this light 
however, is that the Dutch Delegation that participated in the negotiations that 
preceded the adoption of the ECHR, had voted for the individual complaints 
procedure.616 The rejection of the individual complaints procedure was heavily 
criticised in Parliament, but the Government maintained its position.
610 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 5.
611 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 5.
612 See for instance Minister Beyen, in: House of Representatives, 49th meeting, 4 March 1954.
613 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 5.
614 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, in particular p. 5.
615 Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 3043, no. 3, p. 4; Parliamentary Documents, II 1952-1953 
3043, no. 6. p. 4; See also Minister Beyen, House of Representatives, 49th meeting, 4 March 1954. Original 
text in Dutch: ‘…dat personen of groepen zich stelselmatig er op zouden toeleggen klachten uit te lokken.’
616 See for instance Mrs Tenderloo, House of Representatives, 48th meeting, 3 March 1954.
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7.3 The ESC (earliest version)
The European Social Charter was adopted in Turin on 18 October 1961.617 The Dutch 
ratification of the Charter was finally completed in the period 1966 (submission 
of the ratification Bill by the Government618) to 1978 (final adoption of the 
ratification by the Senate619). A part of the ratification process thus coincided 
with the ratification process of the ICESCR (see below in Section 7.4). In both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, the ESC was discussed about one month 
earlier compared to the ICESC. This explains the large amount of references to 
the other treaty during both Parliamentary debates.
7.3.1 Background and added value of the ESC
The Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the Government can be characterised 
as short and concise. It was explained that the Charter embodies ‘a codification of 
the in the Member States existing ideas in the social field and thus intends to provide for 
guidance for the national social policies of those Member States.’620 The added value 
for the Dutch legal order was not discussed in the Explanatory Memorandum, 
but it was obvious that the Government was very cautious to include all the 
ESC Provisions in the ratification Bill, most in particular regarding the fiercely 
discussed right to strike (Article 6 sub 4 ESC). In the original ratification Bill, the 
right was included,621 later – as recommended by the Preparatory Committee 
due to insufficient clarity on the national legal status of the right to strike622 – 
excluded,623 and finally included with the limitation that it would only concern 
employees that are not in the service of the Government, in line with a national 
Bill that was expected to pass Parliament soon.624 In the end however, Parliament 
did not agree on the recognition of the Article.
7.3.2 Direct applicability of the ESC
Regarding the possibility of direct effect of the ESC, the Government in its 
Explanatory Memorandum cannot be misunderstood: ‘The Charter has no ‘internal 
effect’ in the Member States. Citizens of the Parties thus cannot invoke the Charter 
617 European Social Charter, 18 October 1961, Turin, in: European Treaty Series 35.
618 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 2.
619 Senate, 3rd meeting, 31 October 1978.
620 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 3, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘(…)vormt 
een codificatie van de in de lid-staten levende gedachte op sociaal terrein en beoogt aldus een leidraad te zijn 
voor het nationaal sociaal beleid van elk dier Staten.’
621 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 2, Article 2.
622 The Preparatory Committee was the Commission for Social Affairs and Public Health, see: 
Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 5, pp. 2-3.
623 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 7.
624 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 11.
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before a national judicial institution.’625 This point of view was critically received 
by the Preparatory Committee, which considered that indeed most Articles were 
directly addressed to State Parties (mostly by using the word ‘undertake’), and not 
to citizens, although in some Provisions, the word ‘recognise’ was used (especially 
in Articles 6 sub 4 and 18 sub 4): a word that would suggest direct effect.626 The 
Government responded that: ‘The answer to the question whether an agreement or 
Provision of the ESC has direct effect depends in general on whether the parties to the 
agreement have intended the effect. This is not the case regarding the European Social 
Charter, as is illustrated by inter alia the Annex to Part III. Indeed, the Articles of 
the Charter referred to by the Committee stipulate on the one hand State duties with 
respect to each other to perform certain actions, and on the other hand the recognition 
of certain rights of individuals. This does not mean, however, that in the latter cases 
these persons may derive the rights directly from the Charter. Rather, by using the 
terminology, one tried to express that in one case the focus on the State Party’s obligation 
is on the measures to be taken, while in the other case, apart from measures that are 
necessary, the focus of the Government policy will be on the right of these persons. 
The Provisions, however, are still addressed to the state.’627 In general, this view 
was not opposed in Parliament, except with regard to one Provision: Article 6 
(4), stipulating the right to strike. The particularities of that discussion will be 
referred to into detail in Chapter 8, for it will appear that this Provision is the 
pivot of the debate on direct effect of ECOSOC rights, and therefore a separate 
Chapter is dedicated to the mater.
7.3.3 Complaints procedures
In the earliest version of the ESC, no complaints procedure existed, nor was the 
matter discussed during any Parliamentary debate.
625 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 3, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘Het handvest 
heeft geen ‘interne werking’ in de deelnemende Staten. Onderdanen van Partijen kunnen derhalve geen beroep 
doen op het Handvest voor een nationaalrechtelijke instantie.’
626 Parlementaire Geschiedenis, II 1966-1967 8606 (R 533), no. 5, voorlopig verslag van de vaste 
Commissie van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid.
627 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 6. Original text in Dutch: ‘De beantwoording 
van de vraag, of een overeenkomst of bepaling daaruit rechtstreekse werking heeft of hebben hangt in het 
algemeen hiervan af, of de partijen bij de overeenkomst deze werking hebben beoogd. Bij het Europese 
Sociaal Handvest is dat niet het geval, getuige onder meer de bijlage bij Deel III. Inderdaad stellen de door de 
commissie genoemde artikelen van het Handvest tegenover elkaar enerzijds verplichtingen voor de staten tot 
het verrichten van zekere handelingen, anderzijds de erkenning door hen van zekere rechten van personen. Dit 
wil echter niet zeggen, dat in de laatstbedoelde gevallen deze personen de genoemde rechten rechtstreeks aan 
het Handvest kunnen ontlenen. Veeleer is door de gebezigde terminologie getracht tot uitdrukking te brengen 
dat in het ene geval het accent van de aan de Verdragspartij opgelegde verplichting rust op de door haar te 
treffen maatregelen, terwijl in het andere geval, afgezien of maatregelen geboden zijn, het uitgangspunt van 
het te voeren regeringsbeleid het recht van de bedoelde personen zal zijn. De desbetreffende bepalingen blijven 
zich echter richten tot de staat.’
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7.4 The ICCPR and the ICESCR
In 1976, one ratification Bill628 regarding the ICCPR (including its first Protocol), 
the ICESCR and certain regulations regarding the abolishment of the death penalty, 
were discussed in Parliament.
7.4.1 Background and added value of the treaties
The Government clarified some of the backgrounds of the discussed treaties in 
its Explanatory Memorandum. Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR constituted a step 
further in the development of a global human rights mechanism. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (adopted on 10 December 
1948)629 was considered to be a first step in global realisation of respect for human 
rights. At that time, it was the intention to realise a second step soon, by de adoption 
of a treaty that would translate the UDHR into legally binding Provisions. However, 
this next step was only realised in 1966, by the adoption of two treaties instead of 
one. The Government explained that: ‘It should be noted that it was a controversy 
whether all rights to the example of the Universal Declaration should be included in 
one treaty or the civil and political rights on the one hand and the economic, social 
and cultural rights on the other hand in two separate treaties. In 1951, the General 
Assembly decided on the last option, a decision which has been discussed frequently 
ever since, but never reconsidered.’630 The originally intended third step – a global 
monitoring mechanism – had been incorporated in the treaties: both the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR contain a reporting procedure and a States Complaints procedure. 
In an Optional Protocol, an individual complaints procedure was adopted to the 
ICCPR.631
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government frequently reminded of the 
difficult negotiations that preceded the adoption of both treaties, and underlined 
that therefore the final wordings of the Provisions were mostly a result of a 
compromise. As a result, ‘not all the Provisions excel in precision and clarity.’632 Despite 
this rather negative perception of the content of the treaties, the Government 
628 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 2.
629 217 A (III), 10 December 1948, The Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
630 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 7-8. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Hierbij zij aangetekend dat het een strijdpunt is geweest of alle rechten naar het voorbeeld van de Universele 
Verklaring in één verdrag moesten worden opgenomen dan wel de burgerlijke en politieke rechten enerzijds 
en de economische sociale en culturele rechten anderzijds in twee afzonderlijke verdragen. In 1951 besloot de 
Algemene Vergadering tot het laatste, een beslissing die daarna herhaaldelijk in discussie is geweest, maar 
waarop niet meer werd teruggekomen.’
631 A/RES/21/2200, 16 December 1966, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.
632 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 8. Original text in Dutch: ‘niet alle 
verdragsartikelen uitmunten door precisie en helderheid.’
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regarded the adoption of the ICCPR and the ICESCR as important: ‘Despite the 
defects and shortcomings that stick to the treaties in the Dutch opinion, the Dutch 
Government considers their realisation a positive development because thus the possibility 
was created to better found the promotion and protection of human rights on a global 
scale.’633 The Government came to this conclusion after exploring the negative 
and positive aspects of ratification of the treaties. Arguments against ratification 
were in the first place that both the ECHR and the ESC ‘already function within 
a reasonable coherent legal community and offer sufficient additional security, in 
addition to the national legal protection, especially where the European monitoring 
system regarding the compliance with the treaty Provisions clearly goes beyond that of 
the global conventions.’634 Secondly, the Government noticed that a combination of 
regional and global treaties might lead to uncertainty and conflicts between the 
two systems. However, it was the arguments for ratification that finally convinced 
the Government to propose the ratification Bill. In the first place, the Netherlands 
had pledged itself to contribute to the international promotion and protection of 
human rights, which finds its origin in the UN Charter and the UDHR. The ICCPR 
and the ICESCR are therefore necessary further steps to this end. Secondly, the 
Government argued that occasionally, the protection of the UN treaties has a 
broader scope compared to the European equivalents. Thirdly, in case of a possible 
conflict between a regional and a global treaty, the Government underlined the 
principle stipulated in both UN treaties that one convention may not be invoked 
to detract from a Provision that is more favourable to a person.635 In that light, a 
conflict between treaty Provisions seems unlikely.636
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government thoroughly explained the 
differences between the contents of the regional treaties and its international 
equivalents. In general, the added value of ratifying the UN treaties seems to be that 
both treaties offer an extra guarantee for the respect for and realisation of human 
rights: it was suggested that in case when hypothetically, due to whatever reason, 
the Netherlands would denounce one of the European treaties, the UN equivalent 
would still guarantee the substantive rights embedded in that treaty. In addition, 
the Government underlined that the UN treaties would provide for additional 
protection of the rights, ‘because an alleged violation of a right may be brought before 
633 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 8. Original text in Dutch: ‘Ondanks 
de gebreken en de tekortkomingen die naar Nederlands inzicht aan de verdragen kleven, acht de Nederlandse 
Regering de totstandkoming ervan een positieve ontwikkeling omdat aldus de mogelijkheid is geschapen de 
bevordering en bescherming van rechten van de mens op wereldschaal beter te funderen.’
634 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 10-11. Original text in Dutch: ‘reeds 
binnen een redelijk coherente rechtsgemeenschap functioneren en voldoende additionele waarborg bieden naast 
de nationale rechtsbescherming, temeer waar het Europese stelsel betreffende het toezicht op de naleving van 
de verdragsbepalingen duidelijk verder gaat dan dat van de mondiale verdragen.’
635 The Government argued that this principle would also apply to a conflict between an international 
treaty and the Dutch Constitution. Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 8, p. 5.
636 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 10-11.
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more forums’637 Regarding the contents of the ICCPR and the ICSCR compared to 
the ECHR and the ESC, the Government argued that especially the ICCPR and 
the ECHR showed many similarities. This was due to the fact that the ECHR was 
adopted in a period in which the complex political relations within the UN led to 
difficulties in the process to come to global Human Rights treaties. Therefore, there 
was a growing need in Europe to adopt a human rights convention to ‘guarantee in 
a regional, European context the democratic rights and freedoms.’638 The wordings of 
the ECHR were strongly inspired by the UDHR and the then existing draft texts of 
the ICCPR.639 According to the Government, the European experiences with the 
ECHR also had a stimulating effect on the European contribution in the preparation 
of the ICCPR.640 The Government explained that there were fewer similarities 
between the ICESCR and the ESC. Especially the monitoring mechanisms differed 
significantly, for the ESC monitoring mechanism ‘contains elements derived from 
facilities that are applied by the International Labour Organisation.’641 In general, 
it must be observed that the Government took considerably greater effort in 
comparing the ECHR with the ICCPR, and was less comprehensive in comparing 
the ESC with the ICESCR.
7.4.2 The direct applicability of the ICCPR and the ICESCR
The Government explained in its Explanatory Memorandum the criteria used 
by the Courts to determine whether a treaty Provision would be binding on all 
persons: ‘Criterion for answering the question whether treaty Provisions are ‘binding on 
all persons by virtue of their contents’ is according to the case law of the Supreme Court 
the nature and content of the Provision, while also the intention of the draftsmen of the 
Convention may be a guideline.’642 With regard to the ICESCR, the Government was 
of the opinion that the Provisions of the ICESCR would not be directly applicable, 
due to the nature and the content, as well as the wordings of the Articles. The 
Convention ‘is focussed on the progressive and increasing realisation through legislation 
and other implementation measures.’643 The Government underlined that Article 
2 sub 1 ‘clearly expresses that the draftsmen of the Convention took into consideration 
637 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 8, p. 6. Original text in Dutch: ‘doordat 
een beweerde schending van een recht aan meer fora kan worden voorgelegd.’
638 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 9. Original text in Dutch: ‘in regionaal 
Europees verband de democratische rechten en vrijheden te verzekeren.’
639 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 9; Parliamentary Documents, II 
1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 8, p. 6.
640 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 8, p. 6.
641 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 9.
642 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 12. Original text in Dutch: ‘Criterium 
voor de beantwoording van de vraag of verdragsbepalingen ‘naar de inhoud eenieder kunnen verbinden’ is 
volgens de jurisprudentie van de Hoge Raad de aard en de inhoud van de bepaling, terwijl tevens de bedoeling 
van de opstellers van het verdrag een richtsnoer kan zijn.’
643 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 12-13. Original text in 
Dutch: ‘is afgestemd op geleidelijke en toenemende verwezenlijking door middel van wetgeving en andere 
uitvoeringsmaatregelen.’
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that the economic, social and cultural rights as regards to their nature and their contents 
in general do not provide a standard criterion for the pace and degree of the realisation 
of those rights.’644 The pace and degree of the realisation thereby greatly depends 
on the economic and social conditions of the Member State. The Government 
underlined that Article 2 ICESCR had been adopted in a period in which it was 
assumed that economic stagnation or even recession was unlikely to happen. In 
the meantime however, this assumption had proven to be unrealistic, and the 
Government therefore was of the opinion that Article 2 ICESCR must be thus 
understood that its function was also to be a guideline in case of such economic 
stagnation or recession. Furthermore, any restriction on the enjoyment of the 
rights embedded in the ICESCR must be at least in compliance with the non-
discrimination clause of Article 2 (2) but also with Article 4, that only allows such 
restrictions under certain conditions.645
How different was the perception of the Government regarding the possibility 
of direct applicability of the ICCPR Provisions! The Government referred in its 
Explanatory Memorandum to Article 2 ICCPR, which obliges the Member States 
to ‘take the necessary steps, in accordance with their Constitutional processes and with 
the Provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the present Covenant.’646 According 
to the Government, the purpose of this Article is to concretise the responsibility 
of the Member States by indicating the States’ duty to effectuate the contents of 
the treaty in the domestic legal order. It was the opinion of the Government that 
in the Netherlands, Articles 65 and 66 (currently, Articles 93 and 94) fulfil this 
obligation, for these Constitutional Provisions grant direct effect to the eligible 
international regulations. Whether or not the ICCPR Provisions are binding on 
all persons, and thus have direct effect through Articles 65 and 66 CA could 
not be directly deduced from a textual interpretation of the treaty Provisions.647 
The fact however that many analogous Provisions embedded in the ECHR were 
already considered to be directly applicable appeared to be a decisive factor for 
the Dutch Government to conclude that the corresponding ICCPR Provisions 
would also have direct effect. The Government concluded that: ‘many Provisions 
concerning substantive rights, embedded in Part III of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, have, due to the content and wording of these Provisions, and 
following the example of most Provisions stipulating substantive rights of the European 
644 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 45. Original text in Dutch: ‘duidelijk 
doet uitkomen dat de opstellers van het verdrag in aanmerking hebben genomen dat de economische, sociale 
en culturele rechten wat betreft hun aard en inhoud in hun algemeenheid geen vaste maatstaf bieden voor het 
tempo en de graad van de verwezenlijking van die rechten.’
645 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 45.
646 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 13. Original text in Dutch: ‘langs de 
door het staatsrecht van de betreffende staat voorgeschreven weg en in overeenstemming met de bepalingen 
van het verdrag, alle maatregelen te nemen die nodig zijn om de in het verdrag erkende rechten tot gelding te 
brengen.’
647 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 13.
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Convention, direct effect and can be applied by the Courts without the need for further 
legislation.’648 The Government added that ‘partly due to this, civil and political rights 
on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other, are embedded 
in two separate documents, because in general the first group of rights is suitable for 
direct application, while the realisation of the second group often requires implementing 
measures.’649 This reasoning seems to be in contrast with the explanation offered 
by the Government earlier in its Explanatory Memorandum, where instead the 
unity between the two treaties was emphasised. There, the Government underlined 
that both treaties were a further elaboration of the UDHR. The draftsmen of the 
treaties tried to underline the parallel character of the Covenants by ‘formulating 
the preambles in almost identical wordings. They especially wanted to express in the 
preambles that, although civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, 
social and cultural rights on the other hand are enshrined in two separate documents, 
the enjoyment of these rights altogether is essential for humans. Also part 1 of both 
Conventions, relating to the right of all peoples to self-determination, is defined in 
equal terms.’650 In general, the opinion of the Government regarding the direct 
applicability of the ICCPR and the ICESCR was hardly criticised in Parliament, 
although occasionally, the matter was discussed briefly, as will be demonstrated 
below in a short summary.
In the Preparatory Committee, no particular questions were raised concerning 
the direct applicability of both treaties. The Members of the Labour Party (PvdA) 
‘regarded the considerations on the direct applicability in itself as satisfactory. They 
stressed however, that fundamental rights isolated in a convention can never be abstractly 
expressed, independent of any Constitutional system. As long as there is no world 
legal order, there will always remain a certain tension between the granting of rights 
to individuals on the one hand and the claims of states on internal sovereignty on the 
648 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 13. Original text in Dutch: ‘vele 
bepalingen, houdende materiële rechten, voorkomende in deel III van het Internationale Verdrag inzake 
Burgerlijke en Politieke Rechten, op grond van inhoud en formulering van deze bepalingen, en in navolging 
van de meeste bepalingen, houdende materiële rechten, van het Europese Verdrag, rechtstreeks werken en door 
de rechter kunnen worden toegepast zonder dat daarvoor nog enige wetgeving vereist is.’
649 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 13. Original text in Dutch: ‘de 
burgerlijke en politieke rechten enerzijds, en de economische, sociale en culturele rechten anderzijds, mede hierom 
in twee afzonderlijke akten zijn neergelegd, omdat in het algemeen de eerste groep rechten voor rechtstreekse 
toepassing vatbaar is, terwijl voor de verwezenlijking van de tweede groep veelal uitvoeringsmaatregelen zijn 
vereist.’
650 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 8. Original text in Dutch: ‘de 
preambules vrijwel geheel in identieke bewoordingen te formuleren. Zij hebben met name in de preambule doen 
uitkomen dat, hoewel de burgerrechten en politieke rechten enerzijds, en de economische, sociale en culturele 
rechten anderzijds in twee aparte documenten zijn opgenomen, het genot van het totaal van deze rechten voor 
de mens essentieel is. Ook deel 1 van beide verdragen, betrekking hebbend op het recht van alle volkeren op 
zelfbeschikking, is in gelijke termen vastgelegd.’
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other hand.’651 In particular, this was demonstrated by the fact that not all the 
States involved were willing to recognise the complaints procedures to the ICCPR 
by signing the Optional Protocol. In this light, the Members of the Labour Party 
seemed to imply that the Netherlands contributed to the realisation of the treaties 
in a profound way.
In the House of Representatives a Member of the Liberal Party (VVD), Mrs Kapeyne 
van de Coppello, agreed that ‘Although in the wordings of the treaty the economic, 
social and cultural rights are referred to as rights, they are essentially instructional 
standards to the Government and not rights citizens can invoke.’652 With regard to 
the ICCPR Provisions, she asked to be informed on what Articles exactly would 
have direct effect in the domestic legal order. In response, Minister Wiegel replied 
that: ‘I can agree with her that the requested clarification would be a good thing, but 
I believe that the honourable representative also may realise...that the treaties were 
written for States around the entire globe, States with often divergent traditions and 
systems for the way in which treaty obligations are effectuated in their legal order.’653 
He then referred to the Constitutional system of Articles 65 and 66 CA (the current 
Articles 93 and 94 CA), and argued that: ‘It is thus our Constitutional system that 
entails that the question of the effect of the current Treaty Provisions within the Dutch 
legal system is determined by the interpretation of the nature and content of the treaty 
Provisions. I believe that one should not criticise the draftsmen of the treaty too much 
for insufficiently indicating which Provision is directly applicable to citizens and which 
is not. It is the bodies in our legal system which are responsible for the interpretation 
of the Treaty Provisions that should answer that question.’654
651 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 7, p. 7. Original text in Dutch: ‘ervoer de 
beschouwingen over de directe werking op zich als bevredigend. Zij onderstreepten wel, dat in een conventie 
geïsoleerde grondrechten nooit abstract, derhalve los van enig Constitutioneel bestel, tot uitdrukking kunnen 
worden gebracht. Zolang een wereldrechtsorde ontbreekt, zal er altijd een zekere spanning blijven bestaan tussen 
de toekenning van rechten aan individuen enerzijds en de aanspraken van staten op interne soevereiniteit 
anderzijds.’
652 Mrs Kapeyne van de Coppello, House of Representatives, 3rd meeting, 21 September 1978. Original 
text in Dutch: ‘Hoewel de economische, sociale en culturele rechten wel in de verdragtekst als rechten 
aangeduid worden, zijn zij in wezen instructienormen aan de overheid en niet rechten waarop de burger zich 
kan beroepen.’
653 Minister Wiegel, House of Representatives, 3rd meeting, 21 September 1978. Original text in Dutch: 
‘ik kan met haar instemmen dat die door haar gevraagde duidelijkheid een goede zaak zou zijn, maar ik 
meen dat de geachte afgevaardigde ook kan bedenken (…) dat de verdragen zijn geschreven voor staten 
over de gehele wereld, staten met vaak van elkaar afwijkende tradities en systemen voor de wijze, waarop 
verdragsverplichtingen in hun eigen rechtsorde tot uitwerking worden gebracht.’
654 Minister Wiegel, House of Representatives, 3rd meeting, 21 September 1978. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Het is dus ons grondwettelijk systeem dat meebrengt, dat die vraag naar de doorwerking van de voorliggende 
verdragsbepalingen binnen de Nederlandse rechtsorde wordt bepaald door de interpretatie van de aard en 
de inhoud van de verdragsbepalingen. Ik geloof dat men daarom de verdragsopstellers niet al te zeer mag 
verwijten, dat zij onvoldoende aangeven welke bepalingen rechtstreeks van toepassing zijn voor de burgers 
en welke niet. De organen die in onze rechtsorde met de interpretatie van de verdragsbepalingen zijn belast 
moeten die vraag beantwoorden.’
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Also the representative of the Rainbow/Radical Party (PPR), Waltmans, was of the 
opinion that ‘the Provisions enshrined in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
General will have an direct effect in the Dutch legal order. Equally essential are the 
‘promotional rights’ recognised in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
This means that it is the purpose of the treaty to achieve the progressive realisation of 
the rights embedded, through legislation and other implementing measures.’655
However, representative Mommersteeg, Member of the Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA), emphasised the connection between the ICCPR and the ICESCR, 
and its shared origin in the UDHR. He argued that this ‘it is not only about the 
enforcement of the spiritual, physical and political freedom of the individual and citizen, 
but also about the care of the social well-being of the human being as a matter of 
justice.’656 He specifically underlined the strong interrelation between the treaties 
to stress the link between human rights and development cooperation.
Representative Roethof, Member of the Labour Party (PvdA), advised to consider 
the UN treaties not too strictly in legal terms only. He underlined that in both 
treaties important moral standards are recognised that should be complied with, 
also when a Provision does not contain a legally enforceable rule. In that light, he 
considered that moral standards are superior to legal standards. Also, Roethof drew 
attention to the limited interest amongst lawyers in the working of international 
Provisions, and recommended legal educational institutions to pay more attention 
to the matter.657
In the Senate, Rainbow/Radical Party (PPR) Senator B. de Gaay Fortman argued 
that the ICESCR Provisions do not contain subjective rights, but was of the opinion 
that the term ‘promotional rights’ should be replaced by the term ‘promotional 
duties’ because ‘that what should encompass international justice for the individual, is 
embodied in obligations for States. Required is that there is progress in the achievement 
of these obligations, thus the so-called “progressive implementations.”’658 He thereby 
underlined that also in times of economic recession no deterioration with regard 
655 Waltmans, House of Representatives, 3rd meeting, 21 September 1978. Original text in Dutch: ‘de in 
het Verdrag inzake Burgerlijke en Politieke Rechten opgenomen bepalingen generaal een rechtstreekse werking 
zullen hebben in de Nederlandse Rechtsorde. Evenzeer wezenlijk zijn de in het Verdrag inzake Economische, 
Sociale en Culturele Rechten opgenomen ‘promotional rights’. Dat wil zeggen, dat het verdrag beoogt de daarin 
opgesomde rechten geleidelijk en in toenemende mate te laten verwezenlijken door middel van wetgeving en 
andere uitvoeringsmaatregelen.’
656 Mommersteeg, House of Representatives, 3rd meeting, 21 September 1978. Original text in Dutch: 
‘het niet alleen gaat om handhaving van de geestelijke, lichamelijke en politieke vrijheid van individu en 
staatsburger, maar ook om de zorg van het sociale welzijn van de mens als een zaak van gerechtigheid.’
657 Roethof, House of Representatives, 3rd meeting, 21 September 1978.
658 De Gaay Fortman, Senate, 5th meeting, 21 November 1978. Original text in Dutch: ‘datgene wat 
internationale rechtvaardigheid zou moeten inhouden voor het individu, wordt geconcretiseerd in verplichtingen 
van de staten. Vereist is dan, dat er vorderingen worden gemaakt in de verwezenlijking van die verplichtingen, 
die zogenaamde ‘progressive implementations.’
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to the ICESCR rights may be allowed. A principle that would apply as well to the 
level of development aid to the support of the right to an adequate standard of 
living and the right to be free from hunger elsewhere.659
Senator Wiebenga (Liberal Party, VVD), expressed his concern regarding the 
adoption of resolution 32/130 by the UN General Assembly, in which according 
to him the matter of social rights was unjustly separated from political rights.660 
He feared that this resolution recognised a hierarchical relation between the two 
types of rights, in which political rights would be inferior to social rights. In this 
light, Wiebenga referred to a speech of Professor Couwenbergh during a meeting 
of the Atlantic Commission in 1977, who made a distinction between three visions 
on human rights: a Western vision, focussing on classic human rights, assuming 
that the individual is an emancipated human being in a plural society, an Eastern-
European vision, focussing on social human rights for the benefit of the common 
cause, in line with a socialist view on the State, and Developing Countries, with 
a focus on the distinction between human rights for people (such as the right to 
self-determination) and human rights for the individual.661
Minister Van der Klaauw responded to these concerns, by stating that according 
to him no such hierarchical relation between types of human rights existed nor 
would be desirable to exist. He underlined that ‘regarding the resolution, the latest 
development in the debate that has been started in recent years within the United 
Nations concerns the approach towards the issue of human rights, especially concerning 
the relationship between the classical civil rights and the political rights on the one 
hand, and the social and economic rights on the other hand, and to the structural 
causes that stand in the way of the realisation of human rights.’662 He observed that 
a large number of countries emphasised the economic, social and cultural human 
rights, possibly for the purpose of hiding shortcomings concerning the realisation 
of civil and political rights, but also underlined that while in the Netherlands a 
strong focus existed on civil and political rights, in some countries the matter of 
economic, social and cultural rights was indeed urgent. In his view, the General 
659 De Gaay Fortman, Senate, 5th meeting, 21 November 1978.
660 Most likely, this concern was caused by this phrase: ‘The full realisation of civil and political rights 
without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural right is impossible; the achievement of lasting progress 
in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national policies of economic and 
social development as recognised by the proclamation of Teheran of 1968.’ A/RES/32/130, 16 December 1977, 
Alternative approaches and ways and means within the United Nations system for improving the effective 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Section 1.b.
661 Wiebenga, Senate, 5th meeting, 21 November 1978.
662 Minister Van der Klaauw, Senate, 5th meeting, 21 November 1978. Original text in Dutch: ‘wat de 
resolutie betreft, gaat de meest recente ontwikkeling in de discussie die in de laatste jaren in de Verenigde Naties 
op gang is gekomen over de benadering van de problematiek van de mensenrechten, waarbij het vooral gaat 
om de relatie tussen de klassieke burgerlijke rechten, de politieke rechten aan de ene kant, en de sociale en 
economische mensenrechten aan de andere kant alsmede om de structurele oorzaken die de verwezenlijking 
van de mensenrechten in de weg kunnen staan.’
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Assmebly resulution 32/130 did not recognise a hierarchical relation between 
types of human rights, but rather emphasised that both types of rights should be 
given equal and urgent attention, for ‘both categories are essential to the development 
of human beings as an individual and as a Member of society.’663
7.4.3 Complaints procedures
According to the Government, the Netherlands contributed in a profound way to 
the realisation of both treaties. Especially the adoption of an individual complaints 
procedure in an Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was initiated by the Netherlands, 
when an earlier proposed monitoring mechanism was not accepted by the General 
Assembly.664 It appears generally from the Parliamentary History of the ratification 
Bill of both treaties that the Dutch Government was not satisfied with the monitoring 
mechanisms as were finally adopted, especially regarding the individual complaints 
procedure of the ICCPR. It was the ambition of the Netherlands to strive for 
more profound and also more judicial monitoring mechanisms in the future.665 
However, the discussion on monitoring procedures and more specifically complaints 
procedures was basically held in the context of the ICCPR. A complaints procedure 
regarding the ICESCR was not adopted by the General Assembly, and therefore that 
possibility was hardly discussed during the Parliamentary debates on the adoption 
of the ratification Bill. In its Explanatory Memorandum the Government only 
pointed out that the ICESCR monitoring mechanism had a more modest extent 
compared to the ICCPR, due to ‘the other kind of commitments, at least broadly, the 
treaties impose on the parties, that is an immediate obligation to respect and ensure 
on the one hand, and a commitment to progressively realise on the other.’666
7.5 The CEDAW
The ratification Bill of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women667 was discussed in Parliament in the period 
1984-1985.
663 Minister Van der Klaauw, Senate, 5th meeting, 21 November 1978. Original text in Dutch: ‘Beide 
categorieën zijn essentieel voor de ontplooiing van de mens, als individu en als lid van de samenleving.’
664 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 39-40. In order to do so, the 
Netherlands closely cooperated with Nigeria, according to Mommersteeg, House of Representatives, 
3rd meeting, 21 September 1978.
665 See for instance: Minister van Agt, House of Representatives, 3rd meeting, 21 September 1978; and 
Minister Van der Klaauw, Senate, 5th meeting, 21 November 1978.
666 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, p. 57. Original text in Dutch: ‘aan de 
andersoortige verplichtingen die, althans globaal genomen, de verdragen aan de partijen opleggen, namelijk 
een verplichting tot onmiddellijke eerbiediging en verzekering enerzijds en een verplichting tot geleidelijke 
verwezenlijking anderzijds.’
667 A/RES/34/180, 18 December 1979, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women.
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7.5.1 Background and added value of the CEDAW
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government explained that the Convention 
exclusively focuses on all discrimination against women, stipulating both civil and 
political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the 
other hand. According to the Government, it was the duty of the Member States to 
‘implement a policy to eliminate discrimination with all their available resources.’668 The 
Committee on the status of women was founded in 1946, and drafted the declaration 
on the elimination of discrimination against women,669 a document that would 
later be of great influence on the wordings of the CEDAW. It is remarkable here 
that in a footnote, the Government declared to prefer a translation of the name 
of this commission that deviates from the official Dutch translation in Article 21 
of the CEDAW. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission is referred to 
as ‘Commissie inzake de Positie van de Vrouw’ (freely translated: ‘Committee on 
the Status of Women’), while the official translation of Article 21 CEDAW refers to 
‘Commissie inzake de Rechtspositie van de Vrouw’ (freely translated: ‘Committee 
on the Legal Position of Women’). However, no explanation for the preference of 
an alternate translation is given.670
In the Preparatory Committee, a Member of the Reformed Political Association 
(GPV) raised the question what the actual consequences would be for the Dutch 
legal order when ratifying the CEDAW, since it appeared that no direct results 
would follow from this ratification, especially due to the fact that non-compliance 
with the CEDAW would not be sanctioned, for no agreement on a complaint 
procedure had been reached, and many Member States had made reservations 
to Article 29 CEDAW, that recognises an arbitration procedure. In addition, the 
Government had admitted in its Explanatory Memorandum that there are many 
different views worldwide on how to realise emancipation, which implies that 
the effect of the treaty may differ per region. Also, the GPV Member underlined 
the increasing politicisation within the UN bodies, which could also be noticed 
during the negotiations preceding the adoption of the CEDAW. In that light, the 
question was raised whether ratifying the treaty would have any added value at 
all.671 The Government replied that ‘By ratifying the Convention, the Netherlands 
supports the establishment of global standards in this area and thus contributes to 
the development of international law (Article 90 CA). By recognising these standards 
for themselves the Netherlands can also expect other countries to comply with these 
668 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 3. Original text in Dutch: ‘zich met 
alle hun ter beschikking staande middelen een beleid te voeren dat gericht is op de uitbanning van discriminatie.’
669 A/RES/2263 (XXII), 9 November 1967, Declaration on the elimination of discrimination against women.
670 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 4, 5th footnote.
671 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 4, p. 5.
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standards. To this end, the reporting procedure enshrined in the Treaty may serve as 
an important tool.’672
In general, the Government highlighted certain aspects of the drafting history 
of the CEDAW. It underscored that considering the large cultural differences 
concerning the position and role of women, the agreement on the adoption of the 
CEDAW was an important achievement that could only be accomplished through 
the willingness to constructively negotiate. Especially concerning private law and 
family law issues there appeared to be large differences of opinion on the rights of 
women between Western-oriented and Islam-oriented countries, which had led to 
a number of compromises in the final wordings of the relevant CEDAW Provisions. 
The participation of new Member States – mainly developing countries – in the 
UN arena, and the resulting new balance of power within the UN bodies, led to 
the adoption of Provisions that stipulate aspects that were new compared to the 
existing human rights instruments, such as the adoption of Article 14, addressing 
in particular the position of rural women.673
It is interesting to note that in its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government 
summarised the most important contribution of the Netherlands in the realisation 
of the CEDAW, which included the drafting of resolution A/34/180674 with the 
final version of the CEDAW as accepted by the General Assembly.675
7.5.2 The direct applicability of the CEDAW
The Government explained that in Articles 7-17 CEDAW the substantive regulations 
on the equal treatment of women are enshrined. According to the Government 
‘the nature and content of these substantive treaty obligations and the formulation of 
the duties to States lead to the conclusion that implementation is a task of the legislative 
and administrative authorities.’676 The Government underlined that the global 
eradication of all discrimination against women could not be realised immediately, 
and therefore the Convention allowed the progressive realisation of the rights 
in Article 2. This would mean then that a Member State, although having the 
obligation to immediately with all necessary measures focus its policies on the 
672 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 9. Original text in Dutch: ‘Door het 
Verdrag te ratificeren levert Nederland een bijdrage aan de totstandkoming van wereldwijde normen op dit 
terrein en draagt daarmee bij tot de ontwikkeling van de internationale rechtsorde (artikel 90 van de Grondwet). 
Door deze normen voor zichzelf te aanvaarden, kan Nederland ook van andere landen verlangen deze normen 
na te leven. De in het Verdrag neer neergelegde rapportageprocedure vormt daarvoor een belangrijk hulpmiddel.’
673 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 5.
674 A/RES/34/180, 18 December 1979, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women.
675 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 6.
676 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 7. Original text in Dutch: ‘De aard 
en de inhoud van deze materiele verdragsverplichtingen en de formulering van de opdrachten aan staten leiden 
tot de conclusie dat de uitvoering ervan een taak is van de wetgevende en besturende overheid.’
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realisation of the treaty obligations, may achieve the realisation in itself gradually. 
Therefore, at the moment on which the Member State ratifies the Convention, 
not all implementation measures need to be adopted yet. However, according 
to the Government, the Netherlands already fulfilled most of its duties at the 
moment of ratification, and there were hardly any intentions to adjust existing 
or adopt new domestic Provisions or policy with the purpose to progressively 
realise the CEDAW rights. This was criticised by several Members representing 
various parties in the Preparatory Committee.677 On the request of the Christian 
Democratic Appeal (CDA),678 the Government eventually published an overview 
with intended legal reforms that would result from the adoption of the CEDAW.679
To establish whether a CEDAW Provision would be directly applicable, the 
Government referred to criteria used by the Supreme Court, which are ‘the nature 
and content of the Provision as well as its wordings, while also the intention of the 
draftsmen of the Convention may be a guideline.’680 Concerning the latter criterion, 
the Government informed that the matter of direct applicability for those countries 
whose Constitution would allow this had not been explicitly discussed during 
the negotiations preceding the adoption of the CEDAW,681 due to the fact that 
a majority of the UN countries is unfamiliar with a Constitutional construction 
that specifically regulates the direct effect of international Provisions.682 The 
Member of the Reformed Political Association (GPV) raised the question in the 
Preparatory Committee whether the railway-strike ruling could be of influence 
on future case law concerning CEDAW Provisions, considering the fact that in 
that case, the Supreme Court held that concerning Article 6 (4) ESD, ‘there is no 
evidence that the contracting parties have agreed that direct effect may not be granted’683, 
a consideration that was thus understood by this Member of Parliament that it 
would mean that in the absence of an agreement on direct applicability between 
contracting parties, the Supreme Court consequently would grant the Provision 
direct effect.684 The Government responded that: ‘it appears to us that the Provision 
of the European Social Charter on which the Supreme Court ruled (Article 6, Section 
4) had such a clear content in view of the disputed question of law, that the Supreme 
Court in the application of that Provision could remain within the previously by him 
established criteria, which formed the basis of our observations in our reply on the 
677 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 4, especially p. 2 (Labour Party/PvdA), 
and 5 (Reformed Political Association/GPV).
678 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 8, p. 2.
679 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 9, pp. 1-3.
680 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, pp. 7-8. Original text in Dutch: ‘de 
aard en inhoud van de bepaling alsmede de formulering daarvan, terwijl tevens de bedoeling van de opstellers 
van het verdrag een richtsnoer kan zijn.’
681 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 8.
682 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 14.
683 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 8, pp. 4-5. Original text in Dutch: ‘uit niets 
blijkt dat verdragsluitende partijen zijn overeengekomen dat geen rechtstreekse werking mag worden toegekend.’
684 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 8, pp. 4-5.
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issue of direct effect. ... However, we note that the ruling of the Supreme Court does 
not inevitably lead to the conclusion drawn by the Member of the Commission, that 
every treaty should be granted direct effect unless agreed otherwise. Rather, it appears 
from the first sentence of the above quoted phrase that in principle most significance 
can be attributed to the nature, content and wording of the Provision. In our view, 
the Supreme Court only expressed that there were no indications that the Contracting 
Parties intended to block the possible direct effect of Charter Provisions that can be 
granted in accordance with the domestic law of some States Parties.’685
On the one hand, as demonstrated above, the Government was of the opinion 
that the implementation of the Provisions was mainly a responsibility of the 
Legislature. On the other hand, the Government admitted that ‘The decision and 
the conditions under which direct application is granted to a Provision would be, in our 
legal system mainly up to the Judiciary. Therefore, in this Explanatory Memorandum, a 
certain restraint would be appropriate.’686 Nevertheless, the Government underlined 
that in the CEDAW, Provisions were enshrined with equivalents in other human 
rights treaties that had been granted direct applicability before. It could therefore 
be reasonably expected that the CEDAW versions would also be granted direct 
effect. As an example, the Government referred to the equal treatment concerning 
the right to vote and to hold public office as stipulated in Article 7 CEDAW, but 
also in Article 2 (1) and (3) in conjunction with Article 25 and 26 ICCPR.687 
Several fractions of the Preparatory Committee however, asked for more clarity 
concerning the possibility of direct applicability of the treaty Provisions. The 
Members of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) asked this clarity in particular 
in view of the role of the Explanatory Memorandum in the considerations of the 
Courts when they would be confronted with the question whether or not a treaty 
Provision would have direct effect.688 Both the Communist Party of the Netherlands 
(CPN) and the Reformed Political Association (GPV) fractions asked whether the 
aforementioned statements of the Government must thus be understood that 
685 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 9, pp. 8-9. Original text in Dutch: ‘Het 
komt ons voor dat de bepaling van het Europees Sociaal Handvest waarover de Hoge Raad zich uitsprak (artikel 
6, vierde lid) voor de in het geding zijnde rechtsvraag een zo duidelijke betekenis had, dat de Hoge Raad bij de 
toepassing van die bepaling kon blijven binnen de eerder door hem geformuleerde criteria, die de grondslag 
vormden voor onze beschouwingen in de memorie van antwoord over de problematiek van de rechtstreekse 
werking. (…) Wel merken wij op dat de uitspraak van de Hoge Raad niet dwingt tot de door het genoemde 
lid getrokken conclusie, dat aan iedere verdragstekst rechtstreekse werking moet worden toegekend tenzij de 
verdragssluiting anders zou zijn overeengekomen. Veeleer is uit de eerste volzin van het voornoemde citaat af te 
leiden dat in beginsel de meeste betekenis toekomt aan aard, inhoud en formulering van de bepaling. De Hoge 
Raad zou dan ook in onze opvatting slechts tot uitdrukking hebben gebracht dat er geen aanwijzingen waren 
dat de Verdragspartijen de eventueel door het nationale recht van sommige Verdragspartijen toe te kennen 
rechtstreekse werking van Handvestbepalingen hebben willen blokkeren.’
686 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 8. Original text in Dutch: ‘De 
beslissing hierover en de voorwaarden waaronder die rechtstreekse toepassing aan een bepaling zou worden 
gegeven, zijn in ons rechtsbestel voornamelijk aan de rechter. In deze toelichting past daarom terughoudendheid.’
687 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 8.
688 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 4, p. 6.
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only those CEDAW Articles would have direct effect when its equivalents in 
other treaties had been granted direct effect before.689 In addition, Members of 
the CPN asked for more clarity concerning the Government’s statement that the 
decision as to whether a treaty Provision would have direct effect would ‘mainly’ 
be up to the Judiciary, since ‘mainly’ would imply that there are exceptions to the 
rule.690 The Government replied to the aforementioned questions that from the 
nature and content, as well as the wordings of the Provisions – due to the fact that 
these were addressed to States – it followed that it was the task of the Legislature 
and Administration to progressively realise the rights stipulated in the CEDAW. 
However, this does not stand in the way of the fact that the Constitutional system 
(Articles 93 and 94) authorised the Judiciary to not apply domestic legislation 
that is contrary to international Provisions, and it is the Judiciary alone that has a 
final say in the matter.691 On the other hand, this does not preclude that also the 
Administration – to which the said Constitutional Provisions are also addressed 
– can be confronted with the same question whether a Provision is suitable for 
direct applicability.692 It is for the first time (and certainly not for the last time) 
that in human rights-related Parliamentary History, the Government seemed to 
struggle with the exact meaning of Articles 93 and 94 in relation to the balance of 
power between the Legislature and Judiciary in deciding whether an international 
Provision has direct effect or not. A struggle that certainly did not lead to the most 
unambiguous explanation of this Constitutional system.
Eventually, the Government decided to explore what CEDAW Provisions, according 
to them, would be suitable for direct applicability, taken into consideration the 
criteria as developed by the Supreme Court: the nature and content of the Provisions, 
as well as the wordings thereof, while also the intentions of the contracting states 
might play a role.693 Based on this, the Government discussed several CEDAW 
Provisions, and concluded that the introductory words of Article 2 (the non-
discrimination Provision) are a principle that should be realised through ‘all 
appropriate means’, which implies a margin of discretion for Member States with 
regard to their policies. Also the period in which the principle should be realised 
was not specifically embedded in the Provision, which would suggest that the 
Member States should act within a reasonable period. Due to this lack of clarity, 
the Government was of the opinion that this part of the Provision would not be 
suitable for direct application by the Courts.694 According to the Government, 
Article 2 (d), that recognises the prohibition for public authorities and institutions 
to discriminate against women, might be used in conjunction with Article 1 
CEDAW, as a yardstick in civil proceedings based on tort law (in the Netherlands 
689 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 4, p. 7.
690 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 4, p. 7.
691 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 10.
692 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 13.
693 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 10.
694 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, pp. 10-11.
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the current Article 6:162 Civil Code, in the Parliamentary Documents reference 
is made to the earlier Article 1401 Civil Code), but not likely as an independent 
standard in these proceedings.695 With regard to Article 10 (Sections a, b, c, d, 
e, and g), the Government underlined that the Provision basically stipulated 
the obligation to take appropriate measures in order to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of education, implying a large margin of discretion, 
and therefore the Article would not be suitable for direct application.696 The 
Government considered that Article 11, Section 1 sub d and e also implied a certain 
margin of discretion, and concluded (after additional comparison to existing case 
law in which some Members of the Preparatory Committee assumed equivalent 
communitary law was involved) that direct applicability was unlikely.697 Regarding 
Article 11 Section 2, the Government argued that in most cases direct applicability 
would not be possible, due to the aforementioned margin of discretion, and the 
fact that the involved protective legislation should be reviewed periodically in the 
light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or 
extended as necessary, implies a permanent development in legislation that is not 
suitable for judicial review. However, the Government considered – without further 
explanation – that direct applicability of the Provision would be not inconceivable 
in case of the prohibition of dismissal on grounds of pregnancy or maternity leave 
and discrimination in dismissals on grounds of marital status.698 Considering the 
nature, contents and wordings of Article 15, sub 3, the Government recognised 
that this Provision would be suitable for direct application by the Courts. However, 
this notion would only be of an academic relevance, since the essence of this 
Article was already embedded in the Dutch Civil Code.699 Regarding Article 16 
sub 2, the Government underlined that the Netherlands already amply fulfilled 
the obligations stipulated in that Provision, and thus its realisation is already 
guaranteed. The possibility of direct application is therefore not explored.700 Earlier, 
as mentioned above, the Government had already recognised the possibility of 
direct application of Article 7 CEDAW.701 Unfortunately, the Government did not 
discuss its views on the possibility of direct applicability of other CEDAW Provisions 
containing substantive treaty obligations, nor was this discussed significantly 
elsewhere in Parliament. The Government explained that it had discussed the 
matter concerning all treaty Provisions whose direct effect had been specifically 
discussed in Parliament.702 This, and the fact that no further Parliamentary debate 
concerned the direct effect of treaty Provisions, implies that there was no specific 
695 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 11.
696 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 11.
697 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, pp. 11-12.
698 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 12.
699 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 12.
700 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, p. 13.
701 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 3, p. 8.
702 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 9, p. 9.
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interest in the matter of direct effect of other treaty Provisions than the Articles 
discussed.
Regarding the frequently mentioned margin of discretion in case of Provisions 
that are not suitable for direct application, the Government declared that this 
margin was not unrestricted, for Article 2 CEDAW stresses to adopt a policy ‘with 
all appropriate means’ and ‘without delay’. Interestingly, the Government added 
that once these measures have been adopted, the position of women would be in 
compliance with the treaty, and seems to suggest that any further improvements 
or nuances would not fall under the scope and protection of the CEDAW.703
7.5.3 Complaints procedures
Since the Member States of the CEDAW did not agree on the establishment of 
complaints procedures, no such procedures were discussed during the Parliamentary 
debates concerning the adoption of the ratification Bill.
7.6 The ICRC
The ratification Bill of the Convention of the Rights of the Child704 was discussed 
in Parliament in 1994.
7.6.1 Background and added value of the ICRC
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government underlined that it appeared 
from the travaux préparatoires that it was the intention of the State Parties to 
adopt a treaty that would go beyond a declaration on the rights of the child.705 
The Government considered that the already existing declarations on the rights 
of the Child of 1924706 and 1959707 were insufficiently far-reaching, because ‘for 
the effective safeguarding of those rights it was not sufficient to embed these in a 
statement adopted as a resolution.’708 In addition, the Dutch Government considered 
that with regard to the rights of the child, the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights was inadequate, for while these rights were recognised for each human 
being, they could, due to their declarative nature, not be invoked in Courts, and it 
concerned a general list of human rights, not focussed on the position of children.709 
703 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R 1281), no. 6, pp. 3-4.
704 A/RES/44/25, 20 November 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child.
705 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 1.
706 Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the League of Nations, 26 September 1924.
707 A/4354, 20 November 1959, General Assembly Resolution 1386 (XIV), Declaration on the Rights of 
the Child.
708 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘het voor 
een effectieve waarborging van die rechten niet voldoende was deze neer te leggen in een bij een resolutie 
aangenomen Verklaring.’
709 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 1.
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Recognising the rights of the child in a treaty instead, would considerably strengthen 
these rights. However, during the negotiations preceding the adoption of the 
final draft of the ICRC, it appeared to be difficult to come to a common approach 
regarding the substantive rights of the treaty. The added value on top of the existing 
international legal instruments, in which human rights for each individual were 
already embedded, of which some rights specifically stipulate certain rights of the 
child, was frequently discussed. During the negotiations preceding the adoption 
of the ICRC, the Dutch Delegation had underlined that: ‘a lot of the principles in the 
present draft Convention are already embodied in the mandates of agencies like the ILO, 
WHO and UNESCO, or in more judicial wordings, in instruments like the Covenants 
on Civil and Political and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (…) In its view a 
draft convention on the rights of the child must consist of timely, up-to-date concrete 
principles, accompanied by practical guidelines for application, and supplementary to 
already existing instruments and activities, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication.’710 
According to the Government, the contents of the ICRC could be limited to the 
mere recognition of the applicability of existing human rights to children, and 
of certain additional rights that would be applicable to children in particular. 
The Government noticed that this advice was not seriously considered in the 
international arena, and instead a comprehensive convention containing a wide 
variety of Provisions that may therefore overlap with existing human rights treaties 
was drafted.711 Therefore, the Government published in an attachment to its 
Explanatory Memorandum an overview of overlapping, equivalent rights in several 
human rights treaties, as well as the Dutch Constitutional Act. For instance, the 
right to social security was considered to be recognised in Article 26 ICRC, but 
also in Article 20 CA, Article 9 ICESCR, and Articles 12 and 13 ESC. The right 
to an adequate standard of living was considered to be recognised in Article 27 
ICRC, but also in Article 22 CA and Article 11 ICESCR.712
The Government explained the negotiations were based on the principle of 
consensus, in order to achieve the greatest possible degree of acceptance of its 
content. However, this led to the fact that the wordings of the Provisions were 
the result of a compromise between various viewpoints, while the Government 
had hoped that certain Provisions would have a more far-reaching scope.713 This 
even led to an official declaration of vote to the Dutch vote for adoption of the 
final draft text, in which the Dutch Delegation declared that ‘fully aware of the 
importance of the Convention on the Rights of the child, my Delegation did not wish to 
break the prevailing consensus on the draft resolution just adopted. As we all know, the 
birth of the Convention has been far from easy. The youngest among the United Nations 
710 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 6.
711 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 6.
712 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 55, third attachment.
713 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 54, second attachment. In this 
attachment, the Delegation furthermore focussed on the – in its view – limited meaning of Article 38 
ICRC, and the protection of children with regard to armed conflicts.
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treaty instruments came into existence after ten years of labour. Setting standards and 
particularly drafting binding obligations in the field of human rights is an exercise which 
should take place with a magnifying glass in hand. The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child bears the mark of extensive negotiations and thus of many a compromise. 
The Netherlands itself were actively involved in the work of the Working Group which 
prepared the Convention. We accepted in a spirit of compromise and with a view to 
progressively developing human rights law a number of Provisions which could or 
should have been – in the view of my Government – formulated differently and more 
consistent with human rights instruments.’714
Despite the overlap of the ICRC with other treaties, and the rather mild obligations 
recognised in the treaty, the Government considered that the treaty did have its 
added value, and approved of its adoption, for several reasons. In general, the 
Government underlined that the adoption of the ICRC was in line with the global 
tendency to adopt specific treaties on particular issues, alongside the already 
existing general human rights conventions.715 The added value of the ICRC 
then could be found in firstly: the fact that in the Convention the rights already 
recognised in the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, were not only reaffirmed, 
but also focussed on the particular situation of children. Secondly, certain rights 
recognised in the ICRC were only addressed as and applicable to children (for 
instance, the Provisions concerning adoption, education, and contact with the 
parents). Thirdly, in the ICRC also new rights were recognised, which were not 
embedded before in any human rights treaty, such as the regulations regarding 
the relation between the rights of the child and the authority of parents, and 
the (international cooperation in the field of) disabled children. Fourthly, the 
Government underlined that some States were not a Member of the more general 
human rights treaties, but might be interested to ratify the ICRC due to this 
new interpretation of human rights.716 In this light, Minister Kosto suggested in 
the House of Representatives that the ICRC could be used as a basis to address 
other countries to maintain the rights stipulated in the Convention.717 Interesting 
detail is that in their reply to the questions raised by the Preparatory Committee, 
the Government stated that the Netherlands were relatively late in ratifying the 
Convention (150 States already preceded the Netherlands), and this has led to 
questions in the international relations with regard to the Dutch attitude towards 
the treaty.718
714 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 54, second attachment.
715 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 3.
716 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 7. See also: Parliamentary 
Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 2.
717 Minister Kosto, House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994.
718 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 2.
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In Parliament, most Members expressed their approval regarding the added value 
of the ICRC.719 However, there were also some critical notes, especially from the 
confessional parties, which expressed their concerns that ratification of the treaty 
would result in the interference in family relations, which should not be a duty 
of the Government.720
7.6.2 The direct applicability of the ICRC
The Government was pleased that in the ICRC, both civil and political rights on 
the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other hand were 
embedded, for this was in line with the idea coming forth from the UDHR, but 
also expressed in the ICCPR and the ICESCE, that all human rights are inextricably 
linked.721
This time, the Government was somewhat less confusing in its interpretation of 
the Constitutional system embedded in Articles 93 and 94 CA, and enlightened 
on the relation between the Legislature and the Judiciary regarding the decision 
whether a treaty Provision would be directly applicable or not. The Government 
underlined that it was stipulated in Article 94 CA722 that ‘ultimately, the Dutch 
Courts decide whether a Provision that is “binding on all persons” has direct effect or 
not.’723 The Legislature could offer a ‘helping hand’ to the Judiciary by altering 
domestic legislation that is – in the view of the Legislature – in contradiction with 
a directly applicable treaty Provision, but still the Judiciary has final say in the 
matter. However, the Government emphasised that to the Courts, the viewpoints 
of the Legislature regarding the direct applicability of a Provision would be ‘of great 
importance, as demonstrated by the case law of the Supreme Court.’724 According to 
the Government, it appears from the case law of the Supreme Court that fixed 
criteria are used to determine whether a treaty Provision has direct effect or not: 
‘the nature, content and scope of the Provision, as well as the formulation (the wording) 
thereof, while also the intention of the national Legislature during the realisation of 
the ratification law of the relevant treaty could be a guideline, and – insofar as this 
is the case – the intention of the draftsmen of the treaty should be a guideline. Also of 
719 See especially: Van den Burg (PvdA), and De Vries (VVD), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 
23 June 1994.
720 See especially: Van den Berg (SGP), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994, 
House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994; Schutte (GPV) and Rouvoet (RPF), House of 
Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
721 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 3.
722 Parliamentary Documents, I 1994-1995, 22855 (R1451), no. 22a, p. 5.
723 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 8. Original text in Dutch: ‘uiteindelijk 
bepaalt de Nederlandse rechter of een “een ieder verbindende” bepaling rechtstreekse werking heeft of niet.’
724 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 8. Original text in Dutch: ‘wel van 
grote betekenis is, getuige ook de rechtspraak van de Hoge Raad.’
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importance in this is the presence or absence of implementation legislation, and whether 
it is possible within the national legal system to directly apply the Provision.’725
These criteria can be subdivided into four categories, and will be discussed here 
into more detail:
1. The nature, content and scope of the Provision, as well as the formulation 
(the wording) thereof. The Government did not hesitate to express its opinion 
about this criterion concerning the treaty Provisions. The Government stated 
that ‘Considering the nature, content and wording of most Provisions of the present 
Convention, the implementation of and compliance with a large number of substantive 
treaty Provisions implies a task for the Legislature and the governing authorities. 
This does not entirely exclude the possibility that a particular treaty Provision in a 
specific case is granted direct effect. The decision and the conditions under which 
direct effect would be given to a Provision, as stated in our legal system, is ultimately 
up to the Courts.’726 In fact, this statement is a general idea of the perception of 
the Legislature regarding the direct applicability of the treaty Provisions, based 
on the content of the Articles, but actually concerns the second criterion: the 
intention of the Legislature.
2. The intention of the national Legislature can most likely be distilled from 
the Parliamentary History on the ratification of the treaty. The Government 
specifically mentioned what Articles would, in its view, be suitable for direct 
application. Firstly, this would concern the Articles with equivalents in other 
treaties that had been granted direct effect before, basically civil and political 
rights: Articles 7 (1), 9 (1), (2), (3), (4), 10 (1, second sentence), 13, 14, 15, 16, 
30, 37, and 40 (2). In addition, the Government did consider it likely that Article 
12 (2) would have direct effect, and did not preclude the possibility of direct 
effect of some Articles that stipulate rights that were not embedded in other 
treaties yet, especially addressed to the child, and also with characteristics of 
725 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 9. Original text in Dutch: ‘de 
aard, inhoud en de strekking van de bepaling, alsmede de formulering (de bewoording) daarvan, terwijl 
tevens de bedoeling van de nationale wetgever bij de totstandkoming van de goedkeuringswetgeving van het 
desbetreffende verdrag een richtsnoer kan zijn en – zover hiervan sprake is – de bedoeling van de opstellers van 
het desbetreffende verdrag een richtsnoer dient te zijn. Eveneens is in deze van belang de aan- of afwezigheid 
van uitvoeringswetgeving en of het binnen het nationaal rechtelijk bestel mogelijk is de bepaling rechtsreeks toe 
te passen.’ The Government referred to the following case law of the Supreme Court: Supreme Court, 24 
February 1960, NJ 1960, 483; 28 November 1961, NJ 1962, 90; 25 April 1967, NJ 1968, 63, 6 December 
1983, NJ 1984, 557; 18 February 1986, NJ 1987, 62; 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688 (railway-strike ruling); 14 
April 1989, NJ 1989, 469 (‘Harmonisation Act’ ruling), 20 April 1990, RvdW 1990,88. The Government 
also referred to these criteria in: Parliamentary Documents, I 1994-1995, 22855 (R1451), no. 22a, p. 5.
726 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 9. Original text in Dutch: ‘gelet op de 
aard, inhoud, en formulering van de meeste bepalingen van het onderhavige verdrag houden de uitvoering en de 
naleving van een groot aantal materiële verdragsvoorschriften een taak van de wetgever en van de besturende 
overheden in. Dit behoeft overigens niet helemaal uit te sluiten dat aan een bepaald verdragsvoorschrift in een 
concrete casus rechtstreekse werking wordt toegekend. De beslissing hierover en de voorwaarden waaronder die 
rechtstreekse werking aan een bepaling zou worden gegeven, zijn, zoals gezegd, in ons rechtsbestel uiteindelijk 
aan de rechter.’
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civil and political rights: Articles 5, 8 (1) en 12 (1). In this light, hardly anything 
was mentioned concerning the rights with the characteristics of economic, 
social and cultural rights.727 The Government argued that ‘Formulations in 
treaty Provisions that oblige States Parties to undertake appropriate measures to 
facilitate the implementation of the rights in accordance with national conditions 
and with the available resources, first and foremost intend to make clear that a 
Member State is not bound to the impossible. Such Provisions are without prejudice 
to the responsibility of the democratically elected Government, but rather appeal 
to their primary responsibility to do what is reasonably possible, considering the 
national (especially financial) situation. This is exactly why in these cases judicial 
review is unlikely.’728 In its reply to questions of the Preparatory Committee, the 
Government even emphasised that only in extreme situations, judicial review 
against economic, social and cultural rights of the ICRC would be possible.729
3. The intention of the draftsmen of the treaty was also referred to as a possible 
criterion to determine whether a Provision is directly applicable. The 
Government stated that during the negotiations preceding the adoption of 
the ICRC, the matter of direct applicability had not been discussed by the 
draftsmen of the treaty. In the Preparatory Committee, the Democrats ‘66 
(D’66) Members asked how this would relate to the intention of the draftsmen 
of the treaty.730 The Government replied to this that therefore, no intention of 
the draftsmen of the treaty could be distilled from the travaux préparatoires at 
all.731 The Reformed Political Association (GPV) fraction expressed a different 
understanding of the fact that the direct applicability of ICRC Provisions was 
not discussed during the negotiations, and asked whether this could thus be 
understood that, because the matter was not discussed, ‘…at any rate, from the 
nature, content and scope of the Treaty Provisions no argument for direct effect can 
be distilled.’732 This considering, the GPV fraction asked whether that could 
mean that ‘…the Government does not intend to grant direct effect insofar this does 
727 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 9.
728 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 9. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Formuleringen in verdragsbepalingen die verdragsstaten verplichten passende maatregelen te nemen om te 
helpen rechten te verwezenlijken in overeenstemming met de nationale omstandigheden en met de middelen die 
hen ten dienst staan, beogen eerst en vooral duidelijk te maken, dat een verdragsstaat niet tot het onmogelijke 
is gehouden. Dergelijke bepalingen doen dus niet af aan de verantwoordelijkheid van het democratisch gekozen 
bestuur, doch appelleren veeleer aan diens primaire verantwoordelijkheid ter zake te doen wat redelijkerwijs 
mogelijk is, gelet op de nationale (vooral financiële) situatie. Juist daarom ligt in dezen een toetsingstaak van 
de rechter niet voor de hand.’
729 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 18.
730 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 6.
731 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 10.
732 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 6. Original text in Dutch: ‘…in ieder 
geval aan aard, inhoud en strekking van de verdragsbepalingen geen argument ontleend kan worden voor een 
rechtstreekse werking.’
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not already follow from Provisions of other treaties.’733 The Government disagreed, 
and stated that it had already expressed in its Explanatory Memorandum that 
it considered it possible that some of the Provisions of the ICRC that had no 
equivalents in other existing human rights treaties would be suitable for direct 
effect. Apart from that, the Government added that it follows from Articles 93 
and 94 CA that it is up to the Judiciary to finally decide on the matter.734 In 
general however, it is doubtful whether the matter of direct applicability will 
ever be discussed during the negotiations preceding the adoption of a treaty. 
As mentioned earlier, during the Parliamentary History of the ratification Bill 
of the CEDAW, the Government had emphasised that a majority of the UN 
countries is unfamiliar with a Constitutional construction that specifically 
regulates the direct effect of international Provisions.735
4. The presence or absence of implementation legislation, and whether it is 
possible within the national legal system to directly apply the Provision also 
may have influence on the decision whether a Provision is directly applicable 
or not. To demonstrate this, the Government referred to case law, including 
the ‘Harmonisation Act’ ruling.736 It seems most likely that the following 
consideration of the Supreme Court inspired the Government to refer to this 
ruling: ‘moreover, it concerns Provisions that imply performance duties of the 
Government towards citizens; such Provisions can hardly function in the legal order 
without further elaboration, so that direct effect is not likely.’737 It appears that 
the need for further clarification consequently leads to the conclusion that a 
Provision is not directly applicable. However, in this light it is interesting to note 
that it was the conclusion of the Government in the Explanatory Memorandum 
that when considering all Provisions of the ICRC, existing Dutch law for the 
major part already adequately implemented the rights embedded in the ICRC. 
It also seems that in case of doubt as to whether the Netherlands did fulfil 
the obligations coming forth from a certain treaty Provision, the Government 
had the tendency to make a reservation to that Article, instead of proposing 
adjustments in or additions to existing domestic law.738 Also, on some points, 
the Government seemed to assess the consequences when a treaty Provision 
733 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 6. Original text in Dutch: ‘…de 
regering niet beoogt een rechtstreekse werking toe te kennen voor zover deze niet reeds voortvloeit uit bepalingen 
van andere verdragen.’
734 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 10.
735 Parliamentary Documents, II 1984-1985, 18950 (R1281), no. 6, p. 14.
736 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 9. Supreme Court 14 April 1989, 
AB 1989, 207/NJ 1989, 469 (‘Harmonisation Act’ ruling).
737 Supreme Court 14 April 1989, AB 1989, 207/NJ 1989, 469 (‘Harmonisation Act’ ruling), consideration 
5.3. Original text in Dutch: ‘Bovendien gaat het hier om bepalingen die betrekking hebben op door de overheid 
jegens burgers te verrichten prestaties; dergelijke bepalingen kunnen in het algemeen bezwaarlijk zonder nadere 
uitwerking in de rechtsorde functioneren, zodat rechtstreekse werking niet voor de hand ligt.’ In casu, among 
others things, the direct applicability of Article 13 ICESCR was under dispute.
738 For instance, the reservation to Article 37 ICRK. The Government could not guarantee that children 
would be detained separately from adults. Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 
3, pp. 45-46.
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from which it did not consider it possible to be directly applicable, would 
nevertheless be directly applied by the Courts. Such an assessment was made 
regarding Article 26 ICRC, and also led to a reservation.739
In this light, the Minister of Justice Kosto responded in a written reply to several 
questions from Parliament, which included the matter of direct applicability of 
ICPR Provisions. Kosto also referred to the earlier mentioned criteria developed 
by the Supreme Court to determine whether an international Provision is directly 
applicable, but added that it appeared from case law that the Courts should be 
guided by the intention of the Legislature ‘as much as possible’.740 This statement 
shows that the Government considers it of great importance that its view on direct 
applicability is taken into consideration by the Courts, but also refers to a certain 
practice in case law that the view of the Legislature is indeed seriously considered. 
It could be questioned whether the Minister here deliberately suggested a certain 
hierarchy between the criteria of the Supreme Court, in which the opinion of the 
national Legislature prevails to all other criteria. Whatever the intention of the 
Minister was, the phrase ‘as much as possible’ leads to questions and also seems 
to be in tension with other statements of the Minister concerning the criteria. 
For instance, Minister Kosto seems to suggest earlier in the same note that ‘the 
effect of these Provisions is primarily determined by the nature, content, scope, as well 
as the wording of the Provision itself. Then also the intention of the draftsmen of the 
Convention and the national Legislature in the drafting of the implementing legislation 
could be a guideline.’741 The Minister appears to be struggling with the autonomous 
competence of the Judiciary to review national legislation against international 
legislation ex Article 94 CA: ‘Of course, Judges will always base their interpretation 
on the current circumstances in which they live and on the circumstances arising in 
particular situations, so there is nothing else that can be done during the adoption 
of a Bill than indeed give an interpretation that contributes to the Parliamentary 
History, that could be taken into account by the Judge, when, if necessary, considering 
the intentions of the Legislature.’742 Indeed, while discussing the reservation to 
Article 26 ICRC, the Minister even argued that: ‘In the interpretation of Article 26, 
the Parliamentary History of course may play a role. Judges may use this in their 
739 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 34.
740 House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994, second note, p. 84-5783.
741 House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994, second note. Original text in Dutch: ‘De 
doorwerking van deze bepalingen wordt in de eerste plaats bepaald door de aard, de inhoud, de strekking, 
alsmede door de formulering van de bepaling zelf. Vervolgens kan tevens de bedoeling van de opstellers van 
het verdrag en van de nationale wetgever bij de totstandkoming van de uitvoeringswetgeving een richtsnoer 
vormen.’
742 Minister Kosto, House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Rechters zullen natuurlijk altijd interpreteren naar de omstandigheden van de tijd waarin ze leven en naar de 
omstandigheden die zich in concrete situaties voordoen, zodat er nooit iets anders gedaan kan worden bij het 
behandelen van een wetsvoorstel dan inderdaad een interpretatie geven, die dan bijdraagt tot de geschiedenis 
van het wetsvoorstel, waar de rechter, eventueel de bedoelingen van de wetgever peilend, rekening mee kan 
houden.’
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considerations. However, the Parliamentary History is only one of the sources that can 
be used for the interpretation of Article 26. The text will remain of primary importance. 
This may lead to the interpretation that a child has an independent right to social security. 
Because it is uncertain how the Court will rule on this, the reservation was made.’743 
Concerning the relation between the Legislature and the Judiciary regarding the 
interpretation of international Provisions concerning their direct applicability, 
the Minister was very clear: ‘that interpretation is not done in advance, as we know, 
by the Legislature, but only – I refer to Articles 93 and 94 of the Constitutional Act – 
at some unknown time in the future by the independent Judiciary.’744 It seems that 
the Minister on the one hand is very well aware of the fact that Parliamentary 
History is a source for the Judiciary that is used to determine whether a treaty 
Provision has direct effect or not, and tries to emphasise the importance of this 
source. On the other hand, the Minister is also bound by the competence of the 
Judiciary to have a final say in this matter, as embedded in Articles 93 and 94 CA.
It is this competence of the Judiciary, and the consequential uncertainty as to what 
Provisions would have direct effect in the future and the following consequences 
to that in the domestic legal order, that caused some political fractions to be 
cautious towards adopting the ratification Bill. For instance, Members of the 
Political Reformed Party (SGP) and the Reformed Political Association (GPV), both 
in the Preparatory Committee and in Parliament, expressed their concern that 
ratification of the ICRC could result in unpredictable case law. The SGP fraction 
referred to the legal development after ratification of the ECHR that had led to 
verdicts that were contrary to the original intentions of the Legislature.745 In 
this light, Schutte (GPV) even referred to this as ‘the problem of the direct effect.’746 
Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn (Christian Democratic Appeal, CDA) underlined that 
the Judiciary increasingly became less hesitant in granting direct effect (and also 
horizontal effect) to international Provisions. She agreed that during the adoption 
of the ratification Bill of the ECHR, indeed a wrong assessment had been made 
regarding the consequences of ratification of the treaty for the Dutch legal order, 
although she emphasised that these consequences were not necessarily a bad 
thing. According to her, this demonstrates that an Explanatory Memorandum 
743 Minister Kosto, House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994. Original text in Dutch: ‘Bij 
de interpretatie van artikel 26 kan de wetsgeschiedenis uiteraard een rol spelen. Rechters kunnen dit in hun 
beoordeling betrekken. De wetsgeschiedenis is echter slechts een van de interpretatiemiddelen van artikel 26. 
De tekst blijft primair van belang. Zij kan aanleiding geven tot de interpretatie dat een kind zelfstandig recht op 
sociale zekerheid heeft. Omdat het niet zeker is hoe de rechter hierover zal oordelen, is dit voorbehoud gegeven.´
744 Minister Kosto, House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994. Original text in Dutch: ‘die 
uitleg geschiedt niet op voorhand, zoals wij weten, door de wetgever maar uitsluitend – ik verwijs naar de 
artikelen 93 en 94 van de Grondwet – op enig nog onbekend moment in de toekomst door de onafhankelijke 
rechter.’
745 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, pp. 4 and 6. See also: Schutte (GPV), 
House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
746 Schutte (GPV), House of Representatives, 84th meeting, 30 June 1994. Original text in Dutch: ‘het 
probleem van de rechtstreekse werking.’
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can hardly meet the requirements of reality, for law is a dynamic and continuing 
process.747 Rouvoet (Reformed Political Federation, RPF), argued that until then, 
the system embedded in Articles 93 and 94 CA had not led to any significant 
problems yet, although ‘especially in the field of social security and in the sphere 
of justice it has brought us eventually some more or less unpleasant surprises.’748 In 
this light, he asked whether it is ‘to be feared that, given the power of the Courts to 
review laws against the present Convention, the Netherlands may be confronted with 
surprises and consequences that they do not really want? If so, are there any specific 
areas where problems are (can be) expected?’749 In response, the Government argued 
that the Netherlands already complied with the obligations enshrined in the 
treaty, but also that it could never be precluded that in the future, there would be 
a broader interpretation of the Articles than originally foreseen, for instance due 
to suggestions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, or on a national level, 
due to the reviewing powers of the Judiciary as embedded in Articles 93 and 94 
CA.750 The Government underlined elsewhere that ‘Given the experience of recent 
years with (broad) interpretations of Provisions of human rights treaties by the Courts, 
we have, based on the current and, as far as now foreseen, future legal positions, on 
page 9 of the Explanatory Memorandum, generally indicated what Provisions of the 
Convention, in our estimation, are without doubt or with some probability, suitable 
for direct effect; this to avoid surprises in the future. On the basis of that assessment, 
the present reservations are proposed.’751
The CDA fraction in the Preparatory Committee asked to what extent the direct 
effect of treaty Provisions could interfere with policy in the field of for instance 
education, healthcare and social security: a broad area in which the treaty recognised 
certain rights. The fraction underlined that certainly regarding parental authority 
in relation to financial consequences, choices had been made in the political 
arena, in which the Judiciary normally does not play a role.752 The Government 
responded that while it cannot be predicted with absolute certainty, it can be 
747 Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn (CDA), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
748 Rouvoet (RPF), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994. Original text in Dutch: ‘met 
name op het terrein van de sociale zekerheid en in de justitiële sfeer plaatste dat ons uiteindelijk voor een aantal 
min of meer onaangename verrassingen.’
749 Rouvoet (RPF), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994. Original text in Dutch: ‘Bestaat 
de vrees dat, gezien de macht van de rechter om wetten ook aan dit verdrag te toetsen, Nederland wel eens 
voor verrassingen en gevolgen geplaatst kan worden die het eigenlijk niet wil? Zo ja, zijn er specifieke sectoren 
waar problemen verwacht (kunnen) worden?’
750 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 7.
751 Parliamentary Documents, I 1994-1995, 22855 (R1451), no. 22a, p. 5. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Gelet op de ervaringen van de laatste jaren met rechterlijke (ruime) interpretaties van bepalingen uit 
mensenrechtenverdragen hebben wij op grond van de huidige en de, voor zover nu te voorzien, toekomstige 
rechtsopvattingen op blz. 9 van de memorie van toelichting globaal aangegeven aan welke bepalingen van het 
verdrag naar onze inschatting rechtstreekse werking zonder meer of met enige waarschijnlijkheid zou kunnen 
worden toegekend; een en ander om verrassingen in de toekomst te voorkomen. Op grond van genoemde 
inschatting zijn de voorliggende voorbehouden voorgesteld.’
752 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, pp. 5-6.
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assessed with some accuracy whether a treaty Provision will be granted direct 
effect or not. As already discussed before, this would for the major part concern 
ICRC Provisions with equivalent Provisions in other treaties that had been granted 
direct effect before. But in addition, the Government underlined that it had also 
made an assessment of the consequences when a treaty Provision unexpectedly 
would be granted direct effect, and based on that assessment, where necessary, 
proposed a reservation (such as the reservation to Article 26 concerning social 
security). The Government once again emphasised that it did not expect treaty 
Provisions that stipulated duties to undertake appropriate measures to facilitate 
the implementation of the right in accordance with national conditions and with 
the available resources to be directly applicable.753
As mentioned earlier, especially some Christian parties were hesitant in approving 
the ratification Bill, due to the fact that the Treaty might cause Governmental 
interference in family relations.754 The Senate’s fraction of the Political Reformed 
Party (SGP) eventually decided not to support the adoption, due to the possibility 
that some treaty Provisions would be directly applicable: ‘my fraction does not 
wish to bear the co-responsibility for possible consequences within our domestic law 
on which they cannot exert influence anymore. Based on this consideration, they will 
abstain from supporting the Bill.’755
7.6.3 Individual complaints procedures
In the ICRC, a monitoring procedure is embedded in Article 44 that obliges Member 
States to submit periodic reports to the Commission on the Rights of the Child 
on the implementation of the rights enshrined in the Convention. No complaints 
procedures were adopted. In this light, according to the Government, it was a 
general practice to include – besides a reporting mechanism – an individual 
complaints procedure in treaties that stipulate civil and political rights. However, 
regarding treaties in which economic, social and cultural rights were embedded, 
usually only a reporting mechanism was adopted. Since the ICRC enshrined 
both types of human rights, the draftsmen had included, on top of the reporting 
mechanism, as some sort of compromise between the two approaches, a special role 
for the Committee on the Rights of the child to generally oversee that States comply 
with the treaty, and the possibility for specialised agencies of the UN (especially 
753 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 9.
754 See for the viewpoints of the Political Reformed Party (SGP) and the Reformed Political Association 
(GPV): Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 4-5. See for the viewpoints of the 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA): Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 8. 
See also: Schutte (GPV) and Rouvoet (Reformed Political Federation (RPF)), House of Representatives, 
81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
755 Holdijk (SGP), Senate, 6th meeting, 22 November 1994. Original text in Dutch: ‘Mijn fractie durft de 
medeverantwoordelijkheid voor mogelijke consequenties binnen onze nationale rechtsorde waarop zij geen 
invloed meer kan uitoefenen, niet aan. Op grond van deze overweging zal zij haar steun aan het wetsvoorstel 
moeten onthouden.’
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UNICEF) and NGOs to support and advise the Commission on the Rights of the 
Child (Article 45 ICRC)756. According to the Government, at that time, this was a 
revolutionary approach within the UN, and: ‘Therefore, the absence of an individual 
complaints procedure is not considered a deficiency.’757 In addition, the Government 
argued that an individual could nevertheless effectuate ICRC rights with equivalents 
in the ICCPR indirectly, through the individual complaints procedure adopted 
in the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. In both the Preparatory Committee 
and in Parliament, the viewpoint of the Government was criticised by several 
fractions, especially PvdA and D66. Basically, it was criticised that the ICRC also 
stipulated rights that were not embedded in existing treaties yet, and this could 
not be effectuated by individual complaints procedures via equivalent Provisions 
elsewhere.758 The Government replied that it would undesirable when also 
economic, social and cultural rights could be effectuated through an individual 
complaints procedure, due to the margin of discretion of the Administration and 
Legislature, and it would in case of the ICRC lead to unwanted juridification of 
relations within the family. The Government underlined that the effectuation 
by individual complaints procedures of those rights embedded in the ICRC from 
which it would be desirable that they could be effectuated as such, was already 
adequately guaranteed in other treaties.759 The question was raised whether an 
Optional Protocol could be expected to the ICRC, in which an individual complaints 
procedure would be embedded.760 The Government replied that this could not 
be expected soon.761 The discussion on individual complaints procedures was – 
especially in Parliament – intertwined (and sometimes incorrectly mingled) with 
another discussion about whether the treaty would imply that children would be 
756 In one of their responses to questions from the Preperatory Committee (see: Parliamentary 
Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 3), the Government further explained that from 
Article 45 ICRC and the travaux préparatoires, it ‘can be concluded that other competent bodies, which the 
Committee may consider appropriate, including NGOs: (a) may provide expert advice on the implementation 
of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their respective mandates; (b) may receive any reports 
from States Parties that contain a request, or indicate a need, for technical advice or assistance; (c) may be 
involved in undertaking studies on specific issues relating to the rights of the child; (d) through their information 
provided to the Committee, also provide the basis for the draft of recommendations and suggestions by the 
Committee to States and the General Assembly.’ Original text in Dutch: ‘…kan worden afgeleid dat andere 
bevoegde instellingen, die het comité passend acht, dus ook NGOs: (a) het toezichthoudend Comité voor de 
rechten van het kind van deskundig advies kunnen dienen op die gebieden, waarop zij werkzaam zijn; (b) 
elk rapport van een verdragsstaat zullen ontvangen waarin een staat te kennen geeft op (technisch) advies of 
ondersteuning prijs te stellen; (c) ingeschakeld kunnen worden bij het verrichten van onderzoek op gebieden 
die verband houden met de rechten van het kind; (d) door middel van door hen aan het comité verschafte 
informatie, mede de basis kunnen leggen voor door dit comité op te stellen aanbevelingen en suggesties aan 
staten en de Algemene Vergadering.’
757 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 4. Original text in Dutch: ‘Het 
ontbreken van een individueel klachtenrecht derhalve niet als een gemis ervaren.’
758 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 2-3. Van der Burg (PvdA), House of 
Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
759 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 4.
760 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 3.
761 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 6, p. 6.
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capable to exercise their own juridical remedies, instead of their parents or legal 
guardians. The Government together with some (mostly confessional762) parties 
was of the opinion that this was not the case, in contrast with some other fractions. 
The Government explained in its Explanatory Memorandum that the treaty itself 
did not imply juridical remedies for children, which was also not necessary, for it 
is normally the parent or the legal guardian that will act therefore on behalf of the 
child. In some cases however, the Government emphasised that the child has the 
right to express its own opinion in the proceedings, or to start proceedings when 
it concerns the interest of the child.763 In this context it is however unclear what 
exactly is referred to by legal remedies for children. It is our understanding that 
the political parties that expressed their concerns about the possibility of a legal 
remedy for children did so in a context of uncertainty about future rulings of the 
Courts regarding possible direct effect of rights that would affect the relations 
within a family: it was their view that in the first place, a Court should not rule 
on family relations (mostly embedded in economic, social and cultural rights), 
but if a Court would do so nevertheless (due to the uncertainty that comes from 
Articles 93 and 94 CA), it should certainly not be possible that a child could start 
its own proceedings based on those rights. The fractions of the Labour party 
(PvdA), GreenLeft (GL) and Democrats ‘66 (D’66), and the liberal party (VVD) 
on the contrary did not consider the discussion on possible legal remedies for 
children in view of family relations, but rather considered that in society, there 
was an increasing demand for juridical remedies for children.764
7.7 The European Social Charter (revised version)
The ratification Bill of the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter 
Providing for a System of Collective Complaints and the ESC (revised version) 
was discussed in Parliament in the period 2004-2005.
7.7.1 Background and added value of the ESC (revised version)
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government explained that the original ESC, 
originally intended to be the counterpart of the ECHR, was never as influential 
as the ECHR, due to interpretation problems and an ineffective monitoring 
mechanism.765 Therefore, a substantive revision of the ESC and the adoption of 
762 See for the viewpoints of the Political Reformed Party (SGP) and the Reformed Political Association 
(GPV): Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, p. 10. See for the viewpoints of 
the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA): Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, 
p. 8. See also: Schutte (GPV), House of Representatives, 81st meeting, 23 June 1994.
763 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 12.
764 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 4, pp. 8-10. See also: Van den Burg 
(PvdA) and Versnel-Schmitz (D’66). From the speech of De Vries (VVD), House of Representatives, 81st 
meeting, 23 June 1994.
765 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 3, pp. 1-2.
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an improved monitoring mechanism were deemed necessary. To this end, the 
European Committee on Social Rights had earlier drafted a Protocol amending 
the European Social Charter,766 which was already ratified by the Netherlands in 
1993, to improve the reporting procedure. Since then, the European Committee 
on Social Rights had drafted an Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter 
Providing for a System of Collective Complaints,767 and also revised the substantive 
Provisions of the original version of the ESC.768 The last two documents were 
discussed together in Parliament based on one ratification Bill. According to the 
Government, the most important criteria that were used to formulate a substantively 
renewed version of the ESH were ‘the need to take account of the major changes in 
the development of social rights, the content of other international instruments and the 
will to deal with issues that are not covered by these other international instruments.’769
7.7.2 Direct applicability of the ESC (revised version)
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Government was quite clear regarding 
the possibility of direct applicability of the renewed ESC Provisions: ‘The revised 
Charter is a codification of the current ideas in the social field that live in the Member 
States of the Council of Europe and thus aims to provide guidance for national social 
policies of each of these States and a common basis for the development of Europe in 
social matters.’770 Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the Government considered the 
ESC to be complementary to the ECHR: ‘Where the latter Convention in the first 
place aims to protect the citizen against impermissible infringements of the Government 
on private life, the Charter demands of that same Government to deploy measures 
that are necessary to realise that the standard of living and the social-cultural well-
being of the population meet a (European) basic level, and are further improved.’771 
Regarding these performance duties of the Member States recognised in the ESC, 
the Government argued that ‘A number of Provisions of the Revised Charter are so 
766 Amending Protocol of 1991 reforming the supervisory mechanism, 21 October 1991, Turin, in: 
European Treaty Series 142.
767 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, 
9 November 1995, Strassbourg, in: European Treaty Series 158.
768 European Social Charter (revised), 3 May 1996, Strassbourg, in: European Treaty Series 163.
769 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 3, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘de noodzaak tot het 
in aanmerking nemen van de belangrijkste veranderingen in de ontwikkeling van sociale rechten, de inhoud van 
andere internationale instrumenten en de wens thema’s te behandelen die niet door deze andere internationale 
instrumenten worden bestreken.’
770 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 3, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘Het herziene 
handvest vormt een codificatie van de in de lidstaten van de Raad van Europa levende gedachte op sociaal 
terrein en beoogt aldus een leidraad te zijn voor het nationaal sociaal beleid van elk van deze lidstaten en een 
gemeenschappelijke basis voor de ontwikkeling van Europa op sociaal gebied.’
771 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 3, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘Waar 
laatstgenoemde verdrag in de eerste plaats ziet op de bescherming van de burger tegen ontoelaatbaar te achten 
inbreuken van de overheid op de individuele levenssfeer, vraagt het Handvest van diezelfde overheid activiteiten 
te ontplooien welke noodzakelijk zijn om de levensstandaard en het sociaal-cultureel welzijn van de bevolking 
op een (Europese) basisniveau te brengen en verder te verbeteren.’
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generally formulated, that they are mainly of a programmatic nature, allowing the 
contracting States a very large margin of discretion regarding the implementation of 
those principles. However, the adoption of these principles can be appreciated, since 
they form, inter alia in the exchange of views between the European states in view 
of the monitoring procedure, a basis to come to a shared vision on the realisation of 
these principles.’772 It was the opinion of the Government that the Appendix to 
the revised ESC can be understood in such way that in the ESC only duties of an 
international nature were embedded, and the compliance with those duties was 
subject to the ESC monitoring mechanism only. Considering the Appendix, read 
in conjunction with the wording and the contents of the Charter Provisions, the 
Government concluded that ‘the undersigned assume that the Treaty Provisions are 
generally not suitable for direct effect in the Dutch legal system. If that what is stipulated 
in those Provisions is not proven to be realised in the Netherlands, the Provisions should 
be further implemented through acts of legislation and administration. The monitoring 
process...is also focussed on this.’773
However, the Council of State expressed in its recommendations to the Government 
regarding the proposed Explanatory Memorandum a different view on the matter 
of direct applicability of the revised ESC Provisions. The Council argued that the 
Government seemed to suggest that direct effect of the Articles is not possible, 
based on inter alia the Appendix to the ESC. According to the Council of State, 
it is stipulated in the appendix that the compliance with the Charter Provisions 
is supervised by the corresponding monitoring mechanism to the ESC only, to 
exclude other international monitoring agencies, and not to exclude direct effect 
of the substantive Provisions. The Council then stated that for instance through 
Article E (Part V), that stipulates the principle of non-discrimination, an direct 
effect might be granted to other substantive Provisions that would in itself not be 
suitable for direct effect. In addition, the Council reminded that, due to Articles 93 
and 94 CA, it is the Judiciary that eventually decides on the matter of direct effect, 
and argued that therefore, excluding direct effect beforehand by the Legislature, 
was in contradiction with these Constitutional Provisions. That is why the Council 
of State recommended deleting the text that is referred to.774
772 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 3, p. 2. Original text in Dutch: ‘Een aantal 
bepalingen van het herziene Handvest zijn dusdanig algemeen geformuleerd, dat deze in de hoofdzaak een 
programmatisch karakter hebben, waarbij zij aan de verdragssluitende staten een zeer grote beleidsvrijheid 
laten met betrekking tot de uitwerking van deze beginselen. Nochtans is ook de vaststelling van deze beginselen 
positief te waarderen, aangezien deze, onder meer in de gedachtewisseling tussen de Europese staten in 
het kader van de toezichtprocedure een basis vormen om tot een gemeenschappelijke visie te komen over 
concretisering van deze beginselen.’
773 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 3, p. 4. Original text in Dutch: ‘gaan de 
ondergetekenden er van uit dat de verdragsbepalingen zich in het algemeen niet lenen voor rechtstreekse 
werking in de Nederlandse rechtsorde. Indien niet vaststaat dat hetgeen in die bepalingen is neergelegd in 
Nederland wordt gerealiseerd, zullen zij hun vertaling moeten krijgen in daden van wetgeving en bestuur. De 
toezichtprocedure (…) richt zich daar ook op.’
774 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 4, p. 7.
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The Government responded to this that it is indeed the Judiciary that has a 
final say in the matter of direct applicability, but that the Government is free 
to express its own views thereon. The Government then referred to the criteria 
as developed by the Supreme Court to determine whether a treaty Provision is 
suitable for direct effect which are ‘the intention of the contracting Parties, as well 
as the wordings, the nature and the content of the present Provisions, while also the 
intention of the Legislature may be of importance.’775 According to the Government, it 
was the clear intention of the contracting parties not to introduce any monitoring 
mechanism besides the mechanism to the ESC. Whether or not the Government 
then considered the national Judiciary as a monitoring mechanism besides the ESC 
mechanism, and therefore rejects the possibility of direct effect, remains rather 
unclear, and has not been discussed further. The Government emphasised that 
many of the substantial ESC Provisions, considering their wordings, stipulated 
duties basically for the Legislature, to adopt measures to further implement the 
present treaty Provisions. The wordings ‘appropriate’, ‘reasonable’, ‘as necessary’, 
‘as possible’, etc. seem to suggest that there is a large margin of discretion for the 
Member States. ‘In the past, only in respect of Article 6, fourth Section, of the Charter...
read in conjunction with Article 31 (original ESH) the Supreme Court has accepted 
direct effect.’776 The Government added that of course, within the margins of the 
law, the Dutch national States institutions would have to consider the ESC in their 
decision making processes.777 The matter of direct effect was not significantly 
discussed in Parliament.
7.7.3 Complaints procedures
One of the improvements concerning the monitoring mechanism to the ESC was 
the adoption of a collective complaints procedure, supervised by the Committee on 
Social Rights. In the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing 
for a System of Collective Complaints, the right was recognised for international 
and national organisations of employers and trade unions, and other international 
non-governmental organisations of relevance, to submit complaints to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe.778 In its Explanatory Memorandum, 
the Government expressed its approval of the procedure.779 In Parliament, the 
protocol has not been discussed significantly. The possibility of an individual 
complaints procedure was not discussed at all.
775 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 4, p. 8. Original text in Dutch: ‘de bedoelingen van 
verdragsluitende partijen, alsmede de formulering, de aard en de inhoud van de betrokken bepalingen, terwijl 
ook de bedoeling van de wetgever van belang kan zijn.’
776 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 4, p. 9. Original text in Dutch: ‘Slechts ten aanzien 
van artikel 6, vierde lid, van het Handvest (…) gelezen in samenhang met artikel 31 (ESH oud) heef de Hoge 
Raad in het verleden rechtstreekse werking aangenomen.’
777 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 4, p. 9.
778 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, 
9 November 1995, Strassbourg, in: European Treaty Series 158, especially Article 1.
779 Parliamentary Documents, II 2004-2005, 29941, no. 3, pp. 38-42.
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7.8 Conclusion
Based on the analysis above, conclusions can be drawn on three elements, which 
each contribute to a better understanding of the viewpoints of the Legislature 
concerning the direct effect of ECOSOC rights, and thus the right to food. Firstly, 
what was the motivation to ratify the present treaty; secondly, are the Provisions 
suitable for direct effect according to the Legislature; and thirdly, what are the 
viewpoints on complaints procedures.
At the moment of ratification, the Dutch Government is, without exceptions, 
convinced that the Dutch legal order is already in confirmation with the analysed 
treaties. In case of any doubt, the choice is usually made to make a reservation, 
to guarantee compliance with the treaty, instead of proposing implementation 
legislation. From this it appears that throughout the years, the Dutch Legislature 
did not have any ambition to improve the domestic legal order in the field of 
human rights, based on the treaties. Remarkably, realising human rights in the 
Netherlands seems hardly to play a role in the motivation to ratify the treaties. 
Rather, arguments to ratify mostly focus on foreign relations. For instance, the fact 
that a treaty would be legally binding, or would have an (improved) monitoring 
system, is many times expressed as a motivation to ratify, but mostly discussed 
in view of other countries. The Netherlands could then use the treaty as a basis to 
appeal to other countries to respect human rights, an argument that is expressed in 
for example the Explanatory Memorandums to the ratification Bills of the CEDAW 
and the ICRC. On the other hand, the Legislature consequently expressed its 
disappointment in the final result of most treaties, for they are usually sketched as 
compromises after long negotiations, and quite often the Governments regretted 
that the treaties or monitoring mechanisms were not further-reaching, or even 
declared that in the international arena. Both approaches appear to be at odds.
Regarding the matter of direct applicability, a similar approach, albeit technically 
differently and sometimes rather clumsily formulated, can be observed throughout 
the years. It appears that the different Governments, each time when a ratification 
Bill is discussed in Parliament, struggle with the system laid down in Articles 
93 and 94 CA. On the one hand, they want to underline the importance of the 
opinion of the Legislature regarding the possibility of direct applicability of treaty 
Provisions, which is stressed in various degrees of urgency, and seem to be well 
aware of the fact that the Parliamentary Documents are used in the considerations 
of the Courts. On more than one occasion, the possibility of legal developments 
beyond the reach of the Legislature is considered with suspicion. On the other 
hand, the Government feels bound by especially Article 94 CA, and each time, 
sometimes after being reminded by Parliament, almost reluctantly recognises the 
fact that the Judiciary has a final say in deciding whether an Article is suitable for 
direct application. In the Parliamentary Documents, the Government often refer 
to case law of the Supreme Court, in which three, and sometimes four, criteria are 
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described that the Courts usually refer to when deciding on direct applicability. 
These criteria are described in most detail in the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the ratification Bill of the ICRC: ‘the nature, content and scope of the Provision, as 
well as the formulation (the wording) thereof, while also the intention of the national 
Legislature during the realisation of the ratification law of the relevant treaty could 
be a guideline, and – insofar as this is the case – the intention of the draftsmen of the 
treaty should be a guideline. Also of importance in this is the presence or absence of 
implementation legislation, and whether it is possible within the national legal system 
to directly apply the Provision.’780 The first three criteria are referred to more often 
in the various Parliamentary Documents throughout the years, while the last 
criterion (the presence or absence of implementation legislation, and whether it is 
possible within the national legal system to directly apply the Provision) was only 
referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum to the ratification Bill of the ICRC. 
With respect to a possible hierarchy, the Legislature expresses confusing viewpoints 
– especially in the Parliamentary Documents that concern the ratification Bill of 
the ICRC – that are more than once contrary to one another, and flow between the 
notion that the intention of the draftsmen of the treaty (sometimes confused or 
with the intention of the national Legislature) is the primary source to establish 
whether a Provision is suitable for direct applicability on the one hand, and that 
the nature, content and scope of the Provision, as well as the formulation (the 
wording) thereof, are the most important source of interpretation on the other hand.
In general, it can be concluded that civil and political rights are usually suitable 
for direct effect, whereas economic, social and cultural rights are not, due to the 
fact that the Provisions in which those rights are recognised are mostly addressed 
to the Judiciary and Administration, concern a duty to progressively realise and 
therefore imply a large margin of appreciation for them. The discussion on direct 
applicability of ECOSOC rights was more detailed in view of the CEDAW and ICRC, 
for in those Treaties also civil and political rights are stipulated. The Governments 
then were challenged more intensely to explain their viewpoints on the matter, 
and it can be observed that the Governments did not reject the possibility of 
direct effect of the ECOSOC rights in the specialised treaties, the CEDAW and 
the ICRC, as strongly compared to the ICESCR and ESH Provisions. One notable 
exception to the rule that ECOSOC rights are not suitable for direct application 
appears to be Article 6 (4) ESC.781 In Chapter 5, it was discussed that the case law 
on this is frequently referred to in the literature on the functioning of Articled 
93 and 94 CA in relation to the division of powers between the Legislature and 
the Judiciary concerning the decision on direct applicability of international 
standards. It is used as an example to underline that also in legal practice, the 
Judiciary, based on Articles 93 and 94 CA has a final say in deciding whether a 
Treaty Provision is directly applicable, because the Supreme Court, in its case 
780 Parliamentary Documents, II 1992-1993, 22855 (R1451), no. 3, p. 9.
781 Under certain conditions, in literature, also Article 7 (a) (i) ICESCR is considered to have direct effect.
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law, would be opposing the view of the Legislature. Since regarding the right to 
adequate food the Judiciary seems to follow the views of the Legislature (see 
Chapter 4), it may be of interest in this research to further explore to what extent 
indeed, and if so why, the Judiciary decided to oppose the views of the Legislature 
in the case of Article 6 (4) ESC. This will be done in Chapter 8.
Regarding the view on monitoring procedures, the different perception of civil 
and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on 
the other hand, are also visible. The position of the Dutch Legislature throughout 
the years can be summarised as follows: regarding the ECHR and the ICCPR, 
both stipulating civil and political rights, the Legislature appears to have strongly 
stimulated the adoption of individual complaints procedures in the negotiations 
preceding the adoption of the treaties. Remarkable detail regarding the ECHR is 
that the Government in Parliament advised against the ratification of an individual 
complaints procedure, while the Dutch Delegation voted in favour of this procedure 
during the negotiations. Regarding the ICESCR and ESC, the Governments did 
not always discuss the possibility of complaints procedures, for they were usually 
not adopted in the treaties. Regarding the ESC, the Government appeared not to 
oppose a collective complaints procedure. However, in the Parliamentary debate 
on the ratification Bill of the ICRC, the Government did discuss the possibility of an 
individual complaints procedure, and argued that the possibility of an individual 
complaint regarding ECOSOC rights would be undesirable due to the margin 
of discretion of the Legislature and Administration, and the fact that individual 
complaints procedures might possibly lead to juridification of family relations.
In general however, it must also be concluded that throughout the years, with 
some noticeable exceptions, the Parliamentarians have a poor knowledge on the 
functioning of Articles 93 and 94 CA, and more than once seem to discuss manners 
in a way that could be characterised as ‘ad hoc’, and not so well informed.
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8. Intermezzo: the right to strike
8.1 Introduction
From the previous Chapters, especially Chapter 4, it appeared that the Courts 
are generally not willing to grant direct effect to ECOSOC rights, and more in 
particular the right to food. The most notable exception to that rule appears to 
be the case law concerning Article 6 (4), stipulating the right to strike: in their 
verdicts, the Courts consequently consider that the Provision has direct effect in 
the Dutch legal order. As outlined in Chapter 5, in the leading literature on the 
matter, this case law is often considered as proof that it is solely the Judiciary 
that has a final say in determining whether an international Provision has direct 
effect or not. Some authors suggested that it appears from this case law, that 
the nature, scope as well as its wordings are the only or primary source for 
the Courts used in their decisions, for the Supreme Court, in the railway-strike 
ruling,782 would have decided, contrary to the view of the Legislature as expressed 
in Parliamentary History, that Article 6 (4) ESC is directly applicable. If that is 
indeed true, it would not match with the conclusions drawn from Chapter 4, after 
analysing the case law on the right to food, in which I observed that generally 
speaking the Courts follow the lead of the Legislature, in particular considering 
the Parliamentary History of the ratification Bill, and mostly not even consider 
the nature, scope and wordings of the Provision itself. In this light, it appeared 
from especially Chapter 7, that the Dutch Legislature, in their Parliamentary 
Documents, generally considers the direct applicability of ECOSOC rights that 
are stipulated in international Human Rights Treaties, as one general issue, and 
does not discuss the matter separately per treaty Provision. In most Explanatory 
Memorandums thus direct applicability of ECOSOC rights is generally rejected. 
Apparently, there is something special about the right to strike, as stipulated in 
Article 6 (4) ESC. Therefore, in this ‘intermezzo’, I will explore why the case law 
on Article 6 (4) ESC appears to be so different compared to case law on ECOSOC 
rights in general. To this end, I will firstly explore to what extent Article 6 (4) ESC 
is the only exception to the rule that ECOSOC rights are generally not directly 
applicable (Section 8.2). Then, to get more insight in the particularities of the case, 
I will discuss the railway-strike ruling into more detail (Section 8.3). Furthermore, 
I will explore the Parliamentary History on the ESC more thoroughly regarding the 
direct applicability of Article 6 (4). Since the Article was excluded from the first 
draft Bill, as discussed in Chapter 7, the Government did not discuss the direct 
applicability of the Article in its Explanatory Memorandum, but mainly during the 
discussions in Parliament (Section 8.4). Remarkably, Article 8 ICESCR, in which 
also the right to strike is enshrined, has no direct effect – a fact that has been 
782 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling).
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noted by other authors as well.783 Therefore, the Parliamentary History on Article 
8 ICESCR will also be explored (Section 8.5), for the differences between Article 
6 (4) ESC and 8 ICESCR may give more insight in what elements are decisive for 
the granting of direct effect. Of course, in Section 8.6, conclusions will be drawn.
8.2  The direct applicability of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in general
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, in literature Article 6 (4) ESH and Article 7 ICESCR 
are often referred to as (the) two examples of ECOSOC rights in international 
treaties that have direct effect on the Netherlands.784 However, it must be observed 
that Article 7 ICESCR does not have a similar effect compared to Article 6 ESH. In 
the case law in which Article 7 ICESCR plays a role, usually in cases concerning 
discrimination in remuneration, the Article in itself has no direct effect, but is 
rather read in conjunction with Article 26 ICCPR (a non-discrimination Provision), 
recognising a principle of non-discrimination in remuneration. The Courts then 
consider that: ‘…all this means that this principle – which, given the fact that it is also 
supported by treaty Provisions such as Article 26 ICCPR and Article 7 ICESCR, may 
be granted a heavy weight – is not conclusive but should be involved in the judgment, 
alongside other circumstances of the case.’785 Article 7 ICESCR therefore may have 
a certain (indirect) effect in Court cases, but certainly not an direct effect as 
compared to Article 6 (4) ESC.
Regarding the ICRC, there appears to be a slightly different regime concerning 
the effect of ECOSOC rights, compared to the rights stipulated in the ICESCR. 
As demonstrated in Sections 4.4-4.6, focussing on Articles 24, 26 and 27 ICRC, 
occasionally – although the Courts generally deny their direct applicability – 
783 A.K. Koekoek (ed.), De Grondwet, een systematisch en artikelgewijs commentaar (3e druk), Deventer: 
Tjeenk Willink, 2000, p. 467. Reference was made to: Supreme Court, 6 December 1983, NJ 1984, 557 
and Supreme Court, 12 February 1984, NJB 1984, 45. See also: C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel Recht 
(6e druk), Deventer: Kluwer, 2008, p.467. Also here, reference was made to: Supreme Court, 6 December 
1983, NJ 1984, 557.
784 See for the literature review Chapter 5.
785 Original text in Dutch: ‘een en ander betekent dat dit beginsel – waaraan, gelet op het feit dat het ook 
steun vindt in verdragsbepalingen als artikel 26 IVBPR en artikel 7 IVESCR, een zwaar gewicht kan worden 
toegekend – niet doorslaggevend is maar dat het naast andere omstandigheden van het geval moet worden 
betrokken in de afweging.’ See for instance: Central Court of Appeal, 16 February 1989, AB 1989, 164; 
Central Court of Appeal, 3 July 1986, TAR 1986, 215; Supreme Court, 30 January 2004, LJN AM2312; 
Court of First Instance of the Netherlands Antilles, 28 January 2009, EJ 2008/497; Court of Appeal, 
’s-Gravenhage, 28 April 2009, LJN BI3564; Court of First Instance of the Netherlands Antilles, 30 March 
2010, EJ 2009/579. However, direct effect of Article 7 ICESCR is also explicitly denied in some cases. 
For instance: Supreme Court, 20 April 1990, NJ 1992/636; Supreme Court, 07 May 1993, NJ 1995, 259; 
The Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and of Bonaire, Saint Eustatius and Saba, 27 
October 2009, EJ 497/08. In one older case, however, the Article was incidentally granted direct effect 
by the Public Service Tribunal that even concluded a violation with Article 7 ICESCR: Public Service 
Tribunal, Amsterdam, NJCM-Bulletin 1984, pp. 245-252.
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the Courts are willing to use the analysed ICRC Provisions as an interpretative 
standard in their verdicts, more or less comparable to the case law on Article 7 
ICESCR. This seems to be a development that also includes many other ICRC 
Provisions, as observed in a very extensive analysis by J.H. de Graaf, M.M.C. 
Limbeek, N.N. Bahadur, and N. van der Mey.786 However, no evidence could be 
found that the Courts consider any ICRC Provisions stipulating ECOSOC rights 
to be directly applicable.
As already concluded in Chapter 4, in the Netherlands hardly any case law on 
the direct effect of CEDAW Provisions exists.
8.3 The railway-strike ruling
The Supreme Court granted direct effect to Article 6 (4) ESC for the first time 
in their landmark railway-strike ruling. In casu, the national railway company 
(NS) had claimed that the district Court of Utrecht would force the trade unions 
involved to call an end to the collective actions of the NS personnel, and in the 
future, not call for such actions again. The District Court rejected the claim, and 
also the Court of Appeal ruled likewise. Therefore, the NS appealed in cassation 
to the Supreme Court. According to NS, the Court of Appeal wrongly ruled, inter 
alia, that Article 6 (4) ESC would have direct effect, and thus the personnel 
could invoke this Article to justify their collective actions.787 The Supreme Court 
however considered that ‘to judge this legal remedy...in the first place, it should be 
determined whether the Supreme Court may review the ruling of the Court of Appeal 
against Article 6 (4) of the (…) European Social Charter.’788 To this end, the Court 
held that it would be competent to review ‘when this Treaty Provision would fall 
under the scope of the Provisions that are binding on all persons, referred to in art. 
93 CA.’789 To determine this, the Supreme Court argued in its famous passage: 
‘Whether or not the contracting States intended to grant direct effect to Article 6 ESC 
is not relevant, whereas neither from the text, nor the history of the formation of the 
treaty follows that they have agreed that Article 6 ESC is directly applicable. In that 
situation, according to Dutch law, only the content of the Provision is decisive: does this 
oblige the Dutch Legislature to implement a national measure with a certain content 
or scope, or is this of such nature that the Provision can be applied directly to national 
legal order as positive law? Article 6 Section 4 is – contrary to most other Provisions 
786 J.H. de Graaf, M.M.C. Limbeek, N.N. Bahadur, and N. van der Mey, De toepassing van het Internationaal 
Verdrag inzake de Rechten van het Kind in de Nederlandse Rechtspraak, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 2012.
787 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling), legal appeal.
788 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling), consideration 3.2. Original text in 
Dutch: ‘ter beoordeling van dit middel (…) dient in de eerste plaats te worden vastgesteld of de Hoge Raad ’s 
Hofs oordeel kan toetsen aan het bepaalde in art. 6 lid 4 van het (…) Europees Sociaal Handvest.’
789 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling), consideration 3.2. Original text 
in Dutch: ‘indien deze verdragsbepaling behoort tot die in art. 93 Gr.w. bedoelde bepalingen die naar haar 
inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden.’
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of the ESC and in particular also to the other Sections of this Article – thus worded 
that the States Parties concerned are not obliged to adopt measures, but instead that 
the said employees and employers may certainly invoke the law as recognised, within 
certain limits, by the concerned States in the domestic legal order.’790 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court considered that: ‘Also from the ‘Gloss’ to Article 6 (4), attached 
to the ‘Appendix to the ESC’, it appears that the States are not required to regulate “the 
right to strike”...by law: Member States that leave the application and other limitation 
of Article 6 Section 4 and Article 31 to case law, therefore do not violate the Convention, 
provided that the Judiciary respects the limitations stipulated in the latter Article. This 
is also assumed in the authoritative ‘Conclusions’ of the Committee, referred to in 
Article 25 ESC (Conclusions 1, page 38 under (e) and VIII, page 97). All this justifies 
regarding Article 6 Section 4 ESC as a Provision which, by its content, can be binding 
on all persons, ex Article 93 CA.’791
8.4 The Parliamentary History concerning Article 6 (4) ESH
As discussed in Chapter 7, the Government considered that the ESC Provisions 
were not suitable for direct applicability. This general view was slightly contested in 
the Preparatory Committee,792 but not significantly opposed further in Parliament, 
except with respect to one Provision: Article 6 (4) ESC. The actual inclusion of 
Article 6 (4) ESC was not undisputed. In the first draft of the ratification Bill, the 
Government had included the Article,793 and explained that the current situation 
regarding the right to strike was unsatisfactory. Although there was a slightly 
milder approach towards striking in the private sector by the Supreme Court, still 
striking was considered to be in essence a breach of contract by the employees. 
Therefore, the Government had proposed a draft Bill that would more adequately 
790 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling), consideration 3.2. Original text in 
Dutch: ‘Of de verdragsluitende Staten al dan niet hebben beoogd aan artikel 6 lid 4 ESH directe werking toe te 
kennen, is niet van belang nu noch uit de tekst, noch uit de geschiedenis van de totstandkoming van het Verdrag 
valt af te leiden dat zij zijn overeengekomen dat aan artikel 6 lid 4 die werking mag worden toegekend. Bij deze 
stand van zaken is naar Nederlands recht enkel de inhoud van de bepaling zelf beslissend: verplicht deze de 
Nederlandse Wetgever tot het treffen van een nationale regeling met een bepaalde inhoud of strekking, of is 
deze van dien aard dat de bepaling in de nationale rechtsorde zonder meer als objectief recht kan functioneren? 
Artikel 6 lid 4 is – in tegenstelling tot de meeste andere bepalingen van het ESH en met name ook tot de overige 
leden van dit artikel – zo geredigeerd dat de betrokken verdragsstaten niet een verplichting tot regelgeving wordt 
opgelegd, maar integendeel aldus dat werknemers en werkgevers zich op het door de betrokken verdragsstaten 
binnen zekere grenzen erkende recht in de nationale rechtsorde zonder meer moeten kunnen beroepen.’
791 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling), consideration 3.2. Original text in 
Dutch: ‘Ook uit de in de ‘Bijlage bij het ESH’ opgenomen ‘glosse’ bij art. 6 lid 4 blijkt dat de staten niet verplicht 
zijn ‘het recht op staking’ (…) bij de wet te regelen: verdragsstaten die de toepassing en andere begrenzingen 
van artikel 6 lid 4 en artikel 31 aan de jurisprudentie overlaten, schenden dusdoende – mits de rechtspraak 
de door laatstgenoemde artikel getrokken grenzen eerbiedigt – het verdrag niet. Van dit laatste gaan ook de 
gezaghebbende ‘Conclusions’ van de in artikel 25 ESH bedoelde Comité van deskundigen uit (Conclusions 1, 
blz. 38 onder (e) en VIII, blz. 97). Een en ander wettigt de bepaling van artikel 6 lid 4 ESH aan te merken als 
een bepaling die naar haar inhoud een ieder kan verbinden in de zin van artikel 93 Gr.w.’
792 Parliamentary Documents, II 1966-1967, 8606 (R 533), no. 5, p.1.
793 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 2, Article 2.
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regulate the right to strike by national law.794 At the insistence of the Preparatory 
Committee however, Article 6 (4) was removed from the draft Bill.795 According 
to Members of the Committee, the domestic status concerning the right to strike 
was unclear, and in particular, the status of the right to strike of civil servants. 
Until then, it appeared to most Members of the Committee to be wise to exclude 
Article 6 (4) from the ratification Bill, until there was more clarity about the Dutch 
status concerning the right to strike, which was expected to be obtained through 
the future adoption of a national regulation on the matter.796 The Government 
agreed to these viewpoints, decided to await the advice of the national Social and 
Economic Council (SER) on the draft Bill on the right to strike that was submitted 
earlier, and excluded the Provision from the ratification Bill.797 However, the 
draft of a domestic Bill on the right to strike appeared to be not that easy. The 
Parliamentary debate on the draft Bill 10111, which was intended to regulate the 
right to strike, was delayed several times and was cause for intense discussions. 
During the Parliamentary Debate on the ratification Bill of the ESC, draft Bill 10111 
was still not adopted by Parliament. Especially the exact demarcation concerning 
professions that should be excluded from the scope of the right to strike, due to 
the severe consequences it would bring to society when its practitioners would 
exercise the right (basically civil servants), proved to be a problem. When it 
appeared to be impossible to reach agreement on a domestic measure, draft Bill 
10111 was withdrawn.798 Instead, in a new draft Bill on the ratification of the ESC 
which included Article 6 (4) ESC, it was proposed with a reservation ‘with regard 
to the employees not being civil servants.’799 Still, the exact content and scope of the 
right to strike as embedded in Article 6 (4) was not clear, and as appeared from 
the subsequent Parliamentary Debate, highly controversial.800
794 Parliamentary Documents, II 1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 3, p. 5.
795 Parliamentary Documents, II 1966-1967, 8606 (R 533), no. 6, p. 3; Parliamentary Documents, II 
1965-1966, 8606 (R 533), no. 7.
796 Parliamentary Documents, II 1966-1967, 8606 (R 533), no. 5, p. 2-3.
797 Parliamentary Documents, II 1966-1967, 8606 (R 533), no. 6, p. 3.
798 Parliamentary Documents, II 1979-1980, 10111 no. 5.
799 Parliamentary Documents, II 1970-1971, 8606 (R 533), no. 11, Article 2; later also in Parliamentary 
Documents, II 1976-1977, 8606 (R 533), no. 14.
800 For instance, regarding the ratification of Article 6 (4) ESC, two Amendments and one Motion 
were submitted, with various (and opposing) viewpoints regarding the ratification. See: Parliamentary 
Documents, II 1977-1978, 8606 (R 533), no. 15, Amendment of Parliamentarian Verburg, in which the 
proposition was made to exclude Article 6 (4) completely from the ratification Bill. Contrary to that 
Amendment, Roethof and co proposed to include Article 6 (4) without any reservation: Parliamentary 
Documents, II 1977-1978, 8606 (R 533), no. 18. In a motion, Parliamentarians De Voogd and Van Dam 
invited the Government to ‘submit, no later than 1 January 1981, further proposals to ensure the proper 
functioning of the public service on essential parts, also in the situation in which Article 6 (4) ESC will be fully 
ratified, so that the present reservation can be withdrawn.’ Parliamentary Documents, II 1977-1978, 8606 (R 
533), no. 21. Original text in Dutch: ‘om uiterlijk op 1 januari 1981 nadere voorstellen aan het parlement te 
doen ter voorziening in het ongestoord functioneren van de openbare dienst op essentiële onderdelen ook in de 
situatie, waarin artikel 6 (4) van het Handvest onverkort zal zijn geratificeerd en het aldus mogelijk te maken, 
218 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 8
The Government as well as the Preparatory Committee had thus focussed their 
debate on Article 6 (4) on the matter whether the Provision should be included in 
the ratification Bill or not. The possibility of direct applicability of the Provision was 
not discussed at all in the Explanatory Memorandum and subsequent Parliamentary 
documents. Only in the final report of the Preparatory Committee the matter was 
introduced. The fraction of the Liberal Party (VVD) assumed that Article 6 (4) 
would be considered by the Courts to be self-executing. Therefore, the fraction 
was of the opinion that the Provision could not be ratified without a reservation, 
for they considered that an unlimited right to strike for civil servants would be 
undesirable.801 The fraction of the Rainbow/Radical Party (PPR) instead argued 
that Article 31 ESC already adequately allowed restrictions to ESC Provisions by 
law and necessary in a democratic society, and therefore, an unlimited ratification 
of Article 6 (4) would be appropriate.802 The Government did not literally discuss 
the assumption of the VVD fraction that Article 6 (4) would be directly applicable, 
but appeared to have reasoned a similar way: the Government argued that in 
case law, the matter of the right to strike regarding non-civil servants was already 
normalised, but not regarding civil servants. To avoid a legal vacuum that could lead 
to unacceptable consequences, the Government considered that the restrictions 
allowed by Article 31 ESC should first be adequately regulated in the Dutch legal 
order, before the Provision could be ratified without a reservation. Interestingly, 
the Government made a comparison with the ICESCR, and stated: ‘also, the ESH 
does not encompass, unlike the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, a Provision regarding the possibility of progressive realisation of the 
rights stipulated in the Charter.’803 The Government did not unambiguously take 
a position regarding direct effect of Article 6 (4) ESC, but seemed to take into 
account the possibility that the right could be effectuated by individuals in Court. 
The fact that the ESC did not encompass a general Provision allowing progressive 
realisation seems to influence that possibility.
dat het thans op dit stuk gemaakte voorbehoud zal kunnen worden ingetrokken.’ See for the Parliamentarian 
debate: House of Representatives, 37th meeting, 4 April 1978; House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 
5 April 1979; Senate, 3rd meeting, 31 October 1978.
801 Parliamentary Documents, II 1976-1977, 8606 (R 533), no. 12, pp. 2-3.
802 Parliamentary Documents, II 1976-1977, 8606 (R 533), no. 12, p. 3.
803 Parliamentary Documents, II 1976-1977, 8606 (R 533), no. 13. Original text in Dutch: ‘voorts houdt het 
ESH, anders dan het Internationaal Verdrag inzake Economische, Sociale en Culturele Rechten, geen bepaling 
in omtrent de mogelijkheid van geleidelijke verwezenlijking van het in het Handvest bepaalde.’ Later, during 
the Parliamentary debate, a similar reasoning was expressed by Minister De Ruiter. The Minister argued 
that, when hypothetically the Courts would consider that the right as embedded in Article 6 (4) ESC 
would have direct effect, there would certainly be a legal vacuum concerning the right to strike of civil 
servants. But even when the right would not be directly applicable, ratification without reservation 
might be cause for the Courts to be more eager to involve this fact in their ruling, for the ESC, unlike the 
ICESCR, has no general Article that allows for a progressive realisation. The absence of such a general 
Provision thus was reason for the Minister to be very cautious in ratifying the Provision without the 
reservation to exclude civil servants from the right. See: Minister De Ruiter, House of Representatives, 
38th meeting, 5 April 1979.
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However, earlier, during the interpellation-Bakker (Communist Party of the 
Netherlands, CPN) on the draft Bill 10111, the Government was a little more 
specific about the possibility of direct effect of Article 6 (4) ESC. Minister of 
Justice, Van Agt, stated that by ratifying the ESC, the legitimacy of striking would 
be implemented in the Dutch legal order, and thus no further national legislation 
would be required. In response, Parliamentarian Roethof (Labour Party, PvdA) 
argued that ‘Unfortunately, to my regret, judges often experience some difficulty with 
the international conventions. Therefore, I consider it appropriate to embed the issue 
directly in national legislation.’804 In response, Minister Van Agt made a statement 
that would lead to complex discussions later, during the debates on the ratification 
Bill of the ESC: ‘I think that it would be sufficient if we as Legislators should make clear 
that we consider the Provisions of Article 6 (4) as self-executing.’805 This statement 
of Minister Van Agt brought his successor, Minister De Ruiter, in a difficult 
position during the debates in Parliament on the ratification Bill of the ESC. In 
Parliament, Minister de Ruiter was asked several times whether he considered 
Article 6 (4) ESC suitable for direct application. He stated that: ‘In the Explanatory 
Memorandum and Response, the position is taken that the Articles of the Charter have 
no direct effect. Thereby, reference was made to the intention that was leading in the 
drafting of the Charter, as expressed in the Annex to the Charter relating Part III. This 
Annex stipulates: “It is understood that the Charter contains legal obligations of an 
international character, the application of which is submitted solely to the supervision 
provided for in Part IV thereof”.’806 In his view, the Articles were addressed to the 
State, including Article 6 (4). The fact that in the wordings of the Provision the 
phrase ‘recognise’ was used, did not automatically lead to the conclusion that 
the Provision would be suitable for direct application. He admitted however, that 
there appeared to be different views on the matter. When he was reminded of the 
statements of his predecessor, Van Agt (who was now Prime Minister), he argued 
that there was no reason to come to a different conclusion than the one that was 
expressed in the written documents before. He added that: ‘It remains however a 
matter of interpretation of a treaty Provision in the context of the Convention in which 
that Provision is embedded. A decisive judgment – I really have to point this out – is 
not well-given from a Government’s position. It is ultimately a matter in respect of 
which the decision is up to the Court. But even if one starts from the view that Article 
6, fourth Section, of the Charter, has no direct effect, it does of course not mean that 
804 Roethof (Labour Party, PvdA), House of Representatives, 51st meeting, 10 February 1977 
(Interpellation-Bakker).
805 Minister Van Agt, House of Representatives, 51st meeting, 10 February 1977 (Interpellation-Bakker). 
Original text in Dutch: ‘ik meen dat wij er voldoende aan zouden doen als wij als wetgever duidelijk maken 
dat we de bepalingen van artikel 6 (4) als self-executing beschouwen.’
806 Minister De Ruiter, House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 5 April 1979. Original text in Dutch: 
‘In de memorie van toelichting en die van antwoord is het standpunt ingenomen dat aan de artikelen van 
het handvest geen rechtstreekse werking toekomt. Daarbij is verwezen naar de bedoeling die bij het opstellen 
van het handvest heeft voorgezeten, welke bedoeling tot uitdrukking is gebracht in de bijlage bij het handvest 
omtrent deel III. Die bijlage luidt: Het handvest houdt juridische verplichtingen van internationale aard, welker 
toepassing uitsluitend aan het in deel IV onderworpen toezicht is onderworpen.’
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approval and ratification of that Provision would be meaningless, also not to the Dutch 
legal order.’807 The Minister argued that in case law, usually the legality of a strike 
will be considered in the context of tort law (Article 1401 Civil Code808). In their 
judgment, the Courts usually will consider whether the strike is ‘appropriate in 
society’809 and, even if direct applicability of Article 6 (4) is not recognised, ‘(…) 
will take into account the fact that Article 6 (4) ESC is adopted. Recognition of the 
right to strike, resulting from the adoption of Article 6 (4), may indirectly play a role in 
the application of Article 1401 of the Civil Code. When one looks at the matter in this 
way, one may wonder whether there is indeed an absolute contrast between whether 
or not direct effect is possible.’810 The Minister was interrupted by Parliamentarian 
Bakker, who argued that ‘This view can be accepted. To make it abundantly clear, I 
would like to point out again that the Minister, also here, links the ratification of the 
Charter to the withdrawing of Bill no. 10111. This link is so closely established by the 
Government that it is absolutely impossible to deny the direct effect. The Minister has 
directly connected this with a piece of domestic legislation and therefore, there is no 
doubt.’811 The Minister replied: ‘I have no problem with that viewpoint. However, I still 
would like to point out that the direct effect of such an open and general stated principle 
as Article 6 (4) is very different compared to the direct effect of a more or less detailed 
regulation. For me, the effect here – disregarding the words “directly” or “indirectly” – is 
that there is no doubt that the right to strike is recognised in the Netherlands.812
Parliamentarian Roethof (Labour Party, PvdA) was very active in the debate on 
direct effect, and argued that in the first place, he agreed with the Minister that 
807 Minister De Ruiter, House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 5 April 1979. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Het blijft echter een kwestie van uitleg van een verdragsbepaling in de samenhang van het verdrag waarin die 
bepaling is opgenomen. Een beslissend oordeel – ik moet daarop wel even de aandacht vestigen – kan niet goed 
van achter de regeringstafel worden gegeven. Het is uiteindelijk een kwestie ten aanzien waarvan de beslissing 
aan de rechter toevalt. Ook al gaat men uit van de zienswijze dat artikel 6, vierde lid, van het Handvest, geen 
rechtstreekse werking heeft, dan wil dat uiteraard nog niet zeggen dat goedkeuring en ratificatie van die bepaling 
geen enkele betekenis hebben, ook voor de Nederlandse rechtsorde.’
808 Currently Article 6:162 CC.
809 Original text in Dutch: ‘in het maatschappelijk verkeer betaamd.’
810 Minister De Ruiter, House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 5 April 1979. Original text in Dutch: ‘(…) 
acht zal slaan op het gegeven dat artikel 6 (4) ESH is goedgekeurd. Erkenning van het stakingsrecht, welke uit 
de goedkeuring van artikel 6 (4), voortvloeit, zal dan langs indirecte weg een rol kunnen spelen bij de toepassing 
van artikel 1401 BW. Wanneer men de zaak op deze manier beziet, kan men zich afvragen of er wel sprake is 
van een absolute tegenstelling tussen wel en geen rechtstreekse werking.’
811 Bakker (Communist Party of the Netherlands, CPN), House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 5 April 
1979. Original text in Dutch: ‘Deze zienswijze is wel te accepteren. Ten overvloede wijs ik er nog eens op dat 
de Minister ook nu weer de invoering van het handvest koppelt aan de intrekking van wetsontwerp no. 10111. 
Die koppeling is door de Regering zo nauw gelegd, dat het volstrekt onmogelijk is, de rechtstreekse werking te 
ontkennen. De Minister heeft het direct verbonden met een stuk binnenlandse wetgeving en daarmee ligt de 
zaak vast.’
812 Minister De Ruiter, House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 5 April 1979. Original text in Dutch: 
‘Daarmee heb ik ook geen moeite. Ik moet er nog wel even op wijzen, dat de rechtstreekse werking van zo’n open 
en algemene beginselverklaring als artikel 6 (4) heel iets anders is dan de rechtstreekse werking van een min of 
meer gedetailleerde regeling. Voor mij betekent hier de werking – ik laat de woorden ‘rechtstreeks’ of ‘indirect’ 
even buiten beschouwing – dat er geen twijfel over bestaat, dat het stakingsrecht in Nederland is erkend.’
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it is indeed up to the Courts to decide whether a Provision is suitable for direct 
effect. Secondly, he also stated that the opinion of the Legislature might play a 
role in the decision of the Courts as a guideline. However, he observed that this 
opinion of the Legislature was subject to change: ‘the opinion of the Legislature...
was that there certainly was direct effect. This is now slightly reversed by our Minister 
of Justice.’813 He then observed that in the past, the Government had recognised 
the direct effect of many Provisions in the field of Civil and Political rights; a 
reasonable approach, for with regard to those rights, in general, a Government 
is not demanded to act, but rather to ‘tolerate’814 something. This was, logically, 
different in the case of economic, social and cultural rights, for with regard to 
those rights, generally, the Government is asked to undertake, instead of tolerate, 
something. However, with regard to the right to strike, as embedded in Article 
6 (4), the wordings indicate – unlike most other treaty Provisions – that the 
Government were to ‘recognise’ the right, meaning that the Government should 
‘tolerate’ instead of ‘undertake’ something. Roethof emphasised that he valued 
the fact that the Legislature here expressed a position on the direct applicability 
of the Provision, considering the role of Parliamentary History for Courts in their 
verdicts, and understood the Minister thus that he clearly agreed that by ratifying 
the ECS, the right to strike will be recognised in the Netherlands.815 To this, the 
Minister responded that ‘The essence of my argument was actually that the answer 
to the question of direct effect depends on the intention of the contracting parties. I 
explained that this intention clearly goes in the direction of non-direct effect.’816 Roethof 
then observed that he and the Minister had different views, reminded that it was 
eventually up to the Courts to decide on the matter, but underlined that it was 
interesting to establish the opinion of the Legislature in this. The Minister referred 
to the intention of Roethof to contribute to the argumentation on the matter. The 
Minister then decided to focus on one argument in particular, that is the fact 
that in the wordings of Article 6 (4) the word ‘recognise’ was used, in contrast to 
most other ESC Provisions, and that in itself was remarkable, and indeed would 
at least more easily tend to direct effect compared to other Articles. However, 
De Ruiter also underlined that preferably, when possible, direct application of 
Articles should be deduced from the treaty itself, and stated that the intention 
to adopt the Annex to the treaty was expressed by the involved Ministers of the 
signatory countries: ‘They decided to add that Annex with the motivation that the 
Provisions of the Charter cannot be directly invoked by individuals before national 
813 Roethof (Labour Party, PvdA), House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 5 April 1979. Original text in 
Dutch: ‘de mening van de wetgever (…) was dat er wel degelijk rechtstreekse werking was. Dit is nu door onze 
Minister van Justitie weer enigszins teruggedraaid.’
814 Roethof used the Dutch word ‘dulden’.
815 Roethof (Labour Party, PvdA), House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 5 April 1979.
816 Minister De Ruiter, House of Representatives, 38th meeting, 5 April 1979. Original text in Dutch: ‘De 
kern van mijn betoog was eigenlijk dat het antwoord op de vraag naar de rechtstreekse werking afhankelijk is 
van de bedoeling van de verdragsluitende partijen. Ik heb uiteengezet dat die bedoeling overduidelijk gaat in de 
richting van de niet rechtstreekse werking.’
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Courts.’817 Earlier, he had declared that in the Annex, direct effect was clearly 
excluded from the treaty.
The above demonstrates that a rather unstructured and confusing discussion 
preceded the adoption of Article 6 (4). It is hard to distract a clear viewpoint 
on the matter that can be attributed to the Legislature. Especially Minister De 
Ruiter, representing the Government, seems to weave between almost recognising 
direct effect to almost denying the possibility of direct effect of Article 6 (4) 
ESC. This also led to a variety of different interpretations in Parliament on the 
matter. Nevertheless, in Parliament the explanation of the Minister led to no 
further discussions, and in the Senate, the matter of direct applicability was 
hardly addressed.
8.5 The Parliamentary History concerning Article 8 ICESCR
The right to strike is also stipulated in Article 8 ICESCR. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 7, the Government underlined in its Explanatory Memorandum, that 
the rights enshrined in the ICESCR in general would not be suitable for direct 
applicability.818 The direct applicability of Article 8 ICESCR therefore has not 
been discussed in particular in Parliamentary History.
However, some other related particularities were discussed and are worth 
mentioning here. With regard to the backgrounds of the Provision, the Government 
noted that the wordings were heavily inspired by ILO convention 87819 that had 
already been ratified by the Netherlands, and observed that there was a certain 
overlap with Article 22 ICPR. However, as it appears, both legal documents mostly 
concerned the freedom of association, and not the right to strike. Concerning this 
right, the Government underlined that it was preparing the ratification of the 
ESC, and had submitted the draft Bills 10110 (Provisions relating to committees 
of inquiry on strike820) and 10111 (statutory Provision relating to strike821) to the 
States-General. The Government argued that restrictions to the right to strike 
when it concerned certain categories of civil servants could be justified, based 
on the wordings of Article 8 ICESCR.822
817 Minister De Ruiter, House of Representative, 38th meeting, 5 April 1979. Original text in Dutch: ‘Zij 
hebben besloten die Annexe te doen toevoegen met de motivering, dat de regelingen van het handvest niet direct 
kunnen worden ingeroepen door individuen voor de nationale rechtbanken.’
818 See especially: Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 12-13.
819 See: ILO Convention 87, 17 June 1948, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention. Although it must be noted that the right to strike is not stipulated in this ILO convention.
820 Original name in Dutch: ‘regelen met betrekking tot commissies van onderzoek inzake de werkstaking.’
821 Original name in Dutch: ‘wettelijke bepaling met betrekking tot werkstaking.’
822 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 3, pp. 48-49.
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Also here this opportunity was taken, in this case by the fraction of the Labour 
Party (PvdA) in the Preperatory Committee, to criticise the slow progress that was 
made on the draft Bills. Also, the fraction referred to the intended reservation to the 
ESC, Article 6 (4) concerning civil servants, and argued that such discrimination 
was unacceptable.823 The Government in turn, referred to the interpellation-
Bakker, during which it explained why the Draft-Bills were withdrawn. Basically, 
reference was made to the fact that the right to strike of employees in the private 
sector was already normalised in case law, and the right to strike of civil servants 
was about to be regulated in a separate measure. Therefore, ratifying Article 8 
ICESCR would not lead to any difficulties. Remarkably, not a single reference 
was made to the fact that in that same interpellation-Bakker, it became clear that 
Article 6 (4) was considered to be a substitute for especially Draft-Bill 10111, except 
concerning civil servants.
It is interesting to note within the context of the reservation made to Article 6 (4) 
ESC, why the Government explained why Article 8 ICESCR could be fully ratified, 
without reservation: ‘In determining our position that with regard to the Netherlands, 
Article 8 can be ratified without reservation, we assumed that indeed the legislation 
on the right to strike of civil servants shall be realised. From various elements of the 
Convention it can be deduced that the right to strike, mentioned in Article 8, may 
be gradually achieved. This possibility of progressive realisation, for which the ESC 
contains no Provision, means that the legislation of the right to strike of civil servants 
will not have to be realised immediately at the moment when the treaty enters into 
force. We therefore consider it unnecessary to make a reservation to the right to strike 
of civil servants.’824
With regard to the scope of Article 8 ICESCR, the Government considered that 
the basic difference with Article 6 ESC was that Article 8 ICESCR focusses more 
on the right to form trade unions, while Article 6 ESC concentrates more on the 
right to collective bargaining and the right to strike.825
823 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 7, pp. 15-16.
824 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 8, p. 25. Original text in Dutch: ‘Bij de 
bepaling van ons standpunt, dat artikel 8 voor Nederland zonder voorbehoud geratificeerd kan worden, zijn 
wij ervan uitgegaan dat een wettelijke regeling van het stakingsrecht van ambtenaren inderdaad tot stand 
gebracht zal kunnen worden. Uit diverse elementen van het verdrag valt op te maken dat het stakingsrecht, 
vermeld in artikel 8, geleidelijk verwezenlijkt mag worden. Deze mogelijkheid van geleidelijke verwezenlijking, 
ten aanzien waarvan het ESH geen bepaling bevat, betekent dat de wettelijke regeling van het stakingsrecht van 
ambtenaren niet terstond gereed hoeft te zijn als het verdrag in werking treedt. Het maken van een voorbehoud 
over het stakingsrecht van ambtenaren achten wij daarom niet noodzakelijk.’
825 Parliamentary Documents, II 1975-1976 13932 (R 1037), no. 8, p. 25.
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8.6 Conclusion
In the first place, it can be concluded that the Supreme Court in the railway-strike 
Ruling did not necessarily oppose the viewpoints of the Legislature concerning 
the direct applicability of Article 6 (4) ESC. When one would only consider the 
Explanatory Memorandum, it might be concluded that the Government argued 
that the ESC Provisions in general are not suitable for direct applicability. However, 
the debate on Article 6 did not focus on direct applicability, but on the question 
whether or not the Provision should be included in the ratification Bill. Only later 
during the Parliamentary History, especially during the debates in the House of 
Representatives, the possibility of direct effect of Article 6 (4) was discussed in 
detail. Indeed, as Roethof already observed, the Government appeared to have 
altered its position regarding the possibility of direct effect, starting from literally 
recognising its direct effect (Minister Van Agt) for the Provision was considered to 
be a substitute for the withdrawn Draft-Bill 10111, to the statements of Minister De 
Ruiter, who visibly struggled with the matter, and balanced somewhere between 
almost agreeing on direct effect and strongly rejecting the idea. It appears thus 
that the opinion of the Legislature as a criterion for determining whether Article 
6 (4) ESC is suitable for direct applicability, is an unclear criterion and therefore 
hardly practicable for the Judiciary. Therefore, the case law regarding Article 6 
(4) is not necessarily in contrast with the conclusion drawn in Chapter 4, which 
is that the Courts, when determining whether Articles in which the right to food 
is stipulated, have direct effect, follow the lead of the Legislature.
In the second place, it can be questioned to what extent the intention of the 
contracting parties to a Convention seriously were considered by the Supreme 
Court in its railway-strike ruling, for it appears from the Parliamentary History 
that during the drafting of the ESC – or at least in the perception of the Minister, 
representing the Government – the intention was expressed amongst the signatories 
that the Treaty Provisions could not be invoked in the national Courts by individuals. 
In the railway-strike ruling, the Supreme Court considered that ‘whether or not 
the contracting States intended to grant direct effect to Article 6 ESC is not relevant, 
whereas neither from the text, nor the history of the formation of the treaty follows 
that they have agreed that Articles 6 ESC is directly applicable.’826 Indeed it can be 
considered that in general, contracting parties will not express their intentions 
about direct effect of treaty Provisions in the international arena, for due to the 
different Constitutional systems of each country this would be pointless. However, 
according to Minister De Ruiter, the matter had been explicitly discussed.
826 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling), consideration 3.2. Original text 
in Dutch: ‘Of de verdragsluitende Staten al dan niet hebben beoogd aan artikel 6 lid 4 ESH directe werking 
toe te kennen, is niet van belang nu noch uit de tekst, noch uit de geschiedenis van de totstandkoming van het 
Verdrag valt af te leiden dat zij zijn overeengekomen dat aan artikel 6 lid 4 die werking mag worden toegekend.’
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In the third place, it can be concluded that the fact that the invoked Provision 
did not oblige Member States to adopt further legislation, unlike most other ESC 
Articles, seems to be a decisive element. In that respect, as demonstrated above, 
it was already frequently referred to in the Parliamentary History that Article 6 
(4) obliged States to ‘recognise’, which implied generally to abstain from action, 
instead of adopting measures. The Supreme Court seems to agree as well, for ‘in 
that situation, according to Dutch law, only the content of the Provision is decisive: 
does this oblige the Dutch Legislature to implement a national measure with a certain 
content or scope, or is this of such a nature that the Provision can be applied directly 
in the national legal order as positive law? Article 6 Section 4 – contrary to most other 
Provisions of the ESC and in particular also to the other Sections of this Article – is thus 
worded that the States Parties concerned are not obliged to adopt measures, but instead 
that the said employees and employers may certainly invoke the law as recognised, 
within certain limits, by the concerned States in the domestic legal order.’827
Fourthly, it appears that it can be explained why Article 6 (4) ESC is considered 
directly applicable, and Article 8 ICESCR, stipulating an equivalent human right, is 
not, for two main reasons. One reason concerns the opinion of the Legislature, the 
second concerns the wordings of the treaty Provisions. Firstly, it can be observed 
that in the context of the ICESCR Provision, the Legislature has always coherently 
denied the possibility of direct effect, while this is certainly not the case regarding 
Article 6 (4) ESC. In the latter, it remains rather unclear what the vision of the 
Legislature was. On the one hand, ratifying Article 6 (4) ESC was considered to 
be an adequate substitute for national legislation by one Government, and on 
the other hand, the next Government did seem to express considerably more 
cautiousness in recognising the direct effect, but did not come to an unambiguous 
conclusion. Secondly, there is a difference in the wordings between both Treaties. 
In the ICESCR, a general Provision is embedded that recognises the possibility to 
progressively realise a right, implying that the right should not be implemented 
immediately. This is not the case concerning the ESC. The ESC seems to imply 
that at the moment of ratification the rights must already be realised, while this 
is not the case concerning the ICESC. In the ESC Provision the word ‘recognise’ 
is used, while in the ICESCR Provision, in line with the principle of progressive 
realisation, the word ‘ensure’ is used. Generally speaking, it can be observed that 
indeed Article 6 (4) ESC seems to stipulate a duty of the Government to abstain 
827 Supreme Court, 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (railway-strike ruling), consideration 3.2. Original text 
in Dutch: ‘Bij deze stand van zaken is naar Nederlands recht enkel de inhoud van de bepaling zelf beslissend: 
verplicht deze de Nederlandse Wetgever tot het treffen van een nationale regeling met een bepaalde inhoud of 
strekking, of is deze van dien aard dat de bepaling in de nationale rechtsorde zonder meer als objectief recht 
kan functioneren? Artikel 6 lid 4 is – in tegenstelling tot de meeste andere bepalingen van het ESH en met name 
ook tot de overige leden van dit artikel – zo geredigeerd dat de betrokken verdragsstaten niet een verplichting 
tot regelgeving wordt opgelegd, maar integendeel aldus dat werknemers en werkgevers zich op het door de 
betrokken verdragsstaten binnen zekere grenzen erkende recht in de nationale rechtsorde zonder meer moeten 
kunnen beroepen.’
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from acting, while Article 8 ICESCR seems to focus more on Governmental action. 
(However, this did not prevent the Government to proudly report to the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with regard to the implementation of 
Article 8 ICESCR that Article 6 (4) ESC is directly applicable in the Netherlands, 
thereby implying that both Provisions have the same scope.)828
828 E/1990/6/Add.11, 5 August 1996, Sections 106-107, see also the further elaboration of the 
Government: E/C.12/NLD/q/3/Add.1, 23 August 2006, Section 18.
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 227 
9. The Dutch periodic country reports
9.1 Introduction
As stated in Section 2.6.3, this chapter will focus on the question: What does the 
Government of the Netherlands communicate in its reports in the United Nations arena 
regarding the enforceability of the right to food in its domestic legal order? To this end, 
the Dutch reports submitted on the implementation of the ICESCR (Section 9.2), 
the ICRC (Section 9.3) and the CEDAW (Section 9.4) will be analysed. Furthermore, 
when relevant, the two reporting cycles in view of the Universal Periodic Review 
is discussed (Section 9.5). The Dutch reporting behaviour is partly determined by 
several reporting guidelines or formats provided for by the relevant treaty bodies, 
which will when relevant be discussed below. From the analysis it appears that 
in the reports the matter of direct applicability is mostly discussed separately 
from the substantive explanation of the implementation of the specific treaty 
rights. The same applies for the matter of aliens policies. Both issues are therefore 
addressed in this Chapter as a separate topic. In the section on the ICRC reports, 
no sub-section is dedicated to the direct effect of its Provisions, for this was not 
significantly debated during the various reporting cycles.
9.1.2 General (geographical) remarks on the Dutch reports
Since the Kingdom of the Netherlands signs and ratifies international treaties, all 
countries within the Kingdom have the obligation to implement the treaty. As 
already pointed out in Section 1.3, the Kingdom of the Netherlands does not only 
consist of the European Country, baring almost the same name (The Netherlands), 
but also includes overseas territories. Therefore, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as 
signatory of international treaties, has the duty to include the overseas territories in 
its reports as well. This is done in different ways, without any coherence. Especially 
in the earlier reports, the choice was made to separately hand in reports on the 
implementation of a treaty on the Netherlands (European part of the Kingdom), 
Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles. Later, occasionally, one report with sub-parts 
covering the separate countries was submitted. In the subsequent procedures, the 
reports were discussed sometimes separately and sometimes altogether by the 
relevant treaty bodies. Since 2010 however, the Netherlands Antilles was dissolved 
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands reformed: the former Antilles islands of 
Curaçao and St. Maarten became sovereign States within the Kingdom in 2010 (as 
Aruba already was since 1986), while the islands Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba 
became special municipalities within the Netherlands, together referred to as ‘the 
Caribbean Netherlands’. This reform occurred in some cases during a reporting 
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cycle, making matters even more complex.829 In general, it can be concluded that 
the quality, coherence and profundity of the reports varies considerably. Also the 
access to reports through official databases is not coherently organised, neither 
by the Member State nor the relevant UN institutions.
In this Chapter, the reports of the overseas countries and municipalities are 
included in the analysis for two reasons. Firstly, although this research focuses on 
the European part of the Kingdom (see Chapter 1, in particular Section 1.3) it is 
technically the Kingdom of the Netherlands that has a reporting duty, on behalf 
of all the countries within the Kingdom. Since there is no coherent approach in 
reporting and in some occasions the Kingdom of the Netherlands is generally 
discussed by the different Committees, the choice was made to – where relevant 
– include the reporting and subsequent procedures of the overseas territories as 
well. Secondly, since the matter of direct applicability is eventually determined 
by the Courts, and the Supreme Court is the Court of Last Instance in the entire 
Kingdom, the matter of direct applicability naturally concerns all countries within 
the Kingdom in a similar way. No evidence could be found that in the overseas 
territories a different legal doctrine exists regarding the enforceability of the right 
to food. Therefore, the reporting on direct applicability of treaty Provisions is not 
necessarily bounded by State borders within the Kingdom, but will be more or 
less imply one concept shared throughout the Kingdom.
9.2 The ICESCR reports
9.2.1 Introduction
Before 2013, the Netherlands had submitted 5 periodic reports to the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: an initial report was submitted in 1984,830 
a second in 1996,831 a third in 2005,832 and a combined fourth and fifth report in 
2009.833 The Netherlands reported mostly separately on the implementation of the 
829 For instance, during the reporting cycle of the combined fourth and fifth report on the implementation 
of the ICESCR the Kingdom of the Netherlands was reformed, leading to three reports on the 
implementation of the ICESCR regarding the Netherlands, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, but 
later, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was represented by different delegations from the newly formed 
autonomous countries within the Kingdom, in one series of sessions with the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. See: Mr Abath, E/C.12/2010/SR.43, 18 November 2010, Section 2.
830 In three stages: E/1980/6/Add.33, 8 November 1983; E/1982/3/Add.35, 17 January 1986; E/1984/6/
Add.14, 20 February 1986; E/1982/3/Add.44, 19 January 1988; E/1984/6/Add. 20, 19 August 1988. 
The reports are not available anymore in official databases of both the UN and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands.
831 E/1990/6/Add.11, 5 August 1996.
832 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005.
833 E/C.12/NLD/4-5, 17 July 2009.
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ICESCR in Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles.834 However, the combined fourth 
and fifth report of the Netherlands, and the fourth reports of the Netherlands 
Antilles and Aruba were mostly discussed altogether in the List of Issues and 
written replies, and during the sessions with the Committee, with a combined 
Delegation, due to the dissolving of the Netherlands Antilles.835
It is obvious that the Netherlands rarely met the deadlines for submitting the 
reports, for the States are requested to submit an initial report within two years 
after ratification, and from then on a periodic report every five years.836 Because 
of the delay, the Netherlands submitted in 2009 a combined fourth and fifth report, 
instead of two separate ones. Often, no explanation was given for such (huge) 
delays, but in the first Universal Periodic Report, the Dutch Government stated 
that: ‘The Netherlands consider it very important that reports are thorough, accurate 
and submitted on time.’ On the other hand, it added that ‘a great deal of time and 
energy is devoted to ensuring reports are drafted carefully and coherently and are very 
informative, e.g. with regard to the implementation of recommendations made by treaty 
bodies on previous occasions. Since relevant data on a given reporting period, including 
statistical data, often only becomes available after a deadline, processing the data can 
cause delays. Sometimes reports are merged.’837
9.2.2 The quality of the ICESCR reports
In general, it can be observed that in its reports the Government usually has the 
tendency to conclude – in line with the Explanatory Memorandum to the ratification 
Bill on the ICESCR838 – that the Netherlands already fulfil their obligations that 
come forth from the ICESCR. The Government then usually provides with a 
list of facts, policies, legislative measures and other initiatives that have been 
undertaken, to substantiate this. There is hardly any hint that there are points for 
improvement, and no intention at all is ever expressed to come to a further or better 
realisation of the right in the future. However, this approach has been criticised 
by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights on several occasions. 
During the sessions with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
on the second periodic report, one Member reminded the Dutch Delegation that 
‘when considering the initial report of the Netherlands, the Committee had requested 
834 Second report: E/1990/6/Add.12, 28 August 1996 (Netherlands Antilles), E/1990/6/Add.13, 28 
August 1996 (Aruba); Third Report: E/C.12/ANT/3, 13 February 2006 (Netherlands Antilles); Fourth 
report: E/C.12/NLD/4/Add.1, 13 July 2009 (Netherlands Antilles); E/C.12/NLD/4/Add.2, 19 October 
2010 (Aruba).
835 During the reporting process of the fourth periodic report of the Netherlands Antilles, Curaçao and 
St. Maarten became sovereign States within the Kingdom in 2010 (as Aruba was since 1986), while the 
Islands Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba became special municipalities within the Netherlands.
836 Economic and Social Council Resolution 1988/4, 24 May 1988, Section 6.
837 A/HRC/WG/6/1/NLD/1, 7 March 2008, National Report submitted in accordance with Section 15(a) of 
the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, Section 83.
838 See especially Chapter 6.
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that subsequent reports should specify areas in which the Government was encountering 
difficulties. As no action seemed to have been taken on that recommendation, he asked 
the Delegation to rectify the omission.’839 A Dutch Delegate replied that ‘he fully 
understood his concern, but it went somewhat against the grain for a civil servant to 
criticise the policy of his employer, the State.’840 In a shadow-report from two NGOs 
on the third periodic report, this approach criticised again: ‘when reading the 
report, one is left with the impression that the situation in the Netherlands concerning 
the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights is rather rosy. However 
the report does not refer sufficiently to the obstacles on the realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights.’841 The Committee seems to be inspired by this shadow 
report for one Committee Member stated that: ‘the Delegation had pointed a rosy 
picture of the Netherlands’ performance in implementing the Covenant. He could not 
believe, however, that there was any country that did not face challenges, crises or 
problems in that process and he asks the Delegation to provide some information on 
any difficulties encountered.’842 In response, a Dutch Delegate emphasised that it 
was not the intention to ‘to paint an overly positive picture in his country’s report’, 
and elaborated, on the spot, on two difficulties the Netherlands faced, which were 
the relatively high unemployment levels of ethnic minorities, and the integration 
of foreigners.843 Apparently, this was not sufficient to the Committee, for in their 
Concluding Observations, in the Section on ‘factors and difficulties impending the 
implementation of the Covenant’, it was made quite clear that ‘the Committee notes 
the absence of any factors or difficulties preventing the effective implementation of the 
Covenant in the State Party.’844 However, the Dutch reporting behaviour did not 
alter significantly,845 and also in the combined fourth and fifth report, there was 
hardly any reference to factors or difficulties in the implementation process. It 
is remarkable that in their List of Issues, and during the sessions, the Committee 
did not address the issue. Instead however, there was considerably more criticism 
on several aspects of the implementation in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
that became apparent during the reporting procedure, and resulted in a list of 
principal subjects of concern and recommendations of 37 (out of 45) Sections, 
which included issues related to discrimination against foreigners, disabled persons, 
women and prisoners, the direct applicability of ICESCR Provisions, a national 
839 Mr Riedel, E/C.12/1998/SR.14, 15 September 1998, Section 8.
840 Mr Potman, E/C.12/1998/SR.14, 15 September 1998, Section 9.
841 Contribution of the Dutch Section of the International Commission of Jurists (NJCM) and the 
Johannes Wier Foundation (JWS) to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Provisional 
reaction to the Third periodic report submitted by the Netherlands under Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Covenant (E/1994/104/Add.30), Section B.1.
842 Mr Sadi, E.C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 27.
843 Mr De Klerk, E.C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 45-46.
844 E/C.12/NLD/CO/3, 24 November 2006, C, Section 10.
845 As will appear below, the reporting on the right to food as embedded in Article 11 ICESCR is even 
for the major part a copy of the previous report.
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plan and institution on human rights, awareness raising on human rights, and 
some issues related to the overseas territories.846
9.2.3 The right to food in the ICESCR reports
9.2.3.1 The second periodic report
As stated above, the Dutch reports do not excel in self-reflection or critically 
reviewing the implementation status concerning the rights embedded in the 
ICESCR. This certainly also applies to the reporting on the right to food. In 
their second periodic report, the Netherlands basically reported that the food 
production in the Netherlands greatly exceeds the population’s requirements, 
the product quality is high, the prices of foodstuffs are relatively low, and thus 
also affordable for low-income groups. Furthermore, the Netherlands reported 
that their food and nutrition policy was generally focussed on food quality and 
the promotion of healthy eating habits. It was pointed out that on a regular basis, 
research is conducted on the eating habits of the population, showing that in 
general, there was an adequate supply of micro- and macronutrients, although 
overconsumption of fat appeared to be an issue. Therefore, the Government aimed 
a campaign against over-consumption, resulting in a positive downward trend 
of fat consumption. Furthermore, it was reported that nutritional education was 
the most important policy instrument, in which the Nutrition Information Office 
played a vital role. Finally, it was reported that environmental considerations 
were of growing importance in food production and consumer choice.847 During 
the sessions with the Committee, the right to adequate food was not addressed 
in particular, although one Member of the Committee ‘noted that, according to the 
Netherlands Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 240,000 households, or 
almost 1 million persons, were living under an income below the social minimum and 
some 250,000 children belonging to poor families participated very rarely in recreational 
and cultural activities. He was surprised that a country as wealthy as the Netherlands 
was unable to solve the problems.’848 The response of the Delegation was not very 
constructive: ‘There seemed to be no basis for the allegation that 250,000 children were 
unable to exercise their rights provided for in the Covenant. The Netherlands Delegation 
would subsequently describe the steps taken by the Government to alleviate poverty and 
846 E/C.12/NDL/CO/4-5, 19 November 2010, 5-43.
847 E/1990/6/Add.11, 5 August 1996, Sections 235-242.
848 Mr Ahmed, E/C.12/1998/SR.14, 15 September 1998, Section 23.
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improve the situation of children from low-income families.’849 In the Committee’s 
Concluding Observations,850 the right to food was not further addressed.
In the second periodic report of the Netherlands Antilles851 the right to food was 
not discussed at all, and in the report of Aruba, it was only concluded that there 
was adequate food supply, but also an overweight problem.852
9.2.3.2 The third periodic report
In their third periodic report, the Netherlands reported that it has a ‘comprehensive 
system of social benefits guaranteeing its citizens an adequate minimum income.’853 
Regarding the right to food, it was again underlined that the amount of food available 
in the Netherlands ‘greatly exceeds domestic demand.’854 Therefore, Governmental 
policies mainly aimed at food safety, quality, the consequences of food production 
for the environment, and consumption patterns. It was emphasised that Dutch food 
policies were increasingly determined by European Union policies and legislation, 
such as the General Food Law Regulation. In that light, the supervisory role of 
the Food and Consumer Safety Authority855 was mentioned. Some caution was 
expressed toward s the production of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs).856 
Also here, the importance of nutrition education was stressed, in view of unhealthy 
eating habits, and reference was made to the Food and Nutrition Information 
Office,857 an organisation that launched campaigns on healthy eating habits.858 
Furthermore, reference was made to the Dutch role in the international arena 
concerning the equitable distribution of the world’s food supplies:
The Netherlands’ efforts in this respect are focussed on:
•	 strengthening the capacity of developing countries to analyse, monitor 
and address the food insecurity of vulnerable groups;
•	 financing food aid targeted at vulnerable groups.859
849 Mr Potman, E/C.12/1998/SR.14, 15 September 1998, Section 31. This conversation was also noted 
by B. van der Meulen and F.M.C. Vlemminx, Chapter 2, An adequate right to food? The Netherlands 
abundant in food, wanting in law, in: O. Hospes and B. van der Meulen (eds.), Fed up with the right to 
food, Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2009.
850 E/C.12/1998/26, 27 April; 15 May 1998; 16 November; 4 December 1998; CESCR report on the 
eighteenth and nineteenth sessions.
851 E/1990/6/Add.12, 28 August 1996. In Sections 109-119, some other aspects falling under the scope 
of Article 11 ICESCR were discussed, such as income and housing.
852 E/1990/6/Add.13, 28 August 1996, Sections 110-115.
853 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 329.
854 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 331.
855 In Dutch: Voedsel en Waren Authoriteit (www.vwa.nl).
856 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Sections 332-338.
857 In Dutch: Voedingscentrum (www.voedingscentrum.nl).
858 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 339.
859 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 340.
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In this light, the Netherlands referred to their support to – mostly in financial 
terms – the FAO, WFP, and the international Red Cross. It was reported that the 
Netherlands were convinced that ‘food insecurity is a problem of food access rather 
than food availability.’860
In its List of Issues, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights with 
regard to the implementation of Article 11 ICESCR, asked: ‘since the main objective 
of the overall development cooperation policy of the Netherlands is to combat extreme 
poverty, please indicate whether this policy has attained its objective, especially with 
regard to women, ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities, and the disadvantaged 
and marginalised groups.’861 In their reply, the Netherlands underlined that the 
Millennium Development Goals formed the core of their development cooperation 
policy, which was continuously and systematically monitored by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. According to the Netherlands it could be concluded that the Dutch 
development cooperation activities ‘generally contribute to the fight against poverty. 
However, the effectiveness of ODA862 remains the subject of an ungoing debate within 
the Netherlands (…) and throughout the international community (…)’863
During the sessions with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
for the first time in-depth questions were raised about the Dutch asylum policy. The 
Dutch Delegation informed the Committee that in the Netherlands, a distinction 
was made between foreigners legally residing in the Netherlands, who had equal 
entitlements to ECOSOC rights as Dutch citizens, and illegally residing foreigners, 
including asylum-seekers, who had only entitlements to basic needs. The latter 
includes basic healthcare, education and legal assistance.864 The Committee then 
asked whether foreigners without a residence permit enjoyed the same ECOSOC 
rights as the rest of the population.865 The Dutch Delegation responded that ‘the 
vast majority of people who reside illegally in the Netherlands are asylum-seekers 
whose application has been rejected. These people do not have access to economic, 
social and cultural rights, and the State has only a limited responsibility towards them, 
which relates primarily to emergency medical assistance, education of minors and 
legal assistance.’866 This statement is indeed generally in confirmation with the 
860 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Sections 340-343.
861 E/C.12/NLD/Q/3, 2 March 2006, Section 26.
862 Official Development Assistance.
863 E/C.12/NLD/Q/3/Add.1, 23 August 2006, Section 25.
864 De Klerk, E/C.12/2006/SR.34, 10 January 2007, Section 4.
865 Mrs Barahona Riera, E/C.12/2006/SR.34, 10 January 2007, Section 18.
866 De Klerk, E/C.12/2006/SR.34, 10 January 2007, Section 28. Original text in French: ‘La grande majorité 
des personnes qui se trouvent illégalement aux Pays-Bass sont des demandeurs d’asile dont la demande a été 
rejetée. Ces personnes n’ont pas accès aux droits économiques, sociaux er cultureless et l’Etat n’a envers elles 
qu’un nombre limité d’obligations, qui touchent principalement à l’aide médicale d’urgence, à l’éducation des 
mineurs et à l’aide juridictionelle.’
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analysed case law in Chapter 4. The matter was not referred to in the Committee’s 
Concluding Observations.867
In the third periodic report of the Netherlands Antilles, the right to food was not 
significantly discussed.868
9.2.3.3  The combined fourth and fifth report of the Netherlands/the fourth 
report of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
Remarkably, the Sections dedicated to the right to food in the combined fourth and 
fifth report are for the major part an exact copy of the text in the third report.869 
Perhaps due to the fact that the Netherlands did not change its approach in 
reporting, as requested several times by the Committee, or perhaps due to the 
extensive involvement of NGOs, addressing many shortcomings of the Netherlands 
in their implementation of the ICESCR rights,870 the Committee appears to be 
considerably more critical. In three Sections of the List of Issues, the right to food 
was addressed.871
25. Given that there are reportedly some 140 food banks in the State Party, 
please indicate what concrete measures have been taken by the State Party 
in relation to food security, and their outcome.
The Netherlands replied that the Netherlands have an extensive system of social 
security, guaranteeing a minimum income, ‘that enables people to meet their basic 
needs, including food, clothing and shelter.’ Reference was made to a recent study, that 
demonstrated that the income, although being ‘lagged behind the general increase 
in prosperity’ was ‘sufficient for single people, rather high for the elderly and single-
parent families, and sometimes too low for households with several children.’ However, 
it was reported that ‘some people get into debt and the repayment arrangements 
they make may force them to live below the minimum level. There are also people 
who fail to exercise their right to social provision. The authorities inform people, e.g. 
those on social assistance benefit, if they are entitled to crisis payments. These can be 
used for essential investments, such as the purchase of a fridge.’ Regarding the food 
banks, the Netherlands reported that the Government had agreed with the Dutch 
867 E/C.12/NLD/CO/3, 24 November 2006.
868 E/C.12/ANT/3, 13 February 2006. See for the reporting on Article 11 ICESCR: Sections 90-124.
869 E/C.12/NLD/4-5, 17 July 2009, Sections 219-232. Besides some textual rephrasing and some minor 
additions, the only significant addition was that: ‘The Dutch Government brought the importance of the 
right to food to the attention of a wide audience at a 2006 seminar on the subject at Wageningen University 
and Research Centre, and during the national activities to mark the World Food Day last year. Recently, the 
Government supported a workshop that explored the similarities and differences between the concept of food 
sovereignty and the right to food.’
870 Five NGO shadow-reports had been submitted, and a special session with the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was held with NGOs (see: E/C.12/2010/SR.30, 8 November 2010).
871 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5, 22 December 2009, Sections 25-27.
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municipalities to improve the cooperation between the food banks and the local 
authorities.872
26. Please provide information on the extent of homelessness and malnutrition 
among asylum-seekers and immigrants without legal residence. Please also 
indicate whether such persons are entitled to benefits under the Work and 
Social Assistance Act (Wet Werk en Bijstand, Stb. 2003, 375).
The Netherlands replied that the provisions to which asylum-seekers are entitled 
to certain benefits in kind, such as ‘money to cover the costs for food, or provision of 
food in kind, a clothing allowance and pocket money’’ are regulated by the ‘Benefits 
in kind for asylum-seekers and other categories of aliens scheme 2005 (RVA)’.873 It was 
added that ‘the amount of money to asylum-seekers available for food is determined in 
accordance with the standards of the National Institute for Family Finance Information 
(Nibud).’874 Besides that, it was reported that under this Scheme, asylum-seekers are 
‘insured against the costs of medical care, and therefore able to have access to guidance 
on healthy eating.’ Furthermore, asylum-seekers were offered accommodation. 
‘They are not entitled to social assistance until they have obtained a residence permit, 
however.’ The Netherlands informed that the general Act on social benefits, the 
Work and Social Assistance Act,875 would provide a guideline ´for the nature and 
scale of Provisions available under the RVA 2005 scheme.’ Asylum-seekers that reside 
illegally in the Netherlands ‘are entitled to accommodation and other facilities pending 
repatriation in order to allow them to prepare for their departure. The deadline for 
return is 28 days, which can be extended by three months in order for them to effectuate 
their departure.’876
28. Please provide detailed and updated information on the nutritional status, 
in particular in the Netherlands Antilles, of immigrants, homeless people, 
single-parent families, children, unemployed people, low-income earners, 
older persons, persons with disabilities, persons living in rural areas, refugees 
and asylum-seekers, and their ability to access adequate, affordable and 
appropriate food and water.
The Dutch reply consisted mainly of a summary of the average food consumption 
in the Netherlands. There was hardly any information on the requested categories 
of persons. With regard to the data concerning the Netherlands Antilles, the 
Netherlands reported that the Delegation would answer the question during the 
upcoming sessions with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.877
872 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Sections 148-150.
873 In Dutch: Regeling verstrekkingen asielzoekers en andere categorieën vreemdelingen 2005.
874 In Dutch: Nationaal Instituut voor Budgetvoorlichting.
875 In Dutch: Wet Werk en Bijstand.
876 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Sections 151-153.
877 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Sections 156-161.
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It appears thus, that the Netherlands do not get away with only reporting positive 
facts anymore. However, it can be questioned whether the Dutch Government is 
seriously willing to answer the questions of the Committee. Regarding question 
26, it is remarkable that the Netherlands do not fully answer the question, since 
no information is given at all concerning homelessness and malnutrition among 
asylum-seekers and immigrants without legal residence. It must also be noted that 
the response to question 28 is hardly an answer to the question, for no specific 
data on the categories of persons that is requested is provided, and with regard 
to the Netherlands Antilles, no information is provided at all. Interestingly, the 
representatives of the former Netherlands Antilles did not provide the promised 
data during the sessions with the Committee, and matters regarding question 28 
were not even discussed. Regarding the status of asylum-seekers however, the 
Committee asked several questions, which will be discussed in the next section.
9.2.3.4 The Dutch asylum policies in the ICESCR reports
In general, the Dutch procedures and policies concerning the residence of foreigners 
are discussed in view of Article 2 ICESCR, and furthermore more specifically in view 
of the substantive ICESCR rights. In the second periodic report, the Netherlands 
reported that everyone in the Netherlands enjoyed the same rights: ‘This does 
not only apply to those who are born in the Netherlands and brought up in a family, 
but also to the increasing number of under-age unaccompanied asylum-seekers and to 
some 13,000 (…) who grow up in institutional care, i.e. a home or residential facility 
(…).’878 Furthermore, the Dutch procedures on housing legally residing asylum-
seekers is explained,879 some statistical data on asylum-seekers is provided,880 
and it is underlined that foreigners who were granted the status of asylum-seeker 
have access to compulsory healthcare.881 During the sessions with the Committee 
however, the Dutch Delegation further explained some details on the Linkage 
Act, that linked the entitlements to social security to the residence status of a 
foreigner, and explained that ‘the Linkage Act did not aim to withdraw minimum 
subsistence rights from all persons without valid residence status. The Act was based 
on three principles: firstly, that regular social security schemes should be open only to 
foreign nationals admitted to the Netherlands unconditionally; secondly, that special 
arrangements and reception facilities should be established to provide social security 
for foreign nationals admitted to the Netherlands provisionally, including those whose 
applications were still being processed; and, lastly, that social security arrangements 
for foreign nationals who faced expulsion, and were able to leave the country, should 
be limited to elementary provisions such as medical care, free legal aid and childre’’s 
education.’882 In response to this explanation, one Committee Member asked 
878 E/1990/6/Add.11, 5 August 1996, Section 134.
879 E/1990/6/Add.11, 5 August 1996, Sections 191-195.
880 E/1990/6/Add.11, 5 August 1996, Section 200.
881 E/1990/6/Add.11, 5 August 1996, Section 265.
882 Mr Potman, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 85.
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whether there were special Provisions for cases with an urgent need for foreigners 
without a residence permit.883 Similar questions were raised, in the context of 
Article 11 ICESCR, concerning the living conditions of asylum-seekers awaiting 
a residence permit,884 or rejected asylum-seekers.885 The Dutch Delegation only 
answered the latter question, by stating that ‘the Government was required to house 
rejected asylum-seekers until their departure from the country.’886 The Committee 
however, in their Concluding Observations, expressed their concern regarding 
‘the living conditions of asylum-seekers in some reception centres in the country.’887
In their third periodic report, the Netherlands explained once again the working 
of the Linkage Act in the context of the entitlements of foreigners residing in the 
Netherlands to social benefits: ‘the basic rule is that foreigners are only eligible (under 
certain conditions) for social services if they are in the possession of a valid residence 
permit. Anyone who is awaiting a decision on his or her application for a permit has no 
entitlement, with the exception of asylum-seekers and a few other categories of foreigners. 
Without a residence permit, foreigners can only claim education, medically necessary care 
and legal aid.’888 Furthermore, the specific procedures regarding unaccompanied 
under-age asylum-seekers, in which the best interest of the child should prevail, 
was explained.889 Also, the Netherlands reported on the procedures regarding the 
housing of asylum-seekers, in which they are divided into two categories: first, 
those awaiting a decision on their application for a residence permit, who were 
housed in reception centres and falling under the authority of the Government, 
and second, those who were granted a residence permit, who were housed in 
mainstream housings, falling under the authority of the communities.890 In their 
List of Issues, the Committee, referring to the explanation in the report on the 
Linkage Act, asked to explain why ‘asylum-seekers and a few other categories of 
foreigners are granted preferential treatment over other foreigners’891 The Netherlands 
replied that indeed illegally residing foreigners were excluded from any entitlements 
to social benefits, except for the fact that ‘all foreign nationals, with or without 
legal residence status, have the right to services such as education, necessary medical 
assistance and legal aid.’892 Furthermore, the Netherlands somewhat cryptically 
explained that the Linkage Act however does not apply to some categories of 
foreigners awaiting the outcome of their asylum application, but instead have 
883 Mrs Jimenez Butragueño E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 87. See for a similar question, in 
the context of healthcare, Mr Ahmed, E/C.12/1998/SR.14, 15 September 1998, Section 70.
884 Mr Pillay, E/C.12/1998/SR.14, 15 September 1998, Section 42.
885 Mr Riedel, E/C.12/1998/SR.14, 15 September 1998, Section 43.
886 Mr Potman, E/C.12/1998/SR.14, 15 September 1998, Section 46.
887 E/C.12/1998/26, 27 April; 15 May 1998; 16 November; 4 December 1998; CESCR report on the 
eighteenth and nineteenth sessions, Section 184.
888 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 110.
889 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Sections 324-327.
890 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Sections 373-377.
891 E/C.12/NLD/Q/3, 2 March 2006, Section 8.
892 E/C.12/NLD/Q/3/Add.1, 23 August 2006, p. 5.
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a legal residence status for the duration of the procedures. Other foreigners are 
also allowed to remain in the Netherlands awaiting their procedures, for instance 
for the purpose of family reunification, under specific circumstances. Therefore, 
‘These rules illustrate that this is not a matter of some categories of foreign nationals 
receiving preferential treatment with regard to benefits, but rather a question of who 
is allowed to remain in the Netherlands.’893 However, while it is clear that some 
categories of aliens do not fall under the scope of the Linkage Act and therefore 
may have certain entitlements to social benefits, it cannot be deduced from the 
Dutch answer whether those entitlements are equal to foreigners with a valid 
residence permit.894 During the Sessions with the Committee, especially the status 
of illegally residing aliens was questioned, inter alia in view of entitlements to social 
benefits.895 The Dutch Delegation further elaborated on the Dutch procedures 
and policies in that field, but this time, the Delegate was somewhat clearer about 
the entitlements to social benefits of illegally residing aliens and those who were 
legally residing while awaiting the outcome of a procedure: ‘The Netherlands make 
a distinction between persons who are legally resident in the country and as such enjoy 
all the rights enshrined in the Covenant, and illegal immigrants, including asylum-
seekers and those whose application has been rejected, who have more rudimental 
rights (access to basic healthcare, education and legal aid). It goes without saying that 
Dutch with a foreign origin and migrant workers who have a residence permit may 
claim and exercise the same rights as a native Dutch national.’896 It was asked by one 
Member of the Committee whether the access to basic healthcare of foreigners 
without a legal residence permit would include secondary and tertiary healthcare, 
including treatment for HIV/AIDS.897 The Dutch Delegation replied that ‘the law 
on health insurance only covers immigrants in an emergency and in special cases, 
for example when they are affected by HIV/AIDS.’898 Oddly enough, regardless the 
critical questions posed during the Sessions, no further recommendations on the 
matter were made in the Committee’s Concluding Observations.899
893 E/C.12/NLD/Q/3/Add.1, 23 August 2006, p. 5.
894 Not to be confused with a legal residence status, for the temporary purpose of allowing a foreigner 
to legally reside in the Netherlands while awaiting a procedure.
895 See especially the questions asked by Mr Riedel, Mrs Barahona Riera, E.C.12/2006/SR.34, 10 January 
2007, Sections 11 and 18.
896 Mr De Klerk, E.C.12/2006/SR.34, 10 January 2007, Section 4. Originally published in French: ‘Les 
Pays Bas font une distinction entre les personnes qui résident légalement dans le pays et jouissent à ce titre de 
tous les droits consacrés par le Pacte et les personnes en situation irrégulière, y compris les demandeurs d’asile 
et ceux déboutés de leur demande, qui ont des droits plus rudimentaires (accès aux soins de santé de base, à 
l’éducation et à l’aide juridictionnelle). Il va sans dire que les Néerlandais d’origine étrangère et les travailleurs 
migrants au bénéfice d’un permis de séjour peuvent revendiquer et exercer les mêmes droits que les Néerlandais 
de souche.’ See for a similar reply: Mr. De Klerk, Section 28.
897 Mr Riedel, E.C.12/2006/SR.34, 10 January 2007, Section 11.
898 Mrs Nicolai, E.C.12/2006/SR.34, 10 January 2007, Section 31. Originally published in French: la loi 
sur l’assurance maladie ne couvre les immigrés qu’en cas d’urgence et dans des cas particuliers, par exemple 
lorsqu’ils sont atteints par le VIH/sida.’
899 E/C.12/NLD/CO/3, 24 November 2006.
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In their combined fourth and fifth periodic report, the Netherlands stated in 
almost identical wordings used in the fifth periodic report on the implementation 
of the CEDAW900 that it had no intention to sign and ratify the Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
as recommended by the Committee,901 due to the (earlier mentioned) Linkage 
Act, in which entitlements to social security were connected to residence status, 
and therefore a distinction was made between foreigners with and without a 
legal residence status.902 In the report, no further particularities on procedures 
and policies regarding foreigners in view of entitlements to social benefits were 
discussed. During the sessions with the Committee, the asylum procedures and 
policies were discussed extensively. The Linkage Act in relation to the entitlements 
of illegally residing aliens to social benefits was debated once more.903 The tone 
of the Committee had clearly changed, and the Delegation was forced to explain 
and justify into more detail the Dutch rules: a Committee Member underlined that 
‘Undocumented migrants were not provided with the minimum essential level of housing 
and were deprived of shelter, clothing and food, despite being under the jurisdiction 
of the State Party. The State Party thus appeared to have forgotten its core obligations 
under the Covenant, and the Committee’s general comments seemed to have been 
disregarded by the Courts. He asked whether undocumented migrants were provided 
with free essential medical care.’904Another Member of the Committee ‘wished to 
know whether it was true that thousands of undocumented immigrants were held in 
detention centres alongside asylum-seekers, including victims of human trafficking 
and torture, and whether unaccompanied minors were also held in detention centres. 
In addition, she requested statistics on the number of women, children and elderly 
people detained in such centres.905 The Dutch Delegation replied that ‘the Central 
Agency for the Reception of Asylum-seekers provided housing, healthcare and work 
for asylum-seekers and that they received financial assistance until they were granted 
a residence permit, which gave them the same rights as all other lawful residents. 
Since 1998, the provision of social security benefits had been linked to residence status. 
However, undocumented children were enrolled in schools and migrants had access to 
legal assistance and essential medical treatment.906 With regard to asylum-seekers 
whose application was rejected, the Delegate replied that they would have to leave 
the Netherlands within 28 days. ‘If that period was insufficient, they could then be 
housed in facilities, in which their freedom of movement was restricted, for another 12 
900 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, pp. 31-32.
901 E/C.12/NLD/CO/3, 24 November 2006, Section 18.
902 E/C.12/NLD/4-5, 17 July 2009, Sections 8-9.
903 On behalf of the Dutch delegation: Mr Beets, E/C.12/2010/SR.44, 25 March 2011, Section 9; On behalf 
of the Committee: Mr Kedzia, E/C.12/2010/SR.44, 25 March 2011, Sections 52 and 54.
904 Mr Pillay, E/C.12/2010/SR.43, 18 November 2010, Section 27.
905 Mrs Bonoan-Dandan, E/C.12/2010/SR.43, 18 November 2010, Section 30. See also Mr Texier, 
E/C.12/2010/SR.43, 18 November 2010, Section 25.
906 Mr Beets, E/C.12/2010/SR.44, 25 March 2011, Section 9.
240 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 9
weeks’. However, as a result of case law,907 ’the 12-week limit did not apply to families 
with children whose asylum applications had been denied so long as they cooperated 
in preparations for their return to their country of origin (…) Children placed in such 
facilities received schooling, as did unaccompanied minors due to leave the country who 
were temporarily housed in special facilities for juveniles.’ He added that ‘Only people 
legally residing in the Netherlands were entitled to housing. Asylum-seekers received 
shelter during their application process and housing if their application for residence 
was approved.908 With regard to the detention of asylum-seekers, the Delegate 
responded that detention was only a last resort, and could last for a maximum 
of six months. He added that ‘the Government endeavoured to find alternatives to 
detention, especially in the case of families with children and people who cooperated 
in the preparations for their departure. Unaccompanied minors could be detained 
only in special juvenile detention centres.’909 The Committee however seems to 
have been rather sceptical about the Delegates’ replies, for in its Concluding 
Observations, the Committee expressed that it is ‘deeply concerned that asylum-
seekers and unaccompanied minors in the Netherlands have been held in detention for 
long periods of time. The Committee also regrets that undocumented migrants, including 
families with children, are not entitled to a basic right to shelter and are rendered 
homeless after their eviction from reception centres. The Committee is also concerned 
that, although undocumented migrants are entitled to healthcare and education, in 
practice they cannot always have access to either.’ Therefore, ’the Committee urges 
the State Party to: (a) ensure that the legislation in the Netherlands guarantees that 
asylum-seekers are detained only when it is absolutely necessary and that the time 
which rejected asylum-seekers and irregular migrants spend in detention is limited to 
a strict minimum; and (b) meet its core obligations under the Covenant and ensure 
that the minimum essential level relating to the right to housing, health and education 
is respected, protected and fulfilled in relation to undocumented migrants.’910
9.2.4 Direct applicability of the ICESCR rights in the ICESCR reports
9.2.4.1 The second periodic report
The matter of direct applicability was frequently discussed during the reporting 
procedures. During the sessions on the second periodic report, the Dutch Delegation 
underlined that ‘the Netherlands Government was deeply committed to the object and 
purpose of the Covenant and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and shared 
the belief that economic, social and cultural rights should have the same status as civil 
907 Most likely, Mr Beets referred to the Court of Appeal of ’s-Gravenhage, 11 January 2011, JV 2011, 
91, which was later in cassation confirmed by the Supreme Court, 21 September 2012, NJ 2013, 22. 
The case law is also further discussed in Section 4.6, and involves the use of Article 27 ICRC as an 
interpretative norm.
908 Mr Beets, E/C.12/2010/SR.45, 24 November 2010, Sections 24-25.
909 Mr Beets, E/C.12/2010/SR.43, 18 November 2010, Section 37.
910 E/C.12/NDL/CO/4-5, 19 November 2010, Section 25.
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and political rights. Although the obligations of a Government with regard to civil and 
political rights were clear, however, they were less so with regard to economic, social and 
cultural rights. ICJ had moreover argued that the Covenant was not directly applied under 
the Dutch legal order. Indeed it was not. Article 93 of the Dutch Constitution established 
the possibility for international treaties to be directly applied. In case of the Covenant, 
the Government had expressly chosen not to invoke that Provision, on the grounds that 
many of the Covenant’s clauses represented obligations and commitments calling for 
Government action that went beyond mere Government guarantees. In the view of the 
Netherlands, Government action in a democratic State should be based on choices that 
arose from the political will of all. (…) The way in which those rights were implemented 
was political rather than judicial, and therefore dynamic rather than static. That meant 
that although rights were fully recognised, the way in which they were implemented 
could change over time. Emphatically, it did not mean that the rights enshrined in 
the Covenant carried less importance than did those which could be invoked before 
Courts; they were simply implemented differently, and their implementation called for 
an active Government.’911 This reasoning was critically received by the Committee. 
The question was raised whether there were ‘any Court decisions which invoked 
the Covenant.’912 Also, the question was raised whether there was ‘any reason 
why the Covenant should not be treated in the same way as other international legal 
instruments? A number of Dutch jurists have argued that the Covenant established 
different sorts of obligations, and to simply state that they were non-self-executing did 
not suffice.’913According to the Committee, referring to General Comment 3,914 
at least seven rights enshrined in the ICESCR were directly applicable.915 It was 
asked whether it was true, as suggested by the Dutch Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists, ‘that the Covenant was only marginally, if at all, taken into 
consideration in the legislative and policy-making process at the national level.’ How 
then, it was asked, could the Netherlands Government ‘be said to be complying 
with its obligations under the Covenant.’916 Also, the Committee asked ‘for elucidation 
of the statement just made by the head of the Delegation to the effect that the precise 
obligations for Governments in relation to economic, social and cultural rights were 
“less clear” than those relating to civil and political rights.’917 Furthermore, it was 
asked how the different attitude towards ECOSOC rights ‘could be regarded as 
compatible with the United Nations concept of the indivisibility of all human rights.’918 
The Dutch Delegate replied to the above that ‘his Government was fully committed 
to the concept of indivisibility of all human rights and accorded them the same status 
911 Mr Potman, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Sections 10-11.
912 Mr Riedel, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 17.
913 Mr Riedel, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 17.
914 E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), 14 December 1990, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties’ Obligations.
915 Mr. Riedel, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 18.
916 Mr. Pillay, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 21.
917 Mr. Pillay, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 21.
918 Mr. Antanovich, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 23.
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in terms of their implementation. The fact that, for essentially technical reasons, it did 
not think that economic, social and cultural rights had direct applicability certainly 
did not mean that it attached less importance to those rights.’919And in addition that: 
‘(…) unlike civil and political rights, which were essentially rights-oriented, economic, 
social and cultural rights were principally oriented towards the obligations of the State. 
The Maastricht guidelines (…) allowed a certain margin of discretion with regard to the 
implementation of the latter category of rights. In his country’s system, the question 
of the effectiveness of steps taken to discharge an obligation was considered a matter 
for Parliament rather than for the Judiciary. Of course, if the State failed to discharge 
its obligation altogether, an individual who believed that his or her human rights had 
been violated as a result could bring the matter before the Courts. That did not mean, 
however, that all the Provisions of the Covenant could be regarded as self-executing.’920 
In response, a Member of Committee asked whether in the Netherlands it was 
possible, similar to other Western European countries, for the Courts to ‘pass 
judgment in principle on the Government’s compliance with an instrument to which 
it was party, but the question of precisely how that obligation was discharged was left 
to the relevant Government department.’921 Apparently, the Member of Committee 
referred to a type of reviewing that is known in especially Dutch Administrative 
Law as a ‘marginal review’922, in which an Administrative Court judges whether 
an administrative body could reasonably had reached a certain decision, taken into 
account all justified interests, without judging the content of that decision. The 
Dutch Delegate responded that ‘(…) his Government recognised the direct applicability 
of many economic, social and cultural rights, which, in addition to being set forth in 
the Constitution, were also protected by various international instruments to which the 
Netherlands were a party. The difficulty arose where a caring obligation was imposed 
upon the Government. The right to health was a case in point. An individual could hardly 
complain about a violation of human rights simply because he or she was not enjoying 
good health. A violation certainly existed if the Government provided no healthcare at 
all, but where the system was not working very efficiently the matter became political 
rather than judicial.’923 Eventually, the Committee seems to have disagreed with 
the Dutch Delegation, and stated in its Concluding Observations that ‘…in line 
with its General Comment 3, the Committee considers that, at a minimum, certain 
Provisions of the Covenant are potentially able to be directly applied both in law and in 
policy. It therefore cannot accept the assertion by the representative of the State Party 
that “for essentially technical reasons” the Covenant...is not directly applicable.’924 It 
is hard not to notice a slight sarcastic undertone in the last sentence, where the 
Dutch Delegate is quoted. The Committee is quite clear when it considers that 
certain Provisions of the ICESCR are potentially directly applicable, and is not 
919 Mr. Potman, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 24.
920 Mr. Van Rijssen, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 25.
921 Mr. Riedel, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 27.
922 In Dutch: ‘marginale toetsing.’
923 Mr Van Rijssen, E/C.12/1998/SR.13, 7 May 1998, Section 28.
924 E/C.12/1/Add.25, 16 June 1998, Section 11.
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willing to accept the arguments of the Dutch Delegation, especially when direct 
applicability is portrayed to be impossible mainly due to technical, instead of 
substantive reasons, a reasoning that almost seems to marginalise the fact that 
ICESCR Provisions are not directly applicable in the Netherlands.
9.2.4.2 The third periodic report
In their third periodic report, the Netherlands responded to the criticism of the 
Committee, expressed in its Concluding Observations on the second periodic 
report, on the fact that ICESCR Provisions were not directly applicable. Firstly, a 
translation was given of Articles 93 and 94.925 According to the Government, ‘this 
conveys the fact that some international legal standards have direct application and 
that a directly applicable international standard has priority over national law.’926 It 
is our understanding that the first halve of this sentence refers to the function of 
Article 93 CA, and the latter half to the function of Article 94 CA. Furthermore, 
it was reported that in Case Law, criteria had been established to determine 
whether a treaty Provision is directly applicable: ‘in judging whether a treaty Provision 
can be directly applicable in the national legal order, consideration is given to the nature 
and content of the Provision, as well as to its wording. If a particular Provision is 
directed at citizens and gives rise to a claim without any further implementation laws 
being required, it can be directly applied in the Dutch legal order. If the Provision in 
question is directed at the State, and includes phrases such as ‘bear responsibility for’ 
‘take steps’ or ‘guarantee’, citizens cannot then, generally speaking, directly base any 
claim on such a Provision and hence the said Provision cannot be directly applicable 
to the national legal order. A Provision directed at the State can only have direct 
application if its nature and content clearly allow citizens to base a claim thereon. One 
example is a State-directed ban on discrimination, on which a citizen can base a claim 
for equal treatment.’927 The Government stated that in this way, the direct effect 
of ‘eligible treaty Provisions is sufficiently guaranteed.’928 However, with regard to 
the ICESCR, it was reported that ‘The nature and content of the Covenant, as well 
as the wording of the Articles, indicate that it is aimed at the gradual and increasing 
achievement of objectives by means of legislation and further implementation measures. 
As a result, most Provisions cannot be applied directly. All the more because, where 
further implementation laws are required, this implies a certain freedom of choice for 
the national Legislature regarding the way in which the rights to be guaranteed are 
given substance. Simply accepting direct application of Provisions that need to be worked 
out in greater detail would mean that it would be left to the national Courts to put the 
925 Article 93 CA: ‘Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international institutions which may be binding 
on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been published.’ Article 94 
CA: ‘Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict 
with Provisions of treaties or that are binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions.’
926 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 5.
927 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 6.
928 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 7.
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objectives set down in the Covenant into practice. As already indicated in the second 
report, the Dutch Government is set on implementing the obligations imposed on the 
Government under the Covenant within a democratic process. This will enable a better 
response to social developments.’929 Not surprisingly, this explanation was not 
sufficient to the Committee, which asked in its List of Issues: ‘please, explain the 
domestic legal status of the Covenant and whether its Provisions are considered by the 
State Party to be ‘specific and precise enough’ to be directly applicable.’930 The written 
reply was that ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
contains international obligations with which national legislation should not conflict. 
In the Government’s opinion, all of the obligations under the Covenant are adequately 
incorporated in national legislation. Nevertheless, citizens who believe their rights 
under the Covenant are being infringed by Dutch law may invoke the relevant Provisions 
of the Covenant in Court insofar as the substance of the Provisions lends itself to direct 
application (Article 94 of the Constitution). It is then up to the Court to determine 
whether the latter condition is fulfilled and, if so, whether the Provision has been 
violated.’931 The Dutch Delegation, during the sessions with the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, even held that it was ‘the responsibility of 
the Courts to decide whether a Provision of the Covenant should be directly applicable 
in a given case, with case law providing guidance in determining the issue of direct 
effect.’932 Regarding this statement, a Committee Member asked what then the 
procedure was of the Courts to determine whether a Provision would have direct 
effect. Also, the question was raised ‘whether economic, social and cultural rights 
were given as much importance as civil and political rights.’933Another Committee 
Member asked for information regarding case law in which the Court considered 
an ICESCR Provision not suitable for direct application.934 To this, the Dutch 
Delegation responded that ‘under the Constitution, any directly applicable rule of 
international law took precedence over domestic law, even the Constitution. However, 
in the case of economic, social and cultural rights, it was for the individual Courts to 
decide whether a particular Provision was specific and precise enough for an individual 
to invoke. The Supreme Court had, in a number of decisions, referred to the statement 
by the Government, on ratification of the Covenant, that various Provisions would not 
be considered directly applicable by individuals. Nonetheless, in some of those cases 
the Supreme Court or the highest Administrative Court had de facto taken account of 
the substance of the Provisions, such as Articles 9, 11, and 15 when drafting its decisions. 
However, the domestic Courts had ruled that, generally speaking, an individual could 
not invoke Articles 2 (2), 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13 in order to claim specific rights. It was 
difficult to draw general conclusions on the status of case law, as only a few dozen 
929 E/1994/104/Add.30, 23 August 2005, Section 8.
930 E/C.12/NLD/Q/3, 2 March 2006, Section 1.
931 E/C.12/NLD/Q/3/Add.1, 23 August 2006, Section 1.
932 Mr De Klerk, E/C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 4
933 Mr Malinverni, E/C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 13.
934 Mr Atangana, E/C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 15.
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cases had been brought before the highest Courts between 1979 and 2000.’935 It is 
remarkable here that the Delegation made reference to inter alia Article 11 ICESCR. 
In Chapter 4, it is demonstrated that the Provision has no effect at all on legal 
proceedings, and our conclusions in that Chapter do not match with the alleged 
‘indirect’ effect as suggested by the Delegate, in which a Court takes the content 
of the Provision into account. In this light, a Committee Member, asked what 
exactly ‘the State Party’s current position might be on direct applicability and thus on 
the proposed Optional Protocol, and he would welcome a clear statement on that 
position.’936 The Committee Member obviously could not match the fact that the 
Netherlands was actively involved in the negotiation process preceding the adoption 
of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR containing an individual complaint procedure, 
whereas the country was simultaneously rejecting direct effect of the ICESCR 
Provisions. The Dutch Delegate considered that ‘The Government’s position with 
regard to the proposed Optional Protocol on an individual complaints mechanism had 
been rather cautious, although it fully supported the expansion of the mandate of the 
open-ended working group on that instrument. The Government considered the 
implementation of rights under the Covenant to be essentially a political question and, 
indeed, several of those rights were currently under discussion in the political arena 
prior to the upcoming elections. Although the Government wished to be involved in the 
negotiations on the proposed mechanism, the position it had adopted when ratifying 
the Covenant, namely that it considered the rights contained in the Covenant not to be 
of direct applicability, had not changed.’937 However, the Delegate had to acknowledge 
that ‘there was a contradiction in acknowledging the indivisibility of human rights 
while at the same time having different implementation mechanisms for certain rights.’938 
Again, the Committee had to conclude that the Dutch replies were insufficient, 
and stated in its Concluding Observations, this time in somewhat firmer wordings, 
that ‘The Committee is concerned that the Courts in the State Party applies the Provisions 
of the Covenant only to the extent that they consider that these are directly applicable 
and that most Provisions of the Covenant cannot be applied directly.’939 In addition, 
the Committee recommended ‘that the State Party reassess the extent to which the 
Provisions of the Covenant might be considered to be directly applicable. It urges the 
State Party to ensure that the Provisions of the Covenant are given direct effect by its 
domestic Courts, as defined in the Committee’s General Comment 3, and that it promotes 
the use of the Covenant as a domestic source of law. It invites the State Party to include, 
in its fourth periodic report, information on case law concerning the rights recognised 
in the Covenant.’940
935 Mr Kuijer, E/C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 51.
936 Mr Riedel, E/C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 26.
937 Mr De Klerk, E/C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 47.
938 Mr De Klerk, E/C.12/2006/SR.33, 22 November 2006, Section 47.
939 E/C.12/NLD/CO/3, 24 November 2006, Section 11.
940 E/C.12/NLD/CO/3, 24 November 2006, Section 19.
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9.2.4.3 The combined fourth and fifth report
In its combined fourth and fifth report, the Government indeed refers to the 
matter of direct applicability with the following short phrase: ‘The Netherlands 
would refer to previous reports for information on the Netherlands’ position on the 
direct applicability of the Covenant. Information on case law concerning the rights 
recognised in the Covenant is attached to this report.’941
It is obvious that the Dutch Government did not reassess its viewpoints on the 
issue of direct applicability of ICESCR Provisions, and was not attempting to further 
clarify this. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights naturally 
considered the short explanation in the report inadequate, and asked in its List 
of Issues: ‘Please indicate the ways in which the domestic legal system provides an 
effective remedy to persons whose rights under the Covenant have been violated.’942 
And: ‘While noting the State Party’s reply in its report (E/C.12/NLD/4-5, Section 
11), please indicate whether, in accordance with the Committee’s recommendations 
issued in 2006, there have been any recent developments to ensure that the Provisions 
of the Covenant are given effect by domestic Courts.’943 In their written replies, 
the Government answered that ‘In principle, any claimant is entitled to invoke a 
Provision of the Covenant in legal proceedings (e.g. an action for tort brought against 
the State before a civil Court under Article 6:162 of the Criminal Code).’944 According 
to the Government, this was possible due to Constitutional system stipulated in 
Articles 93 and 94 CA. Again, the function of both Articles was clarified: Article 
93 CA stipulates that treaty Provisions that are binding on all persons by virtue 
of their content are ‘binding under national law.’ In addition, Article 94 stipulates 
that national Provisions that are in conflict with treaty Provisions that are binding 
941 E/C.12/NLD/4-5, 17 July 2009, Section 11. In the first Appendix, reference is made to 31 cases in 
the period 1979-2007 in which ICESCR Articles were invoked. Indeed, in 24 of these cases, the direct 
applicability of the invoked Provisions is denied by the various Courts. In 5 cases, all rulings before 
2000, some kind of non-direct effect of the Provision was considered by the Courts, which includes a 
method that will later, by the Dutch delegation, be referred to as the ‘incorporation doctrine’, in which 
the ICESCR treaty, although not directly applied, plays an interpretative role, sometimes in conjunction 
with another Provision (for instance Article 26 ICCPR, or Article 2 ICESCR). It is remarkable however, 
that in all cases the invoked Provision was considered not to be violated (including Central Appeals 
Court for Public Service and Social Security Matters, 31 March 1995, JB 1995, 161; 22 April 1997, JB 1997, 
158). In only one of these five cases, an (indirect) violation of the ICESCR Article (in this case Article 
7) can be found. In two incidental cases, the Court had considered an Article directly applicable, and 
ruled that the invoked Article was violated. One case concerned Article 7 ICESCR, and dates from 1984. 
The second concerned Article 11 ICESCR, and was ruled in 1979. However, from the same appendix 
it can be concluded that the Judiciary generally altered its approach to more permanent case law, in 
which direct effect of both Articles is denied (although Article 7 ICESCR is later used in conjunction 
with Article 26 ICCPR in several rulings).
942 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5, 22 December 2009, Section 2.
943 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5, 22 December 2009, Section 3.
944 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Section 9. Note that the Government is most likely 
mistaken, for Article 6:162 is a Provision of the Civil Code, instead of the Criminal Code. In this Article, 
a wrongful Act, or tort law, is embedded.
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on all persons shall not be applied.945 However, the Government admitted that 
‘it is indeed the case that Provisions in the Covenant are not generally regarded by the 
national Courts as ‘binding on all persons’.946 On the other hand, the Government 
stressed that ‘the question of whether the State is bound by the Covenant should be 
distinguished from the question of whether Provisions of the Covenant have direct 
effect within the State. The Netherlands are bound by international law to realise 
the rights set forth in the Covenant for persons within its jurisdiction. However, the 
question of whether a Provision has direct effect is ultimately determined in individual 
cases by the Dutch Courts.’947Again, it appears that the Government attributes the 
responsibility for the direct applicability of ICESCR Provisions to the Courts. The 
Government argued furthermore ‘that the influence of the Covenant’s Provisions is 
not limited to those cases where the national Courts have declared a Provision “binding 
on all persons”.’ The Government clarified that Courts might give an interpretation 
to national Provisions so that it is in compliance with an international Provision. 
The Government stated that ‘It is important to note that the Dutch Courts adhere to 
the “incorporation doctrine”, whereby the interpretation of a Provision of the Covenant 
given by the supervisory committee is “read into” the Provision.’948 Reference was 
made to a Case in which the Supreme Court ruled that although Article 7 ICESCR 
had no direct effect, ‘the guarantee of equal pay for equal work in the Covenant is 
a goal that should be worked towards. To assume too readily that a reasonable and 
objective justification exists for a pay difference that is at odds with the principle of 
equal pay for equal work would not be consistent with this view.’949 Again, during 
the session with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
fact that ICESCR rights were not directly applicable was heavily and extensively 
criticised by various Committee Members.950 Also in the NGO shadow-reports, 
the matter was frequently stressed.951 The Dutch Delegation once more referred 
to the fact that the Courts were responsible for the direct application, and that the 
Government could not interfere in that process.952 Nevertheless, the Delegation 
appears to have attempted to present the facts somewhat more positive on the 
matter, by informing that ‘a Constitutional review commission was about to publish 
a report on a possible amendment to enhance the direct applicability of international 
945 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Section 9.
946 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Section 10.
947 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Section 11.
948 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Section 12.
949 E/C.12/NLD/Q/4-5/Add.1, 14 October 2010, Section 12. Reference was made to the Supreme Court, 
7 May 1993, NJ 1995, 259.
950 Mr Abashidze, Section 19; Mr Kedzia, Section 20; Mr Atangana, Section 23; Mr Pillay, Section 27; Mr 
Riedel, Section 28, in: E/C.12/2010/SR.43, 18 November 2010.
951 Joint Parallel Report to the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of the Netherlands on 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 28 October 2009, Section 2.1; 
Addendum to the Joint Parallel Report to the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of the 
Netherlands on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (28 
October 2009), 16 September 2010, p. 24; Shadow report on the right to food in the Netherlands, 17 
November 2009, European Institute for Food Law.
952 Mr Beets and Mr Versluis, E/C.12/2010/SR.43, 18 November 2010, Sections 33-34.
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human rights instruments. Those instruments and their applicability were included 
in the training of future judges. Pursuant to Article 2 of the Covenant, the country 
actively supported the work of the United Nations to codify the right to drinking water 
and sanitation and promoted other economic, social and cultural rights such as the 
right to food.’953 While the latter sentence has nothing to do with the matter of 
direct applicability, it seems to be intended to place the Dutch attitude towards 
the ICESCR in a better daylight. Even more interesting was another remark of 
a Dutch Delegate Member: ‘under the Constitution, universally binding Provisions 
were directly applicable. He then pointed out the criteria for application of international 
instruments established by case law. One such criterion was the intention of the authors; 
with the Covenant dating back to 1966, judges tended to interpret some of their Provisions 
according to modern standards. Moreover, because judges were often required to apply 
the Provisions of international human rights instruments, they were well versed in 
them and were equally familiar with general comments, which they also applied.’954 
As observed in Chapter 4, the latter is simply not true.955 How credible the 
information given by the Delegation may or may not be, a Committee Member 
‘deemed that answer unsatisfactory because, for the Committee, all the Provisions of the 
Covenant were directly applicable in their most stringent interpretation.’956 Therefore, 
in their Concluding Observations, in firmer wordings than before, the Committee 
considered that ‘Given the fact that the State Party follows a monist system whereby 
international treaties are directly applicable, the Committee reiterates its concern that 
some Provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing and enforceable in the State 
Party and that they have not been admitted by Courts to substantiate legal claims 
relating to economic, social and cultural rights.’957 Again, ‘The Committee reiterates 
its recommendation that the State Party has the obligation to give effect to the rights 
contained in the Covenant in each territory so that individuals can seek enforcement 
of their rights before national Courts and tribunals. Moreover, in view of the numerous 
decisions of the State Party’s Courts to the effect that the Provisions of the Covenant 
are not self-executing and thus not binding in accordance with Articles 93 and 94 of 
the Constitution of the State Party, the Committee urges the State Party to consider 
all remedial measures, legislative or otherwise, to ensure that the Covenant rights are 
applicable and justiciable in all its constituent countries. In this regard, the Committee 
refers the State Party to its General Comment No. 9 on the domestic application of the 
Covenant (1998). The Committee also requests the State Party to continue to provide 
in its periodic reports detailed information on case-law from all its territories regarding 
the implementation of the Covenant.’958
953 Mr Versluis, E/C.12/2010/SR.44, 25 March 2011, Section 4.
954 Mr Versluis, E/C.12/2010/SR.44, 25 March 2011, Section 11.
955 This was also observed in the Joint Parallel Report to the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report 
of the Netherlands on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 28 October 
2009, Section 2.1.
956 Mr Marchan Romero, E/C.12/2010/SR.44, 25 March 2011, Section 12.
957 E/C.12/NDL/CO/4-5, 19 November 2010, Section 6.
958 E/C.12/NDL/CO/4-5, 19 November 2010. Section 6.
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9.2.4.4 The reports of the Netherlands Antilles
The matter of direct applicability was not only discussed in the context of the 
Netherlands reports, but also, albeit less detailed, in the context of the reports of 
the Netherlands Antilles. In its Concluding Observations to the second periodic 
report of the Netherlands Antilles (and a similar Observation was made regarding 
Aruba959), the Committee regretted that no ICESCR Provision has direct effect in 
the Member State, which is in violation of General Comment 3.960 In their third 
report, the Netherlands Antilles reported in response that ‘the Government will 
take the issue of direct applicability into consideration.’961 The Committee, during 
the sessions with the Netherlands Antilles Delegation, therefore stressed ‘that 
the question of direct applicability of the Covenant’s Provisions has been raised by 
the Committee in 1996 and that a decade later the Government was saying only 
that it would take the issue into consideration.’962 The Delegation replied that the 
Netherlands Antilles Government would ‘consider the issue of direct applicability 
of the Provisions of the Covenant and would include in its fourth periodic report 
information on case law concerning rights recognised by the Covenant.’963 Again, 
in its Concluding Observations, the Committee stated that it regretted ‘that little 
progress has been made with regard to the direct applicability of the rights set out in the 
Covenant. It takes note of the information that these rights may only be applied directly 
by the national Courts to the extent that the Courts deem such application possible. 
The Committee is concerned that the State Party thus considers that most economic, 
social and cultural rights are not directly applicable.’964 However, in the next report, 
the promise of the Delegation was not fulfilled, for it was reported that: ‘as far as 
could be ascertained, there have been no new developments on the issue.’965
9.3 The ICRC reports
9.3.1 The right to food and the ICRC reports
Before 2013, the Netherlands had submitted three,966 the Netherlands Antilles 
two,967 and Aruba also two968 reports on the implementation of the International 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. During the reporting procedures, the 
959 E/C.12/1998/26, 27 April; 15 May 1998; 16 November; 4 December 1998; CESCR report on the 
eighteenth and nineteenth sessions, Section 200.
960 E/C.12/1/Add.25, 16 June 1998, Section 49.
961 E/C.12/ANT/3, 13 February 2006, Section 2.
962 Mrs Atangana, E/C.12/2007/SR.9, 10 May 2007, Section 15. See also in this respect the related 
questions of Mr Ridel (Section 10) and Mr Pillay (Section 11).
963 Mrs Ray, E/C.12/2007/SR.9, 10 May 2007, Section 19.
964 E/C.12/NLD/CO/3/Add.1, 31 January 2008, Section 9. See in this light also Section 23.
965 E/C.12/NLD/4/Add.1, 13 July 2009, Section 4.
966 CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997; CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003; CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008.
967 CRC/C/61/Add.4, 4 October 2001; CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008 (Part 3).
968 CRC/C/117/Add.2, 17 June 2003; CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008 (Part 2).
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right to food was not only discussed in the context of Article 27 ICRC, but also in 
the context of Article 24 (health and nutrition). As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
Netherlands assume a very close interrelationship between Articles 27 and 26 
ICRC. Therefore, when relevant, debates on Article 26 ICRC will also be included 
in the analysis below, especially when it concerns the reservation to the Provision. 
Due to the format adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Dutch 
asylum procedure, as earlier demonstrated closely related to the right to food, is 
discussed as a separate issue not necessarily linked to a particular Convention 
Provision. Thus, below, the debates on the Dutch asylum policy will also be dealt 
with separately.
9.3.1.1 Article 24 ICRC
In view of Article 24 ICRC, the reports frequently address the issue of health and 
nutrition. Both the Netherlands969 and Aruba970 addressed the issue of excessive fat 
consumption and other unhealthy eating habits amongst children, and the kind of 
measures taken by the authorities to improve the situation, in their initial report. 
Another prominent topic was the provision of data on breastfeeding,971 which 
was occasionally reason for debate, for especially regarding the Netherlands the 
Committee criticised the fact that the percentage of women that choose to give 
breastfeeding to their infants was lower compared to other European countries.972 
The Netherlands furthermore reported on several initiatives related to health 
and nutrition in the context of cooperation with other countries,973 including the 
promotion of the right to drinking water and sanitation.974
9.3.1.2 Article 26 ICRC
Article 26 is, based on the format as adopted by the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child,975 mainly discussed in view of ‘disability, basic health and welfare’, 
and more in particular in the context of ‘social security and childcare services and 
facilities’, altogether with Article 18 Section 3. Despite the frequent insistence 
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child to withdraw the Dutch reservation 
969 CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Sections 215-216.
970 CRC/C/117/Add.2, 17 June 2003, Sections 190-191; CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008 (Part 2), Sections 
196-198.
971 CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Sections 217; CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Sections 191-193 (the 
Netherlands); CRC/C/61/Add.4, 4 October 2001, Sections 183-184; CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008 (Part 
3), Section 286-287, 319-322 (the Netherlands Antilles); CRC/C/117/Add.2, 17 June 2003, Section 188 
(Aruba).
972 CRC/C/SR.580, 18 November 1999, Section 43; CRC/C/SR.1377, 21 January 2009, Section 16; CRC/C/
NLD/CO/3, 27 March 2009, Section 59-60.
973 CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Sections 131-142; CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Sections 224-227.
974 CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Section 142.
975 CRC/C/58/Rev.2, 23 November 2010, in particular Section III B and Annex.
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to Article 26,976 the Dutch Government consequently persisted in maintaining 
the reservation, for ‘in the opinion of the Netherlands, the Article implies that States 
Parties should grant social security rights to a child itself since the Article talks of 
recognition of the rights of a child to benefit and of applications for them made by or 
on behalf of the child.’977 In their reports the Netherlands explained that, apart 
from a few minor exceptions, all entitlements to social security of the child are 
guaranteed via the parents, meaning that the child has no direct entitlements 
to social benefits.978 In their initial report, it was stated that ‘the amount of social 
security to the parents is fixed in such a way that the obligation of the parents towards 
the child in terms of care and maintenance can be paid from the benefits. Independent 
rights of the child to social security exist in the Netherlands only to a limited extent, 
and there are no proposals of changing this in the future.’979 The major part of the 
reports however, naturally dealt with the Dutch social security system related to 
the position of children.980
9.3.1.3 Article 27 ICRC
Article 27 is, based on the format as adopted by the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child,981 discussed in two different contexts. Firstly, in view of the ‘family 
976 CRC/C/90, 7 December 1999, Section 38; CRC/C/NLD/CO/3, 27 March 2009, Sections 10-11 (the 
latter also concerns the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba). See also: CRC/C/118, 3 September 2002, 
Section 534 (the Netherlands Antilles), and: CRC/C/15/Add.226, 26 February 2004, Sections 10-11 
(Aruba). See furthermore the Committee’s lists of issues: CRC/C/Q/NET.1, 30 June 1999, Section 1; 
CRC/C/Q/NET-ANT/1, 8 February 2002, Section B1 (the Netherlands Antilles); CRC/C/Q/NLD/2, 27 
October 2003, Section B2 (the Netherlands and Aruba). See also during the sessions with the Committee 
and the Dutch delegation: Mrs Sardenberg, Mrs Karp, Mrs Tigerstedt-Tähtelä and Mrs Mboi, CRC/C/
SR.578, 16 November 1999, Sections 17-18, 25 and 47-48; Mrs Sardenberg, CRC/C/SR.580, 18 November 
1999, Section 61; Mr Kotrane and Mr Citarella, CRC/C/SR.928, 23 January 2004, Sections 9 and 16; Mr 
Citarella and Mrs Smith, CRC/C/SR.1376, 20 January 2010, Section 22 and 37; Mrs Herczog, CRC/C/
SR.1377, 23 January 2009, Section 93.
977 CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Section 223.
978 CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Section 223; CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Section 143; CRC/C/
RESP/48, 16 December 2003, Section B2; CRC/15/Add.227, 30 January 2004, Section 10; CRC/C/NLD/3, 
23 July 2008, Section 243; Mr Halff, CRC/C/SR.579, 8 October 1999, Section 7; Mrs Blom, CRC/C/SR.928, 
23 January 2004, Section 29.
Mr Rouvoet, CRC/C/SR.1376, 20 January 2010, Section 41. See also: CRC/C/61/Add.4, 4 October 2001, 
Sections 194-195; CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008 (Part 3), Sections 57-58 (the Netherlands Antilles). 
The reservation to Article 26 ICRC was also discussed during the first cycle of the Universal Periodic 
Review. Russia recommended withdrawing the reservation (A/HRC/8/31, 13 May 2008, Section 30). 
The Netherlands replied that ‘The Kingdom of the Netherlands will not withdraw its reservation with regard 
to Articles 26, 37 sub-section c, and 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The reasons for these 
reservations remain relevant and the Kingdom can therefore not support this recommendation’ (A/HRC/8/31/
Add.1, 25 August 2008, Section 14).
979 CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Section 223.
980 See: CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Sections 224-227; CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Sections 144-
147. CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Sections 234-242. See also: CRC/C/61/Add.4, 4 October 2001, Sections 
196-197 (Netherlands Antilles). CRC/C/117/Add.2, 17 June 2003, Section 105-108 (Aruba).
981 CRC/C/58/Rev.2, 23 November 2010, in particular Section III B and Annex.
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environment and alternative care’, more in particular in the context of ‘the recovery 
of maintenance for the child’ (Article 27 (4)). Secondly, in view of ‘disability, basic 
health and welfare’, more in particular in the context of the ‘standard of living 
and measures, including material assistance and support programmes with regard 
to nutrition, clothing and housing, to ensure the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, 
moral and social development and reduce poverty and inequality’ (Article 27, Sections 
1-3). In the initial report of the Netherlands, the primary responsibility of the 
parents towards their children is emphasised: ‘Article 245, Section 2, of Book 1 of 
the Netherlands Civil Code provides that parents have a general obligation to look 
after and raise their children. In accordance with Article 404 of Book 1 of the Civil 
Code, parents are also obliged to bear the costs of caring for and raising their minor 
children (whether they are legitimate or illegitimate children). The parents should fulfil 
their financial obligations to the best of their ability given their financial means. This 
obligation therefore consists not only of the costs of such things as food and clothing 
but also of the costs of upbringing in general. If the parents lack the financial means 
to pay for some or all of the costs of subsistence, they may claim benefit under the new 
National Assistance Act.’982 In the reports, especially the legislation on the duty of 
care towards children in complex family relations, such as divorces, is explained,983 
and the Dutch system of social security, when relevant in relation to children, is 
explained.984 In their third report, the Netherlands stated that: ‘The Netherlands 
have a comprehensive system of social insurance and other Provisions that guarantee 
residents a minimum income. A minimum income does not equal poverty; it is enough 
to cover a person’s living costs, provided they use the income support available and 
exercise financial discipline.’985
9.3.1.4 The rights of foreign children in the ICRC reports
On more than one occasion, the Committee asked critical questions about the 
Dutch policy towards foreigners. It is not without reason, that the status of refugee 
children is a separate issue in the reporting format as adopted by the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, in which the Member States are requested to report on 
the status of ‘children outside their country of origin seeking refugee protection (art. 
22), unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, internally displaced children, migrant 
children and children affected by migration.’986 As demonstrated in Chapter 4, it is 
especially in view of the Dutch asylum policy that ICRC Provisions, in particular 
982 27 ICRC: CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Section 246. See in the context of Article 27 also: 
CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Section 75. See furthermore: CRC/C/61/Add.4, 4 October 2001, Section 
209 (Netherlands Antilles). See also: CRC/C/117/Add.2, 17 June 2003, Section 215 (Aruba).
983 CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Sections 138-139; CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Sections 76-79.
984 CRC/C/51/Add.1, 24 July 1997, Sections 247-257; CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Sections 175-197; 
CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Sections 294-311. See also: CRC/C/61/Add.4, 4 October 2001, Sections 129-
133 (Netherlands Antilles). See furthermore: CRC/C/117/Add.2, 17 June 2003, Sections 215-219 (Aruba).
985 CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Section 294.
986 CRC/C/58/Rev.2, 23 November 2010 Section B and Appendix.
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Article 27 ICRC, were invoked in the Courts, on behalf of a minor. Therefore, this 
Section focusses on the various debates on the Dutch asylum policies in view of 
the right of the child to an adequate standard of living.
In their initial report, the Netherlands described, inter alia, the procedures regarding 
the entitlements of foreign children to social benefits. In short, a distinction can 
be made between accompanied and unaccompanied asylum-seekers. In the first 
case, the parent(s) will ask asylum on behalf of the child, and the request of both 
the parent(s) and the child will be assessed altogether. In the second case, the child 
will request asylum on its own behalf. In both cases, the minor will be housed 
in a reception centre, and has entitlements to basic needs such as education and 
medical treatment. In its List of Issues987 however, and more in particular during 
the sessions, the Committee expressed its concern regarding discrimination against 
asylum-seekers in the Netherlands, and the well-being of unaccompanied minor 
asylum-seekers.988 The Dutch Delegation basically further clarified the asylum 
procedures, but could not take the concerns of the Committee away.989 Although 
it noted the efforts of the State to deal with unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers, 
‘the Committee is concerned that they may need to receive increased attention. The 
Committee recommends that the State Party strengthen measures so as to provide 
immediate counselling and prompt and full access to education and other services for 
refugee and asylum-seeking children. Furthermore, the Committee recommends that the 
State Party take effective measures for the integration of these children into its society.’990
Therefore, in their second periodic report, the Netherlands stated that ‘unaccompanied 
minor asylum-seekers receive special care and attention.’991 In general however, it 
was underlined that the Dutch asylum policy concerning unaccompanied minor 
asylum-seekers focussed on the return of those minors to their country of origin, 
due to the increase of unaccompanied minors requesting for asylum, and the 
abuse of facilities when the minor reached adulthood: ‘In this new policy, the 
possibility of return will be investigated far more vigorously than before, while naturally 
taking account of the minor’s position and the situation in the country of origin.’992 
In its List of Issues, the Committee requested additional data concerning ‘the 
number of unaccompanied minors and asylum-seeking and refugee children, as well 
as the number of children awaiting expulsion’, and asked for further information 
regarding ‘discrimination in particular with respect to immigrants, undocumented 
migrants, refugees and asylum-seeking children in the Netherlands and Aruba’ and 
‘refugee and asylum-seeking children in the Netherlands, and their access to services 
987 CRC/C/Q/NET.1, 30 June 1999, Sections 11 and 27.
988 Mr Fulci, CRC/C/SR.578, 16 November 1999, Section 40; Mrs Tigerstedt-Tähtelä, CRC/C/SR.580 18 
November 1999, Section 24.
989 Mr Jansen, CRC/C/SR.580, 18 November 1999, Sections 33-35 and 38.
990 CRC/C/90, 7 December 1999, Section 254.
991 CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Section 236.
992 CRC/C/117/Add.1, 5 June 2003, Section 237.
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including education and housing’993 Besides providing the requested statistics, the 
Netherlands responded to the latter request that ‘In November 2002, a pilot project 
was launched at a centre in Vught with the aim of promoting the return of minors 
to their countries of origin and preparing them for that event. The pilot involves the 
creation of a “campus” in which specific rules and standards of behaviour are enforced. 
The centre runs an intensive full-time programme of organised activities designed to 
prepare the children for return to the country of origin by developing transcultural 
competence. If there is no one to care for them in their countries of origin, the children 
are prepared instead for integration into Dutch society. In any case, the children 
attend school and are prepared for life in the Netherlands.’994 During the sessions 
with the Committee, the Committee expressed its concern regarding the new 
Dutch policy, and it was noted with regret ‘that the definition given by Dutch 
law for “asylum-seeker” is not consistent with Article 22 of the Convention and other 
relevant international standards, and with regard to the reception of unaccompanied 
minors seeking asylum, the State Party has adopted a stricter policy favoring the 
return of children to their country of origin.’995 The Dutch Delegation disagreed, and 
argued that the definition used in the Aliens Act was in fact in accordance with 
the relevant international Provisions. Furthermore, the Delegation claimed that 
the Netherlands successfully decreased the number of unaccompanied minor 
asylum-seekers crossing the Dutch border, and was able to significantly speed up 
the asylum procedures.996 The Delegation explained that ‘Unaccompanied minors 
whose application has been rejected may be granted, due to their status as a minor, 
the temporary status of refugee. They are then placed in an institution in which, in 
accordance with the laws on compulsory education, they receive education equivalent 
in content and quality to that of mainstream schools but taught in English, with the 
purpose to establish a period in which concerned parties may return them to their 
country of origin. (…) In concern for the well-being of these children, they are offered 
a variety of activities, sports and others. The dialogue with refugee organisations is 
constant and they are in good contact with Parliamentarians to express their views.’997 
This explanation was not satisfactory, for in its Concluding Observations, the 
993 CRC/C/Q/NLD/2, 27 October 2003, Sections A11 (c) and BIV.
994 CRC/C/RESP/48, 16 December 2003, Section BVIII (a) (1).
995 Mr Kotrane, CRC/C/SR.929, 23 January 2004, Section 55, original text published in French: ‘que 
la définition que donne le droit néerlandais d’un «demandeur d’asile» n’est pas conforme à l’Article 22 de la 
Convention ni aux autres normes internationales pertinentes, et qu’en matière d’accueil des mineurs non 
accompagnés demandeurs d’asile l’État partie a adopté une politique plus sévère privilégiant le retour de ces 
enfants dans leur pays d’origine.’
996 Mr Ter Kuile, CRC/C/SR.929, 23 January 2004, Section 69.
997 Mr Ter Kuile, CRC/C/SR.929, 23 January 2004, Section 70. Original text published in French: ‘Les 
mineurs non accompagnés dont la demande a été rejetée peuvent se voir accorder, en raison de leur qualité 
de mineur, le statut de réfugié à titre provisoire. Ils sont alors placés en institution où, conformément à la loi 
sur l’enseignement obligatoire, ils suivent un enseignement équivalant en contenu et en qualité à celui des 
établissements ordinaires mais dispensé en anglais, l’objectif recherché étant de permettre à terme aux intéressés 
de retourner dans leur pays d’origine. ... Dans le souci du bien-être de ces mineurs, on leur propose diverses 
activités, sportives et autres. Le dialogue avec les organisations de réfugiés est constant et elles se sont ainsi 
entretenues avec les parlementaires pour exposer leurs vues.
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Committee again expressed its concern ‘that in the Netherlands the definition of an 
unaccompanied minor seeking asylum does not conform to international standards and 
it may make access to basic services more difficult for the child while in the country...’998 
Therefore, among other things, the Committee urged the Netherlands to ‘review 
the Aliens Act of 2001 and its application to ensure full conformity with international 
standards applicable to refugees and to the Convention.’999
In their third report, the Netherlands reported that indeed some changes were made 
in the wordings of the Aliens Act. For instance, the definition of an ‘unaccompanied 
minor’ was revised, and now defined more broadly, so that any minor asylum-
seeker ‘who is not accompanied by a parent or legal guardian is eligible for special leave 
to remain if it is found that he or she is not eligible for refugee status.’1000 Also, some 
other asylum procedure details were adapted for the benefit of unaccompanied 
minor foreigners, especially concerning the duration of the asylum procedures.1001 
Elsewhere, reference was made to a Court ruling that led to changes in legislation 
regarding the entitlements of a legally residing foreign child in the Netherlands to 
social assistance: ‘On 24 January 2006 the Central Appeals Tribunal of Public Service 
and Social Security Matters1002 made a decision to the effect that children residing 
legally in the Netherlands with no residence permit are entitled to social assistance 
from the Government. With effect from 1 January 2007 these children are eligible for 
an allowance equal to the standard amount of social assistance for single young people 
below the age of 21. The Benefits for Specific Categories of Aliens Order has been 
amended to this effect. This is a specific scheme for certain categories of aliens, not 
general social assistance.’1003 Furthermore, in the third report, reference was made 
to several initiatives to improve the situation of minor asylum-seekers, including 
the establishment of reception centres in developing countries to house children 
who unsuccessfully requested asylum in the Netherlands, in which the minors 
received food, education and healthcare until they reach adulthood.1004 It was 
on the other hand reported that in the asylum procedure, as a last resort, aliens 
could be held in detention.1005 While unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers below 
twelve would not be placed in detention, and it was strived for that accompanied 
minors would not be held in detention, possibly together with their parent(s), the 
possibility could not be entirely ruled out.1006 The Committee appreciated the 
998 CRC/C/15/Add.227, 30 januari 2004, Section 53.
999 CRC/C/15/Add.227, 30 januari 2004, Section 54.
1000 CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Section 389.
1001 CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Sections 390-393.
1002 Apparently, the reference concerns the ruling of the Central Court of Appeal, 24 January 2006, LJN 
AV0197, discussed in Section 4.6.
1003 CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Section 311.
1004 CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Sections 394-398.
1005 CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Section 423.
1006 CRC/C/NLD/3, 23 July 2008, Sections 423-428; see also: Mr Rouvoet, CRC/C/SR.1377, 23 January 
2009, Section 87.
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changes in legislation concerning unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers,1007 but 
expressed its ongoing concerns about the discrimination against foreigners and 
asylum-seekers,1008 and the occasional detention of minor asylum-seekers.1009
9.4 The CEDAW reports and the right to food
Before 2013, the Netherlands had submitted five,1010 Aruba five1011 and the 
Netherlands Antilles four1012 reports on the implementation of the CEDAW, in 
accordance with Article 18 CEDAW. Although Article 12 CEDAW is closely related 
to the right to food (Chapter 3), the right is not very often discussed in particular 
in the periodic reports and subsequent procedures (Section 9.4.1). However, 
one closely related issue, that is the Dutch policies towards asylum-seekers and 
foreign residents, was discussed in detail, also in the context of ECOSOC rights 
as embedded in the CEDAW (Section 9.4.2).
9.4.1 The right to food in the CEDAW reports
In view of Article 12 (2) CEDAW, the focus of the reports was not on issues that 
are directly related to the right to food. The reporting guidelines as adopted by the 
Committee on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women do 
not necessarily request Member States to discuss food related issues.1013 Also, the 
wordings of the Provision imply a focus on healthcare. Consequentially, the majority 
of the reporting concerned issues such as the quality of healthcare, financial support 
in the field of healthcare, equal treatment of women in healthcare, the access of 
ethnic minorities to healthcare, and the promotion and use of contraceptives for 
birth control purposes and/or in the fight against AIDS. Only occasionally, food-
related issues were discussed. For instance, policies and data on (the promotion 
1007 CRC/C/NLD/CO/3, 27 March 2009, Section 12.
1008 CRC/C/NLD/CO/3, 27 March 2009, Sections 26-27.
1009 Ms. Khattab, CRC/C/SR.1377, 23 January 2009, Section 8; CRC/C/NLD/CO/3, 27 March 2009, 
Sections 67-68.
1010 CEDAW/C/NET/l, 7 April 1993 (with an updating supplement CEDAW/C/NET/1/Add.3, 18 October 
1993); CEDAW/C/NET/2, 15 March 1999; CEDAW/C/NET/3, 22 November 2000; CEDAW/C/NLD/4, 
10 February 2005; CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008. It should be noted that the Committee on 
the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women discussed and considered the second and third 
periodic report of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba in one session.
1011 CEDAW/C/NET/1/Add.2, 30 June 1993; CEDAW/C/NET/2/Add.2, 15 March 2000; CEDAW/C/
NET/3/Add.1, 27 October 2000; CEDAW/C/NLD/4/Add.1, 7 June 2005; CEDAW/C/NLD/5/Add.1, 3 
September 2009.
1012 CEDAW/C/NET/1/Add.1, 17 September 1993; CEDAW/C/NET/2/Add.1, 15 March 1999; CEDAW/C/
NET/3/Add.2, 22 November 2000; CEDAW/C/NLD/4/Add.2, 19 May 2009; CEDAW/C/NLD/5/Add.2, 
19 May 2009.
1013 HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1/Add.2, 5 May 2003.
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of) breastfeeding,1014 nutrition during (and after) pregnancy,1015 unhealthy eating 
habits, and education on/the promotion of a healthy diet1016 were recurring topics 
that were discussed in the various reports of the Netherlands, Aruba and the 
Netherlands Antilles.
9.4.2 The rights of foreign women in the CEDAW reports
9.4.2.1 The initial report
Also in the context of the CEDAW, the status of foreign women is frequently 
discussed. In the initial report, the Netherlands stated that ‘as regards granting 
Dutch nationality to foreigners (naturalisation) or granting residence rights to stay in 
the country, Dutch law does not make a distinction between men and women.’1017 
Nevertheless, it was reported that increasing attention was paid to the situation 
of women in application procedures for residence permit, especially regarding 
family reunion of migrant workers, the abuse of asylum procedures for human 
trafficking, and unawareness amongst foreign women of the possibility to apply 
for a residence permit in their own right.1018 Furthermore, the report focussed 
on the policies regarding women refugees who were victim of sexual violence. 
Inter alia the appointment of female liaison officials for interviewing the refugee 
women was reported, and the policy on the evaluation of motives for fleeing 
the country of origin included that sexual violence ‘could constitute grounds for 
admission as a refugee if the individual has a well-founded fear of persecution by the 
authorities of the country of origin, or of the authorities failing to be able or willing 
to offer protection against serious acts of violence or persecution by the individual’s 
fellow nationals.’1019 In addition, women who were the victim of sexual violence 
but could not be granted a refugee status could be ‘given exceptional leave to remain 
in the country if there are pressing humanitarian reasons which militate against an 
individual being sent back to her country of origin.’1020 In addition, it was reported 
1014 CEDAW/C/NET/l, 7 April 1993, Sections 535, 543-550 (updated: CEDAW/C/NET/1/Add.3, 18 
October 1993, p. 7-8); CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 30; the Netherlands Antilles: CEDAW/C/
NET/2, 15 March 1999, p. 68; CEDAW/C/NET/2/Add.1, 15 March 1999, p 103; CEDAW/C/NET/3/Add.2, 
22 November 2000, pp. 28-29; CEDAW/C/NLD/5/Add.2, 19 May 2009, p. 47; Aruba: CEDAW/C/NET/1/
add.2, 30 June 1993, especially p. 63; CEDAW/C/NET/3/Add.1, 27 October 2000, p. 24; CEDAW/C/
NLD/4/Add.1, 7 June 2005, p.12; CEDAW/C/NLD/5/Add.1, 3 September 2009, p. 10.
1015 CEDAW/C/NET/l, 7 April 1993, Section 575; the Netherlands Antilles: CEDAW/C/NET/1/Add.1, 
17 September 1993, p. 56.
1016 CEDAW/C/NET/2/Add.1, 15 March 1999, p.42; CEDAW/C/NLD/4, 10 February 2005, p. 75; 
CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 90, 95; the Netherlands Antilles: CEDAW/C/NET/2/Add.1, 
15 March 1999, p. 42; CEDAW/C/NLD/5/Add.2, 19 May 2009, p. 39; Aruba: CEDAW/C/NET/2/Add.2, 
15 March 2000, p.45; CEDAW/C/NLD/4/Add.1, 7 June 2005, p.13.
1017 CEDAW/C/NET/l, 7 April 1993, Section 453.
1018 CEDAW/C/NET/l, 7 April 1993, Sections 453-548.
1019 CEDAW/C/NET/l, 7 April 1993, Section 277, see also Section 456 concerning female asylum-seekers 
in general.
1020 CEDAW/C/NET/l, 7 April 1993, Section 277.
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that The Refugee Healthcare Centre of the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural 
Affairs was responsible to ensure adequate healthcare facilities, with a focus on 
the field of sexual violence.1021 Also, measures to prevent circumcision, aimed 
at refugees and asylum-seekers were discussed in the supplement to the initial 
report.1022 During the sessions with the Committee1023 as well as in its General 
Observations, the status of asylum-seekers/foreign women was not significantly 
discussed.1024
9.4.2.2 The second periodic report
In their second periodic report, the Netherlands reported on a new assimilation 
policy that includes the obligation of newcomers to sign an assimilation contract, 
with the purpose ‘to promote the assimilation of newcomers and in particular to 
improve their position in the labour market.’ The policy is especially aimed at women 
who enter the Netherlands for the purpose of founding or reuniting a family, for 
they were often facing more difficulties in assimilating compared to men.1025 
Furthermore, the report introduces the new Linkage Act that links the immigration 
policy with social services policies. One of the results from this new legislation is 
that ‘The Linkage Act bars illegal immigrants from claiming welfare benefits.’1026 The 
Government then summed up the different consequences in the field of social 
benefits for different types of aliens residing in the Netherlands:
The bill to amend the Aliens Act in order to take account of the Linkage Act 
defines three categories of aliens:
1. legal aliens: in principle entitled to all social services;
2. illegal aliens: entitled under the Linkage Act only to education for their 
minor children and medical assistance in emergencies;
3. lawfully resident aliens: people whose applications for residence are still 
being processed. Under the new Linkage Act people applying for residence 
for the first time will not be entitled to welfare benefits while waiting 
for their applications to be processed. People who have previously been 
lawfully resident in the Netherlands will be entitled to benefits during 
the procedure.1027 
1021 CEDAW/C/NET/l, 7 April 1993, Section 278.
1022 CEDAW/C/NET/1/Add.3, 18 October 1993, pp. 9-10.
1023 CEDAW/C/SR.234, 25 January 1994; CEDAW/C/SR.239, 4 February 1994.
1024 A/49/38, 12 April 1994.
1025 CEDAW/C/NET/2, 15 March 1999, p. 47.
1026 CEDAW/C/NET/2, 15 March 1999, pp. 47-48.
1027 CEDAW/C/NET/2, 15 March 1999, p. 48.
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However, with regard to these three basic rules, some exceptions exist regarding 
certain types of benefits (mainly education, healthcare and legal assistance) for 
certain individuals, mostly children:
•	 Children of compulsory school age cannot be refused access to schooling 
on the ground that they are not lawfully resident.
•	 Healthcare safeguards: children of illegal immigrants are fully entitled to 
be vaccinated under national vaccination programmes, and both children 
and adults are entitled to medical assistance against infectuous diseases. 
Under the human rights conventions, the Dutch authorities are obliged to 
provide the best possible healthcare and to do so without charge where 
the recipients of the care cannot pay for it themselves.
•	 Legal assistance under the Legal Aid Act: the question of whether or 
not a person is legally resident has no bearing on the granting of free 
legal assistance under the Legal Aid Act. In other words, an immigrant 
is entitled to free legal assistance not only in connection with an asylum 
application or appeal against expulsion but also for other civil, criminal 
and administrative proceedings.1028
Furthermore, the Netherlands reported on the particularities of the status and 
asylum procedure regarding women with a foreign partner or husband; women 
with a dependent right of residence; women asylum-seekers and women without 
a right of residence.1029 Regarding the latter category, it was indeed reported, in 
line with the aforementioned amendments to the Aliens Act, that these women 
have the same legal position compared to men in that situation, meaning thus 
that they have no entitlements to any social benefits. It was reported that women 
in that position are more likely to be victim of abuse or ill-treatment, such as 
human trafficking. Therefore, it was underlined that a separate Chapter of the 
Aliens Act focusses on the issue of human trafficking, with the purpose to facilitate 
the investigation and prosecution of cases of trafficking women and to provide 
assistance to the victims.1030 The above was not discussed during the sessions 
with the Committee1031 or in its Concluding Observations.1032
1028 CEDAW/C/NET/2, 15 March 1999, p. 48.
1029 CEDAW/C/NET/2, 15 March 1999, pp. 48-53.
1030 CEDAW/C/NET/2, 15 March 1999, p. 53. See also the related discussion in: CEDAW/C/SR.513, 7 
September 2001, Sections 3 and 10, and the Concluding Observations of the Committee: A/56/38, 31 
October 2001, Sections 211-212.
1031 CEDAW/C/SR.512, 5 September 2001; CEDAW/C/SR.513, 7 September 2001.
1032 A/56/38, 31 October 2001.
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9.4.2.3 The third periodic report
In the third periodic report, no significant additional information was provided 
on the status of asylum-seekers in the Netherlands, nor was there any subsequent 
debate concerning the matter that is worth mentioning.1033
9.4.2.4 The fourth periodic report
Also in the fourth periodic report, the Netherlands reported on their asylum policies, 
and discussed into more detail the particularities concerning the procedures for 
asylum applications of women, especially in the context of a resident who is 
dependant on the residence permit of the partner.1034 In the List of Issues and 
subsequent replies, the Dutch asylum procedures were not discussed.1035 During the 
sessions with the Committee however, the Dutch asylum procedures were discussed 
into detail. It was underlined by the Dutch Delegation that in the Netherlands, an 
illegally residing alien had no entitlements to social benefits at all, except in cases 
of a medical emergency, or a minor (who had the right to education, regardless 
of his/her residence status). Also, it was underlined that aliens who were the 
victim of honour-related violence could apply for residence, and could be granted 
access to shelter.1036 Members of the Committee were especially worried about 
the number of illegally residing women in the Netherlands that were engaged 
in prostitution. In that context, the question was raised ‘how illegal migrants who 
reported on trafficking to the authorities could enjoy the protection and assistance 
recommended in human rights standards.’1037 The Dutch Delegation replied that 
victims of human trafficking could, based on that, apply for a residence permit, 
although their cooperation in Court proceedings against the perpetrators was 
required. Also, the Delegate discussed several measures to prevent the relatively 
vulnerable underaged asylum-seekers from being exploited.1038 In this context, 
there appeared to be doubts however, regarding the fact that sexual abuse was truly 
a recognised ground for granting the status of refugee.1039 The Dutch Delegation 
replied to this by stating that ‘while the Aliens Act 2000 did not recognise fear of 
sexual violence or of honour killings as specific grounds for asylum, several Sections 
of the Aliens Act dealt with gender-related persecution and provided for a gender-
inclusive approach to asylum applications that was fully in compliance with United 
Nations gender guidelines.’1040 In its Concluding Observations, the Committee took 
1033 CEDAW/C/NET/3, 22 November 2000.
1034 CEDAW/C/NLD/4, 10 February 2005, pp. 49-50.
1035 CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/4, 4 August 2006 (see for the written replies: CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/4/Add.1, 27 
October 2006).
1036 Mrs Bleeker, CEDAW/C/SR.767 (B), 5 March 2007, Section 27.
1037 Mrs Chutikul, CEDAW/C/SR.767 (B), 5 March 2007, Section 51.
1038 Mrs Bleeker, CEDAW/C/SR.767 (B), 5 March 2007, Sections 62-64. See also the question posted by 
Mrs Begum, Section 55.
1039 Mrs Tavares da Silva, CEDAW/C/SR.768 (B), 2 February 2007, Section 22.
1040 Mrs Van der Zaal-Van Bommel, CEDAW/C/SR.768 (B), 2 February 2007, Section 30.
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a mild approach towards the Dutch asylum policies. Besides several requests for 
additional data on the status of asylum-seekers in the Netherlands, the Committee 
expressed its concern about the procedure regarding the application for a residence 
permit in cases of human trafficking, and ‘calls upon the State Party to provide for 
the extension of temporary protection visas, reintegration and support services to all 
victims of trafficking, including those who are unable or unwilling to cooperate in the 
investigation and prosecution of traffickers.’1041
9.4.2.5 The fifth periodic report
In their fifth periodic report, the recommendation of the Committee was recalled, 
and the Netherlands explained that any foreign individual who claims to be a 
victim of human trafficking, and who does not derive a permit to reside in the 
Netherlands based on his/her nationality (mostly Dutch or European Community 
nationalities: they are protected and have entitlements to social benefits under 
different legislation), could make use of the so called B9-regulation. Based on this 
regulation, the victim has a consideration period of three months, during which 
he or she will receive aid and support, in which he/she must decide whether to 
‘cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of the human traffickers.’1042 When 
the victim does not choose to cooperate, only ‘in extremely distressing cases there 
is also the option of the State Secretary of Justice granting a victim of human trafficking 
residence on purely humanitarian grounds, in other words, in cases in which it is clear 
that the person is a victim, but the victim cannot cooperate or is scared to do so.’1043 
In addition, it was reported that ‘The option of invoking this so-called discretionary 
power existed before, but was rarely used. In 2007 organisational changes were 
implemented at the IND (Immigration and Naturalisation Service) and agreements 
were made with aid providers to guarantee that these humanitarian cases are actively 
and more broadly submitted to the State Secretary so that he can give his opinion on 
each case.’1044 In case the victim would decide to cooperate, a residence permit 
was granted for the duration of the period. Then, when the prosecution procedure 
would lead to the conviction of the human trafficker, ‘the victim can be offered 
continued residence in the Netherlands.’1045Apparently, this is not a standard norm, 
for later it was stated that ‘the rule applies that after expiration of the B9 permit it 
will be evaluated whether a return to the country of origin is an option.’ In case of a 
prosecution procedure that would take longer than three years, the victim could 
also apply for a continued residence, even when the case was not closed yet.1046 
In this context, the Netherlands reported that increasingly underaged asylum-
seekers entered the Netherlands who were suspected to be a victim of human 
1041 CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/4, 2 February 2007, Sections 23-24.
1042 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 63.
1043 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 63.
1044 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, pp. 63-64.
1045 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 64.
1046 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 64.
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trafficking. A number of them however then disappeared from the reception 
centres, most likely returning back in the hand of their traffickers. To this end, 
‘a policy has gradually been developed for receiving minor foreign nationals who are 
at risk of human trafficking in a closed reception facility, which reduces the risk of 
them disappearing. A ‘closed reception’ pilot has now being started up for all minor 
foreign nationals of whom it is suspected that they were brought to the Netherlands for 
the purpose of being traded.’1047 Also, improvements were reported on the application 
procedures for women who were victims of (threatened) honour-related violence, 
and victims of domestic violence without a residence permit: based on an amended 
regulation, ‘they may be eligible for financial support and health insurance, on the 
condition that they submit an application for a residence permit (which gives them 
lawful residence) and reside in a women’s shelter. The intention of opening up the 
Regulation to this group is to eliminate a possible obstruction, in the financial sense, 
with regard to access to women’s support.’1048 Furthermore, in the report several 
foreign policies in which the Netherlands strived to promote equality between 
men and women abroad were discussed,1049 and in that context it was proudly 
reported that ‘for many years the Netherlands have played a leading role when it 
comes to the promotion of women’s rights’.1050 In addition, regarding illegally residing 
foreigners, the Netherlands explained that the fact that the (earlier mentioned) 
Linkage Act (Dutch: Koppelingswet) in which entitlements to social security were 
connected to residence status, was one of the reasons not to sign and ratify the 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Families, as recommended by the Committee,1051 for the Linkage Act does 
make a distinction between legally and illegally residing foreigners.1052 It is obvious 
that the Committee was not convinced that alien women that were victim of 
sexual abuse or human trafficking were treated in line with the CEDAW and other 
international human rights documents. The Committee expressed its concern 
that in view of the revised, accelerated, asylum procedures ‘women are often unable 
to relate experiences of rape or other traumatic incidents.’1053 Also, the Committee 
asked to ‘please indicate the measures taken to ensure that women victims of trafficking 
are properly identified and are no longer held in alien detention without assistance 
and access to the protective services to which they are entitled. Please also indicate 
whether minors who are victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation have access to 
specialised institutions.’1054 To this, the Netherlands responded by underlining that 
‘there are various ways in which victims of trafficking, domestic violence and honour-
1047 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 64.
1048 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 24.
1049 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, pp. 27-32.
1050 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 29.
1051 CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/4, 2 February 2007, Section 43.
1052 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, pp. 31-32. As stated above, almost identical wordings as 
used in the combined fourth and fifth report on the implementation of the ICESCR: E/C.12/NLD/4-5, 
17 July 2009, Sections 8-9.
1053 CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5, 13 March 2009, Section 22.
1054 CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5, 13 March 2009, p. 28.
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related violence can obtain residence permits to protect them from further violence, 
irrespective of their immigration status and ethnic origin.’ The Netherlands explained 
that in general, an applicant for asylum who was (or fears to become) a victim of 
such violence, would have to demonstrate that his/her own Government is 
incapable of providing the required protection, but that ‘the Aliens Act Implementation 
Guidelines specifically mention domestic violence as a ground of asylum for immigrants 
from certain countries where there is a link between domestic violence and honour-
related violence, discrimination against women or the absence of protection by the local 
authorities.’1055 A further specification is then provided with the description of 
the possible procedures for the application of regular (non-asylum) residence 
permits, depending on the sort of violence and residence status in order to receive 
a residence permit.1056 Furthermore, the Netherlands responded to the concern 
expressed by the Committee that, especially in the newer, accelerated procedures, 
women who were victim of (sexual) violence could not adequately refer to their 
situation. The Netherlands in response stated that when the first asylum application, 
that lasted 48 hours, was rejected, it was always possible to submit a second 
application. Besides that, it was expected that the 48-hour procedure would be 
replaced by a procedure of 8 days. Regarding the psychological or medical status 
of the women involved in the procedure, it was reported that it was standard 
procedure to offer all asylum-seekers a medical check ‘so that their condition can 
be taken into account during the asylum procedure.’ In addition, the Netherlands 
underlined that the Dutch asylum procedures were gender-sensitive, in the sense 
that violence against women was a standard ground for granting asylum or a 
normal residence permit.1057 During the sessions with the Committee, only some 
formal aspects of the procedures were briefly discussed.1058 In its Concluding 
Observations, the Committee, now in some firmer wordings, ‘considers that even 
if extended to eight days, as envisaged by the Netherlands, the short length of the 
1055 CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5/Add.1, 19 October 2009, p. 15.
1056 This list is provided in the replies, although most particularities of the procedures have already been 
discussed above: ‘(a) victims of domestic violence or honour-related violence who have a dependent right of 
residence may be granted a residence permit in their own right within three years on contacting the police and 
producing confirmation of the violence (for example from a women’s shelter, a doctor or social services); after 
three years of residence a dependent residence permit may be replaced by a permit for continued residence, 
in which case no proof of violence is necessary; (b) victims of domestic violence who are resident illegally in 
the Netherlands may apply for a residence permit only on humanitarian grounds based on the specific and 
individual circumstances of the case; (c) victims of honour-related violence who are resident illegally in the 
Netherlands may be granted a residence permit if information provided by a specialised police unit establishes 
that they are under threat of violence in the Netherlands and cannot safely return to their country of origin; 
(d) victims of trafficking who are resident illegally in the Netherlands may be granted a residence permit (a ‘B9 
permit’) if they cooperate with the judicial authorities for the duration of the proceedings against the perpetrator.’ 
See: CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5/Add.1, 19 October 2009, p. 16.
1057 CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5/Add.1, 19 October 2009, p. 25.
1058 See the questions of Mrs Chutikul, Mrs Patten, CEDAW/C/SR.916, 3 March 2010, Sections 49-50, 
53, and the reply of Mrs Bleeker, CEDAW/C/SR.916, 3 March 2010, Section 61. See furthermore, the 
questions of Mrs Awori, CEDAW/C/SR.917, 18 March 2010, Sections 57-58, and the reply of Mrs Dijksma, 
CEDAW/C/SR.917, 18 March 2010, Section 63.
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accelerated asylum procedure remains unsuitable for vulnerable groups, including 
women victims of violence and unaccompanied children, and therefore urges the State 
Party to introduce in the procedure the possibility for women victims of violence and 
unaccompanied minors to fully explain their claims and to present evidence on their 
situation at a later stage. The Committee also urges the State Party to provide asylum-
seekers with suitable accommodation during the entire review of their case, including 
during the appeal phase.’1059 Also, it was urged to include (sexual) violence against 
women as an official ground for asylum, since currently they are still subdued to 
a margin of appreciation of the authorities involved. Furthermore, the Committee 
expressed its concerns regarding the access to healthcare of undocumented female 
asylum-seekers, due to a lack of information concerning the procedures.1060
9.4.3 Direct applicability of ECOSOC rights in the CEDAW reports
The matter of direct applicability was hardly discussed during the reporting 
procedures of the Netherlands Antilles1061 and Aruba, but was discussed in 
detail concerning several periodic reports and the subsequent procedures of the 
Netherlands.
9.4.3.1 The second and third periodic report
The direct applicability of the CEDAW was discussed for the first time during the 
sessions with the Committee, concerning the second and third periodic report 
of the Netherlands.1062 One Committee Member asked the question whether an 
individual could bring a case that was transmitted to the Committee on Equal 
Treatment ‘before a Court in order to obtain a binding decision, if they were dissatisfied 
1059 CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5, 5 February 2010, Section 41.
1060 CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5, 5 February 2010, Section 47.
1061 In their fourth periodic report, the Netherlands Antilles, in the context of Article 11 CEDAW, made 
reference to one Court case of the Supreme Court, involving Antilleans, in which the direct effect of an 
equivalent Provision – Article 7 ICERSCR – was discussed: ‘In a case involving Antilleans, the Supreme 
Court (Hoge Raad; HR) held that discriminating between married and unmarried persons with respect to 
payment was incompatible with Article 7 of the ICESCR. It emerges from case law (HR 7 May 1993, no. 259) 
that Article 7 is not directly applicable, but that guaranteeing equal payment for equal work is an objective 
that the Government must work to achieve. It should not therefore be too readily assumed that there is a 
reasonable and objective justification for differences in payment.’ A seemingly contradicting Section, in 
which it is not entirely clear to what Court case is referred in which the Supreme Court ruled that a 
certain discrimination was incompatible with Article 7 ICESCR. As demonstrated in Chapter 8, there 
are numerous cases in which a not direct effect was accepted of Article 7 ICESCR, and not only ruled by 
the Supreme Court, but also by the Court of First Instance of the Netherlands Antilles. It is remarkable 
that in the report furthermore a reference was made to Supreme Court, 7 May 1993, NJ 1995, 259, in 
which the direct effect was explicitly denied.
1062 While the second and third periodic reports were submitted separately, the Committee discussed 
both reports during one series of sessions with the Dutch delegation.
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with the non-binding decision of the Commission.’1063 The Dutch Delegation simply 
replied ‘that individuals had the right to do so.’1064
9.4.3.2 The fourth periodic report
During the sessions with the Committee on the fourth periodic report, one 
Committee Member was ‘interested in knowing the status of the Convention in the 
Courts, since some ambiguity seemed to prevail with regard to the application of 
the Convention in domestic law.’1065 The Dutch Delegation replied, with similar 
arguments as used in the discussions of direct applicability of the ICESCR that 
‘the Netherlands did not challenge the concept that the Convention was legally binding. 
However, the question of its direct application to individuals was a separate issue. 
According to the Constitution of the Netherlands, the nature of a Provision was the 
decisive factor in determining whether it was binding on all persons. Depending on 
their content, international Provisions might be directly applied if they were binding 
on all persons. The Constitution further provided that international standards that 
were directly applicable to individuals had priority over national law. Certain criteria 
had been established under case law to determine whether treaty Provisions had direct 
application. National Courts had the final say on issues of direct effect and were 
responsible for decisions on the direct applicability of international law. In such cases, 
the Courts could decide whether a national regulation could be deemed inapplicable if 
it conflicted with international treaty Provisions. The Government was of the opinion 
that, by virtue of their content, only some of the Provisions of the Convention could be 
considered binding on all persons. The Convention as a whole was, of course, binding 
on the Netherlands as a State Party.’1066 A Committee Member understood this 
statement as that the Netherlands considered the Convention binding in nature, 
but the direct applicability of the specific Provisions then was depending on the 
nature of the Provisions, that is that according to the Dutch Constitution the 
Provision must be binding on all persons to be directly applicable. Therefore, she 
asked to ‘clarify which Provisions of the substantive Articles of the Convention were 
directly applicable. She suggested that the Provisions that were not directly applicable 
should be incorporated into the domestic legislation.’1067 Interestingly, the Dutch 
Delegation seemed to make a stance that suggests that the CEDAW Provisions 
will likely be not directly applicable at all, by stating that ‘the Government believed 
that the Articles of the Convention implied duties for the State and were aimed at the 
executive and legislative branches of States Parties. National policy and legislation were 
needed for the full implementation of the Convention. Because the Provisions of the 
Convention were not aimed at persons or individuals, they had no direct effect. It was 
1063 Mr Melander, CEDAW/C/SR.513, 7 September 2001, Section 3.
1064 Mrs Verstand-Bogaert, CEDAW/C/SR.513, 7 September 2001, Section 9.
1065 Mrs Patten, CEDAW/C/SR.767 (B), 5 March 2007, Section 17. See also Mrs Šimonovic´ with a similar 
question in Section 20.
1066 Mrs Dopheide, CEDAW/C/SR.767 (B), 5 March 2007, Section 28.
1067 Mrs Šimonovic´, CEDAW/C/SR.767 (B), 5 March 2007, Section 43.
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therefore up to national Courts to decide on the application of those Provisions.’1068 It was 
added that ‘it was the obligation of States Parties to implement the Convention through 
national legislation and to follow up on that obligation in full.’1069 In its Concluding 
Observations, the Committee expressed to remain deeply concerned about the 
Dutch viewpoints on the possibility of direct applicability of the CEDAW, and 
therefore ‘calls upon the State Party to reconsider its position that not all the substantive 
Provisions of the Convention are directly applicable within the domestic legal order and 
to ensure that all of its Provisions are fully applicable in the domestic legal order. The 
Committee points out that by ratifying the Convention and its Optional Protocol, States 
Parties assume the obligation to provide for domestic remedies for alleged violations of 
any rights guaranteed to individuals by the Convention.’1070
9.4.3.3 The fifth periodic report
Indeed, in their fifth periodic report the Netherlands recalled the recommendation 
of the Committee, and once again explained their view on the direct effect of 
the CEDAW, without adding any significantly different arguments or new 
information.1071 However, it was reported that ‘As a result of the criticism from the 
CEDAW Committee and the General Meeting with the House of Representatives, the 
Minister for Emancipation sent a letter to the House of Representatives on the subject 
of the legal application of the Convention on 5 November 2007. The letter addresses the 
question whether stipulations in the UN Women’s Convention have direct effect in the 
Netherlands.’1072A reference was made to Aricle 93 CA that ‘stipulates that stipulations 
in Conventions have binding force if they can bind all individuals through their content. 
The more generally stipulations are formulated and the more active action on the part 
of the state they require, the less the question of direct effect. The question whether 
a stipulation binds everyone and therefore has direct effect is, in the final instance, 
determined by the Dutch Courts in individual cases.’1073 Interesting to note was the 
reference made to the SGP case that was in progress at the moment the report 
was submitted, and concerned Article 7 CEDAW.1074 Clearly, the explanation was 
unacceptable to the Committee that noted in its List of Issues ‘that the State Party 
continues to consider that it is the responsibility of the Judiciary to determine whether a 
particular Provision of the Convention is directly applicable in the legal order, although, 
by signing the Optional Protocol to the Convention, the State Party has recognised the 
individual right of complaint in relation to all the rights set forth in the Convention. 
1068 Mrs Dopheide, CEDAW/C/SR.767 (B), 5 March 2007, Section 47.
1069 Mr Licher, CEDAW/C/SR.767 (B), 5 March 2007, Section 48.
1070 CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/4, 2 February 2007, Sections 11-12.
1071 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, pp. 13-14.
1072 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 14.
1073 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 14.
1074 CEDAW/C/NLD/5, 24 November 2008, p. 14. See also Chapter 8, and the following Court rulings: 
Court of Appeal, ’s-Gravenhage, 7 September 2005, NJ 2005, 473; Court of Appeal, ’s-Gravenhage, 20 
December 2007, NJ 2008, 133; Council of State, 5 December 2007, AB 2008, 35; Supreme Court, 9 April 
2010, LJN BK4549.
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In this context, please indicate how the State Party envisages overcoming this legal 
inconsistency. Please also provide the Committee with the English translation of the 
letter sent on 10 December 2008 to Parliament on the applicability of the Convention.’1075 
The Dutch response however, implied the same type of arguments once more, 
although this time in some richer wordings. It was responded that ‘Contrary to 
the assumption underlying the question, there is not necessarily a legal inconsistency 
between considering it to be the responsibility of the Judiciary to determine whether a 
particular Provision of the Convention is directly applicable in the legal order and signing 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention, and thereby recognising the individual right 
of complaint in relation to all the rights set forth in the Convention. (…) the question 
of whether the State is bound by the United Nations Women’s Convention, should be 
distinguished from the question of whether Provisions of the Convention have direct 
effect within the State. The Netherlands are bound by international law to realise the 
rights set forth in the Convention for persons within its jurisdiction. (…) Although 
the question of whether a Provision has direct effect is ultimately determined in the 
Netherlands by the Dutch Courts in individual cases, this does not interfere with the 
individual right of complaint introduced by the Optional Protocol. If a Court decides 
in national proceedings that a particular Provision of the Convention is not directly 
applicable in the legal order, this would not prevent the individual concerned from 
filing a complaint with the Committee.’1076 The requested translation of the letter 
to Parliament was indeed added, but basically contained the same arguments 
that would justify not unambiguously recognising the possibility of direct effect 
of the CEDAW Provisions.1077 Again, during the sessions with the Committee, 
several Committee Members asked critical questions about the Dutch attitude 
regarding the direct applicability of the CEDAW.1078 Especially the explanation 
in the periodic report on the working of Article 93 was considered to be unclear. 
It must however generally be noted that the questions asked by the Committee 
Members were mostly repetitions of earlier asked (and answered) questions, and 
did not necessarily contribute to a more thorough or different response of the 
Dutch Delegation.1079 The Delegation however tried to convince the Committee 
that the CADEW had some effect in the Dutch domestic legal order, by referring 
to the SGP case that was still in progress and involved CEDAW rights.1080 It was 
underlined that ‘the State Party attached great importance to the Convention, some 
Articles of which were more directly applicable than others.’1081 In addition, one 
Member made a remarkable statement, by arguing ‘that the Charter for the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands required the Netherlands Antilles to harmonise its laws with those 
of the Netherlands, including international instruments ratified by the Netherlands, 
1075 CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5, 13 March 2009, Section 4.
1076 CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5/Add.1, 19 October 2009, p. 4.
1077 CEDAW/C/NLD/Q/5/Add.1, 19 October 2009, Annex 3.
1078 Mrs Jansing, Mrs Ameline, Mrs Šimonovic´, CEDAW/C/SR.916, 3 March 2010, Sections 20, 21, and 68.
1079 See for instance: Mrs Dreesen, CEDAW/C/SR.916, 3 March 2010, Section 37.
1080 Mrs Dijksma, CEDAW/C/SR.916, 3 March 2010, Section 75.
1081 Mrs Dijksma, CEDAW/C/SR.916, 3 March 2010, Section 75.
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while ensuring respect for the country’s autonomy and culture. Most of the Provisions 
of the Convention were directly applicable in the Netherlands Antilles, as evidenced by 
a Court decision in the 1990s establishing equal salaries for men and women. However, 
the Courts had a tendency to invoke European standards, and she suggested that 
efforts to promote awareness of the Convention might change that situation.’1082 This 
statement is rather obscure: it is unclear what is suggested by the fact that the 
Netherlands Antilles needs to harmonise their law with that of the Netherlands, 
including the ratified international instruments in relation to the direct effect 
of such instrument. In addition, it cannot possibly be deduced from one Court 
ruling, in which one Article was directly applied, that most CEDAW Articles are 
directly applicable. It is remarkable that during the sessions no further questions 
were asked about the direct effect of the CEDAW, especially considering the 
standard replies, and in addition the latter confusing statement. On the other 
hand, not surprisingly, in its Concluding Observations, the Committee ‘reiterates 
its concern that as a consequence of the position of the State Party, the Judiciary is 
left with the responsibility of determining whether a particular Provision is directly 
applicable and that consequently, insufficient measures have been taken to address 
discrimination against women and to incorporate all the Convention’s substantive 
Provisions into domestic laws’1083, and therefore ‘reiterates its call on the State Party 
to reconsider its position and to ensure that substantive Provisions of the Convention 
are fully applicable in the domestic legal order, in compliance with the obligation of 
the State Party to adopt measures against discrimination (including within the political 
party SGP) and to provide for domestic remedies for alleged violations of any rights 
guaranteed to individuals by the Convention.’1084
9.5 The Universal Periodic Review
Although the right to adequate food has not been significantly discussed in the two 
reporting cycles of the UPR, the Dutch asylum policy – which can be considered a 
related issue considering the Dutch case law on the right to food – was discussed 
extensively, touching similar aspects compared to the treaty reports and subsequent 
procedures.1085
However, in the context of the Universal Periodic Review, the matter of direct 
applicability was discussed occasionally. In their first national report, the 
Netherlands emphasised that the country traditionally attached great value to 
human rights, within their borders as well as abroad.1086 Therefore, many human 
1082 Mrs Leeflang, CEDAW/C/SR.916, 3 March 2010, Section 80.
1083 CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5, 5 February 2010, Section 12.
1084 CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/5, 5 February 2010, Section 13.
1085 See especially their reports: A/HRC/WG/6/1/NLD/1, 7 March 2008, pp. 13-15; A/HRC/WG.6/13/
NLD/1, 8 March 2012, pp. 17-20. Based on those reports, frequent questions were posed regarding the 
asylum procedures and treatment of foreigners in general during both cycles.
1086 A/HRC/WG/6/1/NLD/1, 7 March 2008, Section 1.
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rights are embedded in the Constitutional Act.1087 A second source for human 
rights is EU legislation and case law, for due to its supranational character, these 
standards are part of the Dutch legal order. Furthermore, ‘A third major source is the 
UN human rights conventions to which the Netherlands is party, along with, for example, 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the 
Council of Europe.’1088 Regarding the direct applicability of international human 
rights, the Netherlands reported that their Government had been criticised on 
more than one occasion in the past, for the fact that certain human rights would 
have no direct effect in the domestic legal order. This criticism was expressed 
by different actors, such as CSOs to UN treaty bodies, and basically concerned 
CEDAW and ICESCR rights. In their report, the Netherlands stated that:
A distinction should be made between the direct effect of Provisions of 
international law and the binding nature of Provisions of international treaties. 
The latter is beyond dispute. However the Netherlands have a qualified 
monistic legal system. In a monistic system the Courts must, in principle, 
apply not only national rules but also the Provisions of treaties and resolutions 
of international institutions, with the latter two categories of law prevailing 
if the domestic legislation is incompatible with them. The Dutch system 
is characterised as a ‘qualified’ monistic system because the Provisions of 
treaties and resolutions of international institutions can only be applied if 
they (a) are binding on all persons; and (b) have been published.’1089
Also here, the responsibility of the Courts was underlined: ‘Because Dutch Courts 
can apply the Provisions of treaties and the resolutions of international institutions 
without the need for implementing legislation they also have the authority to determine 
whether such Provisions or resolutions are formulated in general terms and the more 
action they require on the part of the state, the less likely the Courts are to rule that 
they have direct effect. Provisions of this kind give the state more latitude to make a 
variety of policy choices.’1090 Despite these statements of the Dutch Government, 
and the fact that NGOs also expressed their concerns about the issue in the UPR 
procedure,1091 the matter was not further discussed during the first cycle. In the 
second cycle, the issue of direct applicability was not addressed at all.1092 It must 
be noted here that the formats of the country reports and further procedure, as 
adopted by the Human Rights Council do not necessarily encompass the issue 
of direct applicability.1093
1087 A/HRC/WG/6/1/NLD/1, 7 March 2008, Sections 2 and 11.
1088 A/HRC/WG/6/1/NLD/1, 7 March 2008, Section 11.
1089 A/HRC/WG/6/1/NLD/1, 7 March 2008, Section 18.
1090 A/HRC/WG/6/1/NLD/1, 7 March 2008, Section 19.
1091 A/HRC/WG.6/1/NLD/2, 13 March 2008, Sections 3-4.
1092 See for the second national report: A/HRC/WG.6/13/NLD/1, 8 March 2012.
1093 See: A/HRC/DEC/6/102, 27 September 2007 (first cycle) and A/HRC/DEC/17/119, 19 July 2011 
(second cycle).
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9.6 Concluding remarks
Based on the above analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn.
Firstly, in general, when it concerns the reports on the implementation of the 
human rights treaties of the European part of the Kingdom, the major tendency 
is to report, in line with the intention expressed in the Parliamentary History on 
the ratification Bills of the treaties, the Netherlands, from the start, generously 
fulfil their implementing duties that come from ratifying the treaties. It must also 
be noted that from the reports and subsequent procedures, hardly any ambition 
was expressed to improve the implementation of the human rights concerned.
Secondly, most criticism expressed by the various treaty bodies on the Dutch 
reports, is not related to the implementation of ECOSOC rights in itself. Let alone 
some exceptions, the sound policies and regulations in the field of ECOSOC rights, 
or the high standard of living in the Netherlands, or – more in particular – the 
system of social security is not necessarily a reason for concern. Most criticism 
however is aimed at the fact that one of the most vulnerable groups in society does 
not have (full) access to this system of social security: foreigners that are currently 
awaiting their application for a residence permit, or illegally residing foreigners.
Thirdly, it is unambiguously clear that the Netherlands do not recognise the direct 
applicability of ECOSOC rights. Although the Dutch Delegations once in a while 
tried to convince the Committee that there is a difference between an obligation 
to implement a treaty and recognising its direct effect, or explained that it is – 
due to the Dutch Constitutional system – not the Government’s responsibility 
to recognise direct applicability, but a responsibility of the Courts instead, the 
Committees steadily urged the Member States to ensure the direct applicability 
of the treaty Provisions. Since the matter of direct effect was not discussed in 
view of the ICRC, it is a pity that the development of the Courts to use inter alia 
Article 27 ICRC as an interpretative standard was not discussed in the UN arena. 
It would be interesting to hear the opinion of the Committee in the Rights of the 
Child on this case law.
Fourthly, it can be questioned how serious the Netherlands is taking their reporting 
responsibilities. Besides the fact that the Dutch have the tendency to submit 
reports generously overdue, the recommendations of the various Committees 
are taken rather lightly, leading to an increasingly stiffer atmosphere during the 
reporting cycles, in which the Committees (especially the CESCR) use increasingly 
firmer wordings. In general, some questions of the Committees are answered 
only partially, or are even ignored.
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10.1. Introduction
In this Chapter, the findings of Chapters 4-9 will be summarised. Furthermore, the 
legal practice in the Netherlands will be compared with the reporting behaviour 
of the Dutch Government on the enforceability of the right to adequate food 
(Comparison II).
10.2 An obscure Constitutional system
Since 1953, the Netherlands have quite an obscure Constitutional system regulating 
the position and effect of Provisions under international law. This so-called ‘qualified 
monistic system’ embedded in Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution, enables 
the Courts to apply international Provisions directly, but only when they are 
binding on all persons and have been published. To be more precise, the function 
of Article 93 Constitutional Act is to determine what international legal standards 
are binding on individuals, while the function of Article 94 Constitutional Act is to 
regulate the relation between these internationally directly applicable standards 
and national legislation.
Especially the prerequisite that a Provision must be binding on all persons has 
led to much confusion, in particular with regard to the question whether the 
Government or the Courts have a final say in the matter. Officially, both the 
Government and the Courts agree that it is up to the Judiciary to finally decide 
whether or not a Provision is binding on all persons. It was however the intention 
of the Constitutional Legislator to establish a legal practice in which the Legislature 
would voice his opinion on direct applicability of international legal standards in 
its Parliamentary Documents. This is indeed done ever since by the Legislature 
when adopting a Bill on the ratification of human rights treaties.
10.3 The right to food invoked in the Dutch Courts
The international right to food is not a directly applicable human right in the 
Netherlands. Article 11 ICESCR seems to be completely non-enforceable. However, 
a case law seems to emerge in which ICRC standards – including Article 27 – are 
used as an interpretative norm that is used in the treaty conform interpretation of 
national legislation. As a result, the ICRC provisions had a significant effect on the 
verdicts. The claimants are usually minor asylum-seekers who lawfully reside in 
the Netherlands without a residence permit, and are in distressing humanitarian 
circumstances. Furthermore, Article 27 ICRC was used in a landmark ruling of the 
Supreme Court as an interpretative standard, in which the Court decided that the 
COA could not remove illegally residing children from its facilities, and thus provide 
for the child’s basic needs. However, these cases are still exceptions to the rule that 
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Article 27 is not applied, because it is considered not to be directly applicable. More 
than once, in rejecting the direct applicability of ECOSOC standards, reference was 
made to the Parliamentary Documents in which the Government, in its function 
of Legislator, expressed that in its view, direct applicability of the ICESCR treaty 
will not be possible. It seems thus that the Courts follow the lead of politics in 
order to determinate whether these rights could be directly invoked or not.
10.4 The Dutch position with regard to the right to food
At the time of ratification of the right to food in several treaty Provisions, the Dutch 
Government underlined that the Netherlands already fulfilled the obligations 
that follow from the ratification of this right. A practice that seems to be standard 
procedure in case of the ratification of any economic, social and cultural rights: a 
treaty Provision will only be ratified if the Dutch Legislature is of the opinion that 
the Netherlands already meet the obligations resulting from the human rights in 
question. If there is any doubt, the Provision will not be ratified, or ratified with 
reservations or interpretative declarations.
Also, during the process of the various reporting procedures that constitute part 
of the obligations coming forth from the ratification of international human rights 
treaties, the Netherlands seem to have no ambition to improve the recognition 
of human rights within their borders, which seems to be contradicting with the 
obligation of progressive realisation that can be found in various human rights 
treaties. Especially in the context of the ICESCR, this attitude led to increasing 
differences of opinion between the Dutch Government and the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, the Dutch Government does 
not seem to bother to seriously answer the questions of the treaty-based bodies 
that consider these reports, while the quality of the reports is more than once 
considered to be doubtful. In this light, it is noteworthy to emphasise the fact 
that the Section on the right to food in the combined 4th and 5th ICESCR report 
is almost entirely copied from the 3rd report.
The Dutch Government reported that within the Netherlands, there is far enough 
food of good quality and affordable for everyone, basically due to a sound system of 
social security. However, most cases in which the right to food is invoked concern 
asylum-seekers, who have no automatic access to this system of social security. 
This fact is therefore often discussed with and criticised by the Committees during 
the report cycles.
In general, it can be concluded that the Netherlands, in their reports, make a very 
clear distinction between on the one hand, civil and political rights, and on the 
other hand, economic, social and cultural rights, especially when it concerns the 
possibility of direct applicability: it is unambiguously clear that the Netherlands 
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do not recognise the direct applicability of ECOSOC rights. An approach that led 
to fierce debates during the reporting cycles.
It is in this light remarkable that the Dutch human rights ambition seems to be 
focussed externally, which is inter alia expressed in the Parliamentary Documents, 
where more than once the added value of the ratification of a human rights 
treaty was perceived to be that after ratification, the Netherlands could with more 
conviction address human rights issues in other countries.
10.5  The direct applicability of economic, social and 
cultural rights in the Netherlands
The Dutch Judiciary seems to follow the lead of politics when a decision must be 
made on the direct applicability of ECOSOC rights. According to the Legislature, 
civil and political rights in general are suitable for direct applicability, and ECOSOC 
rights are not, due to the fact that for the realisation of ECOSOC rights policy 
decisions must be made, which is the responsibility of politics instead of Courts. 
This point of view is quite persistently expressed by the Government in the various 
Explanatory Memorandums on the Bills on the ratification of the international 
human rights treaties, but also during the various reporting procedures. The 
Government expresses similar opinions in case of international treaties for specific 
groups that address at the same time civil and political as well as economic, social 
and cultural rights, albeit not always as specific as for instance the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the ratification Bill of the ICESCR. It appears that when the 
Government did express itself clearly on the direct applicability of human rights 
Provisions, normally, the Judiciary doesn’t hesitate to apply this view in its rulings. 
When the Government however is not so specific, the Courts appear to take the 
liberty in reaching their own conclusions with regard to the matter, based on 
arguments that are of a more practical nature and closer related to the case. This 
is clearly demonstrated with regard to the right to strike (Article 6 ESC), which is 
often referred to in literature when scholars address the issue of direct applicability 
of ECOSOC rights, or human rights in general.
Four main criteria can be distinguished in order to determine whether an 
international Provision containing human rights is directly applicable: (1) the 
intentions of the State Parties of the international document expressed during the 
negotiations preceding its final draft; (2) the nature and content of the Provision, 
as well as its wording; (3) the intentions of the national Legislature expressed in 
its Explanatory Memorandum; and (4) the existence of legislation that has the 
purpose of fulfilling the obligations coming forth from the Provision in question. 
The fourth criterion was only mentioned in the Parliamentary Documents of the 
Act of approval of the ICRC. It was hardly explained and has not been mentioned 
elsewhere since then. Furthermore, due to the various constitutional systems 
worldwide it seems unlikely that state parties will express their vision on direct 
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applicability during the negotiations preceding and international human rights 
document. This leaves criteria (2) and (3) as the criteria that truly matter. There 
seems to be a difference between on the one hand the hierarchy as explained by 
both the Dutch Legislature and the Judiciary on the one hand, and the hierarchy that 
is actually used by the Courts with regard to direct applicability of ECOSOC rights. 
Officially, the Courts should look at the nature and content of the Provisions, as 
well as their wording in the first place, and voluntarily use the expressed intention 
of the Legislature as a source of inspiration only. This research demonstrates that 
in situations in which the Legislature clearly expressed its view on the possibility of 
direct applicability of international ECOSOC standards, the Courts duly follow this 
interpretation without giving due consideration to the nature, content or wording 
of the Provision. Only when the Legislature is unclear in its vision, the Courts 
feel free to base their verdict on the nature, content and wording of the Article. 
This is most clearly demonstrated in the ‘railway-strike’ ruling, concerning the 
right to strike ex Article 6 ESC. This led to a very clear and consequent approach 
by the Judiciary, basically due to the fact that the right to strike as formulated in 
this particular Provision has characteristics of a civil or political right (due to the 
phrase ‘recognise’), and was clearly used as a substitute for failed attempts of the 
Legislature to agree on a Dutch Act that would regulate this right.
It is in this light noteworthy to mention that with regard to individual complaint 
procedures for international treaties in which ECOSOC rights are embedded, the 
Netherlands take a very cautious position, but in their pursuit for being known 
as a human rights defender in the international arena do not necessarily reject 
the idea, and officially support most initiatives. For instance, the Netherlands 
signed the OP-ICESCR. This leads to the contradicting situation in which the 
Netherlands officially support individual complaint procedures internationally, 
but nationally persist in rejecting the idea of direct applicability of international 
standards containing ECOSOC rights.
10.6  Comparing the legal practice with the reporting 
behaviour
In general, it can be concluded that the Netherlands, in their reports, are very clear 
about the distinction between on the one hand, civil and political rights, and on the 
other hand, economic, social and cultural rights, when it concerns the possibility 
of direct applicability. An approach that led to fierce debates during the reporting 
cycles. However, this being said, the Dutch reports are full with window-dressing 
when they try to paint a positive image of the Dutch implementation attempts 
of the ICESCR rights, including the substantive right to food. Simultaneously, 
the Dutch do not seem to be eager to answer critical questions, or to reflect on 
points for improvement. The Dutch attitude led to some remarkable statements 
on their domestic case law which are hardly in line with legal reality. It is for 
instance unclear, how the Dutch Government could come to the conclusion that 
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 275 
Evaluation and comparison
the Dutch judges are familiar with the General Comments of the CESCR, and also 
apply them, or that Article 11 ICESCR has any effect in Dutch case law. While in 
general the Committees will probably have a rather accurate impression of the 
status of Dutch case law, the Dutch reporting behaviour cannot be said to be in 





The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 279 
11.  The Belgian Constitutional System and 
the applicability of international legal 
standards
11.1 Introduction
Before analysing the Belgian Court law regarding the direct applicability of the 
right to adequate food, it is first necessary to explore the particularities of the 
Belgian Judiciary. As it will appear below, the organisation of the Judiciary is 
heavily influenced by the complexity of the Belgian trias politica, with three 
main Legislators sharing equal and exclusive powers. Due to this Constitutional 
organisation, one Court was established to rule in matters of competence, and 
evolved into a Constitutional Court, dealing with inter alia matters of human rights 
law. The right to food – and ECOSOC rights in general – is considered in the case 
law of especially this Court, which shows many characteristics of a Court of Last 
Instance. This Chapter will be dedicated to thoroughly explore the Constitutional 
context in which the Belgian Judiciary operates in relation to the Legislature. 
Therefore, firstly, the Belgian Legislature (Section 11.2) and the legislative process 
(Section 11.3) will be analysed, to get a better understanding in what context 
the Belgian Judiciary operates. Furthermore, of course, the Belgian Judiciary 
will be explored (Section 11.4), in which both the subjective litigation (Section 
11.4.1), and the objective litigation (Section 11.4.2) will be analysed, with special 
attention to the functioning of the Constitutional Court (Section 11.4.2). Also, 
the differences between the subjective and objective litigation will be discussed 
(Section 11.4.3). The functioning of international standards in the domestic legal 
order will be examined in Section 11.5, and finally, some conclusions will be 
drawn in Section 11.6.
11.2 The Belgian Legislature
Belgium has four language areas (Article 4 CA): the Dutch, French, German and 
the Brussels-Capital Language Area (the latter is both Dutch and French). Within 
the boundaries of the Dutch, French and German language area, the Government 
is obliged to communicate with its citizens in this language. In the Brussels-Capital 
Language Area however, all general communication is done in both Dutch and 
French, and communication with an individual will be in the language of his/
her choice.
Since the Constitutional reforms of 1970, the Federation is subdivided in 
Communities on the one hand and Regions on the other. The Communities were 
established to maintain the cultural identity of the different language groups in 
Belgium, and therefore geographically overlap with the language areas, except 
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for the Brussels-Capital Language Area, which falls under the authority of both 
the Dutch and the French Community.
Due to rather huge economic differences throughout Belgium, three Regions were 
established in order to facilitate a suitable economic approach in each different 
Region: the Flemish, Walloon and the Brussels-Capital Region. Geographically, 
the Flemish Region and the Dutch Language Area are the same, as well as the 
Brussels-Capital Region and the Brussels-Capital Language Area. The Walloon 
Region includes both the French and the German Language Area.
The Federation, the Communities and the Regions have legislative powers that 
are based on the principles of equality and exclusiveness. The Federal Legislator 
enacts Statutes, the Community and Region Legislators enact decrees, except for 
the Brussels-Capital Region Legislator, who enacts ordinances. These Acts require 
a majority in the relevant representation body (in most cases the Parliament 
involved, see Chapter IV, CA), except for the Brussels-Capital Region Legislator, 
who may only enact a law with a majority in both language groups. All Legislators 
may under circumstances make laws that require a 2/3rd majority, which are 
naturally of a higher order compared to Statutes, decrees and ordinances that 
require a normal majority (or a majority in both language groups). There is no 
hierarchy amongst Statutes, decrees and ordinances.
The federated areas are divided into provinces (except for the Brussels-Capital 
Region) and municipalities, that make provincial and community regulations 
concerning provincial and community matters that do not fall under the authority 
of the Federation, the Communities or the Regions.
11.3 The Belgian legislative process
A general principle is applied in Belgian law, which is that lower legislation may 
not be in violation with higher legislation. Therefore, it is important to understand 
the hierarchy of Belgian legislation, which is as follows: (1) international law; 
(2) Statutes, decrees and ordinances adopted with a 2/3rd majority; (3) normal 
Statutes, decrees and ordinances; (4) executive decisions from the Federation 
(Royal Decrees), the Communities and the Regions; (5) provincial regulations; 
and (6) municipal regulations. The Judiciary is therefore obliged not to apply 
lower legislations that conflict with higher legislation. However, the Constitutional 
Court is exclusively competent in reviewing Statutes, decrees and ordinances 
against Articles 10, 11, and 24 CA and other Constitutional Provisions defined by 
law (Article 142 CA, Sections 2 and 3).
With regard to international relations, the Federation, Communities and Regions 
are entitled to establish their own foreign policy and enter into international 
obligations as long as it falls within the scope of their substantive competences. 
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Belgium is however considered to be a single entity in international law, and will 
therefore be represented by the federation in international forums.
On the Federal level, the Legislator consists of the King and the Parliament. The 
King himself has very limited powers, but the cabinet carries the responsibilities for 
the King in the legislative process. Therefore, the Council of Ministers will speak 
‘in the name of the King.’ The Parliament consists of the House of Representatives 
(150 representatives that are elected directly by the electorate) and the Senate (40 
Senators that are directly elected, 21 community Senators, 10 co-opted Senators 
and a varying number of Senators appointed by law, which are normally the 
children of the King, see Article 67 Constitution). In the procedures of installment 
of both Houses, there is a strong emphasis on a proportional representation of 
all language groups.
The legislative process consists of four stages. In the first stage, the King (the 
cabinet), or one of the Members of Parliament use their right to initiative (Article 
75 Constitution). When the King (one or more Ministers) takes the initiative, and 
the preliminary draft is approved by the Council of Ministers, the Bill has to be 
submitted to the Council of State, which will make recommendations. When a 
Member of Parliament takes the initiative, a consultation of the Council of State 
is only under certain circumstances mandatory, for instance when one third of 
the relevant Chamber votes for such consultation. In such a case, the Chairman 
of the Chamber will ask the Council of State to submit its advice.
In the second stage, the Bill is discussed in Parliament (in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate). This will be done in one of the specialised 
commissions first, consisting of a number of Parliament Members. In both Houses 
such commissions are established. The Members of these commissions may propose 
amendments to the bill. Hereafter, the Bill will be discussed in a plenary session 
of the Chamber in question, and all Parliamentarians may propose amendments. 
Finally, the Chambers will vote on the bill and the proposed amendments. To 
pass a Chamber in case of a normal Bill, a majority of the Chamber must vote, 
and the majority of the voters must vote in favor of the bill. Members that vote 
have three options: ‘yes’, ‘abstain’ and ‘no.’ To pass a Chamber in case of a bill 
requiring a 2/3rd majority (also referred to as ‘special majority’ or ‘communitarian 
majority’), a majority of every language group in the Chamber must approve the 
Bill. From each language group, a majority must participate in the voting, and a 
majority of the voters must approve with the bill. If this is the case, then 2/3rd of 
all voters must approve of the Bill in order to let it pass the Chamber. In general, 
Bills that affect the relationship between the Federation, the Communities and 
the Regions will need a 2/3rd majority to pass a Chamber.1094
1094 See inter alia Articles 4 and 5 CA.
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The distribution of competences between the House of Representatives and the 
Senate during this stage in the legislative process differs per legal issue. There 
are three ways in which the legislative competences are divided. Firstly, the 
House of Representatives and the Senate have equal legislative powers (Article 
77 Constitution). A Bill will have to pass both Chambers. If one of the Chambers 
does not approve with the Bill, it will amend the Bill and send it back to the other 
Chamber, and vice versa, until both Chambers approve. For instance, ratification 
Bills of international treaties fall under this category. Secondly, the House of 
Representatives has sole competences, while the Senate has no powers (Article 
74 Constitution). For instance, the Federal Finance Act and Federal social security 
legislation fall under the competence of the House of Representatives only. Thirdly, 
the Senate serves as a reflection Chamber, but has no legislative powers (Article 
78 CA, see also: Articles 79-82 CA for procedural matters). In case the Senate 
decides to propose amendments to a bill, the House of Representatives may decide 
whether to accept these or not.
In the third stage, the Bill has been approved by Parliament, and will be presented 
to the King, who will ratify the Bill, together with a Minister of the cabinet (since 
the King himself has no or limited legislative responsibilities).
In the fourth stage, the King – this time in his capacity as Member of the executive 
power – will proclaim the Bill, ordering that the Bill shall be implemented in the 
Belgian legal order (Article 109 Constitution).
Finally, the proclaimed Bill will be published in the Belgian State Gazette (Belgisch 
Staatsblad). Unless arranged for otherwise, the Bill is a legally binding Act from 
the tenth day after its publication.
11.4 The Belgian Judiciary
In Belgium, the Judiciary consists of the Courts recognised in the Constitutional 
Act (Article 40), and bodies that are established by the Legislator (Article 146 CA) 
which are the Administrative Courts, the Council of State (Article 160 CA) and 
the Constitutional Court (Article 142 CA).
The Belgian Judiciary operates in two areas: a subjective litigation, in which the 
verdicts apply inter pares, and an objective litigation, in which the verdicts apply 
ergo omnes.
11.4.1 The Subjective Litigation
The Courts within the subjective litigation rule on disputes concerning civil and 
political rights. According to the Constitutional Act (Articles 144 and 145), the 
common Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes concerning civil rights. 
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Depending on how one defines political rights, the Courts have also jurisdiction 
over disputes concerning political rights when the Legislature did not explicitly 
authorise another judicial body. The Legislature established several Administrative 
Courts and tribunals for specific disputes concerning political rights (Article 145 
Constitution). The difference between civil and political rights is not easy to 
make. In both academic literature and within the Judiciary, the characteristics 
of civil and political rights are discussed, but no clear conclusion can be drawn 
yet. Basically, two approaches are defended in order to determine what civil and 
political rights are. The first is a substantial approach, in which rights are labeled 
‘civil’ or ‘political’ based on their nature. In this approach, it can be considered 
that civil rights ‘include all subjective rights in relation to the status and capacity of the 
person, his freedom and ability and also the most fundamental rights and freedoms’1095, 
which includes matters of private law and criminal law.1096 Traditionally, political 
rights can be considered to include inter alia rights in which civilians contribute 
to or participate in the execution of public powers, and rights where civilians 
enjoy services and other (social) benefits from the Government.1097 These lists 
are not exhaustive, and it is hardly possible to clearly and exhaustively define the 
characteristics of these two groups of rights. The second approach is the so-called 
classification based on an ‘organic criterion.’ In this context, civil rights can be 
understood as all subjective rights that are not political rights, and political rights 
can be understood as all rights whose disputes are entrusted to an administrative 
body by the Legislature (Article 145 Constitution). This circular reasoning seems 
to be more or less accepted,1098 for it appeared impossible to use any substantive 
criteria. According to the Constitution, the Court of Cassation is authorised to judge 
in attribution conflicts (Article 158 Constitution), but the Constitutional Court 
considered that it is competent in judging whether the choice of the Legislature 
to entrust certain issues to an administrative body is not subdued to arbitrariness, 
and therefore in violation with Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution.1099 In his 
ruling, the Constitutional Court appears to return to a ‘substantive criterion’ in 
order to determine whether a right is of a civil or political nature, but in doing so 
giving a rather broad interpretation to ‘political rights’ that resembles the legal 
1095 K. Rimanque, De grondwet toegelicht, gewikt en gewogen, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005, pp. 324-326. 
Original text in Dutch: ‘omvat alle subjectieve rechten in verband met de staat en de bekwaamheid van de 
persoon, zijn vrijheden en vermogen en ook de meeste fundamentele rechten en vrijheden.’
1096 A. Alen and K. Muylle, Compendium van het Belgisch staatsrecht, Syllabusuitgave (2e uitgave), 
Mechelen: Kluwer 2008, p. 320.
1097 J. Vande Lanotte, S. Bracke and G. Goedertier, België voor beginners, Brugge: Die Keure, 2010, p. 
94. In Belgium, the Latin terms ius suffragii (active and passive suffrage), ius honorum (the right to be 
eligible for appointment to public service), ius militiae (the right and the obligation to be called to military 
service) and ius tribute (the right and the obligation to pay tax) are traditionally used to further subdivide 
political rights. See: A. Alen and K. Muylle, Compendium van het Belgisch staatsrecht, Syllabusuitgave 
(2e uitgave), Mechelen: Kluwer 2008, p. 320; K. Rimanque, De grondwet toegelicht, gewikt en gewogen, 
Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005, p. 327.
1098 K. Rimanque, De grondwet toegelicht, gewikt en gewogen, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005, pp. 327-328.
1099 Constitutional Court, 14/97, 18 March 1997.
284 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 11
practice. It is to be expected therefore, that this Court will be very cautious in 
ruling that a right is not of a political nature when the Legislature established an 
Administrative Court for issues related to that right.1100
11.4.1.1 Civil rights
In Belgium, the Courts of First Instance are spread throughout the country and 
deal with the more common cases: the Peace Courts have jurisdiction over simple 
civil cases and trade disputes, while the Police Courts have jurisdiction over 
violations and traffic offences, including claims for compensation between the 
parties involved coming forth from traffic offences.
For the less common cases, one needs to turn to a specialised Court that then 
serves as a Court of First Instance, while on the other hand these Courts may also 
serve as a Court of second appeal for those cases dealt with by the Peace and Police 
Courts. These Courts are in the first place the so-called Courts of First Appeal, 
with three departments: the Civil Court (for civil disputes), the Correctional Court 
(for cases regarding misdemeanors1101) and the Juvenile Court (for all disputes 
regarding minors). In the second place, there are Commercial Courts that have 
jurisdiction over trade issues and disputes on companies. Thirdly, there are Labour 
Courts that deal with labour disputes and disputes regarding social affairs. It is 
noteworthy here that most cases with regard to economic, social and cultural 
human rights are dealt with by the Labour Courts in first appeal. Fourthly, there 
are District Courts that deal with issues related to the jurisdiction of Courts. 
In the fifth place, there are Sentencing Courts that deal with issues relating to 
sentencing modalities.
Third in hierarchy are the Courts of Appeal and the Court of Assizes. The Courts 
of Appeal consist of three departments: the Civil Court, the Correctional Court 
and the Juvenile Court. Furthermore there is a special Court of Appeal for the 
cases dealt with by the Labour Courts. The Court of Assizes has jurisdiction over 
criminal matters, political crimes and press offences, and is a Court of First Instance.
The Court of Cassation is the highest Belgian Court in the subjective litigation that 
deals with civil rights (and some political rights, depending on one’s reasoning). 
This Court considers whether the lower Courts acted in accordance with the 
relevant legal standards and formal requirements, but does not reconsider the 
case in itself (Article 147 CA).
1100 A. Alen and K. Muylle, Compendium van het Belgisch staatsrecht, Syllabusuitgave (2e uitgave), 
Mechelen: Kluwer 2008, pp. 321-322.
1101 A misdemeanour is considered to be more severe than a violation, but not as severe as a crime.
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11.4.1.2 Political rights
Disputes related to political rights in the subjective litigation that fall under the 
jurisdiction of Administrative Courts installed by the Legislature in accordance 
with Article 146 CA are dealt with by the various Administrative Courts. Normally, 
there is always the possibility of higher appeal, although this is arranged for in 
very different ways. With regard to cases concerning political rights, the Council 
of State is the highest Court and has similar authorities compared to the Court 
of Cassation (Article 14 § 2 Council of State Act). One may only appeal to the 
Council of State when all other legal remedies are exhausted. The Legislature 
occasionally decides that the Court of Cassation serves as highest Court in political 
right issues instead.
One example of an Administrative Court that is established by the Legislature 
ex Article 146 CA is the Council for Aliens Disputes, installed by Statute of 15 
September 2006 CA.1102 The Council is an Administrative Court with an exclusive 
jurisdiction over complaints against individual administrative decisions regarding 
the access to, residence in and the removal from Belgium. The Council’s jurisdiction 
basically encompasses two procedures. In the first, the Council functions as a 
Court of appeal regarding individual decisions made by the Commissioner-General 
for refugees and stateless persons. In these cases, the Council re-examines the 
presented facts, and may confirm or reform the disputed decision, or – when the 
Council is unable to do so based on the presented facts – the Council may annul 
the decision.1103 In the second procedure, the Council may annul ergo omnes an 
administrative action that violates formal requirements, or exceeding or diversion 
of power, that are related to the access to, residence in and the removal from 
Belgium. The Council only examines the conformity with the law, and the verdict 
does technically not concern subjective rights. However, as will appear in Section 
12.2, the differences between the legal effect of both procedures seems to be very 
hypothetical, while in practice, also the verdicts in annulment procedures have 
a strong (indirect) effect inter pares.1104
1102 Wet van 15 september 2006 tot hervorming van de Raad van State en tot oprichting van een Raad 
voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen, Belgian State Gazette, 6 October 2006, 53.468. In Dutch: ‘Raad voor 
Vreemdelingenbetwistingen.’ The Council replaced the Permanent Appeals Commission for Refugees 
(in Dutch: Vaste Commissie voor Vluchtelingen).
1103 Note that before the instalment of the Council for Aliens Disputes, an appeal against the decision 
of the Commissioner-General was directly brought before the Council of State.
1104 According to the Council of Aliens Disputes (see its Annual Report 2008-2009, pp. 20-21, available 
at www.rvv-cce.be), this second procedure mostly concerns decisions that are summed up in the 
attachments of the Royal Decree on the access to the area, the residence, the establishment, and the 
removal of Aliens, BS 27 October 1981, 13.740, attachments (Koninklijk Besluit betreffende de toegang 
tot het grondgebied, verblijf, de vestiging en de verwijdering van vreemdelingen).
286 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 11
11.4.2 The objective litigation
Two Courts operate in the objective litigation: the Council of State (Article 160 
CA) and the Constitutional Court (Article 142 CA), which is the former Court of 
Arbitration.
11.4.2.1 The Council of State
As demonstrated above, the Council of State operates in the subjective litigation 
as Court of Last Instance in cases concerning political rights. With regard to the 
objective litigation, the Council of State is entitled to nullify all administrative 
acts, such as Royal Decrees, Ministerial Decisions, and Decisions by decentralised 
authorities, if they are in conflict with any higher legal standard, including 
international legal standards that are directly applicable, and general legal 
principles, such as the general principles of good governance. Every person or 
group of persons that demonstrates to have an interest in the disputed action may 
invoke an annulment (Article 19 Council of State Act). Interest appears when 
the complainer experiences a disadvantage due to the disputed action, and the 
disadvantage will cease to exist when the action is nullified.1105 The Council of 
State then will take into consideration whether the disputed administrative act 
is lawful and opportune. The latter is possible due to the fact that the appeal is 
technically an Administrative Appeal, which is not a part of the competences of 
the Judiciary (that will usually solely rule on the lawfulness of an act), but rather 
part of the competences of the Administration in itself.1106 If the Council of State 
nullifies an administrative act, the ruling applies ergo omnes. As a consequence, the 
ruling is binding for the administrative body whose act has been nullified, who is 
therefore not allowed to reestablish a similar action. The ruling is also binding for 
the Courts, which are obliged to award compensation in case of the existence of a 
causal relation between the nullified action and damage to the parties involved. 
Finally, the ruling is also binding for the Legislature, who is not allowed to validate 
a disputed or nullified administrative act.1107 Since 1989, an interim injunction 
proceeding can be raised before the Council of State. The complainer must base 
his/her claim on serious legal remedies, and demonstrate that the administrative 
act when executed will cause serious damage that is difficult to repair (Articles 
17 and 18 Council of State Act).
1105 G. Maes, De afdwingbaarheid van sociale grondrechten, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003, p. 17.
1106 A. Alen and K. Muylle, Compendium van het Belgisch staatsrecht, Syllabusuitgave (2e uitgave), 
Mechelen: Kluwer 2008, p. 335.
1107 A. Alen and K. Muylle, Compendium van het Belgisch staatsrecht, Syllabusuitgave (2e uitgave), 
Mechelen: Kluwer 2008, pp. 341-342.
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11.4.2.2 The Constitutional Court
As will appear in Chapter 12, the Constitutional Court rules on most cases in which 
international economic, social and cultural rights are invoked. During the Court’s 
relatively short history – the Court was only established in 1980 – its authorities 
shifted from a Court that was authorised to judge on conflicts of competences 
(a Court of Arbitration) to a Court with the full competences of a Constitutional 
Court. During this period, the competences of the Court were broadened at three 
stages. To fully understand the Court’s verdicts, it is therefore necessary to examine 
these stages before analysing its verdicts.
•	 The first stage: 1980-1989
Due to the state reforms that took place since 1970,1108 the division of powers 
was considerably altered by the recognition of the Regions and Communities that 
now have exclusive and autonomous legislative powers equal to the legislative 
powers of the Federation. Not surprisingly, there was a need for an institution 
that could rule on conflicts of these powers. Therefore, the Court of Arbitration 
was founded in 1980.1109 Its original authorities were limited to settle conflicts 
of power that could arise between the three legislative powers in Belgium. 
Because the Court would have to rule on conflicts between (democratically 
chosen) Legislators, the choice was made to compose the judges of 6 jurists and 
6 politicians (of whom 6 were Dutch-speaking and 6 were French-speaking). 
During this first period, the Court’s work was limited to a few rulings in 
which the general principles of division of powers were developed (the so-
called ‘krachtlijnen’).1110 The powers of the Communities and Regions were 
interpreted broadly.
•	 The second stage: 1989-2003
In 1989, the Belgian Constitution was reviewed. The old Article 107ter 
was replaced by the new Article 140, broadening the competences of the 
Constitutional Court. Cause for this review was the necessity to solve problems in 
the sphere of the protection of minorities after the transfer of powers regarding 
educational matters to the Communities. In Belgium, the freedom of education 
has always been a sensitive issue, especially concerning the freedom of choice 
for non-confessional education. After a century of political struggle, in which 
a balance between confessional and non-confessional education was sought, 
the ‘school-pact’ of 1958 was concluded, whose principles are now laid down in 
Article 24 of the Constitution that stipulates the recognition of equal treatment 
of different forms of education (unless a different treatment can be justified 
1108 Especially the first two state reforms. During the first reform (1970-1971), three culture communities, 
four language areas and three regions were recognised. During the second reform (1980), the culture 
communities became communities, and the legislative powers of the communities and regions were 
recognised. See also: Karel Rimanque, De grondwet toegelicht, gewikt en gewogen, Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2005, pp. 6-8.
1109 Article 107ter Constitutional Act (old), the current Article 142 Constitutional Act.
1110 Freely translated: ‘power principles’.
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based on objective differences).1111 By broadening the competences of the Court 
of Arbitration in such way that decrees from the communities concerning 
educational matters could now be reviewed against Article 24 Constitution, 
the ‘school-pact’ and its forthcoming ‘school-peace’ should be preserved.
The Court’s competences were also broadened by allowing it to review 
legislation against Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution. Both Articles are 
often mentioned together and stipulate the equality of all Belgian citizens 
(Article 10) and the principle of non-discrimination (Article 11). Especially 
the review of legislation against Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution resulted 
in remarkable and extensive case law, in which the Court appeared to have 
interpreted its competences in a very broad manner.1112 The Court reviewed 
against both Constitutional Articles in conjunction with other legal standards. 
Via Articles 10 and 11 Constitution, the Court reviewed legislation indirectly 
against the other rights that are recognised in Chapter II of the Constitution,1113 
against Provisions from international treaties and Covenants that are directly 
applicable,1114 and against treaties and Covenants in general that are binding 
to Belgium, regardless of the fact whether its Provisions are directly applicable 
or not.1115 Also, the Court reviewed against general legal principles.1116
During the first stage, only the three autonomous legislative powers had access 
to the Court of Arbitration. Since the Constitutional reform of 1989 however, 
every natural legal entity that demonstrates interest may request the annulment 
of legal standards as well.
•	 The third stage: since 2003
The reviewed Constitution also stipulated the authority of the Federal Legislator 
to further broaden the competences of the Court with regard to the legal 
standards it may review against by adopting a Statute with a 2/3rd majority. On 
21 April 2003, during the Fifth Belgian State Reform (2001-2003), the Federal 
Legislator used this authority to further broaden the competences of the Court 
of Arbitration by the coming into effect of the adopted special Act of 9 March 
2003.1117 This Act basically acknowledges the established practice of the Court 
to review legislation indirectly (via Articles 10 and 11 Constitution) against all 
rights that are recognised in Chapter II of the Constitution. In addition, the 
1111 See: K. Rimanque, De grondwet toegelicht, gewikt en gewogen, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005, pp. 79-82, 
314-315; A. Alen (ed.), 20 jaar Arbitragehof, Mechelen: Kluwer, 2005, p. 7.
1112 A. Alen, Twintig jaar grondwettigheidstoezicht op wetgevende normen, Krachtlijnen van de rechtspraak 
van het Arbitragehof van 1985 tot en met 2004, in: Twintig Jaar Arbitragehof, Mechelen: Wolters Kluwer 
België, 2005, p. 7-10.
1113 Constitutional Court, 23/89, 13 October 1989.
1114 Constitutional Court, 18/90, 23 May 1990; 22/94, 8 March 1994, consideration B.1.
1115 Constitutional Court, 41/2002, 20 February 2002; later reaffirmed in Constitutional Court, 75/2003, 
28 May 2003; Constitutional Court 106/2003, 22 June 2003; and Constitutional Court 189/2004, 24 
November 2004.
1116 Constitutional Court, 72/92, 18 November 1992.
1117 Bijzondere wet van 9 maart 2003 tot wijziging van de bijzondere wet van 6 februari 1989 op het 
Arbitragehof.
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Court could also review legislation against Articles 170, 172 (equality regarding 
taxes) and 191 (equality between aliens and Belgians) of the Constitution. The 
jurisprudence of the Court did not change considerably, for the broadening of 
its competences was merely a way to avoid unnecessarily complicated legal 
constructions regarding indirect violations of rights via Articles 10 and 11 
Constitution. The Court could now directly review against the rights embedded 
in Chapter II of the Constitution. Therefore, the case law of the second stage 
was basically continued: the Court would in a majority of the cases keep on 
adding Articles 10 and 11 as a standard that would be reviewed against, in 
addition to the legal standard of the second Chapter of the Constitution. It 
is the view of the Court that a violation of a fundamental right is ipse facto a 
violation of Articles 10 and 11 Constitution.1118
With regard to international human rights law, it is the opinion of the Court 
that when an international Provision, legally binding to Belgium, has a similar 
scope compared to one of the Constitutional Provisions the Court may review 
against, the content of this international Provision is inextricably linked to its 
national counterpart. Therefore, this international Provision must also be taken 
into account when legislation is reviewed against a Constitutional norm.1119 
This does not mean that legal standards are reviewed against international 
legal standards directly (for this would still fall outside the competence of the 
Court), but the content of the international standard certainly plays a role 
concerning the interpretation of the analogous Constitutional standard. Valaers 
distinguishes three possible situations in this context.1120 The first is that the 
analogous international Provision offers no broader protection compared to 
the national Constitutional norm, or the complaining party does not base 
substantially different arguments on the international standard compared to 
the arguments based on the national Constitutional standard. In such a case, 
the Court will not feel the necessity to involve the international standard in its 
review. In the second case, the international standard may offer somehow a 
broader protection compared to the analogous national Constitutional standard. 
In such a case, the Court will strive to offer the broadest protection to the 
parties involved, and the protection that is offered by national Constitutional 
Provision will thus be broadened by the additional protection offered by the 
international standard. A third possibility is that an international standard has 
no analogous national Constitutional standard. In this case, the Court will most 
likely turn to the method of reviewing against the international indirectly, via 
Articles 10 and 11 Constitution.
1118 Constitutional Court, no. 136/2004, 22 July 2004, Section B.5.3.; reconfirmed in no. 158/2004, 20 
October 2004, Section B.5.2.; no. 202/2004, 21 December 2004, Section B.2.2.
1119 Constitutional Court, no. 136/2004, 22 July 2004, Section B.5.3.; reconfirmed in no. 158/2004, 20 
October 2004, Section B.5.2.; no. 202/2004, 21 December 2004, Section B.2.2; no. 101/2005, 1 June 2005, 
consideration B.2.3.
1120 See: J. Valaers, Samenloop van grondrechten: het Arbitragehof, titel II van de Grondwet en de international 
mensenrechtenverdragen, in: A. Alen (ed.), 20 jaar Arbitragehof, Mechelen: Kluwer, 2005.
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The Constitutional Court has not only the authority to nullify Statutes, decrees 
and ordinances, but is also entitled to receive preliminary questions. To promote 
coherent case law, the Courts, the Administrative Courts and the Council of State 
are obliged to ask a preliminary question when in their case the question arises 
whether Statutes, decrees or ordinances are in conflict with one of the standards 
the Constitutional Court may review against. The Constitutional Court may then 
rule whether the disputed standard is in conflict with one of these standards or not. 
The effect of such a preliminary ruling is that the Court that asked the question 
has to implement the view of the Constitutional Court in its actual decision 
on the case. The effect of a preliminary ruling is supposed to have res judicata, 
although, as will be demonstrated below, the Courts do not always willingly apply 
the verdicts of the Constitutional Court.1121
11.4.3  The subtle difference between the subjective and the 
objective litigation
The effect of the difference between the subjective and objective litigation however, 
must not be overestimated. It clarifies on the one hand the structure and functioning 
of the Belgian Judiciary, and, could be seen as one – among other – reasons why 
the reasoning patterns of the Constitutional Court are so different compared 
to the Court of Cassation or the Council of State. Of course, the fact that one 
Court rules on the legality of national legislation, and specifically reviews that 
legislation against Constitutional Provisions, leads to a different approach in case 
law compared to disputes inter pares.
However, on the other hand, the difference has only a limited effect on the actual 
nature and effect of the verdicts for the involved parties, due to some developments 
in legal practice. Gunter Maes, who dedicated his PhD thesis to the matter of 
enforceability of social fundamental rights in Belgium,1122 thoroughly explained 
why the difference between the subjective and the objective litigation is a very 
subtle one, with convincing arguments.
He argues in the first place that the Council of State, in its annulment cases, may 
indirectly judge in matters concerning subjective rights. The Council of State 
interpreted its competences broadly, and will therefore tend to receive complaints, 
also when the disputed administrative act has effect on a very limited group 
of individuals. The complainers will hardly act for the greater good or general 
interest, but rather act for their own benefit, defending their subjective interest. 
Nullifying such an act will therefore indirectly protect subjective rights as a result, 
1121 See for instance below, Section 12. 5.3.7.
1122 G. Maes, De afdwingbaarheid van sociale grondrechten, Antwerp, Grondingen, Oxford: Intersentia, 
2003, no. 28-49. He also uses a fourth argument that relates to the European Court of Justice. Since the 
argument has a very limited link with this research, it was excluded. See no. 50-54.
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for the annulment will technically have effect ergo omnes, but has practically 
only an effect on the interest of a specific group of individuals. Only in matters 
in which the Administration refuses to execute a specific legal obligation while 
the complainer is entitled to its execution, based on unambiguous legislation 
with no margin of appreciation for the Administration, the Council of State will 
decide the complaint to be inadmissible, due to the fact that it concerns a clear 
subjective right. Perhaps in addition to Maes, a same argumentation may apply 
to the annulment procedures of the Council for Aliens Disputes. The Council 
may nullify an Administrative Act ergo omnes, but practically, the annulment will 
have almost exclusively consequences for the subjective rights of the complainer. 
This may clarify why there seems to be hardly any difference in approach or 
reasoning patters of those Courts which operate in both the subjective and the 
objective litigation between the two correlating procedures.1123
Maes argues in the second place, that the Courts in preliminary injunction 
procedures, being part of the subjective litigation, also interpret their competences in 
a broad way, leading to judgments that are different from rulings of (Administrative) 
Courts on standard cases, showing some characteristics of the objective litigation. In 
preliminary injunction procedures, the Courts appear to restrict their considerations 
to a balancing of interest rather than ruling on subjective rights. This can be 
explained by the function of a preliminary injunction procedure: the task of a 
Court is then to judge a case preliminary, and on the surface.
Thirdly, Maes observes that especially in the case law of the Council of State, and 
also by special legislation, the direct interest of the plaintiff is understood rather 
broadly, for in some proceedings within the subjective litigation, interest groups 
are admitted as requesting party/plaintiff in cases that relate to their specific 
statutory purposes. While an interest group will primarily be interested in the 
effect of a verdict for the common good, the procedure in itself was designed to 
have effect inter pares.
Fourthly, Maes argues that the Constitutional Court considers that cases, especially 
regarding immigration law in which the Administration has a certain margin of 
appreciation, falls within the subjective litigation since they concern political 
rights, thereby using the earlier mentioned ‘organic criterion.’ Therefore, it is 
possible that the Council of State, in its capacity as Court of Last Instance, has 
jurisdiction in these cases, while when applying a classic approach, this would 
rather fall under the objective litigation.
In addition to the arguments of Maes, developments in case law of the Constitutional 
Court might be added. As discussed in Section 11.4.2.2, the Constitutional Court 
gradually developed from a Court of Arbitration between Legislators to a full 
1123 The Court of Cassation, but also the Council for Aliens Disputes.
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Constitutional Court. Now, also natural legal entities whose interest is affected 
can start an annulment procedure before the Court, and the Court’s reviewing 
competences are broadened to all rights embedded in the Constitution. As a 
result, the cases brought before the Court, as will be demonstrated in Section 
12.5, concern very specific groups of persons who claim that their fundamental 
rights are violated by Legislative Acts, and consequently, the verdict has a strong 
indirect effect on this group (especially in the cases concerning the entitlements 
to social benefits). Furthermore, the Constitutional Court seems to gradually 
move beyond merely ruling whether or not a national Provision is in violation 
with a Constitutional Provision. Especially in preliminary rulings, in which the 
Court is asked by a Court operating in the subjective contentious (in this research, 
mostly the Labour Courts) whether a certain application of a law is in violation 
with a Constitutional Provision, the Constitutional Court has the tendency to 
prescribe a specific interpretation to a legal rule in a particular case.1124 Due to 
the enhanced res judicata, although its effect is disputed, those interpretations of 
the Constitutional Court may have a profound effect in the subjective litigation.
To conclude, the legal effect of verdicts in the subjective and an objective litigation 
for the parties involved seems to be increasingly similar, which is exactly the point 
Maes tries to emphasise. He writes in the context of the issue of applicability 
of ECOSOC standards. Traditionally, it can be considered that rights (whether 
recognised nationally or internationally) are considered to be enforceable rights 
when they are specific and unambiguous enough to be applied without the need for 
further clarification by a Legislator, and addressed to citizens. According to Maes, 
this approach is also supported by the Court of Cassation and the Council of State 
(see also Sections 12.3 and 12.4), which generally consider that ECOSOC standards 
are no subjective rights as stipulated in Articles 144 and 145 CA, and thus the 
Courts operating in the subjective litigation are not competent in reviewing against 
ECOSOC Provisions.1125 By nuancing the difference between the subjective and 
objective he finds an argument against this traditional approach. He emphasises 
that the applicability of ECOSOC standards, due to this subtle difference, should 
not necessarily be excluded from the subjective litigation. Gunter Maes basically 
writes about the effect of verdicts in relation to the invoking parties. Indeed, as 
discussed above, the difference between the subjective and objective contentious 
should not be overestimated in that light. On the other hand, it should not be 
marginalised as well, for the differences explain the organisational structure of 
Belgian Judiciary, and also greatly influence the reasoning patterns used by the 
Constitutional Court, operating in the objective litigation only.
1124 J. Smets, De verhouding van het Arbitragehof tot de verwijzende rechter in het prejudiciële contentieux, 
in: Twintig Jaar Arbitragehof, Mechelen: Wolters Kluwer België, 2005.
1125 G. Maes, De afdwingbaarheid van sociale grondrechten, Antwerp, Grondingen, Oxford: Intersentia, 
2003, no. 21-27.
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11.5 Belgian monism
It is generally accepted that Belgium has a monistic system.1126 However, the 
Constitution does not regulate the relation between international standards and 
national standards. Instead, Belgian monism appears from case law. In the famous 
Franco-Suisse Le Ski ruling, the Court of Cassation considered that an international 
rule is superior to a contradicting (anterior and posterior) national rule, as long 
as the international rule has direct effect.1127 The Constitution only regulates the 
formalities for a treaty to become effective in the internal legal order. Firstly, a 
treaty needs Parliamentary approval by the relevant legislative body (Federal 
Parliament, Communities or Region, as stipulated in Article 167 CA. Secondly, the 
treaty must be published (Article 190 CA) – normally this is done in the Belgian 
State Gazette.1128 Usually, these formalities have no influence on the effect of 
the treaty involved. It is the notion of ‘direct effect’ that primarily determines 
whether or not a treaty Provision can be invoked by a person or legal entity. 
In the case law of the subjective litigation, the Courts seem to judge whether 
an international Provision has direct effect by applying a subjective criterion 
and/or an objective criterion. In applying a subjective criterion, the question is 
asked what the intention was of the State Parties regarding the direct effect of a 
standard. It is often considered that this is demonstrated by the addressee of the 
Provision: when the standard is addressed to citizens, the State Parties intended the 
Provision to have direct effect, while if the standard is addressed to the Contracting 
States, it was not intended that the standard would have direct effect. In applying 
an objective criterion, the question is raised whether a standard is indeed self-
executing, meaning that an individual can derive a specific right from the standard, 
without the need for further clarification in national legislation. It is then often 
accepted that if a standard leaves a considerable margin of appreciation for the 
national Legislature or Administration, the standard has no direct effect. The 
Courts in the subjective litigation seem to apply both criteria randomly, while 
it must be noted that usually the ‘direct effect’ of a Provision is not thoroughly 
examined.1129 Of course, the idea of ‘direct effect’ has a very limited meaning in 
1126 D. Van Eeckhoutte and A. Vandaele, Doorwerking van internationale normen in de Belgische rechtsorde, 
Instituut voor Internationaal Recht K.U. Leuven, Working Paper no. 33, October 2002.
1127 Court of Cassation, 27 May 1971, arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1971(p. 959). Before this ruling, 
it was assumed that Belgian had a monistic system, in the sense that international law could have effect 
in the national legal order without the interference of a national Legislator. However, international law 
was not necessarily superior to national law. The principle of ‘lex posterior derogate legi priori’ generally 
applied, and therefore, later national law would be superior to contradicting earlier international law. 
See: G. Maes, De afdwingbaarheid van sociale grondrechten, Antwerp, Grondingen, Oxford: Intersentia, 
2003, no. 105-108.
1128 In Dutch: Belgisch Staatsblad.
1129 See: G. Maes, De afdwingbaarheid van sociale grondrechten, Antwerp, Grondingen, Oxford: Intersentia, 
2003, no. 112-146; D. Van Eeckhoutte and A. Vandaele, Doorwerking van internationale normen in de 
Belgische rechtsorde, Instituut voor Internationaal Recht K.U. Leuven, Working Paper No. 33, October 
2002. See also the Belgian Government in its reports on the implementation of UN treaties, for instance: 
E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 9; CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Sections 8-10.
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the objective litigation, especially regarding the Constitutional Court since – as 
discussed above – the concept of ‘direct effect’ has no real meaning anymore 
since its ruling in 2002.1130
11.6 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter, the Belgian Constitutional System was discussed, particularly 
in view of the Belgian Judiciary. It can be concluded that there exists a certain 
complexity that is partly related,1131 in the organisation of both the Belgian 
Legislature and Judiciary. The complexity of the Legislature may have found its 
origin in the profound differences amongst the Belgians in language and economics. 
The complexity of the Judiciary may be caused by the fact that the organisation 
is based on purpose and functionality rather than pragmatic considerations. It 
is this complexity that leads to a very vivid and extensive case law amongst the 
different Courts, as will be analysed in the next Chapter. Remarkable aspects of 
the organisation of the Judiciary are firstly, the existence of two Courts of Last 
Instance. Both have an exclusive jurisdiction, and therefore, opposing case law 
is not to be expected. However, it is their relation with the Constitutional Court 
that also shows many characteristics of a Court of Last Instance, which may lead 
to a ‘battle of the forums.’1132 Secondly, the development of the Constitutional 
Court, as discussed in Section 11.4.2.2, is remarkable and leads to case law that 
is of a different nature and with different reasoning patterns compared to all 
other Courts, as a result of its function. It is to be expected, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 12.5, that due to the fact that the Constitutional Court is not bound by 
the principle of ‘direct effect’ in ruling in matters in which international human 
rights Provisions are invoked, there is more room for effect in case law of such 
internationally recognised Articles. Thirdly, the Belgian Judiciary is organised 
from the perspective of two different litigations. Whereas this difference thus is 
important to explain the organisational structure, and also the nature and reasoning 
patterns of the Courts, the differences in result for invoking parties, as discussed 
in Section 11.4.3, should not be overestimated, for it seems that there is a trend in 
Belgian case law in which the objective and subjective litigation increasingly blend.
1130 Constitutional Court, 41/2002, 20 February 2002.
1131 The installment of the Constitutional Court for instance, is a direct result of the organisational 
structure of the legislative branche.
1132 See for instance the matter of the regularisation request and the entitlements to social benefits as 
discussed in Section 12.5.3.7.
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12.  The Belgian case law on the enforceability 
of the right to adequate food
12.1 Introduction
The structure of the Belgian Judiciary is explained in the previous Chapter, in 
Section 11.4. In this section, case law regarding the right to adequate food will 
be analysed or, if there is no significant case law on the right to food, case law 
regarding the UN Treaties in which the right to food is stipulated will be discussed 
more generally.
As will appear below, most cases in which the right to food is invoked, or ECOSOC 
rights in general, concern immigration issues, and especially the issue of illegally 
residing aliens. In this light, two judicial proceedings are commonly used. Firstly, 
a legal dispute regarding administrative decisions (mostly regarding the residence 
status of an alien) starts with an appeal to the Council for Aliens Disputes, and may 
be continued before the Council of State. Secondly, a dispute on social benefits 
is usually brought before a Labour Court, continued in appeal before a Labour 
Court of Appeal, and may eventually be brought before the Court of Cassation. 
However, the Labour Courts appear to frequently submit preliminary questions 
to the Constitutional Court on the interpretation and legality of legislation.
In this Chapter, there is a strong focus on the extensive case law of the Courts of 
last instance and the Constitutional Court. However, it will appear that both the 
Council of State (Section 12.3) and the Court of Cassation (Section 12.4) hardly 
deal with cases in which the right to food is explicitly invoked. Therefore, the case 
law analysis of both Courts of Last Instance is extended to the direct applicability 
of ICESCR, ICRC and CEDAW Provisions in general. Instead, the Constitutional 
Court appears to have ruled frequently on cases in which the right to food and 
related ECOSOC rights are invoked, resulting in interesting case law on the matter 
throughout the years. This development will be discussed in detail in Section 12.5.
To keep this Chapter readable, the case law of the lower Courts is only included 
when significantly relevant. However, an analysis of the case law of the Council of 
Aliens Disputes is included, for this relatively new administrative body appears to 
frequently rule in individual and annulation cases in which the direct applicability 
of especially ICRC Provisions is disputed (Section 12.2). Furthermore, when 
relevant, case law of the Labour Courts is included, mostly in the context of the 
subsequent rulings of last instance, or to demonstrate the effect of a ruling of a 
Court of Last Instance. This case law is not discussed in a separate Chapter, but 
included where necessary throughout the Sections. This was done especially in 
Section 12.5, in relation to the preliminary rulings of the Constitutional Court.
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12.2 The Council for Aliens Disputes
As explained in Section 11.4.1.2, the Council for Aliens Disputes has exclusive 
jurisdiction over complaints against individual administrative decisions regarding 
the access to, residence in and the removal from Belgium.
Because the Council summarises its case law briefly in its annual reports, this 
will be explored first. Secondly, an analysis will be made of all relevant case law 
regarding the direct applicability of ECOSOC rights. The Council for Aliens Disputes 
rules in both the subjective and the objective litigation. In practice however, also 
the rulings ergo omnes have a strong influence on the legal position of the parties 
involved. Here thus the difference between verdicts in the subjective and objective 
litigation appeas to be more of theoretical than of practical relevance. Therefore, 
no deliberate distinction is made between the two types of procedures in the 
analysis below, in line with the annual reports of the Council.
12.2.1 The annual reports of the Council for Aliens Disputes
In its ruling of 17 October 2007, the Council ruled that Article 10 ICRC has no direct 
effect.1133 This was understood in the Annual report 2007-2008 as a confirmation 
of the case law of the Council of State, in which it was ruled that most treaty 
Provisions were not suitable for direct effect.1134 In several subsequent rulings, 
the Council reaffirmed that the ICRC Provisions would not be suitable for direct 
applicability. In its annual report 2008-2009, the Council stated that due to its 
nature, content and wordings, Articles 2, 3, 9, 28, and 29 as individual rights 
are not directly applicable. Further legislation would be required to specify and 
complement the meaning of these Articles. With regard to Articles 3 (1), 5, 7, 8, 
and 16, the Council reported that complaining parties appeared to have invoked 
these Articles by merely referring to them, without any further substantiation. 
Therefore, no answer to the question of direct applicability was given. With regard 
to Articles 9 and 10, the Council reported that no answer was given on the matter 
of direct applicability, due to the fact that the complainer failed to adequately 
specify why these rights were violated. The Council reported furthermore that 
Article 3 has a very general scope, and could therefore not be invoked against 
procedural rules embedded in the Aliens Act. The Council also reported that the 
Covenant could only be invoked on behalf of children, and certainly not by adults, 
and annulment procedures must always concern administrative actions.1135 In 
its third annual report (2009-2010), the Council reaffirmed that in its case law 
1133 Case no. 2760, 17 October 2007, published on www.rvv-cce.be.
1134 Council for Aliens Disputes, Annual report 2007-2008, p. 45.
1135 Council for Aliens Disputes, Annual report 2008-2009, pp. 70-71. Reference was made to case no. 
28476, 9 June 2009, available at: www.rvv-cce.be. See also (available at: www.rvv-cce.be): case no. 77468, 
19 March 2012; case no. 79734, 20 April 2012; case no. 81048, 11 May 2012; case no. 82696, 11 June 2012; 
case no. 82697, 11 June 2012; case no. 82790, 11 June 2012; case no. 83484, 22 June 2012.
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Articles 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, and 16 had no direct effect, in line with the case law of the 
Council of State. Besides that, the Council observes that – regardless of the fact 
whether a ICRC Provision is directly applicable or not – the parties requesting 
for the annulment of a certain administrative action often fail to substantiate 
how the disputed administrative decision contradicts the well-being of the child 
in concreto.1136
12.2.2 Case law of the Council for Aliens Disputes
As it appears from the case law of the Council as well, the opinion of the Council of 
State is greatly valued, in line with one of the goals of the Council which is to promote 
the unity of law.1137 Indeed the Council seems to consider that the aforementioned 
ICRC Provisions, and the ICRC in general, cannot be directly applicable,1138 or the 
matter of direct applicability remains unanswered, for the complaining party failed 
to substantiate why the disputed administrative action would be a violation of the 
rights of the child.1139 The exact considerations leading to the decision that ICRC 
Provisions are not directly applicable however show some variety.
1136 Council for Aliens Disputes, Annual report 2009-2010, p. 61.
1137 See for instance: Council for Aliens Disputes, Annual report 2008-2009, Section 2.3.
1138 Referred to by the Council in its annual reports (available at: www.rvv-cce.be): case no. 15780, 11 
September 2008 (Articles 3 and 9); case no. 24487, 13 March 2009 (Article 3); case no. 20139, 9 December 
2008 (Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, and 9); case no. 27657, 26 May 2009 (Article 3); case no. 27.951, 28 May 2009 
(ICRC in general, and Articles 9 and 10); case no. 37979, 29 January 2010 (Articles 2, 8, 9 10, and 16); 
case no. 40246 15 March 2010 (ICRC in general, and Article 28); furthermore, in 2012: case no. 72810, 6 
January 2012 (Article 3); case no. 74507, 31 January 2012 (Article 3); case no. 75732, 24 February 2012 
(Articles 3, 7, and 9); case no. 75953, 28 February 2012 (ICRC in general); case no. 76154, 29 February 
2012 (Article 7, 9, and 16); case no. 76891, 9 March 2012 (Articles 3 and 28); case no. 77339, 15 March 
2012 (Article 3); case no. 77338, 15 March 2012 (Article 3); case no. 77700, 21 March 2012 (Articles 8 and 
28); case no. 78203, 28 March 2012 (ICRC in general, and Articles 3 and 9); case no. 79852, 20 April 2012 
(Article 3); case no. 42394, 27 April 2010 (Article 9); case no. 45588, 29 June 2010 (Articles 3, 9, and 10); 
case no. 80534, 27 April 2012 (Article 3); case no. 81048, 11 May 2012 (Articles 7, 9, and 16); case no. 
81092, 14 May 2012 (Article 9); case no. 81503, 22 May 2012 (Articles 3 and 9); case no. 82143, 31 May 
2012 (Article 3); case no. 82145, 31 May 2012 (Article 3); case no. 82696, 11 June 2012 (Article 9); case 
no. 82697, 11 June 2012 (Article 9); case no. 82790, 11 June 2012 (Article 28); case no. 83585, 25 June 
2012 (Article 9); case no. 83716, 26 June 2012 (Article 3); case no. 84296, 6 July 2012 (Article 9); case 
no. 85594, 3 August 2012 (Articles 2, 8, 9, 10, and 16); case no. 91043, 6 November 2012 (Articles 3 and 
9); case no. 93190, 10 December 2012 (Article 9);case no. 93287, 11 December 2012 (Article 3); case no. 
93272, 11 December 2012 (Articles 3 and 9); case no. 93863 18 December 2012 (Article 3). Considering 
the extensive amount of cases, only the case law referred to in the annual reports, and the cases covering 
2012 – at the time of writing the most recent calendar year – were included in the footnote.
1139 Referred to by the Council in its annual reports (available at: www.rvv-cce.be): case no. 18.341, 4 
November 2008 (Articles 3, 7, and 9); case no. 24320, 11 March 2009 (Articles 9 and 10); case no. 24487, 
13 March 2009 (Article 28); case no. 25703, 7 April 2009 (Articles 8 and 16); case no. 27657, 26 May 2009 
(Article 2); In 2012: case no. 73575, 19 January 2012 (Article 3); case no. 76427, 1 March 2012 (Article 
3); case no. 77918, 23 March 2012 (Article 6); case no. 80146, 25 April 2012 (Articles 3 and 9); case no. 
82145, 31 May 2012 (Article 1); case no. 84816, 18 July 2012 (Article 9); case no. 88126, 25 September 
2012 (Article 28).
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For instance, in its ruling on 17 October 2008,1140 the Council stated that Articles 27, 
28 ICRC and 13 ICESCR could not be invoked, for both the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights were not directly applicable in general. No further explanation was given.
A more subtle approach to the matter was expressed in a ruling on 31 August 2009, 
in which a complainer invoked Articles 3, 6, 12, and 28 ICRC. The Council ruled 
that it appears from the Council of State’s (legislation department) advice on the 
Ratification Act of the ICRC that the ICRC stipulates different types of Provisions.
The legal department of the Council of State makes a distinction between 
Provisions that generally meet accepted criteria to determine that international 
treaties are ‘self-executing’ and as such have an direct effect in the domestic 
legal order of the signatory States, Provisions that establish rights whose 
principles are recognised in the Convention and whose implementation 
requires a positive legislative action, and Provisions that stipulate rights 
that belong to the category of economic, social and cultural rights leaving 
a large margin of discretion to the States regarding their progressive 
implementation.1141
In this consideration thus the ICRC Provisions are divided into three groups: 
(1) self-executing Provisions; (2) Provisions that require national legislation to 
be effective; and (3) ECOSOC rights that leave a large margin of appreciation to 
the Member States with regard to their progressive realisation. In its verdict, the 
Council held that Articles 3, 6, and 28 resort under the second category and are 
therefore not directly applicable.1142 The disputed decision is however reviewed 
against Article 12 ICRC (the right to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child), but according to the Council, this standard was 
not violated by the decision.1143 The consideration quoted above was later used 
in other cases as well, each time by the same Magistrate.1144
1140 Case no. 17293, 17 October 2008, available at: www.rvv-cce.be.
1141 Case no. 30858, 31 August 2009, available at: www.rvv-cce.be, consideration 2.3.2. Original text in 
Dutch: ‘De afdeling wetgeving van de Raad van State maakt namelijk een onderscheid tussen bepalingen 
die beantwoorden aan de algemeen aanvaarde criteria om te bepalen dat de internationale verdragen ‘self-
executing’ zijn en die als zodanig rechtstreekse gevolgen hebben in de interne rechtsorde van de ondertekende 
staten, bepalingen die rechten vaststellen waarvan het principe door het Verdrag wordt erkend en waarvan de 
uitvoering een positief optreden van de wetgever vereist en bepalingen die rechten vaststellen die behoren tot 
de categorie van economische, sociale en culturele rechten en die aan de Staten een grote beoordelingsvrijheid 
laten wat de geleidelijke uitvoering ervan betreft.’
1142 Case no. 30858, 31 August 2009, available at: www.rvv-cce.be, consideration 2.3.2.
1143 Case no. 30858, 31 August 2009, available at: www.rvv-cce.be, consideration 2.3.2.
1144 See for instance (available at: www.rvv-cce.be): case no. 72810, 6 January 2012; case no. 77339, 15 
March 2012; case no. 77338, 15 March 2012; case no. 80534, 27 April 2012, consideration 2.7.2, and case 
no. 83716, 26 June 2012; case no. 37862, 29 January 2010 all ruled by the same Magistrate: M.C. Goethals. 
In one case brought before the Council of State, it was disputed whether the Council for Aliens disputes 
would have considered that the ICRC in general was not directly applicable. The complainer argued 
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With regard to the international right to food, reference was made already above 
to a case in which inter alia Article 27 (includes the right to food) was invoked.1145 
In its ruling on 11 May 2009,1146 the Council reaffirmed that Article 27 had no 
direct effect, due to the fact that this Article is not a clear or legally complete 
Article that would impose clear duties on a Member state.
It is remarkable that ICESCR or CEDAW Provisions are rarely invoked by the 
complaining parties. No verdicts of significance can be found in which the Council 
rules on the direct applicability of CEDAW Provisions.1147 Regarding ICESCR 
Provisions, no Article 11 ICESCR case could be found during the analysis. Besides 
some cases in which the Council ruled that an invoked ICESCR Article was clearly 
not violated, or the complaining party did not substantiate why the invoked Article 
would be violated,1148 the Council ruled that Articles 101149 and 131150 ICESCR 
had no direct effect.
To conclude, there appears to be a very extensive case law on the direct applicability 
of ICRC Provisions. While the reasoning to reject direct applicability of ICRC 
Provisions shows some variety, ICRC Provisions in general (both civil and political 
rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights) are considered not to be 
directly applicable. Furthermore, there is so little case law on the ICESCR and 
the CEDAW, that no general conclusions on the direct effect of those Provisions 
can be drawn, although also here in the few cases that exist, not a single time 
the direct applicability of a Provision was recognised. Regarding the right to food 
in particular, it can be concluded that, according to the Council, Article 27 ICRC 
has no direct effect, while no rulings could be found on the direct applicability of 
other international Provisions stipulating the same right. The Council however 
has the tendency – apart from some exceptions – to only answer the question of 
that while the Council of Aliens Disputed did not dispute an earlier ruling of the Council of State, in 
which the Council had ruled that the ICRC had no direct effect, the Council of Aliens Disputes had also 
earlier ruled that Article 12 could have direct effect, which would violate the principles of legal unity. 
The Council of State then somewhat confusingly considered that the fact that the Council of Aliens 
Disputes did not dispute the said ruling of the Council of State would not automatically imply that it 
fully agreed, and therefore the legal remedy of the complainer was factually incorrect. See: Council of 
State, 25 March 2010, case no. 202356, available at: www.rvv-cce.be.
1145 Case no. 17293, 17 October 2008, available at: www.rvv-cce.be.
1146 Case no. 27146, 11 May 2009, available at: www.rvv-cce.be. In casu, also Article 6 ICRC was invoked.
1147 In case no. 53965, 28 December 2010, available at: www.rvv-cce.be, several CEDAW Provisions were 
invoked by the complaining party. The Council however ruled that the party involved referred to facts 
that did not match the administrative files, and therefore, it would not be plausible that any CEDAW 
Provisions would have been violated.
1148 Case no. 59130, 31 March 2011, available at: www.rvv-cce.be (Article. 12); case no. 59131, 31 March 
2011, available at: www.rvv-cce.be (Article 12); case no. 67931, 5 October 2011, available at: www.rvv-
cce.be (Article 6); case no. 92302, 27 November 2012, available at: www.rvv-cce.be (Aricle 6); case no. 
23968, 27 February 2009, available at: www.rvv-cce.be (Article 13).
1149 Case no. 28928, 22 June 2009, available at: www.rvv-cce.be.
1150 Case no. 17293, 17 October 2008, available at: www.rvv-cce.be; case no. 34792, 25 November 2009, 
available at: www.rvv-cce.be.
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direct applicability when it is strictly relevant. In case of inadequate arguments 
or apparently non-violation of the invoked norm, the matter often remains 
unanswered. In general, the Council appears to greatly value the opinion of the 
Council if State (both the legislation department and the judicial department), 
and seeks to judge in line with the opinion of the Council of State. This is not 
surprising, as the Council of State is the appellate body for cases ruled by the 
Council.
12.3 The Council of State
As will appear below, there are hardly any verdicts in which the Council clearly 
ruled on the direct applicability of an international Provision stipulating the right 
to food. Only two cases could be found in which the Council denied direct effect 
to Article 27 ICRC.1151 More generally, only a limited amount of rulings exist in 
which the direct applicability of ECOSOC rights is dealt with.1152 Therefore, in the 
analysis below, the effect of ICESCR, ICRC and CEDAW Provisions in general will 
be analysed as well. As discussed in Section 11.4.2.1, the Council of State rules 
in both the subjective and the objective litigation. No evidence could be found 
however, that regarding the effect of international Provisions there is a different 
approach in each function of the Council. Therefore, in the analysis below, no 
distinction is made between the objective litigation and the subjective litigation, 
but rather between the analysed treaties.1153
12.3.1 The Council of State on ICESCR Provisions
With regard to the direct applicability of ICESCR Provisions, the Council seems to 
prefer to circumvent the issue, by ruling that the invoking party did not adequately 
substantiate why the invoked standard is violated,1154 or, while an ICESCR Provision 
1151 Council of State, 12 February 1996, case no. 58122l, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be.
1152 For the Court case analysis, the author primarily used the search engine installed on the official 
website of the Council of State (www.raadvst-consetat.be). The database of this search engine only 
includes rulings since 1994. A case review of the period 1994-2012 appeared to be rather inconclusive. 
Therefore, only when of significant importance, rulings in the period before 1994 are included in the 
analysis.
1153 Since the database of the Council of State stores all case law since 1994, the analysis does not go 
further back in time, unless a verdict is of significant relevance.
1154 Council of State, 2 December 1996, case no. 63387, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 6 
(1)); Council of State, 21 December 1999, case no. 84310, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 
7); Council of State, 9 December 2004, case no. 138290, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 
26); Council of State, 12 July 2005, case no. 147579, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 
13); Council of State, 6 April 2006, case no. 157423, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 26); 
Council of State, 30 August 2006, case no. 162085, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 26); 
Council of State, 7 November 2006, case no. 164420, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Articles 1, 2, 
and 6); Council of State, 30 October 2008, case no. 187467, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 
13 (2) (C)); Council of State, 21 February 2011, case no. 211392, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be 
(Articles 6 and 8 ICESCR).
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was invoked by the plaintiff, the Council chose not to significantly include the 
Provision in its considerations.1155 However, the Council ruled in several cases 
rather clearly that the ICESCR in general would have no direct effect.1156 The 
denial of direct effect is not always explained further. However, in a case in 1993 
the Council offers a short explanation. In casu, a plaintiff argued that a Royal 
Decree, that stipulated that a prison warder should have the same sex as the 
prisoners detained, would violate inter alia the ICESCR, for it would constitute 
discrimination between men and women. The Council considered that ‘first it should 
be determined whether the applicant can indeed invoke the violation of international 
Conventions mentioned by her as legal remedy for annulation before the Council of State, 
that consequently it should be determined whether or not the by her invoked standards 
of international law have direct effect in the internal Belgian legal order, that a rule of 
international or supranational law has direct effect when it can be applied in the legal 
order in which this rule is in force without any substantial internal implementation 
measure, that a rule of international or supranational law, however has no direct 
effect, when it imposes an obligation to the State to act or not to act according to the 
principles embedded in the rule, that the treaty Provisions that have no direct effect do 
not possess a normative character towards the individual, do not constitute subjective 
rights by their nature, but only impose obligations on the contracting parties; that is, 
that the individual citizen cannot derive rights from it, and therefore are not subject 
to any obligations.’1157 In a later case, the Council explained that this ‘appears 
from Article 2 of the treaty that only obligations to act accordance with the principles 
1155 Council of State, 17 October 1994, case no. 49701, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 7); 
Council of State, 23 December 1994, case no. 50972, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 7); 
Council of State, 5 November 1997, case no. 69470, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 7); 
Council of State, 1 April 1998, case no. 72893, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 8); Council 
of State, 20 November 2000, case no. 90902, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 11); Council 
of State, 28 January 2002, case no. 102971, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 7); Council of 
State, 10 June 2002, case no. 107611, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 7); Council of State, 
1 October 2002, case no. 110821, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 10); Council of State, 28 
February 2005, case no. 141340, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 26); Council of State, 29 
March 2005, case no. 142691, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 26); Council of State, 4 May 
2005, case no. 144111, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Articles 1, 2, 6, and 12); Council of State, 
8 December 2009, case no. 198664, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 12).
1156 Council of State, 30 December 1993, case no. 45552, S.K. 1994, 6 (ICECR in general was invoked); 
Council of State, 21 December 2005 case no. 153073, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 26 
was invoked); Council of State, 29 September 2009, case no. 196475, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.
be (Article 6 was invoked).
1157 Council of State, 30 December 1993, case no. 45552, Sociaalrechtelijke Kronieken 1994, 6. Original 
text in Dutch: ‘Overwegende dat vooreerst dient nagegaan te worden of verzoekster wel degelijk de schending 
van de door haar vermelde internationale akten als annulatiemiddel voor de Raad van State kan inroepen; dat 
bijgevolg dient onderzocht te worden of de door haar ingeroepen normen van internationaal recht al dan niet 
directe werking hebben in de interne Belgische rechtsorde; dat een regel van internationaal of supranationaal 
recht directe werking bezit indien hij, zonder enige substantiële interne uitvoeringsmaatregel, kan toegepast 
worden in de rechtsorde waar deze regel van kracht is; dat een regel van internationaal of supranationaal 
recht daarentegen geen directe werking bezit, wanneer hij aan de Staat de verplichting oplegt te handelen, of 
niet te handelen, volgens de principes die vervat zijn in de regel; dat de verdragsverplichtingen die geen directe 
werking hebben geen normerend karakter bezitten ten opzichte van de individuen, geen subjectieve rechten 
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embedded in the Convention are imposed on the States.’1158 There seem to be some 
exceptions to that rule however, in which the Council cautiously accepts some 
effect of ICESCR Provisions in the national legal order.
Firstly, the Council seems to have reviewed against Article 7 ICESCR. In one case, 
a disappointed civil servant, belonging to the Dutch language group, started legal 
proceedings against the State of Belgium in a case in which someone else was 
promoted to Deputy Commissioner-General in one of the Belgian Ministries, due 
to the fact that the promoted person belonged to the French speaking language 
group, and the Belgian Government strived for numeric equality on language 
background amongst the personnel of the State. In casu, the Council ruled that 
Articles 10 and 11 CA, whether or not read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 
7 (c) ICESCR were not violated, referring to and in line with the answer to the 
prejudicial question the Council asked from the Constitutional Court.1159 Also 
earlier, in 2002, the Council had reviewed against Article 7 ICESC, ruling that the 
Provision was not violated, in a case in which a new Ministerial Decree concerning 
the mode of calculating working hours of the national gendarmerie was contested 
in an annulment procedure.1160
Furthermore, the Council appears to have granted at least some effect to Article 13 
ICESCR on several occasions. For instance, in one case, the Council distilled from a 
combination of Articles, including Articles 23 and 24 CA, Article 2 of the Additional 
Protocol to the ICCPR, and Article 13 ICESCR, the general principle of freedom of 
choice for parents regarding the education of their children. In casu, a teacher was 
less positively assessed during an appraisal interview compared to the previous 
year, due to the fact that he had enrolled his children in a different (competing) 
school. The Council ruled that this was a violation of this principle.1161 In another 
case, in 1995, the Council ruled that the denial of the Ministry of the Interior to 
grant permission to a not formally recognised and unsubsidised school for higher 
education to issue certificates to foreign students necessary for a residence permit 
longer than three months was in violation with inter alia Article 13 ICESCR, for it 
would establish a non-justifiable discrimination between educational institutions, 
in hunnen hoofde scheppen, maar alleen verplichtingen opleggen aan de verdragsluitende partijen; dat met 
andere woorden de individuele burger er geen rechten kan aan ontlenen en erdoor aan geen verplichtingen 
onderworpen wordt.’
1158 Council of State, 29 September 2009, case no. 196475, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be. Original 
text in Dutch: ‘blijkt uit artikel 2 van het verdrag dat alleen aan de staten de verplichting wordt opgelegd te 
handelen overeenkomstig de principes vervat in het verdrag.’
1159 Council of State, 27 January 2003, case no. 115050, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be. Prejudicial 
question asked in: Council of State, 15 December 1997, case no. 70202, available at: www.raadvst-
consetat.be. Prejudicial question answered by the Constitutional Court in: Constitutional Court, 2/99 
13 January 1999.
1160 Council of State, 14 January 2002, case no. 102510, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (based on 
other legal grounds however, the disputed Article of the decree was eventually quashed).
1161 Council of State, 13 December 2000, case no. 91625, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be.
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but also a non-justifiable discrimination between foreign students who want to 
study at educational institutions that are allowed to grant the said certificates, 
and foreign students that want to study at educational institutions that are not.1162
Also the right to strike, as embedded in Article 8 ICESCR, seems to be granted 
some effect. In a case in 1995, the Council ruled that certain disciplinary measures 
against a strike undertaken by employees of the postal service were against the 
right to strike, as embedded in Article 6 ESC and Article 8 ICESCR.1163 The Council 
had a similar reasoning in other cases, in 2002 and 2006.1164
In one case, the Council referred to inter alia Article 6 ICESCR to underline that 
the right to work is a basic principle, albeit that in casu this principle was not 
violated.1165
12.3.2 The Council of State on ICRC Provisions
Also regarding the ICRC, a large amount of cases can be found in which the Council 
circumvented to decide on the direct applicability of ICRC Provisions, by ruling 
that the invoking parties did not adequately substantiate why the invoked standard 
was violated.1166 In other cases, the invoked Articles were not used further – for 
1162 Council of State, 30 October 1995, case no. 56106, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be.
1163 Council of State, 22 March 1995, case no. 52424, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be.
1164 Council of State, 3 December 2002, case no. 113168, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be; Council 
of State, 13 February 2006, case no. 154824, 154825, 154826, 154827, 154828, 154829, 154830, 154831 and 
154832, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be. See also: Council of State, 1 April, 1998, case no. 72893, 
available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be. Also here, disciplinary measures against an employee of the 
National Railways in case of strike were under dispute. The employee invoked inter alia Article 6 ESC, 
and successfully appealed against these disciplinary measures, although the Council did not implicitly 
base its verdict on the invoked ESC standard.
1165 Council of State, 3 July 1998, case no. 74948, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be.
1166 See for instance (available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be): Council of State, 24 January 1996, case no. 
57793 (ICRC in general); Council of State, 19 March 1997, case no. 65343 (Article 28); Council of State, 
7 December 1999, case no. 83940 (Article 15); Council of State, 16 January 2001, case no. 92281 (ICRC 
in general); Council of State, 16 January 2001, case no. 92285 (ICRC in general); Council of State, 27 
March 2002, case no. 105233 (ICRC in general); Council of State, 4 July 2002, case no. 108866 (Article 
9); Council of State, 2 March 2004, case no. 128688 (ICRC in general); Council of State, 13 October 2004, 
case no. 135968 (Article 22); Council of State, 31 March 2005, case no. 142746 (Article 22); Council of 
State, 12 July 2005, case no. 147579 (Articles 28 and 29); Council of State, 5 December 2005, case no. 
52209 (Article 3); Council of State, 14 December 2005, case no. 152699 (the requesting party derived 
a non-refoulement principle from the ICRC in general); Council of State, 27 December 2005, case no. 
153187 (Articles 7, 9, and 10); Council of State, 26 January 2006, case no. 154152 (Article 28, continuation 
of case 65343); Council of State, 13 December 2006, case no. 165924 (ICRC in general); Council of State, 
17 January 2007, case no. 166839 (Article 24); Council of State, 4 May 2007, case no. 170798 (ICRC in 
general); Council of State, 9 April 2008, case no. 181862 (Articles 9 and 10); Council of State, 29 June 
2009, case no. 194819 (ICRC in general); Council of State, 29 June 2009, case no. 194820 (Articles 9 and 
10); Council of State, 9 June 2011, case no. 213778 (Article 28); Council of State, 13 December 2011, case 
no. 216839 (ICRC in general).
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several reasons – in the considerations of the Council,1167 the invoking party 
would not fall under the scope of the ICRC,1168 the situation would not fall under 
the scope of the ICRC and therefore the invoked Provisions are not violated,1169 
or the invoking party could not adequately prove its interest in casu.1170
Only occasionally, the Council specifically ruled on the matter. In some cases, 
the direct effect of the ICRC in general was denied ‘…because the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, ratified by Belgium on 20 November 1989, at first sight, has not 
direct effect.’1171 In another case, the Council considered that ‘…to the extent that 
violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is included in the legal remedy 
it cannot be invoked, for the convention has no direct effect.’1172 In other cases, the 
direct effect of particular Provisions was denied. For instance, in two cases in 1996, 
the Council stated that Articles 6, 24, 27 (1), and 28 ICRC would have no direct 
effect, due to the fact that the Provisions were not specific enough to distill specific 
1167 Council of State, 26 January 1996, case no. 57840, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Articles 2 
and 8); Council of State, 22 March 1996, case no. 58746, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 
37); Council of State, 4 July 2002, case no. 108862, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Articles 9 
and 28); Council of State, 14 September 2004, case no. 134863, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be 
(Articles 12, 13, and 16); Council of State, 24 August 2005, case no. 148314, available at: www.raadvst-
consetat.be (Articles 7 and 14); Council of State, 9 January 2006, case no. 153367, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be (Article 3); Council of State, 17 March 2007, case no. 156541, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be (Article 3); Council of State, 9 September 2010, case no. 207266, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be (ICRC in general).
1168 Council of State, 16 October 2002, case no. 111607, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (ICRC in 
general); Council of State, 8 December 2003, case no. 126132, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be 
(Article 29); Council of State, 25 October 2005, case no. 150620, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be 
(in particular, Articles 1-4); Council of State, 15 December 2009, case no. 198958, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be (Article 3); Council of State, 23 November 2011, case no. 216416, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be (Article 3); Council of State, 14 March 2012, case no. 218469, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be (Article 3); Council of State, 14 March 2012, case no. 218470, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be (Article 3); Council of State, 14 March 2012, case no. 218474, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be (Article 3).
1169 Council of State, 10 October 2002, case no. 111411, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Articles 9, 
19, and 29); Council of State, 11 February 2004, case no. 128051, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be 
(Articles 3 and 39); Council of State, 18 March 2005, case no. 142387, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.
be (Article 22); Council of State, 25 May 2005, case no. 144960, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be 
(ICRC in general); Council of State, 31 August 2005, case no. 148485, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.
be (Article 3); Council of State, 9 September 2005, case no. 148700, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.
be (Articles 2, 3, and 6); Council of State, 28 August 2008, case no. 185919, available at: www.raadvst-
consetat.be (Articles 9 and 10); Council of State, 8 May 2009, case no. 193105, available at: www.raadvst-
consetat.be (Articles 9 and 10).
1170 Council of State, 12 March 2001, case no. 93859, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 36).
1171 Council of State, 26 April 2000, case no. 86914, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be. Original text in 
Dutch: ‘…omdat het Verdrag inzake de rechten van het kind van 20 november 1989, geratificeerd door België, 
op het eerste gezicht geen rechtstreekse werking heeft.’
1172 Council of State, 16 December 2002, case no. 113723, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be. Original 
text in Dutch: ‘…in de mate dat de schending van het Verdrag inzake de rechten van het kind in het middel 
vervat zit, dit niet op ontvankelijke wijze kan worden aangevoerd nu voormeld verdrag geen directe werking 
heeft.’
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rights from their wordings.1173 In another case, the Court ruled that ‘Considering 
that Article 9.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child must be denied direct effect 
since this treaty Provision is not a clear and legally complete Provision that imposes 
the States Parties either a duty to refrain or a duty to act in a particular manner; that 
therefore, the applicant cannot effectively invoke a violation thereof.’1174
A large number of cases referred to above concern disputes concerning the refusal 
to foreigners of a permit to legally reside on Belgian territories. It is interesting 
to note here that it seems to be not unusual for the Commissioner-General for 
refugees and stateless persons to emphasise that the ICRC is applicable to the minor 
applicant while rejecting the request for a residence permit. Usually, a standard 
consideration is used: ‘I draw the attention of the Minister of the Interior on the fact 
that under your national law you are considered to be a minor, and that consequently 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989, ratified by Belgium, 
can be applied.’1175 In none of these cases however, this notion resulted in a more 
favourable verdict for the applicant, nor could the applicant successfully invoke 
one of the ICRC Articles in appeal.1176
12.3.3 The Council of State on CEDAW Provisions
Regarding the CEDAW, it must be concluded that there is no significant case law on 
CEDAW treaty Provisions. Articles are rarely invoked, and have no significant effect 
on the verdict of the Council.1177 Interesting detail in a case in 2009 however, is that 
the direct effect of Article 16 CEDAW is explicitly denied, due to an interpretation 
of the Council of Article 2 in conjunction with Article 11 CEDAW. To this end, the 
1173 Council of State, 24 January 1996, case no. 57793 (Articles 6, 24, 27 (1), and 28) available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be; Council of State, 12 February 1996, case no. 58122, available at: www.raadvst-
consetat.be (Articles 6, 27 (1), and 28).
1174 Council of State, 9 July 2003, case no. 121461, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be (Article 3). 
Original text in Dutch: ‘Overwegende dat aan artikel 9.1 van het Verdrag inzake de Rechten van het Kind een 
directe werking moet worden ontzegd aangezien deze verdragsbepaling geen duidelijke en juridisch volledige 
bepaling is die de verdragspartijen of een onthoudingsplicht of een plicht om op een welbepaalde wijze te 
handelen, oplegt; dat verzoeker de schending daarvan bijgevolg niet dienstig kan aanvoeren.’
1175 Original text in Dutch: ‘Ik vestig de aandacht van de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken op het feit dat u 
krachtens uw nationale wet minderjarig bent en dat bijgevolg het Verdrag inzake de rechten van het kind van 
20 november 1989, geratificeerd door België, op u kan worden toegepast.’ In some cases, the word ‘must’ is 
used instead of ‘can’. See for instance: Council of State, 24 Mai 2005, case no. 144825, available at: www.
raadvst-consetat.be.
1176 See for instance (available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be): Council of State, 2 April 2002, case no. 
105351; Council of State, 10 March 2003, case no. 116807; Council of State, 23 April 2003, case no. 118541; 
Council of State, 8 December 2003, case no. 126132; Council of State, 15 December 2003, case no. 126410; 
Council of State, 31 March 2005, case no. 142746; Council of State, 24 May 2005, case no. 144825; Council 
of State, 22 September 2005, case no. 149302; Council of State, 1 March 2006, case no. 155724; Council of 
State, 25 March 2010, case no. 202357. It must be noted that in cases no. 105351, 118541, 126410, 144825 
and 202357, in appeal, no ICRC Articles were invoked by the applicant.
1177 See for instance (available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be): Council of State, 7 March 2002, case no. 
104430 (Article 15); Council of State, 23 December 2009, case no. 199259 (Article16).
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Council rather selectively quoted two elements of the two Articles: ‘States Parties 
(…) agree to pursue by all appropriate means a policy of eliminating discrimination 
against women’ and ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women.’ From this, according to the Council, follows that 
Article 16 CEDAW has no direct effect. A reasoning that is hardly understandable, 
for there is no relationship with Article 11 and the case, for in casu, the applicant 
appeals against a decision that denies her request to change her family name, 
while the quoted part of Article 11 could also be taken from Article 16 CEDAW, 
whose first sentence has the same wordings.1178
12.3.3.4 Concluding remarks
It can be concluded that the case law of the Council of State regarding the direct 
applicability of ECOSOC rights is rather inconsistent. Especially regarding the 
ICESCR, the Council varies as it seems randomly between denying the direct 
effect of the entire treaty, to granting some effect to certain Articles, whereas the 
ICRC seems to have no direct effect at all in the case law of the Council. Regarding 
the CEDAW, no significant case law could be found in which the Council ruled 
on the possibility of direct effect. No evidence could be found that the difference 
between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and 
cultural rights on the other, plays a significant role in the considerations of the 
Council in determining whether or not a treaty Provision has direct effect.
12.4 The Court of Cassation
The Court of Cassation did not rule on matters in which the international right 
to food was invoked, and only occasionally on international ECOSOC Provisions. 
In this Section, therefore, rulings in which ICESCR, ICRC, and CEDAW Articles 
are invoked will be discussed in general.
12.4.1 The Court of Cassation on ICESCR Provisions
The Court of Cassation did not rule very often in cases in which ICESCR Provisions 
were invoked, and rather exceptionally decided on the direct effect of the Provisions.
For instance, on 20 December 1990,1179 a plaintiff invoked Article 13 ICESCR 
in a case in which certain school fees were under dispute that due to Article 
2.1. ICESCR, stipulating the obligation to progressively realise the rights in the 
Covenant, Article 13 therefore cannot have any immediate legal effect, and does 
not constitute any subjective right for an individual. In a ruling on 25/09/2003, 
1178 Council of State, 23 December 2009, case no. 199259, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be 
(Article 16).
1179 Court of Cassation, 20 December 1990, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1990(91)(p. 445).
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the Court had a similar reasoning with regard to Article 15.1180 In casu, a plaintiff 
invoked Article 15 ICESCR to justify her publication of summaries of scientific 
articles, without the approval of the authors of these articles. On 26 May 2008, 
the Court ruled that inter alia Articles 9 and 10 ICESCR had no direct effect. Also 
here, the Court referred to Article 2 ICESCR, and furthermore considered that 
from the wordings of the invoked Provisions, it followed that the Articles had 
no direct effect. In casu, the amount of child allowance was under dispute. The 
plaintiff claimed that the difference of child allowance in case of the death of 
a parent between entrepreneurs on the one hand, and ‘regular’ employees and 
civil servants on the other, was discriminative. The Court ruled that the different 
groups of beneficiaries were not comparable, and therefore the disputed Royal 
Decree was not discriminative.1181
On 21 November 1996, the Court ruled that the use of coercion tools as a security 
measure for hospitalised detainees could only be an exceptional measure, and 
not a normal safety rule. In this case, the plaintiff invoked Article 12 ICESCR 
in a cassation plea against a Court ruling, in which the Court of First Instance 
had decided that certain straps could lawfully serve as a replacement for several 
necessary safety equipment that would normally be present in a prison, in case of a 
hospitalised detainee. The Court decided with a confusing reasoning that Article 12 
ICESCR could not be violated without the violation of several national Provisions, 
together with Articles 2 and 12 ICESCR. The most probable interpretation seems 
that in this case, the national Provisions offer at least a similar, or possibly a 
broader protection than Article 12 ICESCR read alone.1182
12.4.2 The Court of Cassation on ICRC Provisions
Regarding the ICRC, the Court frequently seems to consider the invoked ICRC 
Provision, but rules that in casu, the invoked Provision is not applicable or it 
has not been violated.1183 Only occasionally, the Court decided on the direct 
1180 Court of Cassation, 25 September 2003, no. C030026N, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1181 Court of Cassation, 26 May 2008, no. S060105F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1182 Court of Cassation, 21 November 1996, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1996 (446).
1183 For instance: Court of Cassation, 31 October 2006, P.06.0890.N, published on: http://jure.juridat.
just.fgov.be (Article 40, due to an interpretative declaration made by Belgium to this Article: ‘(a) this 
Provision shall not apply to minors who, under Belgian law, are declared guilty and are sentenced in a higher 
Court following an appeal against their acquittal in a Court of the first instance; (b) this Provision shall not 
apply to minors who, under Belgian law, are referred directly to a higher Court such as the Court of Assize.’).
See also: Court of Cassation, 4 November 1993, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1993 (p.919) (Article 
21); Court of Cassation, 1 October 1997, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1997(378) (Article 16); Court 
of Cassation, 14 October 2003, no. P.03.0591.N, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be (Articles 
3, 9, 12, and 18); Court of Cassation, 22 March 2005, no. P050340N, published on: http://jure.juridat.
just.fgov.be (Article 37, 38 and 40); Court of Cassation, 21 March 2006, no. P060211N, published on: 
http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be (Article 16); Court of Cassation, 27 January 2010, no. P091686F, published 
308 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 12
applicability of ICRC Provisions. In some cases, the Court was rather clear in 
explicitly denying direct effect of an Article.
On 31 March 1999, the Court ruled in a case in which a child was placed into Court 
custody in order to resume proper education and restore the relationship with 
its father. In casu, the father did not agree with the Court custody, and invoked 
inter alia Article 25 ICRC. He argued that in Article 25 ICRC, the restoration of 
the relationship with the father was not recognised as a legal ground for placing 
a child into the Court’s custody. The Court considered among other things that 
from the wordings of Articles 4 and 24 ICRC it appears that they only stipulate 
obligations to State Parties, and therefore have no direct effect, and consequently 
cannot be invoked directly before the national Courts.1184
In the ruling of 26 May 2008 discussed above, not only Articles 9 and 10 ICESCR, 
but also Articles 2.1 and 26.1 ICRC were invoked. The Court considered also, 
regarding the invoked ICRC Provisions, that from the wordings of the invoked 
Provisions, it followed that the Articles had no direct effect.1185
On 11 March 1994, the Court decided that the Court of Appeal rightfully could 
decide that the visiting rights of a father could not be enforced by implementing 
measures or coercive measures against the children involved. The Court considered 
that the rights embedded in the Convention on the rights of the child (including 
the visiting rights of parents) should always be considered in view of the best 
interest of the child. Furthermore, children have the right to express their opinion 
on matters that concern their interest, and this opinion needs to be taken into 
careful consideration (as stipulated in Articles 9 (2) and 12 ICRC). In casu, there 
was a deeply disturbed relationship between the father and his daughters, and 
his daughters had clearly no desire to be in contact with their father.1186
The Court decided on 4 November 1999 in two cases1187 that Articles 3 (1) and 
3 (2) could be useful for the interpretation of other legal Provisions, but are of 
insufficient clarity to have direct effect due to the fact that these Provisions 
recognise a large margin of appreciation for Member States to, in casu, decide 
on how the interests of the child are best protected in relation to the manner in 
which the biological origin of the father is determined. Therefore, no substantive 
on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be (Article12); Court of Cassation, 15 September 2010, no. P101218F, 
published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be (Article 12); Court of Cassation, 20 October 2010, no. 
P090529F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be (Article 3).
1184 Court of Cassation, 31 March 1999, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1999(195).
1185 Court of Cassation, 26 May 2008, no. S060105F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1186 Court of Cassation, 11 March 1994, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1994(I, p. 243).
1187 Court of Cassation, 4 November 1999, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1999 (588); Court of 
Cassation, 4 November 1999, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1999 (589).
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rights can be distilled from Article 3. On 10 November 1999,1188 the Court was less 
subtle, by simply stating that Articles 3 and 13 ICRC were not directly applicable 
in criminal proceedings. This was reaffirmed by the Court with regard to Article 
3 on 4 March 20081189 and 20 October 2010.1190
On 23 October 2006,1191 The Court of Cassation ruled in a case in which the plaintiff 
invoked Articles 2, 3, 24 (1), 26, and 27 ICRC against a verdict of the Labour Court 
in higher appeal. The Labour Court denied social benefits to a woman with three 
children, not legally residing in Belgium. The Labour Court had referred to the 
Constitutional Court’s verdict of case 106/2003,1192 in which the Constitutional 
Court ruled that Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare’ was in violation with Articles 2, 3, 24 (1), 26, and 27 ICRC if it would not 
allow Public Centres for Social Welfare to provide material help that is necessary 
for the development of the child. In casu however, the plaintiff demanded financial 
assistance, and not material benefits, which was according to the Labour Court not 
in accordance with the reasoning of the Constitutional Court, and the resulting 
revision of the relevant national law. The Court of Cassation however, ruled 
otherwise, stating that the adapted Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on 
public centres for social welfare’ did not necessarily exclude financial benefits, and 
therefore could not be a valid ground to deny the financial assistance demanded 
by the plaintiff. Based on the above, the Court already concluded to annul the 
disputed ruling, and therefore did not feel the need to consider the cassation 
plea in which the ICRC Provisions were invoked. In casu, the Court appears to be 
willing to broaden the scope of the verdict of the Constitutional Court.
On 24 October 2012, the Court ruled that Article 8 ECHR needs to be read in 
conjunction with Articles 7 and 9 ICRC, meaning that ‘Thus, the right to respect 
private and family life, implies the right of the child to be cared for by his parents, and 
the right of a mother not to be separated from her child against her will, unless such 
separation is necessary in the interest of the child and to the extent that the measure, 
which has been taken in accordance with applicable law and applicable procedures, is 
subject to juridical review on behalf of, in particular, the holders of parental authority, 
which has thus been compromised.’1193 In casu, a minor was placed in foster care 
for an unlimited period, until the age of majority, and the parents had very 
1188 Court of Cassation, 10 November 1999, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1999 (599).
1189 Court of Cassation, 4 March 2008, no. P071541N, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1190 Court of Cassation, 20 October 2010, no. P090529F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1191 Court of Cassation, 23 October 2006, no. S050042F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1192 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 June 2003.
1193 Court of Cassation, 24 October 2012, no. P121333F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
Original text in Dutch: ‘Aldus houdt het recht op eerbiediging van het familie- en gezinsleven het recht in, voor het 
kind, om door zijn ouders te worden verzorgd en, voor een moeder, om niet tegen haar wil te worden gescheiden 
van haar kind, tenzij deze scheiding noodzakelijk is in het belang van het kind en voor zover de maatregel, die in 
overeenstemming met het toepasselijke recht en de toepasselijke procedures is genomen, door de rechter getoetst 
kan worden op verzoek van met name de houders van het ouderlijk gezag waaraan aldus afbreuk is gedaan.’
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limited access to legal remedies. The Court ruled that this was an unnecessary 
infringement to the right to private and family life.
12.4.3 The Court of Cassation on CEDAW Provisions
Also concerning the case law of the Court of Cassation, no rulings of any significance 
could be found regarding the direct applicability of CEDAW Provisions.1194
12.4.4 Concluding remarks
In general, it can be concluded that the Court of Cassation only occasionally rules 
on the possibility of direct effect of ICESCR and ICRC Provisions. Regarding the 
ICESCR Articles, no evidence could be found that the Court granted direct effect – 
or any effect at all – to one of the Provisions. Regarding the ICRC Provisions, there 
appears to be – rather exceptionally – some room for effect of certain Provisions, 
although no direct effect was ever explicitly granted, and the Provisions concerned 
do not stipulate typical ECOSOC Provisions.
One remarkable case is the ruling of 23 October 2006, in which the Court appears 
to open the door for financial social benefits for illegally residing aliens with 
children, while this is, as will appear below, clearly a broader scope of benefits 
than the Constitutional Court, and the subsequently altered Organic Law seem 
to recognise. The effect in casu of the invoked ICRC Provisions however remains 
unclear.
12.5 The Constitutional Court
The direct applicability of economic, social and cultural rights is in fact a matter 
in which the Constitutional Court cannot decide, since the Constitutional Court 
only reviews legislation against the Constitution, and not against international 
standards. Indirectly however, as demonstrated in Section 11.4.2.2, international 
standards can play a role in the interpretation of Constitutional standards for 
which the Court is authorised to review against. As mentioned above, the Court 
ruled that it was authorised to review legislation indirectly against Provisions 
1194 As it seems, in proceedings that concern discrimination against women, Provisions of EU legislation 
or the ECHR are invoked, rather than CEDAW Provisions. See for instance: Court of Cassation, 17 
January 1994, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1994(I, p.54); Court of Cassation, 5 December 1994, 
Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1994(II, p.1052); Court of Cassation, 5 December 1994, Arresten 
van het Hof van Cassatie, 1994(II, p.1055); Court of Cassation, 4 November 1996, Arresten van het Hof 
van Cassatie, 1996 (411); Court of Cassation, 4 November 1996, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 
1996 (412); Court of Cassation, 13 January 1997, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1997 (28); Court of 
Cassation, 13 February 1997, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1997 (83); Court of Cassation, 29 May 
1998, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1998 (279); Court of Cassation, 8 March 1999, Arresten van 
het Hof van Cassatie, 1999 (136); Court of Cassation, 29 April 2002, no. S010137F, published on: http://
jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
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from international treaties and Covenants that are directly applicable, but also 
against international Provisions that are not directly applicable, as long as they 
are binding to Belgium.
12.5.1 The first reviews against Article 13 ICESCR
In 1992, the Constitutional Court seemed to review a decree from the French 
Community that would lead to an increase of certain school fees, against Article 
13 ICESCR. The Court decided that the increase of school fees was not a violation 
of the standstill obligation with regard to 13 ICESCR, due to the fact that such fees 
were no severe or significant obstacle for the access to education, considering the 
average income of Belgian citizens.1195 This ruling however was understood by 
the requesting party of a case in 1994,1196 that Article 17 CA – the predecessor of 
Article 24 CA – should be understood in conjunction with Article 13 ICESCR.1197 In 
casu, a decree of the French Community was under dispute. The decree introduced 
school fees for arts education that did not yet exist at the moment on which the 
ICESCR was ratified by Belgium, and was therefore perceived to be a violation 
of the standstill obligation. The Court held that Article 13 ICESCR had no direct 
effect in Belgium, and could not create any subjective rights, but held also that any 
national Provision that would introduce school fees for primary, secondary and 
higher education that was accessible free of charge at the time of ratification of the 
ICESCR would be in violation with Article 13 ICESCR.1198 Furthermore, perhaps 
somewhat in contradiction to the previous reasoning, the Court considered that 
any school fee that would not severely hinder the access to education would not 
be considered to be a step back compared to the previous situation in which no 
school fees existed yet.1199 Moreover, the Court held that the arts education in 
question did not fall under the scope of primary, secondary or higher education, 
and the French Community was therefore not obliged to keep this education free 
of any charge.1200 The Court finally ruled that the disputed decree was not in 
violation with Article 24 Constitution in conjunction with Article 13 ICESCR.1201
Since then, the Court repeatedly reviewed national legislation against Article 
24 Constitution in conjunction with (the standstill effect of) Article 13 ICESCR, 
but mostly ruled that the national Provision in question did not violate these 
standards.1202 However, the Court did not only reject nullification requests in 
1195 Constitutional Court, 33/92, 7 May 1992, especially consideration B.8.2.
1196 Constitutional Court, 40/94, 19 May 1994.
1197 Constitutional Court, 40/94, 19 May 1994, A.10.1.
1198 Constitutional Court, 40/94, 19 May 1994, consideration B.2.3.
1199 Constitutional Court, 40/94, 19 May 1994, consideration B.2.7.
1200 Constitutional Court, 40/94, 19 May 1994, consideration B.2.8.
1201 Constitutional Court, 40/94, 19 May 1994. consideration B.2.9.
1202 For instance, a decree of the French Community refusing finances for students who repeatedly 
failed to pass their exams (Constitutional Court, 35/98, 1 April 1998, consideration B.5.1.-B.5.2.); a 
decree of the French Community indirectly allowing Universities to impose under circumstances 
312 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 12
which Article 13 was invoked. In a case on 4 June 1998,1203 the Court ruled that 
a decree of the French Community, practically resulting in the fact that a quota 
was established for the acceptation of foreign students due to altered subsidy 
rules, and also the prohibition to oblige student candidates to do an entrance 
examination before attending a specific type of arts education, would lead to 
serious and irreparable harm to the school. The requesting party invoked inter 
alia Articles 10 and 11 Constitution read in conjunction with Article 13 ICESCR. 
The Court however did not specify on which Articles the verdict was based.1204 
The ruling was later reaffirmed on 15 July 1998.1205
In a case in 2001,1206 another decree from the French Community was under 
dispute. The decree introduced certain reference systems that explained basic 
competences in education. According to the requesting party, this system was 
detailed to such extent that it would impose a particular pedagogic view on schools, 
which would be in violation with Article 24 CA in conjunction with inter alia 
Article 13 ICESC. The defending party – the French Community Government 
– held that the invoked international Provisions were inadmissible whereas the 
requesting party did invoke these Provisions directly (thereby suggesting that 
additional registration fees (Constitutional Court, 44/98, 22 April 1998, consideration B.4); a decree from 
the French Community that obliged students with French as mother tongue but attending secondary 
education in Dutch to do a language exam in order to attend education on a university in the French 
language (Constitutional Court, 48/98, 22 April 1998, consideration B.5); a decree from the French 
Community that would lead to less favourable working conditions for education personnel compared 
to the other communities (Constitutional Court, 134/98, 16 December 1998, consideration B.4); a 
decree from the French Community allowing rarely visited religious education to coincide with other 
educational activities (Constitutional Court, 42/99, 30 March 1999, and 90/99, 15 July 1999: in both 
cases Article 13 ICESCR was invoked, but the Court only reviewed against Constitutional Provisions); a 
decree from the French Community on the equal granting of social benefits to schools installed by the 
Government and schools not installed by the Government, in which an exhaustive list of categories of 
social benefits for schools that are subsidised under strict conditions is stipulated (Constitutional Court, 
56/2003, 14 May 2003); a decree from the French Community allowing higher educational institutions 
that are not a university to raise additional school fees (Constitutional Court, 28/2007, 21 February 2007; 
56/2008, 10 March 2008); a decree of the Flemish Community on the fees for teacher education, in which 
the fees were raised (Constitutional Court, 105/2008, 17 July 2008); a decree of the French Community 
blocking the possibility in primary education to change school during a college year (Constitutional 
Court, 119/2008, 31 July 2008; a decree of the French Community altering the enrolment procedures 
for the admission to secondary education (Constitutional Court, 121/2009, 16 July 2009); a national 
Law excluding non-subsidised and recognised educational institutions from legal grounds for foreign 
students to be granted a residence permit (Constitutional Court, 145/2010, 16 December 2010); a national 
Law to prevent the abuse of asylum procedures in order to gain access to social benefits (Constitutional 
Court, 135/2011, 27 July 2011); a decree of the Flemish Community allowing schools to give priority to 
the enrolment of students with the Dutch language as mother tongue in the Brussels-Capital Language 
Area (Constitutional Court 7/2012, 18 January 2012), were considered not to be in violation with Article 
24 Constitution, read in conjunction with Article 13 ICESCR.
1203 Constitutional Court, 62/98, 4 June 1998.
1204 Constitutional Court, 62/98, 4 June 1998, consideration B.13.
1205 Constitutional Court, 91/98, 15 July 1998. The requesting party invokes Articles 10 and 11 
Constitution in conjunction with inter alia Article 13 ICESCR in the first part of the appeal.
1206 Constitutional Court, 49/2001, 18 April 2001.
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 313 
 The Belgian case law on the enforceability of the right to adequate food
the Provision was not invoked in conjunction with a Constitutional Provision) 
and did not specify in what manner the disputed decree would violate these 
standards.1207 According to the Court, the international standard was invoked in 
conjunction with a Constitutional standard. Moreover, the Constitutional standard 
in itself (Article 24 CA) clearly recognises the respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms. According to the Court, Article 13 ICESCR is one of these fundamental 
rights and freedoms, and could therefore be rightfully invoked by the requesting 
party.1208 Finally, the Court ruled that the decree was indeed in violation with the 
freedom of education as recognised in Article 24 CA. Despite the recognition that 
Article 13 ICESCR could rightfully be invoked by the requesting party, and thus 
apparently is a standard that needs to be taken into consideration, no reference 
was made to the earlier invoked international standards in the final verdict.1209
12.5.2 Reviews against ECOSOC rights in general
Since the aforementioned early rulings in which the Court indirectly reviewed 
against Article 13 ICESCR, it also started to review national Provisions, indirectly, 
against other ICESCR Provisions.
The Court, similar to the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court, however 
does not always choose to review against an invoked international standard when 
it does not seem necessary. There are plenty of cases in which an international 
ECOSOC right was somehow invoked or referred to by a requesting or defending 
party, or referred to in a preliminary question, but not considered further by the 
Court. In some cases the Court ruled that the invoked international Articles were 
not violated due to the fact that the invoked protection did not fall under the scope of 
the invoked Article.1210 In some cases the Court ruled that the invoked international 
Provision would not lead to a broader protection, or that no additional arguments 
were derived from these Provisions by the requesting party.1211 In all these cases, 
the Court did not review indirectly against the international Provision. In one 
case, the requesting party did invoke Article 6 ICESCR, but not in conjunction with 
a Constitutional Provision. The Court therefore ruled that it was not competent 
1207 Constitutional Court, 49/2001, 18 April 2001, A.4.2.
1208 Constitutional Court, 49/2001, 18 April 2001, considerations B.5.1. and B.5.2.
1209 Constitutional Court, 49/2001, 18 April 2001, consideration B.12.
1210 For instance: Constitutional Court, 41/2002, 20 February 2002, considerations B.5-B.6 and verdict 
(Article 6); 110/2005, 22 June 2005, consideration B.3.2 (Article 13); 147/2005, 28 September 2005, 
consideration 10.5 (Article 8); 28/2007, 21 February 2007, Consideration B.5.2 (Article 13); 64/2008, 
17 April 2008, B.S. 9 May 2008 (9 ICESCR and 12 ESC); Constitutional Court, 64/2009, 2 April 2009 
(Article 8).
1211 For instance: Constitutional Court, 49/95, 15 June 1995, consideration B.6.2 (Article 2); Constitutional 
Court, 1/95, 12 January 1995, consideration B.9 (Article 9); Constitutional Court, 85/98, 15 July 1998, 
consideration B.5.9 (Article 13); Constitutional Court, 15/2001, 14 February 2001, consideration 
B.9 (Article 7); Constitutional Court, 109/2001, 20 September 2001, consideration B.12 (Article 6); 
Constitutional Court, 137/2011, 27 July 2011 (Article 6).
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reviewing the disputed national standard only against an international Provision, 
hereby drawing a line between direct and indirect reviewing competences.1212
On the other hand, in other cases the Court did review (indirectly) against the 
invoked treaty Provisions. While in some cases the parties involved seem to quarrel 
over the direct applicability of treaty Provisions,1213 the Constitutional Court appears 
not to engage in that debate1214 but instead seems to consider rather frequently 
whether or not a restriction on an invoked human right would be necessary in 
a democratic society, not unreasonable, and not incompatible with its purpose. 
This way, the Court reviewed indirectly against Articles 6,1215 8,1216 and 131217 
ICESCR, although such a review seldom resulted in a verdict in which a national 
rule was considered to be indirectly in violation with an international standard.
1212 Constitutional Court, 107/98, 21 October 1998, consideration B.7.2.
1213 For instance, in Constitutional Court, 110/98, 4 November 1998, the Court was asked to review a 
decree of the Flemish Community against Article 24 Constitution in conjunction with inter alia Articles 
5 and 7 CEDAW, Articles 2 and 10 ICESCR. According to the Flemish Community Government, this 
Court could not review against these Articles due to the fact that these Provisions could not be applied 
in the internal legal order without implementing measures. The requesting party also invoked Article 2 
ICRC, but according to the Flemish Community Government, this Provision had no direct effect for the 
Article recognised merely a modality of the rights recognised in the Convention, but had no independent 
significance. The Court did not directly respond to the arguments of the Government, but instead quoted 
all international Provisions invoked, and did review the disputed decree against those Provisions. In 
casu, the Court considered that the Articles were not violated by the decree. The direct applicability 
of Article 7 ICESCR was also disputed in Constitutional Court, 2/99, 13 January 1999. A preliminary 
question was raised concerning the compliance of a Board Language Law that obliged a complex but 
equal division in language groups of certain civil servants with regard to bilingual matters with Articles 
10 and 11 Constitution in conjunction with Articles 2 and 7 ICESCR. The Council of Ministers questioned 
the direct applicability of Article 7 ICESCR. The Court however reviewed the disputed Statute against 
Articles 10 and 11 Constitution in conjunction with Articles 2 and 7 ICESCR, and decided that the Statute 
was not in violation with the Constitutional and international standards.
1214 Although in the period 1990-2002, the Court considered itself to be only competent in indirectly 
reviewing against international, directly applicable Provisions. During that period – although very 
rarely – the Court decided on the direct applicability of international Articles. For instance, the Court 
ruled that the Provisions stipulated in the UDHR had no direct effect. See: Constitutional Court, 22/94, 
8 March 1994, Consideration B.1.
1215 Constitutional Court, 22/94, 8 March 1994, consideration B.9.2; 109/2001, 20 September 2001, 
consideration B.10.2 (although no specific reference was made to the criteria, they appear to have been 
considered implicitly).
1216 Constitutional Court, 62/93, 15 July 1993, consideration B.3.8-B.3.12. 42/2000, 06 April 2000, 
consideration B.7.4.
1217 As already referred to in Section 12.5.1. Constitutional Court, 47/97, 14 July 1997, consideration 
B.3.2; Constitutional Court, 28/2007, 21 February 2007, Consideration B.4.11-B.4.12; Constitutional Court, 
56/2008, 10 March 2008; Constitutional Court, 105/2008, 17 July 2008; Constitutional Court, 145/2010, 
16 December 2010, consideration B.5-B.6.
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12.5.3  Proceedings regarding the right to food as embedded in 
Article 11 ICESCR
International Provisions recognising the right to adequate food were almost 
exclusively invoked (with varying degrees of success) in annulment procedures 
regarding national Provisions on the basis of which aliens may request social 
benefits, or in cases in which another Court asked a preliminary question, mostly 
in the same context. Aliens seeking protection by invoking fundamental human 
rights have led to extensive case law that is explained in detail in the PhD thesis 
of Steven Bouckaert, a book that I gratefully consulted as an important source 
of inspiration for this Section.1218 This Chapter will instead focus on the cases 
in which the international right to food played a role. However, in some cases 
this right was not explicitly invoked, while it is important to fully understand 
the general lines in the case law of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, where 
necessary, these cases are also discussed below.
12.5.3.1 The first review of Article 57 § 2 O.C.M.W: Case 51/941219
On 29 June 1994, the Court made its first landmark ruling in a series of cases 
concerning the review of Article 57 § 2 of the ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public 
centres for social welfare’1220 against several human rights Provisions, including 
Articles stipulating the right to food. The disputed Article was altered by the Federal 
Government with the aim of restricting immigration. Before, the public centres for 
social welfare were bound to provide for basic needs to aliens illegally residing on 
Belgian territory by granting them benefits in kind. After the Amendment of 30 
December 1992, Article 57 § 2 stated that ‘The Provision of social benefits shall end 
from the date of the execution of the order to leave the territory, and at the latest, from 
the date of expiration of the period of the final order to leave the territory. Deviation 
from the Provisions of the preceding Section shall be allowed during the period that 
is strictly necessary to enable the person to effectively leave the territory: that period 
shall in no case exceed one month. Also, deviation shall be allowed in case of urgent 
medical care.’1221
1218 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007.
1219 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994.
1220 In Dutch: artikel 57, § 2, van de organieke wet van 8 juli 1976 betreffende de openbare centra voor 
maatschappelijk welzijn, abbreviated as: Article 57 § 2 O.C.M.W.
1221 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, III. Original text in Dutch: ‘Aan de maatschappelijke 
dienstverlening wordt een einde gemaakt vanaf de datum van de uitvoering van het bevel om het grondgebied 
te verlaten, en ten laatste, vanaf de datum van het verstrijken van de termijn van het definitieve bevel om 
het grondgebied te verlaten. Van het bepaalde in het voorgaande lid wordt afgeweken, gedurende de strikt 
noodzakelijke termijn, om de betrokkene in staat te stellen het grondgebied effectief te verlaten: die termijn mag 
in geen geval een maand overschrijden. Er wordt eveneens afgeweken ingeval van dringende medische hulp.’
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In casu, the requesting party – a variety of interest groups – argued that this 
would result in discrimination between illegally residing aliens or aliens whose 
request for a residence permit was denied on the one hand and legally residing 
aliens and Belgian citizens on the other hand. The requesting parties thereby 
invoked Articles 10 and 11 CA in conjunction with Articles 3 ECHR, 7 ICCPR, 11 
ICESCR, and 13 ESC.
The Court stated that the disputed Statute did not unlawfully treat persons 
differently, because in a situation in which a State wishes to restrict immigration, 
while all measures taken seem to be ineffective, it is not unreasonable to accept 
different obligations regarding the needs of legally residing persons in Belgium 
on the one hand and illegally residing persons on the other hand. In addition, the 
illegally residing person could know beforehand what the consequences would be 
when he does not leave the territory on time. The Court ruled that the disputed 
measure was not disproportionate with its purpose, as long as it would guarantee 
to foreigners the social benefits that are necessary to leave the country for one 
month, and emergency medical assistance for an unlimited period.1222
The Court then affirmed that with regard to Articles 10 and 11 ‘the Constitutional 
Provisions on equality and non-discrimination are applicable with regard to all rights 
and freedoms, including those resulting from international treaties that are binding to 
Belgium, made  applicable by ratification in the internal legal order and have direct 
effect.’1223
In this light, the Court firstly ruled that restrictions on the right to social benefits 
were not in violation with Articles 3 ECHR and 7 ICCPR. The Court considered 
that the restrictions were not an act of torture or inhuman treatment, for there 
was no act in which severe pain or suffering of a physical or psychological nature 
was deliberately inflicted on the victim with the purpose of obtaining information 
or confessions, nor was there an act of punishing the victim, or putting pressure 
on or intimidating the victim or third parties. Also, the restrictions would not 
result in any kind of degrading treatment, for there was no situation in which a 
victim was hurt in front of other persons, or the human dignity of the victim was 
seriously affected.1224
Secondly, the Court quoted Article 11 ICESCR, and considered that this Article 
must be read in conjunction with the standstill Provision of Article 2.1 ICESCR. 
The Court ruled with remarkable consideration that despite the fact that the 
1222 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, consideration B.4.3.
1223 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, consideration B.5.2. Original text in Dutch: ‘de 
grondwettelijke regels van de gelijkheid en van de niet-discriminatie zijn toepasselijk ten aanzien van alle rechten 
en alle vrijheden, met inbegrip van die welke voortvloeien uit internationale verdragen die België binden, die 
door een instemmingsakte in de interne rechtsorde toepasselijk zijn gemaakt en die directe werking hebben.’
1224 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, consideration B.5.4.
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 317 
 The Belgian case law on the enforceability of the right to adequate food
ICESCR stipulates the right to an adequate standard of living for everyone, this 
right cannot reasonably be understood without limitations. The Court argued that 
Article 11 ICESCR could only apply to persons for whom the State is responsible, 
and that the State is not responsible for aliens residing in Belgium who were 
ordered to leave the territory due to the fact that they did not fulfil (anymore) 
the conditions to get a residence permit.1225
Thirdly, the Court held that it was not necessary to decide whether Article 13 
ESC was directly applicable, for the Provision would only add to the previous 
that the Member States of the ESC were obliged to grant on the basis of equality 
social benefits to nationals and citizens from other Member States that legally 
reside on their territory. According to the Court, this Article was not violated, 
since the different treatment was not based on nationality, but on the legal status 
of residence.1226 The Court thus rejected the request.
Interesting however in this case is that the Court ruled that Articles 10 and 11 CA 
are applicable with regard to all rights and freedoms, including those embedded 
in directly applicable international Provisions. The Court reviewed the disputed 
national Provision against Article 3 ECHR and 7 ICCR, and also against Article 
11 ICESCR. Is the Court telling us here, that in their view, Article 11 ICESCR is 
directly applicable? It will probably never be known, for some years later, the Court 
would explicitly consider being competent to also review against international 
Provisions that are not directly applicable. As a matter of fact, the Court seems 
already to hint at a broader understanding of its reviewing capacities in this case 
implicitly, by considering that Articles 10 and 11 CA could be read in conjunction 
with ‘all rights and freedoms, including those resulting from international treaties that 
are binding to Belgium, made  applicable by ratification in the internal legal order and 
have direct effect.’1227
Another interesting observation can be made. The Court avoids reviewing against 
Article 13 ESC, based on the ratione personae of this Provision. In fact, as Bouckaert 
points out, the Court’s considerations regarding Article 11 ICESCR concern the 
ratione personae of the Provision as well.1228 The difference however is that in 
Article 13 ESC the ratione personae is clearly described (all citizens of all Member 
States, legally residing on the territory of one of the Contracting Parties), and 
therefore cannot be invoked by the plaintiff, while Article 11 ICESCR recognises 
the right to an adequate standard of living for everyone, without a limitation 
regarding the ratione personae. The Court then ruled that an unlimited ratione 
personae is unreasonable, and therefore decides that the Provision is not violated, 
1225 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, consideration B.5.5.
1226 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, consideration B.5.6.
1227 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, consideration B.5.2.
1228 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 553.
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without reviewing against the standstill effect of 11 ICESCR, or the substantive 
right in itself.
This Court ruling can be considered as a landmark ruling, introducing the basic ideas 
and direction of the Constitutional Court regarding the restricting of fundamental 
human rights of illegally residing aliens. For the first time, and certainly not for 
the last time, the Constitutional Court reviewed Article 57 § 2 Organic Law of 8 
July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’, representing an important part of the 
Belgian aliens rules and policy, against several basic human rights.
12.5.3.2  The period after Case 51/94 and the meaning of ‘urgent medical 
care’ and ‘final order to leave’
Although Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare’ was thus not considered to be a violation of fundamental human rights, the 
application of the amended Provision led to some confusion regarding the exact 
meaning of the terms ‘urgent medical care’ and ‘the final order to leave the territory.’
Some Labour Courts understood ‘urgent medical care’ in a very broad sense, and 
even considered that the assistance would include the right to adequate food 
and housing.1229 As an example to this, Bouckaert refers to the Labour Court of 
Verviers, that held that ‘refugees who are denied asylum retain the right to a minimum 
of dignity; that is not to die from hunger or cold’1230 and to the Labour Court of Appeal 
of Liège, that ruled that ‘this urgent medical assistance is not limited to a medical 
consultation and the provision of medicines. It should also be understood as granting 
supplies, including food essential for the survival of a person, and the enjoyment of 
decent housing.’1231 In appeal to the last verdict however, the Court of Cassation 
ruled otherwise, and considered that adequate housing and food did not fall under 
the scope of emergency medical assistance.1232 In response to these developments 
in case law, the Federal Government amended Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 
July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ by authorising the King to determine 
in more detail the meaning of ‘emergency medical assistance.’ As a result, in the 
1229 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 571-572.
1230 Bouckaert referred to: Labour Court of Verviers, 12 August, 1993, S.K. 1993, part 10, 471-473 and 
Labour Court of Verviers, 22 March 1994, S.K. 1995, part 2, 60-61. Original text in French: ‘les candidates 
réfugiés non admis à l ásile conservent le droit à la dignité minimale de ne mourir de faim, ni de froid.’
1231 Labour Court Liège, 13 February 1996, S.K. 1996, part 11, 568. Original text in French: ‘cette aide 
médicale urgente ne se limite pas à une consultation médicale et l’octroi des medicaments. Elle doit aussi 
s’entendre comme permettant la fourniture, notamment des vivres indispensables à le sauvegarde de la 
personne humaine ainsi de la jouissance ce d’un logement decent.’
1232 Court of Cassation, 17 February 1997, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie 1997 (91).
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Royal Decree of 12 December 1996 (Article 1),1233 emergency medical assistance 
was understood as assistance of a pure medical nature, of which the urgency is 
demonstrated by a medical certificate. The assistance may not consist of financial 
support, housing or other social services in kind.
A more complex question appeared to be the exact meaning of ‘the final order to 
leave the territory.’ After some consideration,1234 the Federal Government understood 
this phrase restrictively, and stated that an order to leave the territory is final 
when it can be executed. This would practically mean that when an alien would 
be involved in a legal procedure that does not automatically suspend the execution 
of the order (as in the case of an annulment procedure before the Council of State) 
he would have no access to any social benefits, besides urgent medical care, for 
the duration of this procedure. Therefore, this approach was not supported by the 
Labour Courts, which unanimously understood ‘the final order to leave the territory’ 
in a broader sense. Most Labour Courts at least understood ‘final order’ in the 
sense that an order is final when the alien could no longer appeal to the order to 
leave the territory, whether or not this appeal would suspend the execution of the 
order. Some Courts considered an even broader interpretation.1235 However, in 
several verdicts, the Court of Cassation ruled that the interpretation of the Federal 
Government was the correct one,1236 and consequently quashed the verdicts of 
the Labour Courts. However, not all Labour Courts were willing to change their 
view, and some of them persisted in their broader interpretation.1237
The Federal Legislator solved the matter by amending Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law 
of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ once more, on 15 July 1996.1238 
The granting of social benefits to aliens who were given a final order to leave 
Belgian territory would be ended on the day of their departure, but at the least 
from the day of the expiration of the order to leave the country. Deviation from 
the above would only be allowed for the duration that was strictly necessary to be 
able to leave the territory, but only when the alien signed a declaration of intent 
to leave, and only for the maximum period of one month. In fact, this amendment 
1233 Royal Decree on the emergency medical assistance provided for by the public centres of social 
welfare to illegally residing aliens in Belgium, 12 December 1996. Original Dutch name: Koninklijk 
Besluit van 12 december 1996, betreffende de dringende medische hulp die door openbare centra voor 
maatschappelijk welzijn wordt verstrekt aan de vreemdelingen die onwettig in het Rijk verblijven.
1234 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 577.
1235 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 578-581.
1236 For instance,the earlier mentioned Court of Cassation, 17 February1997, Arresten van het Hof van 
Cassatie 1997 (90).
1237 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 583.
1238 Statute of 15 July 1996 amending Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare’.
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reaffirmed the original understanding of the Government of the phrase ‘final order’, 
meaning that it is understood as an ‘executable order’. However, compared to the 
previous version of Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for 
social welfare’ on 15 July 1996, the amended version made it possible to prolong 
the full right to social benefits with the period necessary to leave the territory 
(with a maximum of one month), instead of granting only the right to the aid that 
was necessary to leave the country.1239
12.5.3.3  Article 57 § 2 O.C.M.W. and the appeal to an order to leave: Case 
43/98
On 22 April,1240 some interest groups requested nullification of the Statute that 
amended Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare.’1241 They claimed that the Article amending the Organic Law was in 
violation with Articles 10, 11, 23, and 141 Constitution, because the Statute creates a 
difference in treatment between on the one hand aliens that receive social benefits 
at the time when they are ordered to leave the Belgian territory and appeal against 
that decision, and on the other hand aliens that appeal to the order to leave while 
they reside illegally in Belgium. Both categories are awaiting a decision of the 
Council of State regarding their appeal against the order to leave, while only the 
first category of aliens will receive social benefits for another period, until the 
last day of the expiration of the order to leave the country, while the last category 
receives no social benefits except for urgent medical care. Also, the requesting 
parties held that Article 23 CA was violated, for the enjoyment of the right to a 
dignified life could not legally be depending on the residence status. According 
to the interest groups, this would be at least a violation of the standstill effect of 
this basic human right, for it would result in a situation in which a group of aliens 
is deprived of its right, which is to be considered as a step backwards. Besides 
that, this would be a disproportionate means in order to achieve the restriction of 
immigration. In addition, the interest groups argued that this would undermine 
the right to appeal to an order to leave the territory, as recognised in national 
legislation (by Statute of 15 December 1980). Furthermore, the requesting parties 
argued that another difference in treatment was installed, based on financial 
power, between aliens who could afford to live without social services for the 
period of the appeal, and those who could not.1242
The Council of Ministers basically claimed that in case 51/94 the Court adopted a 
principle of restricting social benefits, regardless of the fact whether an order to 
1239 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 590.
1240 Court of Cassation, 43/98, 22 April 1998, B.S. (04) (83, pp.13348-13357).
1241 Article 65, Statute of 15 July 1996 amending Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public 
centres for social welfare’.
1242 Constitutional Court, 43/98, 22 April 1998, A.13.
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leave the territory is final or merely executable. Furthermore, the Council argued 
that both categories of aliens referred to by the requesting parties were in the 
same uncertain situation awaiting a decision on their appeal against the order to 
leave, and therefore, there was no difference in treatment.1243
The Court ruled that indeed the principles forthcoming from their ruling in case 
51/94 were still applicable, and reaffirmed that the basic idea of restricting social 
services to aliens who were ordered to leave Belgian territory was a suitable 
means for the purpose of restricting immigration. However, the Legislature chose 
to restrictively interpret ‘final order’ which was expressed in the amended law, 
in the sense that in case of an executable order to leave Belgian territory, except 
for emergency medical assistance, the Provision of all social services would be 
stopped. According to the Court, this measure was proportionate in a situation in 
which the alien wishes to leave the territory, and explicitly expresses the intention 
to leave. However, this is clearly not the case when the alien appeals against the 
decision to leave and (in addition) asks for suspension of the execution of the 
order to leave. According to the Court, the Council of State may, by an accelerated 
procedure, reject appeals that are manifestly inadmissible or unfounded. This 
would limit the chance that asylum-seekers would abuse an appeal procedure in 
order to enjoy social benefits for a longer period. The Court considered that it is 
unnecessary to deprive the appellants of social benefits during appeal procedures. 
The amended legislation would thus disproportionately restrict the exercise of 
fundamental human rights, in particular the right to social services and the right 
to effective exercise of a judicial appeal.1244 The Court therefore nullified the 
word ‘executable’ in the phrase ‘The Provision of social services to an alien who was 
making actual use of these services at the time he received an executable order to leave 
the territory will be ended, with the exception of urgent medical care, on the day the 
alien actually leaves the territory, and at the latest, on the day of the expiration of 
the order to leave the territory.’1245 Furthermore, the Court ruled that this should 
be understood as that during the period of the appeal against the order to leave 
before the Council of State, Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public 
centres for social welfare’ shall not be applied, practically meaning that the alien 
has normal access to social benefits during these procedures.1246
1243 Constitutional Court, 43/98, 22 April 1998, A.14
1244 Constitutional Court, 43/98, 22 April 1998, consideration B.33-36.
1245 The original text in Dutch: ‘De maatschappelijke dienstverlening aan een vreemdeling die werkelijk 
steuntrekkende was op het ogenblik dat hem een uitvoerbaar bevel om het grondgebied te verlaten werd 
betekend, wordt, met uitzondering van de dringende medische hulpverlening, stopgezet de dag dat de 
vreemdeling daadwerkelijk het grondgebied verlaat, en ten laatste de dag van het verstrijken van het bevel om 
het grondgebied te verlaten’ (Article 65, Statute of 15 July 1996 amending Article 57 § 2 Organic Law of 8 July 
1976 on public centres for social welfare).
1246 Constitutional Court, 43/98, 22 April 1998, consideration B.37 and verdict.
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In this case, no international Provisions were invoked, but only domestic Provisions. 
The Court reaffirmed this verdict in two preliminary rulings concerning this 
matter.1247 Although in both cases Article 11 ICESCR – read in conjunction with 
Articles 10 and 11 Constitution – was included in the prejudicial question, the 
Court did not explicitly review against Article 11 ICESCR, but referred to its 
previous verdict (43/98).
12.5.3.4  Article 57 § 2 O.C.M.W. and the request for a prolonged stay: Case 
25/99
Ruling 43/98 did not solve all the matters regarding the entitlements to social 
benefits during legal proceedings in relation to the order to leave. Whereas now 
it was made clear that during an appeal to the refusal of a residence permit the 
alien would have entitlements to social benefits, there appeared to be alternative 
procedures as well that were accessible for aliens, as will appear in this section, 
but also more extensively in Sections 12.5.3.6-12.5.3.7.
The Labour Court of Liège asked a preliminary question with regard to a procedure 
of the Statute of 15 December 1980 (Article 9). In this procedure, an alien may 
request permission to reside in Belgium for a period longer than the normal 
maximum period of three months. This request must be reviewed by the competent 
Minister or an authorised representative. The Labour Court asked whether this 
procedure would discriminate between asylum-seekers whose request for a 
residence permit was denied, but requested permission for a prolonged stay under 
the procedure of Article 9 (Statute of 15 December 1980) before they received an 
order to leave the territory on the one hand, and asylum-seekers whose request for 
a residence permit was denied, and who did not submit a request for a prolonged 
stay before they received an order to leave the territory on the other hand. The 
reason for this question was that the first category of aliens would still have 
entitlements to social benefits during the procedure stipulated in the Statute of 
15 December 1980, while the second category of Asylum-seekers would not have 
any entitlements to social benefits during this procedure. Therefore, the Labour 
Court asked in addition whether this would be in violation with Articles 10, 11, and 
23 Constitution in conjunction with Articles 2 and 11 ICESCR. The Constitutional 
Court concluded that there was no difference in treatment due to the disputed 
Articles, but instead due to a circular of the Minister, ordering the municipalities 
not to send the order to leave the territory when it was determined that the alien 
submitted a request to a prolonged stay, based on Article 9 Statute of 15 December 
1247 Constitutional Court, 46/98, 22 April 1998, consideration B.2-B.4; Constitutional Court, 108/98, 21 
October 1998, consideration B.3.2-B.3.5 and verdict.
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 323 
 The Belgian case law on the enforceability of the right to adequate food
1980.1248 The consequence would be that an alien that requested a prolonged 
stay would still receive social benefits, for the order to leave was not sent, while 
other aliens, who did receive an order to leave would not receive social benefits. 
A circular however is an administrative act, and no legislation. Therefore, The 
Court ruled that it was incompetent in reviewing the circular against the invoked 
legislation. Remarkable in this case is that the Court determined in detail that this 
circular resulted in a difference of treatment, while such a consideration was not 
necessary to come to the verdict, and it might even be questioned whether such 
considerations would fall outside the scope of the Court’s competences. On the 
other hand, the Court was well aware of the fact that the discriminative wordings 
were already omitted in a later circular.1249
12.5.3.5 The medical impossibility of Case 80/991250
The Labour Court of Gent asked in a preliminary procedure whether the amended 
Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ was 
in violation with Articles 10 and 11 Constitution in conjunction with Articles 11 
ICESCR and 13 ECHR, because it would institute an unjustified difference in 
treatment regarding the entitlement to social benefits between aliens who were 
ordered to leave the Belgian territory who can be removed and those who cannot 
be removed due to medical impossibility.1251 The Court confirmed in a short 
consideration that if Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for 
social welfare’ would be applied to persons who are in an absolute incapacity due 
to medical reasons to leave the Belgian territory, this was indeed in violation with 
Articles 10 and 11 Constitution. In its considerations,1252 the Court referred to the 
invoked international Provisions, while in its verdict only a reference was made 
to the violation of Articles 10 and 11.1253 According to the Court thus an illegally 
residing alien, regardless the fact whether he/she appealed against the decision 
1248 Circular on the application of Article 9, third Section, of the Act of 15 December 1980 on the access 
to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens, 9 October 1997, B.S. 14 November 
1997. Original title in Dutch: Omzendbrief betreffende de toepassing van artikel 9, derde lid, van de wet van 
15 december 1980 betreffende de toegang tot het grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging en de verwijdering van 
vreemdelingen.
1249 Circular on the application of Article 9, third Section, of the Act of 15 December 1980 on the access 
to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens, 15 December 1998, B.S. 19 December 
1998. Original title in Dutch: Omzendbrief betreffende de toepassing van artikel 9, derde lid, van de wet van 
15 december 1980 betreffende de toegang tot het grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging en de verwijdering van 
vreemdelingen.
1250 Constitutional Court, 80/99, 30 June 1999.
1251 Another question was raised by the Labour Court, regarding the difference of treatment between 
Belgian citizens and legally residing aliens on the one hand, and aliens whose request for a residence 
permit was denied and who had received an order to leave the territory on the other hand. The 
Constitutional Court referred to its earlier case law on this matter, especially cases 51/94 and 43/98, 
and reaffirmed this case law.
1252 Constitutional Court, 80/99, 30 June 1999, consideration B.5.1.
1253 Constitutional Court, 80/99, 30 June 1999, verdict.
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ordering him/her to leave, who is in a situation in which it is impossible to obey 
the order to leave due to medical reasons, should receive full social services.
Due to the short consideration of the Constitutional Court, the principle that 
medical impossibility should result in not applying Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 
8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’, Bouckaert observed that therefore 
the Courts, in their later rulings, further specified (1) whether invoking medical 
impossibility was only possible when a regularisation request was submitted1254; 
(2) what medical impossibility means;1255 and (3) what the substance should be 
of the social benefits when the medical impossibility was invoked.1256
12.5.3.6  Artice 57 § 2 O.C.M.W. and the application for recognition of 
statelessness
In two preliminary rulings1257, the Constitutional Court was asked whether 
Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ would 
institute an unjustified difference in treatment regarding entitlements to social 
benefits between Belgian citizens, legally residing aliens and aliens who appealed 
to a refusal of their request to a residence permit on the one hand, and aliens 
1254 Due to the extensive case law on this, and the limited link with the main issue of this thesis, 
this debate is excluded from this Chapter. For more information see: S. Bouckaert, Documentloze 
vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, 
Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 759-765.
1255 In case law, certain rules of thumb could be distilled. Four categories seem to have been developed 
amongst the Labour Courts and Courts of Appeal: (1) most importantly, the intrinsic severity of 
the condition of the person; but also (2) the impossibility to travel; (3) the impossibility to receive 
adequate medical care in the country of origin; and (4) medical attests that can prove what the 
applicant claims. See: S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de 
Belgische en internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 766-778. 
However, not all the Courts seem to have adopted a similar approach towards the principle of medical 
impossibility. This can be demonstrated by one poignant decision of the Labour Court of Brussels. In 
casu, a refugee who was infected with the HIV virus and therefore under heavy treatment was ordered 
to leave Belgian territory. It was rather clear in the case that in the country of origin the treatment 
could not be continued. The Court ruled that the refugee was not entitled to full social services, for 
the impossibility to obey the order to leave due to medical reasons could not be proven. The refugee 
also submitted a regularisation request. The Labour Court referred to case 89/2002, in which the 
Constitutional Court ruled that restricting social services to an illegally residing alien who submitted 
a regularisation request was not in violation with Constitutional standards. This case seems to reflect 
a broader discussion, in which the question was raised whether an illegally residing alien that invokes 
a medical impossibility to obey an order to leave should submit a regularisation request in order to be 
entitled to full social services. It is doubtful however, whether in this particular case the Court uses 
case 89/2002 as an argument to deny social services in case of medical impossibility, for both issues 
were dealt with separately. See: Labour Court of Appeal of Brussels, 16 December 2004, S.K. 2005 (pp. 
264-265).
1256 Basically, a minimum substance of existence will be granted, and where necessary, additional 
necessary medical aid. See: S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen 
de Belgische en internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 779-
780.
1257 Constitutional Court, 17/2001, 14 February 2001; Constitutional Court, 89/2002, 5 June 2002.
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who are ordered to leave the Belgian territory and submitted an application for 
recognition of statelessness on the other hand, aliens whose order to leave the 
territory is definite, and did not appeal or whose legal remedies are exhausted 
and submitted an application for recognition of statelessness on the other hand 
(case 17/2001), or, between aliens who appealed to the order to leave the territory 
in their capacity as refugee on the one hand, and aliens who were ordered to 
leave the territory in refugee procedures and now submitted an application for 
recognition of statelessness on the other hand (case 89/2002).1258 In the first 
situation of both questions, the alien would receive social services, as was ruled in 
case 43/98,1259 while in the second case the alien would receive only emergency 
medical assistance. The question was whether the principle of an effective legal 
remedy (and therefore the right to social services) of case 43/98 would analogously 
apply to an application for recognition of statelessness. In both cases, the Court 
ruled that this was not an unjustified difference of treatment. Basically, the Court 
reasoned that there would be a significant risk that in judging otherwise, the 
procedure of applying for recognition of statelessness might be abused to receive 
social benefits.1260 In addition, the Court underlined in both cases that the fact 
that the alien in a previous procedure submitted a request for obtaining the status 
of refugee, based on his nationality, was not a convincing fact in a procedure for 
applying for recognition of statelessness.1261 Only in case 89/2002, Article 11 
ICESCR was invoked in the preliminary question. In its considerations however, 
the Court ruled that the invoked international Provisions would not lead to a 
different conclusion.1262
12.5.3.7 Article 57 § 2 O.C.M.W. and the regularisation request
The Statute of 22 December 1999 ‘on the regularisation of the residence of certain 
categories of Aliens residing on Belgian Territory’1263 instituted a one-time opportunity 
to submit a regularisation request for certain categories of aliens (1) whose request 
for a refugee status was not considered within a period of four years (or in cases 
of families with minors three years); (2) who could not return to the country 
from which they arrived before entering Belgian territory, due to reasons beyond 
their control; (3) due to serious illness; or (4) due to humanitarian reasons while 
1258 In case 89/2002, a second question was raised, whether an unjustified difference in treatment was 
installed between aliens who are ordered to leave Belgian territory but appealed to that decision on the 
one hand and aliens who are ordered to leave Belgian territory and submitted a regularisation request 
on the other hand.
1259 Constitutional Court, 43/98, 22 April 1998, consideration B.5.3.
1260 Constitutional Court, 17/2001, 14 February 2001, consideration B.5.2; 89/2002, 5 June 2002, 
consideration B.8.
1261 Constitutional Court, 17/2001, 14 February 2001, consideration B.5.3; Constitutional Court, 89/2002, 
5 June 2002, consideration B.8.
1262 Constitutional Court, 89/2002, 5 June 2002, consideration B.9.
1263 Original title in Dutch: Wet van 22 december 1999 ‘betreffende de regularisatie van het verblijf van 
bepaalde categorieën van vreemdelingen verblijvend op het grondgebied van het Rijk.’
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having developed considerable lasting social bonds with their country, illegally 
resided in Belgian territory on 1 October 1999 (Article 2). During the procedure, 
the alien would not be removed from Belgian territory (Article 14). The question 
was raised whether 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare’ should be applied to those aliens who submitted such a request and were 
awaiting a decision.1264 Bouckaert observed that the Council of State advised that 
during this period, Article 57 § 2 of the Organic Law should not be applied, so that 
these aliens were entitled to social benefits during the period of the procedure. 
The Federal Government however expressed in a Ministerial circular an opposite 
view, and stated that the Statute of 22 December 1999 did not change the illegal 
residence status and therefore the alien would have no entitlements to social 
services. A majority of the Labour Courts however, followed the reasoning of the 
Council of State, and ruled that during the process, Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 
8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ would not apply, and as a result, the 
alien would be entitled to social services. Apparently, the situation was rather 
unclear, which led to a complex chain of legal proceedings.
In two annulment procedures, interest groups requested nullification of Article 
14 of the Statute of 22 December 1999 ‘on the regularisation of the residence of 
certain categories of Aliens residing on Belgian Territory’ for the Legislator, based on 
the principles of equality and non-discrimination (Articles 10 and 11 CA), should 
have excluded the application of Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on 
public centres for social welfare’ to aliens who submitted a regularisation request. 
The Constitutional Court referred to the Parliamentary History of the Statute 
of 22 December 1999,1265 and stated that it was obviously not the intention of 
the Legislature to grant full social benefits to these aliens. However, due to the 
fact that the requesting party basically argued that the Legislature refused to 
alter a standard that was not under dispute in the annulment request, the Court 
considered the request to be inadmissible.1266
In five preliminary questions the Labour Courts of Antwerp, Liège and Brussels 
asked whether Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for 
social welfare’ was in violation with Articles 10 and 11 Constitution (in two cases 
read in conjunction with Articles 11 ICESCR and 3 ECHR) when the Provision 
of social benefits would be limited to emergency medical aid to illegally residing 
aliens who submitted a regularisation request.1267 According to the Constitutional 
Court, it was the competence of the Legislature to adopt a policy regarding the 
1264. See: S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 649-659.
1265 Parliamentary Documents, House of Representatives, 1999-2000, doc. 50 0234/005, p. 60; 
Parliamentary Documents, Senate, 1999-2000, no. 2-202/3, p. 23; House of Representatives, 1999-2000, 
meeting of 24 November 1999, HA 50 plen. 017, pp. 7, 8, 18 and 31-32.
1266 Constitutional Court, 106/2000, 25 October 2000; Constitutional Court, 32/2001, 1 March 2001.
1267 Constitutional Court, 131/2001, 30 December 2001.
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access to, residence in and the removal from Belgium of aliens, and to make 
regulations to define the conditions of legal residence in Belgium. The Court 
considered also here that it could be deduced from the Parliamentary Documents 
that the Legislature by adopting the regularisation procedure did explicitly not 
intend to alter the juridical status of the illegally residing aliens, and thus did not 
intend to create a right to social services for those who submitted a regularisation 
request, but only intended to postpone the actual removal of the territory. The 
Legislature was clearly looking for a solution to deal in a humane manner with a 
large group of illegally residing aliens on the one hand, while on the other hand 
such a procedure needs to be controllable and workable. In addition, it was the 
intention of the Legislature to discourage illegally residing aliens to abuse such 
a procedure only to gain access to social benefits.1268 The Court then considered 
that it was the competence of the Constitutional Court to judge whether such 
policy measures were not in violation with the principle of non-discrimination.1269 
The Court underlined that illegally residing aliens had no entitlements to social 
benefits, except for urgent medical assistance. The Court then argued, in line 
with the Legislature, that the juridical status of the illegal alien who submitted a 
regularisation request was not different from the status of illegally residing aliens 
who did not submit such a request.1270 In addition, the Court considered that the 
illegality of the alien was a result of his/her own actions, for apparently he/she 
did not act in accordance with the relevant regulations.1271 The Court also stated 
that the regularisation procedure was not an international obligation, such as 
the recognition of the status of refugee, but a national choice.1272 Furthermore, 
it seemed unreasonable not to guarantee the postponement of removal from the 
territory when illegally residing aliens were asked to identify themselves, while 
it seems also unreasonable to then assume that postponing the removal would 
imply access to social benefits.1273 Therefore, the Court ruled that the restriction 
of social services to illegally residing aliens who submitted a regularisation request 
was not an unreasonable measure. Thus, in its verdict the Court ruled that the 
application of Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare’ would not be in violation with the invoked standards in the interpretation 
that social benefits are restricted to urgent medical care for illegally residing 
1268 Constitutional Court, 131/2001, 30 December 2001, consideration B.3.5. The Court referred to 
Parliamentary Documents, House of Representatives, 1999-2000, doc. 50 0234/001, p. 5. and doc. 50 
0234/005, p. 60; Parliamentary Documents, Senate, 1999-2000, no. 2-202/3, pp. 23, 36, and 58. House 
of Representatives, 1999-2000, meeting of 24 November 1999, HA 50 plen. 017, pp. 7, 8, 18, 31, and 32.
1269 Constitutional Court, 131/2001, 30 December 2001, consideration B.3.4.
1270 Constitutional Court, 131/2001, 30 December 2001, consideration B.3.5.
1271 Constitutional Court, 131/2001, 30 December 2001, consideration B.4.3.
1272 Constitutional Court, 131/2001, 30 December 2001, consideration B.3.7.
1273 Constitutional Court, 131/2001, 30 December 2001, consideration B.4.3.
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aliens that submit a regularisation request. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed 
this verdict in four preliminary rulings on 17 January 2002.1274
Nevertheless, the matter appeared not to be completely settled. Bouckaert observed 
that case 131/2001 did not lead to a uniform approach amongst the Labour Courts 
toward the application of Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres 
for social welfare’ to aliens who submitted a regularisation request.1275 Since a 
majority of the Labour Courts had consistently granted social benefits to applicants 
of a regularisation request, following the ruling of the Constitutional Court would 
result in an inconsistency in their own case law. Some Labour Courts did alter 
their original view due to the enhanced res judicata of the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling, and while explicitly considering that there are convincing arguments to 
rule otherwise, they ruled in compliance with case 131/2001.1276 Other Labour 
Courts however maintained their original view.1277 The Labour Court of Brugge 
for instance,1278 among others, appeared to be struggling with the legal effect of 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling. The Labour Court recognised the res judicata of 
this verdict, but added that such an effect applied to all rulings, and not only to 
case 131/2001. The Court considered that when the Constitutional Court ruled 
that social services were granted to an alien that could not be removed due 
to medical reasons (case 80/99),1279 it was unclear why this should not be the 
case for a group of aliens that the Legislature did not even want to remove. The 
Court furthermore stated that it remained unclear whether the Constitutional 
Court decided to change their approach by case 131/2001 in view of their earlier 
rulings on comparable matters, such as the case of medical impossibility. The 
Labour Court considered that changing approaches in case law as such was not 
automatically unjustifiable, but underlined that such a radical change needed 
to be considered with caution. In the past, the Labour Court had systematically 
and with detailed motivation ruled that an alien who submitted a regularisation 
request was entitled to full social service during the period of that procedure. In 
casu, the alien involved belonged to one of the last submitters of a regularisation 
request. The ruling of the Constitutional Court was published near the end of 
1274 Constitutional Court, 14/2002, 17 January 2002, B.6, verdict; Constitutional Court, 15/2002, 17 
January 2002, verdict. Constitutional Court, 16/2002, 17 January 2002, consideration B.5, verdict; 
Constitutional Court, 17/2002, 17 January 2002, consideration B.6, verdict. Only in case 15/2002 Article 
11 ICESCR was not invoked.
1275 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 665.
1276 Bouckaert refers for instance to the Labour Court of Leuven, 12 December 2001, published on 
http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1277 Bouckaert refers for instance to the Labour Court of Appeal of Liège, 5 March 2002, published on: 
http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be; Labour Court of Appeal of Brussels, 17 April 2002, published on: http://
jure.juridat.just.fgov.be; Labour Court of Brugge, 28 January 2002 published on: http://jure.juridat.just.
fgov.be.
1278 Labour Court of Brugge, 28 January 2002, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1279 Constitutional Court, 80/99, 30 June 1999.
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the period in which the regularisation procedure was valid. The Court was thus 
confronted with a dilemma: on the one hand, there was the enhanced res judicata 
of case 131/2001, while on the other hand, by recognising this res judicata, the 
Court would violate the principles of equality and legitimate expectations due 
to its previous rulings. The Labour Court of Brugge eventually decided not to 
change its approach in line with case 131/2001, and firmly rejected the ruling of 
the Constitutional Court.
Not surprisingly, the Court of Cassation, being the Court of Last Instance for 
Labour Court cases, was also confronted with appeals to the rulings of Labour 
Courts concerning this issue. On 17 June 2002, the Court ruled that Article 23 
Constitution recognised the right to a decent existence, including the right to 
social benefits. The Court considered that entitlements to social benefits could 
be restricted to urgent medical care when an alien illegally resides on Belgian 
territory, by applying Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres 
for social welfare’, in order to encourage the alien to leave the territory. The Court 
considered furthermore that the Statute of 22 December 1999 ‘on the regularisation 
of the residence of certain categories of aliens residing on Belgian territory’ opened a 
possibility for aliens who stayed illegally on Belgian territory to submit a special 
regularisation request. During this procedure, the aliens could not be removed 
from Belgian territory. Therefore, the Court ruled that Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic 
Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ could not be applied to aliens 
who were allowed to reside on Belgian territory during this procedure.1280 In 
other words: the illegally residing alien submitting a regularisation request did 
not reside illegally on Belgian territory during the regularisation procedure, and 
was therefore fully entitled to social benefits. The Court reaffirmed this on 7 
October 20021281 and 7 June 2004.1282 The ruling of the Court of Cassation does 
not necessarily contradict the earlier rulings of the Constitutional Court. This is 
due to the fact that the Constitutional Court only discussed the entitlements to 
social benefits of illegally residing aliens, while the Court of Cassation considers 
the aliens who submitted a regularisation request not to be illegally residing.1283 
The two approaches do not excel in consistency either.
Therefore, again, prejudicial questions were raised concerning the legality of 
applying Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare’. The Constitutional Court confirmed its previous case law, using remarkably 
frequent references to Parliamentary History. Furthermore, the Court considered 
that there are also differences between the aliens who requested regularisation, for 
some applicants would already have full access to social benefits based on other 
1280 Court of Cassation, 17 June 2002, no. S010148F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1281 Court of Cassation, 7 October 2002, no. S000165F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1282 Court of Cassation, 7 June 2004, no. S030008N, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be.
1283 Steven Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Maklu: Antwerp-Apeldoorn, 2007, part II, no. 667.
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procedures. Those who had no access to these social benefits did then clearly not act 
in accordance with the Belgian rules on immigration, and are therefore responsible 
for their own illegality.1284 Furthermore, the Court underlined that due to the fact 
that the regularisation procedure did not include automatic regularisation, but 
rather a procedure in which each request was judged individually, Article 57 § 2 of 
the Organic Law could not be interpreted in such way that by merely submitting a 
regularisation request an entitlement to full social services would be created.1285 
The Court then explicitly ruled that Article 14 of the Statute of 22 December 1999 
on the regularisation of the residence of certain categories of aliens residing on 
Belgian Territory (the alien would not be removed from Belgian territory during 
the regularisation procedure) should be interpreted in such a way that until the 
residence status of the alien is regularised, the entitlements to social benefits of 
the alien are restricted to emergency medical aid only.1286
Bouckart observed that the above situation led to an impasse amongst the Labour 
Courts: rulings of the Constitutional Court have an enhanced res judicata, while 
on the other hand the Court of appeal – the Court of Cassation – may nullify a 
ruling of the Labour Court that follows the interpretation of the Constitutional 
Court.1287 Of course, in this matter the regularisation procedure was only a 
temporary measure, and the Constitutional Court’s verdicts came at the end of 
this period so that actual legal inconsistencies due to the opposing rulings of the 
Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation are of a hypothetical nature. This 
matter however does reflect a debate in Belgium concerning the competences of 
the Constitutional Court.1288 The Court is authorised to review national legislation 
against Constitutional standards. However, especially in case of a preliminary 
ruling, the Court may need to review a standard against Constitutional standards 
in a certain interpretation of that national standard, usually given by the Court that 
raises the preliminary question. The Constitutional Court may perhaps suggest 
that it does not approve of that interpretation, or may even suggest one or two 
other possible interpretations in its verdict. It is however questionable whether 
the Constitutional Court’s competences go this far, that it may impose a specific 
interpretation on law on a Labour Court. Smets analysed the preliminary rulings 
of the Court throughout the years, and concludes that the Constitutional Court 
1284 Constitutional Court, 203/2004, 21 December 2004, consideration B.13.1.
1285 Constitutional Court, 203/2004, 21 December 2004, B.S. 25 February 2005, consideration B.14; 
204/2004, 21 December 2004, B.S. 03 March 2004, consideration B.15; 205/2004, 21 December 2004, 
B.S. 04 March 2005, consideration B.14.
1286 Constitutional Court, 203/2004, 21 December 2004, consideration B.15; Constitutional Court, 
204/2004, 21 December 2004, consideration B.16; Constitutional Court, 205/2004, 21 December 2004, 
consideration B.15.
1287 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 673.
1288 See especially: J. Smets, De verhouding van het Arbitragehof tot de verwijzende rechter in het prejudiciële 
litigation, in: Twintig Jaar Arbitragehof, Mechelen: Wolters Kluwer België, 2005.
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increasingly interferes with the interpretation that should be given to a national 
standard in a preliminary procedure.1289
12.5.3.8  Article 57 § 2 O.C.M.W. and an appeal to the Council of State against 
a second or third rejection of a request for asylum
The Aliens Act recognises the possibility for a refugee to request for asylum a 
second time when he/she is of the opinion that there is new evidence to support 
the request. The Belgian Immigration Department may in such a second or third 
request refuse to consider the request when it is doubtful whether there is indeed 
such new evidence.1290 The alien can only appeal to this decision before the 
Council of State.
In three prejudicial cases, the Constitutional Court was asked whether the alien 
who appealed against such a decision was entitled to full social benefits, in an 
analogue interpretation of case 43/98, in which inter alia the principle of an 
effective exercise of a judicial appeal was recognised.1291 The Constitutional 
Court ruled that the application of Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on 
public centres for social welfare’ to these aliens, and thus restricting their right to 
social services to emergency medical aid, was not in violation with the invoked 
Constitutional and international standards. The Court considered in case 21/2001 
that in ruling otherwise, the procedure to apply for asylum a second or third time 
might easily be abused to get entitlements to social benefits only.1292 The Court 
furthermore ruled that an alien, who submitted a second request and had already 
exhausted all legal remedies during the first request, was in a significantly different 
position compared to the alien who requested asylum for the first time.1293 The 
last argument was also (although perhaps not very convincingly) used in case 
148/2001, in a situation in which the alien submitted a second request for asylum, 
but clearly did not exhaust all legal remedies during the first procedure.1294 The 
Court however added in case 50/2002 that the alien who did not exhaust or did 
not use the juridical remedies during the first procedure, and asked for asylum 
a second time, was in a different situation compared to the alien who asked for 
asylum for the first time.1295 Therefore, applying Article 57 § 2 of the Organic 
1289 J. Smets, De verhouding van het Arbitragehof tot de verwijzende rechter in het prejudiciële litigation, in: 
Twintig Jaar Arbitragehof, Mechelen: Wolters Kluwer België, 2005.
1290 See for more information regarding the procedure: https://dofi.ibz.be, the official website of the 
Belgian Immigration Department.
1291 Constitutional Court, 43/98, 22 April 1998, considerations B. 33-36.
1292 Constitutional Court, 21/2001, consideration B.4.
1293 Constitutional Court, 21/2001, 1 March 2001, consideration B.6.
1294 Constitutional Court, 148/2001, 20 November 2001, consideration B.7.
1295 Constitutional Court, 50/2002, 13 March 2002, consideration B.6.2. Bouckaert argued that in a case 
in which the alien did not exhaust all legal remedies during the first procedure, full social services 
should be granted during the second, when it is apparent that the alien is not abusing the procedure. He 
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Law was not in violation with the principles of equality and non-discrimination, 
and not an unreasonable means to prevent the abuse of the procedure.1296
In cases 21/2001 and 148/2001 the Court only reviewed against Articles 10 and 
11 Constitution, while in case 50/2002 the Court reviewed against Articles 10 and 
11 Constitution read in conjunction with Article 11 ICESCR.
12.5.4  Proceedings regarding the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child
The ICRC was ratified by Belgium by the decree of the Flemish Community on 
15 May 1991, the decree of the German language Community of 9 August 1991, 
the decree of the French Community of 25 November, and the Federal Statute of 
15 January 1992. Therefore, the Convention came into force in the Belgian legal 
order on 15 January 1992. Since 2003, Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on 
public centres for social welfare’ was also reviewed against national Constitutional 
Provisions in conjunction with ICRC Articles.
12.5.4.1  Case 106/2003: social benefits for the child of illegally residing 
aliens
The Labour Court of Brussels asked in a prejudicial question whether Article 57 
§ 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ was in violation 
with Articles 10 and 11 CA, separately or read in conjunction with Articles 23 
and 191 Constitution, Articles 2, 3, 24, 26, and 27 ICCR (separately or read in 
conjunction with Article 4 ICCR), Article 11 (1) ICESCR (separately or read in 
conjunction with Article 2 (1) ICESCR), and Article 3 ECHR, when it restricts 
the entitlements to social benefits to urgent medical care to an illegally residing 
minor alien, and consequently institutes a difference in treatment between (1) 
illegally residing minor aliens on the one hand, and minor Belgian and legally 
residing minor aliens on the other hand, when this difference of treatment is 
instituted with the purpose to encourage illegally residing aliens to voluntarily 
leave Belgian territory; and (2) illegally residing major aliens, who could leave 
the territory voluntarily on the one hand, and illegally residing minor aliens, 
who due to their young age could not on the other hand. The Labour Court case 
concerned a minor that was accompanied by its parents.1297
supports a more practical approach towards the principle of an effective legal remedy. See: S. Bouckaert, 
Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en internationale rechtspraak 
vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part II, no. 721.
1296 The Court referred to a verdict of 1994, in which the Constitutional Court had ruled that a Legislator 
may take measures to prevent the abuse of procedures as long as these measures are not unreasonable 
or disproportionate. See: Constitutional Court, 83/94, 1 December 1994.
1297 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, B.S. 4 November 2003.
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The Council of Ministers argued firstly that the Provisions of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child would have no direct applicability, and that the Convention 
was only applicable to children under the jurisdiction of the contracting Parties, 
which would not include illegally residing children.1298 The Council argued 
furthermore that there was no reason why a child could not, due to his/her age, 
leave the territory voluntarily, and made a distinction between accompanied and 
unaccompanied illegally residing minor aliens. In the first situation, the child was 
accompanied by the parents, who were the main applicant of the residence permit. 
If the parents would be ordered to leave the territory, this would automatically 
include the child. In the second situation, the child is unaccompanied, and could 
therefore request for a residence permit on its own behalf. If in such a case a 
residence permit is denied, Article 118 of the Royal Decree of 8 October 19811299 
will be applied, which means that an order of refoulement will be issued against 
the child, ordering the receiver to take the necessary measures to return the child 
to the country of origin. Therefore, the Council concluded that the situation of 
an illegally residing child is similar to the situation of illegally residing adults, 
and thus the restriction of entitlements to social services is not unreasonable.1300
The Court in response clarified its competences, by underlining that it was not 
bound to decide on the direct applicability of international Provisions, but instead 
was authorised to assess whether the national Legislature violated international 
obligations of Belgium in a discriminative manner.
The Court emphasised that Belgium made a reservation to Article 2 (1):‘With regard 
to Article 2, Section 1, according to the interpretation of the Belgian Government non-
discrimination on grounds of national origin does not necessarily imply the obligation 
for States automatically to guarantee foreigners the same rights as their nationals. 
This concept should be understood as designed to rule out all arbitrary conduct but 
not differences in treatment based on objective and reasonable considerations, in 
accordance with the principles prevailing in democratic societies.’1301 The Court however 
underlined that this declaration should be read in conjunction with Article 141 
Constitution, which recognises equal rights between aliens and Belgian citizens, 
apart from exceptions prescribed by Law. The Court considered that unequal 
treatment thus can only be legal when it was enacted by law, while the Legislature 
1298 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, B.S. 4 November 2003, A.3.2.
1299 Royal Decree of 8 October 1981 on access to the territory, residence, establishment and the removal 
of aliens. Original title in Dutch: Koninklijk Besluit van 8 oktober 1981, betreffende de toegang tot het 
grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging en de verwijdering van vreemdelingen.
1300 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, A.3.3.
1301 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, consideration B.5.2. Text in Dutch: ‘In verband met 
artikel 2, eerste lid, legt de Belgische Regering niet-discriminatie op grond van nationale afkomst uit als niet 
noodzakelijk de verplichting voor de Staten inhouden om aan vreemdelingen dezelfde rechten te waarborgen 
als aan de eigen onderdanen. Dit begrip moet worden verstaan als ertoe strekkende iedere willekeurige 
gedraging uit te bannen, doch niet verschillen in behandeling, stoelend op objectieve en redelijke overwegingen, 
overeenstemmend met de beginselen die in democratische samenlevingen gelden.’
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thereby had to take into consideration the fundamental principles embedded in 
the Constitution.1302
The Court also considered that Article 2 ICRC, stipulating that States Parties shall 
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the Convention to each child within their 
jurisdiction, implies that there must be a certain connection between the child 
that invokes the Convention and the Member State that is accused of violating 
it.1303 According to the Court, Article 2 ICRC had to be understood in view of the 
entire Convention, while also the nature of the difference in treatment that is 
under dispute must be taken into consideration. Therefore, the Court reasoned 
that the answer to the question whether illegally residing children would fall 
under the jurisdiction of Belgium according to the Convention, coincided with 
the assessment of the invoked discrimination.1304 The Court thus did not directly 
answer the question whether in this context illegally residing children would fall 
under Belgian jurisdiction. The fact however – as will be demonstrated below 
– that the Court reviews against the invoked Articles suggests that the ratione 
personae of the Convention on the Rights of the Child includes illegally residing 
alien children.1305
The Court furthermore considered that the parents had the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of the child, as embedded in Article 27 (2) ICRC.1306 However, 
the parents in casu could not fulfil this obligation due to the illegality of their 
stay.1307 The Court underlined that parents who did not obey the order to leave 
the territory had no rights to social benefits. It would be unreasonable when illegal 
aliens with children would have indirect access to social benefits by invoking the 
needs of their child, for this would result in a difference of treatment based on 
whether or not illegally residing adults are accompanied by children. In addition, 
granting the parents social benefits, even when limited to the amount that is 
necessary for the maintenance of the child, would be contrary to the aim of the 
Belgian Legislator to encourage illegally residing aliens to leave the territory 
(case 51/941308).1309 However, the Court considered that this would not justify 
complete refusal of any aid to the child, when this would lead to a situation in 
which the child would live in circumstances that are harmful for his/her health and 
development, while there would be a certainty that the parents cannot enjoy these 
social benefits. The Court referred in this light to Article 2 (2) ICRC, stipulating 
1302 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, considerations B.5.2.-B.5.3.
1303 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, consideration B.6.2.
1304 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, consideration B.6.3.
1305 See also: Steven Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de 
Belgische en internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Maklu: Antwerp-Apeldoorn, 2007, part III, no. 32 
and 438.
1306 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, consideration B.7.2.
1307 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, consideration B.7.1.
1308 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994.
1309 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, B.S. 4 November 2003, consideration B.7.3.-B.7.4.
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that States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is 
protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the 
status of the parents.1310 Also, the Court considered that the purpose of Articles 
2, 3, 24 (1), 26, and 27 ICRC had to be reconciled with the goal of encouraging 
illegally residing adults to leave.1311
Therefore, the Court ruled that social benefits may be granted under strict 
conditions. Firstly, the competent authorities had to establish that the parents 
do not or cannot fulfil their duty to maintain the child. Secondly, the requested 
social benefits must only cover the necessary expenses for the development of 
the child. Thirdly, the Centre of Social Welfare involved must be absolutely sure 
that the social services are indeed used to cover those necessary expenses. To 
avoid any abuse of these benefits by the parents, the Centres of Social Welfare 
may only provide for social benefits for the particular need of the child, and the 
benefits must be provided in kind (or payment to third parties that provide for 
services in kind).1312 The Court ruled that the refusal of these social benefits 
would indeed be a violation of Articles 10 and 11 Constitution, read in conjunction 
with Articles 2, 3, 24 (1), 26, and 27 ICRC. Remarkably, Articles 11 ICESCR and 
3 ECHR were not included in the verdict.
Ruling 106/2003 was later reaffirmed by the Court in case 129/20031313 and 
189/2004.1314 Both cases concerned accompanied alien children.
12.5.4.2 Case 131/2005: social services and the right to family life
Cases 106/2003, 129/2003, and 189/2004 resulted in the adaption of a new law: 
Article 496 of the Programme Act of 22 December 20031315 authorised the Centres 
for Social Welfare to determine the needs of a minor alien illegally residing on 
Belgian territory whose parents cannot fulfil the duties towards the child. In 
such circumstances, the social benefits are limited to those that are necessary 
for the development of the child, and only provided for in Federal Centres for 
Social Welfare, according to the conditions and modalities established by the 
King. The restriction that these social benefits could only be provided for in a 
Federal reception centre could however result in the fact that the child would be 
separated from his/her parents, who are not entitled to any social benefits except 
1310 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, B.S. 4 November 2003, consideration B.7.5.
1311 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, B.S. 4 November 2003, consideration B.7.6.
1312 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, consideration B.7.7. But see in this light also the 
interpretation of the Court of Cassation of this verdict, 23 October 2006, no. S050042F, published on: 
http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be. In this verdict, the Court ruled that benefits in kind does not necessarily 
exclude financial benefits.
1313 Constitutional Court, 129/2003, 1 November 2003.
1314 Constitutional Court, 189/2004, 24 November 2004.
1315 Programme Act 22 December 2003, B.S. 31 December 2003.
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for urgent medical assistance. The Labour Courts were confronted with many 
cases in which the question was raised whether separating the family due to the 
fact that the child was housed in a reception centre receiving social benefits, while 
the parents were not, was in violation with human rights.1316
On 19 July 2005,1317 some interest groups requested the nullification of Article 
496 of the Programme Act. To support their request, they firstly invoked Articles 
22 and 23 Constitution in conjunction with Articles 191 Constitution, 8 ECHR, 
17 and 23.1 ICCPR, 2 (1), 10 (1), and 10 (3). ICESCR, and 3 and 16 ICRC. The 
requesting parties argued that separating the child from his/her family would be 
an unreasonable infringement of a the right to privacy and family life ‘…to the 
extent that law implicitly but with certainty requires that the limited material social 
benefits, which are essential for the development of the child, are exclusively granted 
to the child, without taking into account the situation of all Members of the family.’1318 
In response, the Court considered that on the one hand granting social benefits 
to the parents of the illegally residing child would be contrary to the principles 
introduced in case 51/94, that is to encourage the illegally residing parents to 
voluntarily leave the Belgian territory. On the other hand, the Court stated that it 
had to consider whether the disputed Programme Act would make the existence of 
a family life impossible.1319 The Court considered that a restriction to family life 
could only be allowed if it was enacted by law and foreseeable, with a legitimate 
goal and proportionate, as stipulated in Articles 22 CA and 8 ECHR. The Court 
then referred to Parliamentary Documents, a Ministerial circular and case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, in which the importance of the presence 
of the parents near to the child is stressed.1320 Based on this, the Court ruled 
that by restricting the Provision of the social benefits necessary for the child’s 
development to only the location of Federal Centres for Social Welfare, the right 
to privacy and family life was violated.1321
Secondly, the Court did not consider a legal remedy, in which the requesting 
parties invoked inter alia Articles 23 Constitution, 11 and 13 ICESCR, 27, 28, and 29 
ICRC, 16 and 17 ESC (the treaty Provisions in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11 
CA), due to the fact that a violation of those Provisions could not lead to a broader 
nullification than the already established violation of privacy and family life.1322
1316 S. Bouckaert, Documentloze vreemdelingen, grondrechtenbescherming doorheen de Belgische en 
internationale rechtspraak vanaf 1985, Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu, 2007, part III, no. 488-522.
1317 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005.
1318 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005, A.3.1.1. Original text in Dutch: ‘…in zoverre die wet 
impliciet doch met zekerheid bepaalt dat de tot de materiële hulp beperkte maatschappelijke dienstverlening, 
die absoluut noodzakelijk is voor de ontwikkeling van het kind, hulp is die uitsluitend aan het kind wordt 
voorbehouden, zonder rekening te houden met de situatie van alle leden van het gezin.’
1319 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005, considerations B.3.2.-B.4.
1320 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005, considerations B.5.1.-B.5.5.
1321 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005, considerations B.5.5.-B.6.
1322 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005, considerations B.9.1.-B.9.2. and B.10.1-B.10.2.
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Thirdly, the requesting parties argued that Article 496 of the Programme Act was in 
violation with Articles 10 and 11 CA, for it would institute a difference in treatment 
between illegally residing children or their families on the one hand, and legally 
residing children or their families on the other hand, since the residence status 
would determine how the interest of the child is understood. The Court ruled 
that the application of Article 496 of the Programme Act is not discriminative, 
for both categories of children would have entitlements to social benefits. The 
fact that the kind of social benefits might differ was also not discriminative, due 
to the fact that it was the purpose of the Act to reconcile the principles of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child with the purpose to encourage illegally 
residing aliens to leave Belgian territory.
Another difference in treatment was invoked, based on Articles 10 and 11 CA, 
whether or not in conjunction with Articles 2 (2) ICESCR and 2 ICRC. The interest 
groups argued that the Programme Act made an unjust difference in treatment 
regarding the Provision of social benefits between illegally residing children that 
are accompanied by their parents on the one hand, and illegally residing children 
that are not accompanied by parents on the other hand. The Court however ruled 
that this difference in treatment was not discriminating and it could be reasonably 
justified that children accompanied by their parents would receive different social 
services compared to minors who are not accompanied by their parents.1323
Finally, the Court ruled that Article 496 of the Programme Act of 22 December 
2003 violates Article 23 CA and equivalent international Provisions, but only to 
the extent that the Provision does not guarantee that parents can accompany 
their child to the centre for social welfare, where the child receives the social 
assistance.1324
As a consequence, the Federal Legislator once again changed its legislation by 
adopting Article 22 of the Programme Act of 27 December 2005,1325 recognising 
that an illegally residing child that receives social benefits necessary for his/her 
development in a Federal Centre for Social Welfare can enjoy the presence of the 
parents or persons who exercise parental authority.
12.5.4.3  Case 194/2005: social services, the right to family life, medical 
impossibility to leave the territory
The course set by the Constitutional Court in case 131/2005 was later continued 
in other cases with different circumstances. In case 194/2005, the Labour Court 
of Brussels asked in a preliminary question whether Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law 
1323 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005, consideration B.11.2.
1324 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005, consideration B. 12.2. and verdict.
1325 Programme Act, 9 January 2006, B.S. 30 December 2005.
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of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ was in violation with Articles 10 
and 11 Constitution, whether or not read in conjunction with Articles 22, 23, 
and 191 Constitution and 2, 3, 24 (1), 26, and 27 ICRC, when it was applied to 
an illegally residing mother of a severely handicapped child, while the medical 
situation of the child made it absolutely impossible to return to the country of 
origin. The Court referred to its ruling in case 80/991326 in which it recognised 
the principle that an illegally residing alien who cannot be removed from Belgian 
territory due to medical reasons has entitlements to full social services.1327 The 
Court considered furthermore that it is a fundamental element of family life that 
parents and children live together, as embedded in Articles 22 CA and 8 ECHR.1328 
Therefore, the Court finally ruled that Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 
on public centres for social welfare’ was in violation with Articles 10, 11, and 22 CA, 
because it treated persons equally who were in fundamentally different position, 
without a reasonable justification: on the one hand those aliens who could be 
removed, and on the other hand, those aliens who cannot leave the Belgian territory 
due to the fact that they can prove to be the parent of a severely handicapped 
child that cannot possibly leave the territory due to medical reasons. In casu, the 
Court considered that it was impossible for the child to leave the territory due to 
these medical reasons, because it was in need for adequate medical healthcare 
that cannot be offered in the country of origin or another country that should 
receive the family.1329
12.5.4.4  Social services to Belgian children with illegally residing alien 
parent(s)
The Labour Court of Brussels asked in a preliminary question whether Article 57 
§ 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ was in violation 
with Articles 10 and 11 Constitution, alone or in conjunction with Articles 2 (2), 
3.2, 9, 10, and 27 ICRC, for it would institute an unequal treatment between 
children born to Belgian parents, minor aliens with alien parents who were allowed 
residence on Belgian territory, minor aliens born to minor parents who were 
illegally residing on Belgian territory on the one hand, and an illegally residing 
alien who is the parent of a Belgian child on the other hand. In case of the first 
category, due to the case law mentioned above, the parents would be entitled to 
social benefits, while in the second category, the child has the Belgian nationality 
and therefore, Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare’ is not applicable, while in case of an illegally residing child, the parents 
may receive social services via the child based on this Article (case 131/2005). 
1326 Constitutional Court, 80/99, 30 June 1999.
1327 Constitutional Court 194/2005, 21 December 2005, consideration B.4.2.
1328 Constitutional Court 194/2005, 21 December 2005, consideration B.5.1.
1329 Constitutional Court 194/2005, 21 December 2005, consideration B.5.2. and verdict.
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Consequently, the entitlements to social services of the illegally residing parent 
of a Belgian child are limited to urgent medical care.1330
The Court ruled that Articles 10 and 11 Constitution were not violated, thereby 
referring to the legitimate policy of the State to encourage illegally residing aliens 
to leave the territory.1331 In the opinion of the Court the child had, due to his 
nationality, a right to social benefits of his own, and therefore Articles 2 (2) and 
3 (2) ICRC were not violated. However, the Court considered that the fact that 
an illegally residing parent of a Belgian child that has no individual entitlements 
to social benefits does not automatically imply that the Public Centres for Social 
Welfare do not have to take into account the specific family situation. These 
centres were free to select the appropriate instrument to meet the medical and 
development needs of the child. The Court ruled that in determining the amount 
of the social benefits to the child, the Centres for Social Welfare had to take into 
account the fact that the social services of the mother were restricted to emergency 
medical aid, and the fact that the (Belgian) father had a legal duty to maintain the 
child.1332 In this interpretation, the Court ruled that Article 57 § 2 of the Organic 
Law was not in violation with the invoked Provisions.
Interesting detail in this case is that the Court explicitly considered that it was 
not asked to determine whether the illegally residing mother should be granted a 
residence permit. The Court underlined that therefore a review against Articles 9 
and 10 ICRC would be necessary, which was not part of the prejudicial question.1333 
Most probably the Court is giving a hint to the Labour Court on how to settle the 
issue.
In cases 35/20061334 and 44/20061335 the Court was asked the same preliminary 
question as in 32/2006, although now the cases concerned two illegally residing 
parents of a Belgian child. The Court reaffirmed its ruling 32/2006 also to this 
case, and ruled that Article 57 § 2 of the Organic Law did not violate the invoked 
Provisions, although the Centres for Social Welfare were free to determine the 
appropriate social benefits, taking into consideration the particularities of the case.
In case 110/20061336 not the social benefits of the parents, but the benefits of the 
child were under dispute. The Labour Court of Brussels asked in a preliminary 
question whether the fact that a Belgian child with illegally residing parents was 
1330 Constitutional Court, 32/2006, 1 March 2006.
1331 Constitutional Court, 32/2006, 1 March 2006, considerations B.6.1.-B.6.4. and B.10.
1332 Constitutional Court, 32/2006, 1 March 2006, consideration B.10.
1333 Constitutional Court, 32/2006, 1 March 2006, consideration B.9.
1334 Constitutional Court, 35/2006, 1 March 2006.
1335 Constitutional Court, 44/2006, 15 March 2006.
1336 Constitutional Court 110/2006, 28 June 2006.
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not entitled to certain family benefits1337 was in violation with Articles 10 and 11 
Constitution, whether or not read in conjunction with Articles 2 and 26.1 ICRC. 
Also here, the Court ruled that the disputed Articles were not in violation with 
the invoked Constitutional and International Provisions, but despite that, the 
Centres of Social Welfare were free to select the appropriate instrument to meet 
the medical and development needs of the child, thereby referring to Articles 2 
(1) and 26 ICRC.1338
12.5.4.5  Case 43/2006: the principle of legality in Articles 22 and 23 
Constitution
The Labour Court of Brussels asked in a preliminary question whether Article 57 
§ 2 Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare violated Articles 
22 and 23 (2) (3) Constitution (alone or together) whether or not in conjunction 
with Article 191 Constitution when authorising the King to set the conditions 
and modalities for the establishment of social benefits in kind that are provided 
for in Federal Centres for Social Welfare to minor aliens and their parents who 
illegally reside on Belgian territory, instead of establishing those conditions by 
law. In addition, the Court asked the same question with regard to the fact that 
the disputed legal standard entrusted the King with establishing the minimum 
guarantees regarding the right to privacy and family life as recognised in Article 
22 Constitution, and the prerequisites for entitlements to social benefits and 
adequate housing in kind in Federal Social Welfare Centres as recognised in Article 
23 (2) and (3) Constitution. In Articles 22 and 23 the Constitution clearly (and 
exclusively) authorises the Legislature (by Statute, decree or ordinance) to establish 
the aforementioned conditions. Therefore, the Labour Court asked whether these 
competences of the King are in accordance with the principle of legality. The 
Court ruled that the Legislature sufficiently met its obligations in Articles 22 and 
23 Constitution, and merely entrusted the King with the specific execution of 
the legal standards.1339 The Court added however, that this does not mean that 
the King has unlimited authority, for He is also obliged to take into account the 
Constitution and the ICRC. In this light, the Court especially referred to the right 
to health (24 ICRC), the right to an adequate standard of living (27 ICRC) and the 
right to education (28 ICRC and 24 Constitution). The Court finally concluded 
that both the Administrative Courts and the regular Courts had the obligation to 
nullify any measures taken by the Crown regarding the granting of social benefits 
that were in violation with these human rights (159 Constitution).1340
1337 In casu, based on Article 1 (6). Statute of 20 July 1971 on the establishment of guaranteed family 
benefits. Original title in Dutch: wet van 20 juli 1971 tot de instelling van gewaarborgde gezinsbijslag.
1338 Constitutional Court 110/2006, 28 June 2006, B.S. 15 September 2006, consideration B.6.
1339 Constitutional Court, 43/2006, 15 March 2006, considerations B.20.-B.21.
1340 Constitutional Court, 43/2006, 15 March 2006, consideration B.22.
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12.6 Concluding remarks
From the analysis of case law, some conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, in general 
there appears to be hardly any case law in Belgium on the effect of CEDAW 
Provisions. Furthermore, there seems to be a difference between the Council 
of State and the Court of Cassation on the one hand, who are very hesitant in 
applying ICESCR and ICRC Provisions directly in their case law, and on the other 
hand the Constitutional Court, which does not need to rule on the direct effect 
of those Articles and therefore – not surprisingly – seems to be more willing to 
indirectly review against international Provisions, including the right to food. 
Thirdly, there is occasionally a ‘battle of the forums’ in Belgium. The Courts of 
Last Instance do not always seem to agree with the Constitutional Court,1341 and 
the Labour Courts seem to have some difficulties in recognising the res judicata 
in prejudicial rulings of the Constitutional Court.1342 This does not contribute to 
the principles of legal certainty.
12.6.1 The Council of State and the Court of Cassation
It can be concluded that both the Council of State and the Court of Cassation 
hardly ruled on matters in which international Provisions stipulating the right 
to food were invoked. The only two cases were rulings of the Council of State in 
which inter alia Article 27 ICRC was invoked. The Council ruled, without further 
explanation, that the Provision had no direct effect.1343 In general, the Council 
of State and the Court of Cassation have the tendency to circumvent the issue of 
direct effect, and only rule on the matter when it is absolutely necessary.
When ruling on the direct effect of a Provision, the case law of the Council of 
State does not excel in consistency. Where in a majority of the cases, the direct 
effect of ICESCR and ICRC Provisions is denied, and even in some verdicts the 
direct effect of the entire Covenant or Convention is rejected, there appear to 
be – almost randomly – some cases in which the Council is willing to review 
against some of the ICESCR Provisions, or at least to take into consideration the 
principles stipulated in those Articles. Furthermore, no evidence could be found 
that the Council ever granted direct effect to an ICRC Provision. The Council of 
Aliens Disputes seems to greatly value the case law of the Council of State and – in 
line with this case law – consistently decides that ICRC Provisions invoked have 
no direct effect. Also, direct effect is denied in the few cases in which ICESCR 
Provisions were invoked.
1341 See for instance Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 200 and the Court of Cassation, 23 October 
2006, no. S050042F, published on: http://jure.juridat.just.fgov.be, on the interpretation of the concept 
‘benefits in kind.’
1342 See for instance the aftermath of Constitutional Court, 131/2001, 30 December 2001.
1343 Council of State, 12 February 1996, case no. 58122l, available at: www.raadvst-consetat.be.
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The Court of Cassation, in the scarce cases in which ICESCR Provisions are 
invoked, generally rules that ICESCR Articles have no direct effect. Regarding 
the ICRC, the tendency appears to be that most Provisions have no direct effect 
either, although in some cases, without explicitly recognising direct effect, there 
seems to be some room for application of ICRC Provisions (albeit mostly Articles 
stipulating civil and political rights).
Perhaps the occasional (although very rare) exceptions to the principle that ECOSOC 
standards have no direct effect, might be clarified by the observations made by 
Gunter Maes, as discussed in Section 11.4.3, who underlined that the difference 
between the subjective and objective litigation is gradually diminishing. Especially 
in cases in which the Courts, operating in the subjective litigation, are weighing 
interests rather than ruling on subjective rights, the matter of ‘direct effect’ becomes 
less relevant, so there might be some more effect for internationally recognised 
ECOSOC rights.1344
12.6.2 The Constitutional Court
The right to food however, was often invoked in proceedings brought before the 
Constitutional Court. Since 1989, the Court was competent in reviewing national 
legislation against Constitutional Provisions, and throughout the years the Court 
gradually started to review indirectly against international human rights Provisions. 
Since 1992, the Court reviewed against the right to (equal treatment in) education, 
as stipulated in Articles 24 CA and 13 ICESCR. This opened the door for the 
review against other ICESCR Provisions via Articles 10 and 11 CA. It seems that 
due to indirect reviewing, there is more room for effect of international Provisions 
stipulating human rights.
Since 1994, the right to food as embedded in Articles 11 ICESCR and 27 ICRC 
was frequently invoked in cases concerning illegally residing aliens. In these 
cases, Article 57 § 2 of the ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social 
welfare’ was usually reviewed against Articles 10 and 11 CA, whether or not 
read in conjunction with other Constitutional and international human rights 
Provisions. Usually, in this review against the non-discrimination principle, the 
Court seems to balance the interest of the State’s policies to restrict immigration 
with the individual interest of the illegally residing foreigner.1345 In case 51/94, 
the principle was introduced that applying Article 57 § 2 of the Organic Law to 
1344 See for instance the aforementioned Court of Cassation, 11 March 1994, Arresten van het Hof 
van Cassatie, 1994 (I, p.243), and Council of State, 13 December 2000, case no. 91625, available at: 
www.raadvst-consetat.be. In both cases there seems to be a weighing-up of principles rather than an 
assessment on whether or not a subjective right has been violated. In the first case, some effect was 
granted to Articles 9 and 12 ICRC, and in the latter to Article 13 ICESCR.
1345 This was quite accurately described by Belgium in the second periodic report on the implementation 
of the ICRC: CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Sections 28-29.
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illegally residing asylum-seekers, resulting in the fact that their entitlements to 
social benefits are restricted to urgent medical care only, was not in violation with 
the invoked Provisions. This principle was further specified and nuanced in a 
period of approximately 12 years. Generally, in both annulment and preliminary 
procedures, the Constitutional Court was confronted with particular groups of 
aliens that claimed to be exempted from this principle due to several reasons, as 
discussed into more detail above. Article 11 ICESCR was mainly invoked in cases 
concerning illegally residing aliens, ordered to leave the territory, while they 
were awaiting the outcome of a legal procedure (an appeal to the order to leave 
the territory, a request to a prolonged stay, the recognition of statelessness, a 
regularisation request, and the appeal to a rejection to a second or third request 
for asylum), or could not leave the territory due to a medical impossibility. Only 
the medical impossibility and the appeal to the (first) order to leave the territory 
resulted in a deviation of the principle of case 51/94. The ICRC, including Article 
27, was later invoked by parents of children in several situations, also claiming to 
be exempted from the basic principle of case 51/94. This led to a chain of case law 
in which firstly the child of illegally residing parents was granted the necessary 
social benefits in kind, whilst later the Provision of these social benefits was 
broadened to the benefit of the parents too, based on the right to family life, as 
well as to the parents whose child could not leave the territory due to a medical 
impossibility. Although the illegally residing parents of a Belgian child were not 
exempted from the main principle, the Court ruled that the Centres for Social 
Welfare should, when establishing the social benefits for the child, take the family 
situation into account.
12.6.3  To what extent has the right to food legal effect in the 
domestic legal order of Belgium?
As it seems, the right to food and other ECOSOC rights as embedded in the ICESCR 
and ICRC, have some (indirect) effect in the case law of the Constitutional Court. 
Purely considered from a technical juridical point of view this is interesting, 
for it appears that indeed the right to food, alongside with other internationally 
recognised human rights, can be invoked before the Constitutional Court – and 
successfully so – since the Court seems to consider that the standard has been 
violated more than once. However, due to the very strong interrelationship with 
domestic Provisions, and perhaps due to the indirectness of the review, it is doubtful 
whether invoking those Articles truly makes a difference. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that firstly, in some cases, the Court, despite the fact that during the 
procedure international Provisions were invoked, only refers to national Articles 
in its verdict;1346 secondly, the fact that the Court occasionally made principle 
decisions in a series of similar cases, while in some of those cases only national 
Provisions were invoked, and in other cases those national Provisions were read 
1346 For instance, Constitutional Court, 80/99, 30 June 1999.
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in conjunction with international Articles;1347 thirdly, that in the chain of case 
law analysed above, in which the cases are strongly interconnected, it is not 
self-evident that international Provisions are invoked or reviewed against. To 
understand the complete course of events, it is also necessary to analyse case 
law in which only national Provisions are discussed. Therefore, no particular 
evidence could be found that the international Articles led to a significantly broader 
protection compared to the national Provisions invoked in the various cases. The 
case law seems to be focussed rather ‘inwards’ and the international Provisions 
are occasionally listed, even quoted, and analysed, but do not appear to play a 
role of any significance. On the other hand, this does not mean that there are no 
rights for those who need it most (usually illegally residing asylum-seekers), but 
those rights are rather determined in balancing between on the one hand the 
well-being and human dignity of the requesting part, and on the other hand the 
justified policies of the Belgian (Federal) Government.
1347 See for instance: Constitutional Court, 21/2001 and 148/2001, in which the Court only reviewed 
against Articles 10 and 11 Constitution, while in 50/2002, the Court reviewed against Articles 10 and 11 
CA read in conjunction with Article 11 ICESCR.
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13. The Belgian periodic country reports
13.1 Introduction
As stated in Section 2.6.3, this Chapter will focus on the question: What does 
the Government of Belgium communicate in its reports in the United Nations arena 
regarding the enforceability of the right to food in its domestic legal order?
To this end, the Belgian reports submitted on the implementation of the ICESCR 
(Section 13.2), the ICRC (Section 13.3) and the CEDAW (Section 13.4) are analysed. 
Furthermore, when relevant, the reporting cycle of Belgium in view of the Universal 
Periodic Review will be discussed (Section 13.5). Belgium submitted four periodic 
reports on the implementation of the ICESCR.1348 On the implementation of the 
ICRC1349 Belgium submitted four periodic reports as well, from which the third and 
fourth were submitted as combined reports.1350 Six periodic reports were submitted 
on the implementation of the CEDAW, from which the third and fourth as well as 
the fifth and sixth were combined reports.1351 In the analysis special attention is 
drawn to the federal structure, as this appears to have raised the concern of the 
different treaty bodies in relation to a coherent and uniform implementation of 
the rights stipulated in the treaties. Furthermore, there is a focus on the Belgian 
Aliens policies and legislation, for they are strongly interrelated with the right 
to food and ECOSOC rights in general, and also in the reports often discussed 
separately. Of course the right to food and the direct applicability of the treaties 
are the primary focus.
13.2 The ICESCR reports
13.2.1 Introduction
In general, it must be concluded that Belgium expresses little self-criticism in its 
reports. The ICESCR reports mainly consist of a long list with legal and policy 
1348 Initial report: E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993; second periodic report: E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 
1998; third periodic report: E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006; fourth periodic report: E/C.12/BEL/4, 
18 June 2012. Please note that the Belgian Delegation replied to the Committee’s List of Issues on the 
initial report during the sessions and not in a written reply, contrary to all later reporting procedures.
1349 Initial report: CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994; second periodic report: CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 
October 2000; combined third and fourth periodic report: CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009.
1350 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 1. As recommended by the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, see: CRC/C/114, 14 May 2002, p. 5. This report encompasses mainly information on 
the period 2002 – July 2008, instead of the official period 1999-2004 (third report) and 2004-2009 
(fourth report), due to the fact that the second report was already updated in written replies in 2002, 
in preparation of the sessions with the Committee, and because Belgium was asked to hand in the 
combined report 18 months before the deadline set in 2009.
1351 Initial report: CEDAW/C/5/Add.53, 25 September 1987; second periodic report CEDAW/C/BEL/2, 8 
April 1993; combined third and fourth report: CEDAW/C/BEL/3-4, 29 September 1998; combined fifth 
and sixth report: CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007.
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initiatives in a certain field that is related to the rights stipulated in the ICESCR. 
However, points for improvement are hardly included, which was also noted by 
the Committee. For instance, in its Concluding Observations on the third periodic 
report, ‘The Committee notes the absence of any factors or difficulties preventing the 
effective implementation of the Covenant in Belgium.’1352
When discussing the right to adequate food, also the reporting on Article 9 was 
taken into consideration, due to the fact that Belgium considers Article 23 CA to be 
equivalent to Article 11,1353 although discusses many aspects of the implementation 
of Article 23 CA in view of Article 9 ICESCR.
Please note that at the time of writing only a fourth report was submitted, while 
the follow up of that procedure was scheduled for 2013. Therefore, only the content 
of the fourth report could be taken into consideration in this Section, and not the 
List of Issues, replies, summary records and Concluding Observations.
13.2.2 Federal structure
The initial report on the implementation of the ICESCR was submitted far too late. 
This was regretted by Belgium, and it was explained that this was partially caused 
by the State reforms that took place simultaneously.1354 In response, the Committee 
stated in its Concluding Observations that it ‘regretted, however, that the report was 
submitted nearly 10 years late’, and was quite firm in its opinion on Constitutional 
reform as a cause for this delay: ‘The Committee wishes to emphasise that those 
explanations should not be considered by the Belgian Government as justification. 
States Parties must comply with the reporting obligations they have freely assumed 
under the Covenant.’1355
During the sessions on the second periodic report, Belgium needed to explain its 
complex federal structure, especially in the light of overlapping powers regarding 
international instruments. The Delegation explained that it could occur that both 
the Federal Government and the Governments of federated areas had to ratify the 
ICESCR, due to the different aspects of the instrument, covering the authorities 
of both the Federal Government and the Governments of the federated areas. 
It underlined that this was indeed a complex system, but also very democratic, 
and therefore ‘the degree of bonding of the State to the international instrument 
is only higher.’1356 The Delegation had to recognise that the Belgian authorities 
had not developed a national plan on human rights, but stressed that ‘at the 
1352 E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 9.
1353 As reported by Belgium, see: E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 151-152.
1354 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, introduction; E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Sections 1 and 3.
1355 E/1995/22, 20 May 1994, Section 145.
1356 Mr Noirfalisse and Mr Nayer, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, especially Sections 12-13. 
Original text in French: ‘le degré d’adhésion de l’État à l’instrument international n’en est que plus élevé.’
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federal level and in the regions and communities, many bodies ensure the promotion 
and enforcement of human rights. There can be no doubt about the unquestionable 
commitment of different powers to human rights and one might even say that there 
is some competition between them on the matter.’1357 The Delegation added that 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs normally is the first to receive the Committees 
Observations, and ensured the implementation of the Committee’s ‘Jurisprudence’. 
The Federal Government, the Communities and the Regions are responsible for 
applying their international commitments. The Delegation pointed out that it 
cannot be said that there was disparity in the application of human rights across 
the Regions and the Communities, and explained that there was in fact some 
cooperation. The Delegation explained that if there were differences in policies in 
the field of economic rights, there was one legal system ensuring equal rights to 
all citizens, and the highest Courts ensured a uniform case law regarding human 
rights throughout the country.1358 However, in its Concluding Observations, the 
Committee noted with concern ‘that there are no sufficient mechanisms to coordinate 
and ensure uniformity of compliance, at both the federal and regional levels, with the 
State Party’s international human rights obligations.’1359
In the third periodic report, Belgium again referred to the autonomous powers of 
the Communities and the Regions,1360 but assured that ‘The Constitution contains 
Provisions designed, on the one hand, to ensure that the internal autonomy of the 
Communities and Regions is as extensive as possible at the international level and, 
on the other hand, to guarantee, through appropriate mechanisms, consistency and 
unity in the country’s external relations.’1361 The Committee was not convinced 
however, and repeated its concern ‘relating to the lack of appropriate and effective 
mechanisms to ensure compliance, at the federal, regional and community levels, with 
the State Party’s obligations under the Covenant.’1362
In the fourth periodic report, Belgium once more clarified its Constitutional system, 
in a request of the Committee to update its Core Document in accordance with 
the 2006 harmonised guidelines on a common core document.1363
1357 E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 35. Original text in French: ‘au niveau fédéral que 
dans les régions et les communautés, de nombreuses instances veillent à la promotion et à l’application des 
droits de l’homme. On ne saurait mettre en doute l’attachement incontestable des différents pouvoirs aux droits 
de l’homme et on pourrait même dire qu’il y a une certaine concurrence entre eux à ce sujet.’
1358 Mr Vandamme, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 36.
1359 E/C.12/1/Add.54, 1 December 2000, Section 5.
1360 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Section 6.
1361 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Section 7.
1362 E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 11.
1363 As requested in E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 42. The harmonised guidelines can 
be found in: HRI/GEN/2/Rev.4, 21 May 2007. See the update in the fourth report: E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 
June 2012, Sections 15-26.
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13.2.3 The right to food in the ICESCR reports
13.2.3.1 The initial report
In the first initial report, no food-related issues were discussed in particular. 
On the implementation of both Articles 9 and 11 ICESCR, Belgium clarified the 
functioning of its social security system. Noteworthy is the reference to Article 1 
of the Act of 8 July 1976,1364 stipulating that ‘everyone is entitled to social welfare. 
The aim of social welfare is to permit everyone to live in a manner befitting the 
dignity of the human person.’ Belgium stated that this Provision had two important 
cornerstones. The first was the universal scope, for entitlements to social benefits 
applied to everyone, and the second was ‘the explicit reference to human dignity.’1365 
Particularities regarding the social security system in relation to foreigners will 
be discussed below in Section 14.2.3. During the sessions with the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights however, the Delegation had to admit 
that Belgium’s social security was quite expensive, and therefore the goal was 
set to streamline the system in a sustainable way, not with the aim to restrict the 
rights but to avoid ‘wastage that may in the long run undermine the system.’1366 The 
Delegation furthermore stated that while Belgium had a high standard of living, 
there was still poverty and growing unemployment. However, ‘the social security 
system covers a large part of the population.’1367 Also, the Delegation noted that the 
Belgian food industry was highly developed, hygiene was strictly controlled, and 
a an extensive regulatory framework Law on the matter was in force.1368
The Committee invited the Delegation to provide an answer to one of the 
questions that were included in the List of Issues, regarding the implementation 
of Article 11 ICESCR: ‘Please describe the system adopted in Belgium for determining 
the standard of living of the population and in this connection give information on the 
most vulnerable groups – the unemployed, pensioners, migrant workers, etc.’1369 The 
Delegates’ reply was short: ‘there was no single system in Belgium for determining 
the standard of living of the population. Various income guarantee systems existed, 
including the unemployment benefit, pensions, and collective agreements on minimum 
wages in the various occupational sectors. The final safety net was the public welfare 
centre, which provided financial, housing, psycho-social and legal assistance that 
1364 Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on the Public Centres for Social Welfare. Original title in Dutch: Organieke 
wet van 8 juli 1976 betreffende de openbare centra voor maatschappelijk welzijn, B.S. 5.VIII.1976 – err. B.S. 
26.XI.1976). At the time of publishing, Article 1 as referred to in the initial report was still applicable.
1365 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Sections 143-145.
1366 Mr Vandamme, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 15. Original text in French: ‘les gaspillages 
qui risquent à la longue de saper le système.’
1367 Mr Vandamme, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, para 17. Original text in French: ‘le système de 
sécurité sociale couvre une grande partie de la population’.
1368 Mr Vandamme, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 21.
1369 Mrs Vysokajova, in her capacity as chairperson, E/C.12/1994/SR.16/Ad.1, 18 May 1994, Section 41.
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was indexed.’1370 No further questions were asked by the Commission regarding 
the issue. However, in its Concluding Observations, the Committee noted with 
concern in this light ‘that the most vulnerable groups of society in Belgium are not 
always adequately protected.’1371
13.2.3.2 The second periodic report
Belgium reported on Article 9 that no significant changes had been made regarding 
Belgium’s social welfare system. Renewed legislation was merely aimed at the 
modernisation of the existing system.1372
Regarding Article 11, Belgium reported the adoption of Article 23 in its Constitution, 
including the right to ‘lead a life consistent with human dignity’, and the ‘right to 
decent accommodation’: fundamental rights, similar to the rights embedded in 
Article 11 ICESCR. Belgium added however that the ‘comments made in connection 
with the discussion of Article 2 of the Covenant naturally apply to them as well.’1373 
Hereby thus suggesting that the rights embedded in Article 11 ICESCR, but also 
Article 23 CA, are of a programmatic nature and can therefore not easily be 
invoked directly before a Court.1374 To demonstrate this, Belgium made reference 
to Constitutional Court case of 26 June 1994, in which the Court ruled that ‘The 
scope of the fundamental right to a satisfactory standard of living is at present subject 
of debate in Belgium. In its judgment of 26 June 1994,1375 the Court of Arbitration 
ruled that a fundamental right of this kind could be subject to certain limitations in 
the case of well-defined general policy objectives. The judgment concerned a case of 
limitation of the right to welfare of illegal foreigners who had been ordered to leave the 
country.’1376 Furthermore, Belgium reported the draft of two reports on the combat 
of social exclusion and the prevention of poverty: the General Report on Poverty, 
and Habitat II.1377 Also, the legislation setting the conditions for applicants for 
the guaranteed minimum income was discussed, as well as several initiatives 
on the improvement of social integration.1378 On federated level, the Regions 
reported on their housing policies.1379 Right to food issues were not discussed as 
a separate issue.
1370 Mr Vandamme, E/C.12/1994/SR.16/Ad.1, 18 May 1994, Section 42.
1371 E/1995/22, 20 May 1994.
1372 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 107-134.
1373 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 151-152.
1374 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 2-3.
1375 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994. The case referred to is exhaustively discussed in Section 
12.5.3.1., and is the first in line of a series determining the limits of Belgium’s Asylum Legislation, 
basically by reviewing Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ against 
human rights.
1376 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 151-152.
1377 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 148-149.
1378 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 148-156.
1379 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 157-167.
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The Committee’s questions in the List of Issues on the implementation of Article 
11 basically concerned housing legislation and policy.1380 One question however 
was food-related, and concerned information on food contaminated by dioxine, 
the measures to prevent this, and the compensation to victims.1381
During the sessions with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Belgian Delegation explained the wording of the recently adopted Article 
23 of the Constitution, and clarified that the Article was actually a compromise 
between two views. On the one hand, some Parliamentarians wanted to incorporate 
a directly applicable right in the Constitution, while others favoured a solemn 
declaration independent from the Constitution. The result was Article 23, which 
stipulates the right to lead a life consistent with human dignity, but also leaves 
a large margin of appreciation. The Provision is therefore indirectly applicable, 
requiring the federal Parliament and the Communities to enact legislation to 
effectuate the right.1382 On the other hand, the Delegation stated that even before 
the adoption of Article 23 in the Constitution, Belgium already had legislation 
that gave effect to the ICESCR, basically by upholding a ‘social security system of a 
very high quality.’1383 However, it was unclear to the Committee what the precise 
effect of Article 23 then would be, and it therefore invited Belgium to further 
explain this in its next report.1384 Also, the question was raised what the general 
criteria were under which Article 23 would have direct effect instead of having 
only a declarative character.1385 The Committee furthermore expressed its concern 
on the fact that it appeared that individuals did not know the principles of the 
application of Article 23, and also that Courts were reluctant to fully implement 
the Article. Belgium was urged to solve that matter as quickly as possible.1386 The 
Delegation replied that Article 23 Constitution was of a programmatic nature and 
consequently was never directly invoked before a Court. However, the Provision 
was occasionally invoked indirectly before the Constitutional Court, via Articles 
10 and 11 Constitution.1387 In response, the Committee stated in its Concluding 
Observations that ‘Article 23 of the Constitution represents a step forward in that it 
incorporates a number of economic, social and cultural rights, leaving the guarantee 
of such rights to statutes and royal decrees. However, such legislation has so far not 
been adopted. While Article 23, read in conjunction with other fundamental rights 
guarantees of the Belgian Constitution, could be interpreted to be applicable directly in 
the domestic legal order, such interpretation still depends on the exercise of discretion by 
1380 E/C/12/Q/BELG/1, 13 December 1999, questions 27-29.
1381 E/C/12/Q/BELG/1, 13 December 1999, question 30.
1382 Mr De Neve, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 19.
1383 E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 20. Original text in French: ‘...régime de sécurité 
sociale de très grande qualité’.
1384 Mr Riedel, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 27.
1385 Mr Wimer Zambrano, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 31
1386 Mr Antanovich, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 30.
1387 Mr Vandamme, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 37.
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the national Courts.’1388 Clearly, the Committee did not attach much value to the 
Delegation’s opinion that there was already legislation that gave effect to Article 
23 Constitution by upholding a social security system of a very good quality. It is 
remarkable here, that the Commission also considers the discretion of the Courts 
in relation to the direct effect of Article 23 CA a reason for concern. Furthermore, 
the Committee expressed its concern that ‘the most vulnerable groups of society in 
Belgium are not always adequately protected. In this regard, it is particularly concerned 
about the reductions made in 1993 with regard to subsidies and certain social benefits, 
such as some categories of reimbursable medicines. The Committee regrets that this 
negative trend is developing in Belgium as well as in other European countries.’1389
In general, the Committee criticised the second periodic report of Belgium for 
the fact that ‘the report did not adequately deal with the situation of economic, social 
and cultural rights in Belgium. In future there must be better coordination among the 
various departments participating in the drafting of Belgium’s report.’1390 The Belgian 
Delegation promised that ‘the next report would be fuller and better balanced.’1391
13.2.3.3 The third periodic report
The concerns of the Committee on the effect of Article 23 CA seem hardly to be 
taken into consideration in drafting the third periodic report: Belgium sufficed with 
merely referring to the existence of the Provision in reporting on the (legislative) 
measures taken on Federal level to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 ICESCR, 
while no further explanation or clarification was given on the working of this 
Provision.1392
On Article 11 ICESCR, Belgium reported at the federal level inter alia on national 
action plans for social inclusion and certain changes regarding the legislation on 
minimum incomes in which the focus shifted from income grants to enabling 
persons to generate their own income. Also, due to market liberalisation of the gas 
and power market, Belgium introduced legislation for social benefits for households 
that cannot pay their energy bills.1393 In that light, as a temporary measure, 
households could be provided with heating allowances to meet winter heating 
requirements.1394 On federated level, the Regions and Communities reported on 
1388 E/C.12/1/Add.54, 1 December 2000, Section 6.
1389 E/1995/22, 20 May 1994, Section 153.
1390 Mr Grissa, E/C.12/2000/SR.66, 14 March 2002, Section 37.
1391 Mr Vandamme, E/C.12/2000/SR.66, 14 March 2002, Section 38.
1392 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Section 14.
1393 Reference was made to the Statute of 4 September 2002, on the assignment to the public centres 
on social welfare of the guidance and financial social assistance to the most deprived on the supply 
of energy. Original title in Dutch: Wet van 4 september 2002, houdende toewijzing van een opdracht aan 
de openbare centra voor maatschappelijk welzijn inzake de begeleiding en de financiële maatschappelijke 
steunverlening aan de meest hulpbehoevenden inzake energielevering, B.S. 28 September 2002.
1394 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Sections 423-424.
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their programmes and activities on social assistance1395 and housing.1396 Regarding 
food related issues, both the French-speaking and Flemish Communities reported 
on several initiatives on awareness-raising programmes for healthy nutrition.1397
Since food security was reported to be a focus of Belgian development cooperation,1398 
Belgium reported that a number of bilateral cooperation projects were undertaken, 
and that the Belgian Parliament had established the Survival Fund (EBS) ‘which 
supports integrated programmes for arid and depressed areas in sub-Saharan Africa.’ 
In addition, another more general fund was established for the Third World. 
The goal of the EBS was to ‘improve food security of the most vulnerable population 
groups in the least developed countries.’1399 The EBS was the predecessor of the later 
established Belgian Fund for Food Security.1400
Regarding food safety, Belgium reported on the establishment in 2000 of the 
Belgian Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain (FASFC) ‘in the wake of 
controversies regarding food crisis management in the late 1990s.’ This agency, in 
line with EU law, was reported to be an autonomous federal organisation under 
supervision of the Ministry of Health that supervises the entire food production 
process.1401
In its List of Issues, right to food issues were not addressed directly. Regarding 
Article 11 ICESCR, the Committee mainly asked questions concerning the situation 
of social housing (and to what extent Belgium implemented the Committee’s 
previous recommendations on the matter), as well as the State’s policy regarding 
poverty acquisition and its impact on social housing.1402 However, in response to 
the question on what measures Belgium had adopted to achieve its objective to 
devote 0.7% of the GDP to international cooperation for development and how 
Belgium’s policy on development cooperation contributed to the realisation of 
1395 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Sections 426-492.
1396 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Sections 493-539.
1397 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Sections 541-550.
1398 Belgium reported that in its development cooperation, as regulated by the Act of 25 May 1999 
(amended on 19 July 2005), there was a focus on five specific sectors, and four cross-cutting themes. 
One of the sectors was agriculture and food safety, and one of the cross-cutting themes was the 
respect for the rights of the child. Also, Belgium reported to have subscribed to the Millennium Goals: 
‘Although they do not include in detail all rights stipulated in the Covenant, those goals are not attainable 
unless economic, social and cultural rights are exercised in the developing countries. Accordingly, pursuit 
of the the MDGs may increase pressure on Governments to ensure respect for those rights.’ See: E/C.12/
BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Section 50. In the report, reference was made to: Statute of 25 May 1999 on 
Belgian international cooperation. Original title in Dutch: Wet van 25 mei 1999 betreffende de Belgische 
internationale samenwerking, B.S. 1 July 1999.
1399 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Sections 551-555.
1400 See their current website: http://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/development_cooperation/
partnerships/special_programmes/belgian_fund_food_security.
1401 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Sections 556-558.
1402 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3, 10 April 2007, Sections 18-19.
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economic, social and cultural rights, right to food-related issues were discussed.1403 
Belgium responded by underlining several initiatives on development aid and 
improvements in the field of development cooperation.1404 Belgium stressed ‘to 
work tirelessly to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.’1405 Regarding goal 
no. 1 on poverty and hunger, Belgium stated that ‘the eradication of poverty has a 
central place in Belgium’s cooperation activities. One of the ways in which Belgium 
is working to eradicate poverty is by supporting the drafting and implementation of 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (in particular, through the Belgian Poverty Reduction 
Partnership, a multilateral World Bank programme). The eradication of poverty is also 
the main objective of Governmental cooperation. Belgium places particular importance 
on reducing hunger, including through the Belgian Survival Fund (FSF).’1406 Regarding 
goal no. 7 on the environment, access to water and sanitation, Belgium underlined 
that it ‘supports the United Nations Environment Programme and a World Bank 
programme designed to provide access to water and sanitation for the poorest peri-urban 
populations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.’1407
The fact that right to food issues were not discussed in the report directly was also 
noticed by one of the Committee Members: ‘Since the term “right to adequate food” 
was not included in the report, she wished to know what had been done to guarantee 
that right, and ensure that the poor had access to food. Travelling communities were 
particularly vulnerable to deprivation of their right to food, and she wondered what 
measures were taken to overcome that problem.’1408 The question was however never 
answered by the Delegation, although one Delegate admitted that ‘his Delegation 
had taken note of the Committee’s concerns, particularly regarding improvements in 
the method of drafting periodic reports.’1409
In its Concluding Observation, the right to food was not discussed further. However, 
a compliment was made on the Belgian system for social welfare: ‘The Committee 
notes with satisfaction the high quality, comprehensiveness and almost universal coverage 
of the social security and healthcare systems existing in the State Party.’1410
13.2.3.4 The fourth periodic report
Regarding the implementation of Article 9 ICESCR, Belgium reported that ‘the 
right to social security is guaranteed by Article 23 of the Belgian Constitution.’1411 An 
1403 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3, 10 April 2007, Section 2.
1404 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Sections 24-49.
1405 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 30.
1406 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 41.
1407 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 46.
1408 Mrs Bonoan-Dandan, E/C.12/2007/SR.42, 10 December 2007, Section 39.
1409 Mr Vandamme, E/C.12/2007/SR.42, 10 December 2007, Section 40.
1410 E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 5.
1411 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 149.
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interesting choice of words, for the Article is considered, as discussed above, to 
have no direct effect, or at most non-direct effect before the Constitutional Court. 
However – not surprisingly – Belgium recalls in its fourth periodic report the 
compliments made by the Committee in itsr Concluding Observations concerning 
the Belgian social security system,1412 and furthermore updates on the latest 
developments in legislation in the field.1413
Also regarding the implementation of Article 11 ICESCR, an update was provided 
on newly adopted legislative measures: ‘although Belgium already had a successful 
mechanism for ensuring a decent income in place, many new elements have been 
introduced in recent years.’1414 This included a federal anti-poverty plan, the 
publication of a report on poverty every two years, a national plan for social 
inclusion and against poverty, and updates on the legislation on social benefits.1415 
Also, an update was provided on the latest policies and legislation on housing.1416
This time, indeed and as requested by the Committee during the sessions on the 
third periodic report, the right to food was included as a separate reporting topic. 
A reference was made to a national nutrition and health plan, health promotion 
targets of which one was food in the Flemish Community, and the establishment 
of a health promotion advisory board in the German-speaking Community.1417 
Also, the right to water was addressed, for Belgium had ratified the Protocol on 
Water and Health to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes in 1999.1418 As part of the implementation, 
Belgium reported to have ‘submitted its first report on the measures taken to ensure 
access to safe water in sufficient quantities.’1419 Furthermore, a reference was made 
to regional initiatives to help people who were living in poverty or precarity 
paying the waterbills.1420
13.2.4 The Belgian asylum policies in the ICESCR reports
13.2.4.1 The initial report
In its initial report on the implementation of the ICESCR, Belgium reported several 
times on its system of social benefits, and repeatedly stated that this system was 
1412 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 151.
1413 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Sections 149-169.
1414 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 237.
1415 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Sections 235-243.
1416 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Sections 249-262.
1417 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Sections 244-246.
1418 See: The Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 18 October 1999, MP.WAT/2001/1, EUR/ICP/
EHCO 020205/8Fin.
1419 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012. Section 247.
1420 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012. Section 248.
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equally accessible to all persons, regardless of their nationality or race. With regard 
to Article 9, Belgium reported that ‘the Belgian social security system applies to every 
Belgian or foreign salaried or wage-earning worker who is employed in Belgium by an 
employer established in Belgium or who is attached to an establishment located there’.1421 
In view of Article 11, Belgium firmly stated that the relevant legislation on social 
welfare does not restrict welfare to Belgians, for ‘the Act excludes any requirement 
as to the existence and duration of residence in Belgium. The only consideration is the 
presence of a destitute person in Belgium, regardless whether he or she has the status 
of a resident. The universality of the terms of the Act makes it impossible to restrict 
welfare to foreigners who are duly registered in a municipal population or aliens’ register, 
and ensures that the requirement of lawful residence in Belgium territory may in no 
case constitute a condition sine qua non.’1422 Belgium reported that ‘anyone who 
has reached the age of majority is entitled to subsistence provided he or she actually 
resides in Belgium, does not have sufficient means of subsistence and is not capable 
of obtaining them.’1423 Regarding the demand to reside in Belgium, the report 
explained that ‘anyone who customarily and permanently lives in Belgium territory 
is considered as being actually resident in Belgium.’1424
13.2.4.2 The second periodic report
While in the second periodic report hardly any reference was made to legislation 
regarding (the entitlements to social benefits of) aliens, the Committee asked some 
critical questions concerning changes in legislation on the position of aliens. In the 
first place, the Committee referred to a change in Belgian legislation on entitlements 
to social benefits of refugees. Before, refugees were aided financially, but as a result 
of abuse of these regulations, the aid provided for had been replaced by aid in kind 
‘(in particular, food and clothing)’. The Committee asked why Belgium, despite the 
criticism of Amnesty International and other NGOs regarding ‘the disastrous effect 
of the latter policy on the human dignity of refugees’ did not consider a compromise 
solution. Now, all refugees were punished for the abuse of the rules of a few.1425 
The Delegation replied that ‘Belgium had to deal with ever-increasing influxes of 
refugees. As the capacities of the two centres in Liège and Antwerp were no longer 
sufficient, new centres, some of which were run by the Red Cross and others by local 
public welfare offices, had been opened. In a statement to Parliament in October 2000, 
the Prime Minister had said that the best strategy for combatting trafficking in human 
beings by criminal organisations, was to give refugees aid in kind rather than financial 
support. Such aid was thus being provided by decision of the Government and had not 
yet been established in law. The matter was now before Parliament. In any event, the 
1421 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Section 109.
1422 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Section 150
1423 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Section 153.
1424 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, especially Section 154.
1425 Mr Riedel, E/C.12/2000/SR.66, 14 March 2002, Section 7.
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State would cover medical expenses incurred by sick refugees.’1426 Secondly, questions 
were asked about the regularisation procedure. Illegally residing foreigners could 
‘regularise their situation but, if they did so, would lose their job and their right to a 
pension under that job’. The Commission asked whether all the consequences of such 
a procedure were taken into account.1427 The Delegation replied that ‘only periods 
of legal employment subject to the payment of social security contributions were taken 
into account in calculating pensions. That appeared to be fair and he (the Delegate) 
did not think that more favourable measures would be adopted in the near future.’1428 
Thirdly, the Committee, recalling the concerns expressed by the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child1429 ‘about the fact that although unaccompanied minors 
whose asylum requests had been rejected by the Belgian authorities were permitted to 
remain in the country until they were 18, they incurred the risk of being denied their 
identity and certain rights, such as the right to education.’1430 The Delegation replied 
that unaccompanied asylum-seekers were not ‘simply abandoned’ but housed in 
a federal reception centre. Also, a series of measures was adopted, ‘amending 
the procedure for handling asylum requests and providing for improved treatment of 
the asylum-seeker’. Furthermore, the Centre for Equal Opportunity and Action to 
Combat Racism was competent to ‘receive complaints from persons who believed 
they had been the victim of discriminatory treatment, assisted persons who wished to 
undertake legal action.’1431
Comparing the concerns of the Committee with issues dealt with in the case 
law analysed in Chapter 12, it is remarkable that they are of a different nature. 
Where the case law of especially the Constitutional Court was mainly about the 
access of illegally residing aliens to social benefits in itself, the concerns of the 
Committee are about the nature of the social benefits. Indeed, in 2000 Article 57 
§ 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’ was amended, 
and social benefits for refugees awaiting their asylum procedure were only to be 
provided with social benefits in kind.1432 Secondly, where in case law the access to 
social benefits of illegally residing aliens during the regularisation procedure was 
under dispute the Committee was concerned about the long-term consequences 
on the pensions of the requesting parties. Thirdly, where in case law the access 
of unaccompanied and illegally residing minors to social benefits was disputed, 
1426 Mr Donis, E/C.12/2000/SR.66, 14 March 2002, Section 9.
1427 Mr Riedel, E/C.12/2000/SR.66, 14 March 2002, Section 7.
1428 Mr Deneve, E/C.12/2000/SR.66, 14 March 2002, Section 10.
1429 Probably, the Committee referred to the following section of the concluding observations on 
Belgium’s initial report on the ICRC: CRC/C/15/Ad.38, 20 June 1995, Section 9.
1430 Mr Ahmed, E/C.12/2000/SR.66, 14 March 2002, Section 13.
1431 Mr Vandamme, E/C.12/2000/SR.66, 14 March 2002, Section 16.
1432 See for an overview of the social benefits and a historical overview of the Provision of social benefits: 
http://www.kruispuntmi.be, an expert centre on migration, integration and cultural diversity. See in 
particular: http://www.kruispuntmi.be/vreemdelingenrecht/wegwijs.aspx?id=14882. See Article 57 § 
1 ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on the Public Centres for Social Welfare.’
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the Committee was concerned about the long-term consequences for their stay 
in Belgium.
13.2.4.3 The third periodic report
The Belgian approach in its aliens’ policies and legislation had changed compared 
to the period of the initial report. Belgium reported in its third periodic report on 
the legislative measures taken to fulfil its obligations under Article 2 ICESCR. A 
reference was made to Article 191, which stipulates that ‘all foreigners on Belgian 
soil shall benefit from the protection provided to persons and property, save for the 
exceptions specified by the law.’ Thus, exceptions by law could ‘provide for a partial 
exception to these rights.’ As an example, it was explained that for the exercise of 
certain rights embedded in Article 23 Constitution, foreigners had to meet ‘a 
number of conditions related to their status.’1433 On the implementation of Article 
11 ICESCR, Belgium reported however that ‘any person residing legally or illegally 
in the national territory is entitled to emergency medical care, the need for which must 
be attested by a physician.’ Reference was made to Articles 1 and 57 of the ‘Organic 
Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’.1434
In their shadow report, NGOs expressed profound criticism on Belgium’s aliens 
policies. The NGOs argued that there were two main grounds which allow foreigners 
to legally reside on Belgian territory. The first is on humanitarian grounds, and 
the second on socio-economic grounds, such as employment (only for EU and 
EEA citizens, and exceptionally for non-EU nationals), family reunification, 
education and tourism. The NGOs argued that only a small number of people 
could invoke such a legal ground, leading to far more people remaining illegally on 
Belgian territory. The NGOs referred to the rights enshrined in the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families, stating that ‘independent of their legal (documented) or illegal 
(undocumented) status, migrants are entitled to the full respect, protection and fulfilment 
of their fundamental rights, including economic, social and cultural rights.’
Indeed, the Commission asked for some clarification regarding the entitlements 
to social benefits of aliens, and therefore ‘asked whether asylum-seekers whose cases 
had not yet been decided were entitled to emergency medical assistance in the same 
way as persons in an irregular situation.’1435 In response, the Delegation ‘explained 
that there was a difference between procedures for asylum-seekers and persons in 
the country illegally who did not have a pending application.’1436 Furthermore, the 
Delegation emphasised ‘that asylum-seekers were entitled to material assistance at 
1433 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Sections 15-16.
1434 E/C.12/BEL/3, 21 September 2006, Section 425.
1435 Mr Riedel, E/C.12/2007/SR.41, 29 February 2008, Section 52.
1436 Mr Vulder, E/C.12/2007/SR.42, 10 December 2007, Section 20.
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the federal reception centres. However, persons in the country illegally who did not 
have an application pending were entitled only to emergency healthcare, and it was 
for the person’s doctor to decide what constituted an emergency. The principle of the 
best interests of the child applied, however, and a family with children in the country 
illegally, without any possibility of legalising its status, could receive material assistance, 
including accommodation and healthcare, at the federal reception centres.’1437
The Committee however, seemed to be not convinced that this policy was in 
conformity with the obligations stipulated in the ICESCR, for in its Concluding 
Observations it noted ‘with concern that access to healthcare facilities, goods and services 
for persons belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, such as undocumented 
migrant workers and members of their families, is limited to access to urgent medical 
care.’1438 And therefore, ‘Taking into account general comment No. 14 (2000) on the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health, the Committee urges the State Party 
to adopt all appropriate measures to ensure that persons belonging to vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups, such as undocumented migrant workers and members of their 
families, have access to adequate health-care facilities, goods and services, on an equal 
basis with legal residents of the State Party.’1439
13.2.4.4 The fourth periodic report
In its fourth periodic report, Belgium gives an update on its policy and legislation 
on asylum proceedings and the entitlements to social benefits of aliens during and 
after those procedures. Belgium explains that an asylum-seeker has entitlements 
to material social benefits from the moment of the ‘lodging of an asylum application’ 
to ‘any appeal lodged in either in plenary jurisdiction before the Conceil du Litigation 
des Étrangers,1440 an Administrative Court of appeal, or before the Council of State 
(…) including during the time limits for lodging appeals.’1441 Then, there are three 
possibilities. First, the application is rejected, and once the deadline of the order 
to leave the territory expires, the alien is illegally residing, and therefore only 
entitled to urgent medical care. Second, the application is granted, and the alien 
is considered a refugee, is issued a residence permit of unlimited duration, and is 
therefore entitled to social integration assistance. Third, the application is rejected, 
however, an application for subsidiary assistance1442 is granted, meaning that the 
alien is issued a registration certificate that is valid for one year, which may be 
1437 Mrs Proumen, E/C.12/2007/SR.42, 10 December 2007, Section 21.
1438 E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 21.
1439 E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 35.
1440 The Council for Aliens Disputes.
1441 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 217.
1442 Subsidiairy protection of persons is an EU concept and is stipulated in: Council Directive 2004/83/
EC, 29 April 2004, on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content 
of the protection granted. See for the definition in particular Articles 2 (e) and (f).
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extended or renewed for a maximum period of five years. After this period, the 
alien is granted a residence permit for an unlimited period. During the period 
of subsidiary protection, the alien is entitled to (normal) welfare assistance.1443 
Regarding the distribution of the social benefits during the asylum procedure, 
Belgium reported that ‘asylum-seekers are entitled to reception in the form of material 
assistance provided by Fedasil or one of its reception partners. When asylum proceedings 
end, the entitlement to material assistance may be extended in the following situations: 
to safeguard family unity, to allow a child to complete the school year, in the event 
of pregnancy, when returning to the person’s country of origin is impossible, if the 
person is the parent of a Belgian child, if the person has signed a commitment to leave 
voluntarily, or for medical reasons.’1444 Regarding the nature of those benefits, 
Belgium stated that ‘the material assistance provided in open collective or individual 
reception structures must be adapted to individual needs and enable the asylum-seeker 
to live decently. Such assistance comprises the following elements: housing, food, social 
support, free legal aid, medical and psychological support, right to education for minors, 
training for adults and access to the services of translators and interpreters.’1445
13.2.5 Direct effect of the ICESCR rights in the ICESCR reports
13.2.5.1 The initial report
Belgium explained in its initial report that Provisions of international treaties 
would have direct effect when the Provision was ‘sufficiently precise and binding 
for a national judge to be able to apply them’.1446 In that light, Belgium argued that 
the ICESCR Provisions did not have direct effect, and underlined that, Article 2 
ICESCR ‘provides that the implementation of the “rights enunciated in the (…) Covenant” 
depend on “the available resources” of the State and “the adoption of legislative measures.” 
The programmatic nature of this requirement prevents the Provisions of the Covenant 
from being directly invoked by complainants before Belgian Courts and tribunals.’1447 
However, Belgium pointed out that it was nevertheless bound by the standstill effect 
of the Covenant’s Provisions, ‘because of the requirement that treaties be performed 
in good faith, rules of domestic law by which rights embodied in the Covenant were 
already secured at the time it entered into force in Belgium cannot be challenged at a 
later date.’1448 A principle that was recognised in a Court of Cassation ruling on 
1443 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 218.
1444 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 219.
1445 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 220.
1446 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Section 1.
1447 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Section 2.
1448 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Section 3.
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20 December 1990.1449 Furthermore, Belgium stated that the Covenant may be 
used as a ‘basis for interpretation of the law applied by judges (…)’.1450
During the sessions with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the Delegation underlined that Belgium ‘particularly values the concept 
of the indivisibility of human right.’1451 Reference was made to a statement of the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs during the World Conference on Human Rights held in 
Vienna 1993, in which he emphasised that ‘a true democracy can only be based on 
an inclusive society, socially just and economically stable.’1452 The Committee asked 
to explain whether the Covenant and various human rights instruments may 
be invoked before and directly applied by the Belgian Courts or administrative 
tribunals.1453 The Delegation replied that some of the ICCPR Articles were directly 
applicable, but the ICESCR had no direct effect except for its standstill-clause. 
The Delegation explained that the Court of Cassation applied two main criteria to 
determine whether a Provision has direct effect. The first criterion was whether the 
Provision was formulated in clear and unambiguous terms. The second criterion 
was whether the Provision was not dependant on further national legislation for its 
application. The Delegation referred to the Court rulings of the Court of Cassation 
concerning Article 13 ICESCR, in which the Court ruled that the Provision had 
no direct effect. Also, the Delegation underlined that the Courts could use the 
Covenant as a tool for interpretation of domestic legislation or general principles of 
law.1454 Not surprisingly, the Committee did not share the vision of the Delegation, 
and referred inter alia to its General Comment 4, in which ‘one may find a careful 
analysis of certain Provisions of the Covenant from which it does not appear that one 
can say that they have absolutely no direct effect.’1455 As an example, the Committee 
referred to Article 13 ICESCR, which stipulates that primary education shall be 
free and compulsory for all. The Committee stated that this sub-part of Article 
13 should have direct effect. The Committee therefore ‘regrets to some extent the 
1449 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Section 3. Reference was made to: Court of Cassation, 20 December 
1990, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1990(91)(P.445); as discussed in Section 12.4.1., although 
the standstill effect was recognised, the invoked Article 13 ICESCR did not have any immediate 
consequences, and did not create any subjective rights that should be safeguarded by the Courts.
1450 E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Section 4.
1451 Mr Reyen, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 4. Original text in French: ‘attache une 
importance particulière à la notion de l’indivisibilité des droits de l’homme’.
1452 Mr Reyen, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 4. Original text in French: ‘une véritable 
démocratie ne peut être fondée que sur une société solidaire, socialement juste et économiquement stable.’
1453 Mrs Bonoan-Dandan, in her capacity as chairperson, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994
1454 E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 29.
1455 Mr Simma, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 33. Original text in French: ‘on y trouve une 
analyse minutieuse de certaines dispositions du Pacte dont il ne semble pas que l’on puisse dire qu’elles n’ont 
absolument aucun effet direct’.
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attitude of the Belgian Courts which, together with Courts of many other countries, 
insist in considering that the Covenant as a whole is not directly applicable.’1456
Furthermore, referring to the report, the Committee underlined that the 
implementation of the rights embedded in the Covenant does not by definition 
depend on financial resources, and therefore such dependence, as mentioned 
in Article 2 ICESCR, could not always be used as an argument to deny direct 
applicability.1457 This was repeated in the Concluding Observations of the 
Committee.1458 The Delegation replied that the Court of Cassation ‘recognises that 
it appears that there are Provisions in the Covenant that are clear and unambiguous – 
including the Provision of Article 8 on the right to strike – which should in principle be 
directly applicable if not Article 2 of the Covenant stipulated the principle of progressive 
implementation.’1459 The Delegation added that the Council of State had a more 
subtle approach, by recognising some effect of Article 13 ICESCR, in particular 
that ‘if the compulsory and free primary education is established, it is not possible to 
derogate from that later and such derogation would be null and void.’1460 Regarding the 
interpretation of the standstill effect, the Delegation referred to the Committee of 
Independent Experts for the implementation of the ESC, which stated in a Dutch 
case that a standstill effect does not mean the obligation to maintain the social 
benefits as they were at the moment of ratification of the relevant international 
obligations, but rather to keep the same level of social benefits comparable to the 
moment of ratification.1461
No further questions were asked by the Committee on the matter of direct 
applicability, neither was the issue addressed in its Concluding Observations.
In addition, the Delegation was asked what the Belgian position was regarding the 
draft of an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.1462 The Belgian Delegation replied 
with some caution that ‘since the protocol in question does not yet exist, it is difficult 
for the Belgian Delegation to express an opinion on the matter. From a theoretical point 
of view, however, the position of the Belgian Government is as follows: such a protocol 
1456 Mr Simma, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 33. Original text in French: ‘déplore dans une 
certaine mesure l’attitude des tribunaux belges comme des tribunaux de beaucoup d’autres pays consistant à 
considérer que le Pacte dans son ensemble n’est pas d’application automatique’.
1457 E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 41.
1458 E/1995/22, 20 May 1994, Section 146.
1459 Mr Deneve, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 43. Original text in French: ‘reconnaît semble-
t-il qu’il y a dans le Pacte des dispositions claires et nettes – notamment une disposition de l’Article 8 relative 
au droit de grève – qui devraient en principe être directement applicables si l’Article 2 du Pacte ne prévoyait 
pas une application progressive’
1460 Mr Deneve, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 43. Original text in French: ‘si l’obligation et 
la gratuité de l’enseignement primaire sont établies, il n’est plus possible d’y déroger ultérieurement et que toute 
dérogation serait nulle et non avenue.’
1461 Mr Deneve, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Sections 44 and 52.
1462 E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 51.
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is possible, provided that Belgian citizens can not apply directly to the Committee after 
exhausting all their legal remedies.’1463
In General, the Delegation regretted that the Covenant was not well-known amongst 
the judges, and promised future measures to make the Covenant better known 
amongst them.1464
13.2.5.2 The second periodic report
In its second periodic report, Belgium almost literally repeated its view on the 
working of Article 2 ICESCR regarding its programmatic nature as stated in its 
initial report.1465 However, Belgium added that the Court of Cassation and the 
Council of State had ruled that Belgium is nevertheless bound by the ‘standstill’ 
effect of the ICESCR Provisions, which means that ‘rules of domestic law by which 
rights embodied in the Covenant were already secured at the time it entered into force 
in Belgium cannot be challenged at a later date.’1466 Since then, judgments of the 
Constitutional Court (at that time the Arbitration Court) show a ‘trend towards 
recognition of direct effect of certain Provisions.’1467 As an example, Belgium discussed 
two cases, from 15 July 1993,1468 recognising direct effect of Article 8 ICESCR, 
and 8 March 1994,1469 recognising direct effect of Article 6 ICESCR.1470 However, 
Belgium rightfully added that ‘A distinction must be made (…) between the decisions 
of the Court of Arbitration, which exercises indirect control since it assesses the degree to 
which laws in conformity with Articles 10 (equal treatment), 11 (discrimination), and 24 
(freedom of instruction) of the Constitution (which incorporates the texts of duly ratified 
international treaties) and the decisions of the Courts and tribunals, in particular the 
Court of Cassation and the Council of State, which exercise direct control. The latter 
have not yet recognised any direct effect of the Covenant.’1471
During the sessions with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Committee referred to its previous concerns that it was not possible to invoke 
the Covenant before the Courts, and asked whether the situation had improved, 
1463 Mr Van Craen, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 53. Original text in French: ‘puisque le 
protocole en question n’existe pas encore, il est difficile pour la délégation belge d’exprimer une opinion en la 
matière. D’un point de vue théorique, cependant, le principe qui inspire la position du Gouvernement belge est le 
suivant: un tel protocole est envisageable, pour autant que les citoyens belges ne puissent s’adresser directement 
au Comité qu’après extinction de l’ensemble des voies de recours internes.’
1464 Mr Deneve, E/C.12/1994/SR.15, 17 May 1994, Section 45.
1465 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Section 2.
1466 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Section 3.
1467 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Section 3.
1468 Constitutional Court, 62/93, 15 July 1993, considerations B.3.8-B.3.12.
1469 Constitutional Court, 22/94, 8 March 1994, consideration B.9.2.
1470 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Sections 4-7.
1471 E/1990/6/Add.18, 5 March 1998, Section 8.
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and whether international law would now prevail over national law.1472 Regarding 
the possibility to invoke ICESCR Articles before the Courts, the Delegation basically 
repeated the Belgian view on Article 2 (1) ICESCR – the ICESCR is of a programmatic 
nature, and therefore its Provisions have no direct effect before the Courts – and 
the recognition of the ‘standstill’ effect.1473 The view of the Courts regarding 
the matter had not changed: ‘The three main Belgian Courts, namely the Court of 
Arbitration, the Court of Cassation and the Council of State, apply on a regular basis 
the “standstill” effect, while the other Courts are bound by their case law.’1474 Once 
again, a reference was made to the two Constitutional Court cases referred to in the 
second periodic report, to demonstrate that the Court had granted a certain effect 
to Articles 6 and 8 ICESCR, and therefore the Court seems to move towards the 
acceptance of direct effect of certain ICESCR Provisions. Remarkable however is 
the observation of the Delegation that ‘since then, the Court of Arbitration and other 
Courts such as the Council of State, once again recognised that certain Provisions of the 
Covenant are directly applicable.’1475 It is unclear what Cases of the Council of State 
is referred to, and it seems inappropriate to refer to rulings of the Constitutional 
Court as proof for the possibility of direct effect, due to its indirect reviewing 
competences. Only later, during the sessions, the Delegation explained the indirect 
application of the Constitutional Court of international Provisions via Articles 10 
and 11 Constitution.1476
Regarding the question whether international law prevails over national law 
in Belgium, the Delegation replied that ‘Belgium has legal monism, which means 
that international law and national law are part of a single legal order. Therefore, the 
Provisions of the Covenant have precedence over domestic laws to the extent that they 
are directly applicable Provisions.’1477 In addition, the Delegation underlined that 
the Court of Cassation recognised the primacy of international law over domestic 
law in 1971 (this must be a reference to the Franco-Suisse Le Ski case1478), and this 
doctrine was never altered since. It must be noted here that in the Franco-Suisse 
Le Ski case, the Court of Cassation indeed recognised the primacy of international 
1472 Mr Kouznetsov, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 9.
1473 Mr Deneve, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 21.
1474 Mr Deneve, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 22. Original text in French: ‘Les trois 
Courts principales de Belgique, à savoir la Cour d’arbitrage, la Cour de cassation et le Conseil d’État, appliquent 
depuis, de manière régulière, l’effet “standstill”, et les autres tribunaux sont liés par leur jurisprudence.’
1475 Mr Deneve, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 23. Original text in French: ‘Par la 
suite, la Cour d’arbitrage et d’autres tribunaux comme le Conseil d’État, ont reconnu à nouveau que certaines 
dispositions du Pacte sont directement applicables.’
1476 Mr Vandamme, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 37.
1477 Mr Deneve, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 24. Original text in French: ‘la Belgique 
connaît le monisme juridique, c’est-à-dire que le droit international et le droit national font partie d’un seul 
ordre juridique. Il s’ensuit que les dispositions du Pacte priment sur les dispositions internes dans la mesure 
où il s’agit des dispositions directement applicables.’
1478 Court of Cassation, 27 May 1971, arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1971 (p. 959).
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Provisions over national Provisions but, as discussed in Section 11.5, only insofar 
these international Provisions have an direct effect.
According to the Committee, the interpretation of Belgium on Article 2 ICESCR 
was in contradiction with the authoritative interpretation of the Committee, for 
‘The possibility to implement the rights gradually at the level of available resources 
are not obstacles to the direct application of the Covenant.’1479 Also, the Committee 
considered that the precedence of international law over domestic law was in 
contradiction with the fact that the Courts decided whether a Provisions was directly 
applicable or not. In addition, the Committee referred to General Comment 9, 
Section 11,1480 in which the Committee expressed the view that ‘the Covenant does 
not negate the possibility that the rights it contains may be considered self-executing 
in systems where that option is provided for.’1481
An interesting question was raised regarding the Concluding Observations of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which noted with satisfaction that in 
Belgium, the ICRC is self-executing and that its Provisions may be invoked before 
the Court.1482 The Committee asked what made the ICRC directly applicable, 
and the ICESCR not.1483 The Delegation replied that the ICRC did not contain 
an equivalent Provision to Article 2 (1) ICESCR, in which the implementation of 
the Covenant was made dependent on the resources of the state. For this reason, 
the Belgian Courts first considered that all Provisions of the ICESCR were not 
directly applicable, but this view was later corrected, ‘in particular in view of the 
concluding observations of the Committee after consideration of the initial report of 
Belgium.’1484 Again, reference was made of the Court cases of the Constitutional 
Court, in which Articles 6 and 8 ICESCR were invoked.1485 A curious response 
since firstly, as will appear below, the Concluding Observation of the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child was a misunderstanding: most ICRC Provisions have no 
direct effect in Belgium (see also Chapter 12). It seems unlikely that a Delegation 
does not know this. Secondly, the Constitutional Court did not refer to the any 
Concluding Observations in its verdict, and therefore, the suggestion that there 
is a causal link between the Committee’s Observations and the alleged change 
of view of the Belgian Judiciary seems to be inaccurate.
1479 Mr Dasi, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 28. Original text in French: ‘La possibilité 
de mettre en œuvre des droits progressivement et le niveau des ressources disponibles ne sont pas des obstacles 
à l’application directe des dispositions du Pacte.’
1480 Mr Ceville, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 29.
1481 See: /C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998, CESCR, General Comment 9, The Domestic Application of the 
Covenant, Section 11.
1482 Reference was made to document CRC/C/15/Add.38, 20 June 1995. See Section 6.
1483 Mr Ahmed, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 34.
1484 Mr Deneve, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 38. Original text in French: ‘notamment 
à la lumière des observations finales émises par le Comité après l’examen du rapport initial de la Belgique.’
1485 Mr Deneve, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 38.
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To conclude, in its Concluding Observations, the Committee recommended Belgium 
to ‘take appropriate steps to fully guarantee the direct applicability of the Covenant in 
the domestic legal order.’1486
13.2.5.3 The third periodic report
In its third report, Belgium did not address the issue of direct applicability of the 
Covenant at all. Perhaps unexpectedly, especially after the extensive discussion 
on the matter during the sessions with the Committee on the second periodic 
report, the NGOs did not address the issue either.1487 The Committee however, 
asked in its List of Issues ‘whether Covenant Provisions have been invoked before, or 
directly enforced by, the Courts, other tribunals or administrative authorities.’1488 To 
this Belgium replied that the Constitution and the ECHR were in fact enforced by 
Belgian Courts on a regular basis in cases involving ECOSOC rights. Also, in specific 
cases, the social law of the EU may be enforced as well, especially regarding the 
freedom of movement of workers and fender equality.1489 Furthermore, Belgium 
replied that the ICRC was invoked in ‘very specific cases’.1490 As an example, 
Belgium referred to the Constitutional Court case 106/2003 ‘which affirms the 
right of underage irregular migrants to receive social assistance, provided that the 
authorities have ascertained that the parents do not or cannot discharge their duty to 
support them, that the claim manifestly concerns expenses necessary for the minor’s 
development and, lastly, that the assistance is used solely for those expenses.’1491 This 
indeed summarises the core content of the Court’s verdict. Regarding the ICESCR, 
however, Belgium reported that the Covenant, ‘just like the European Social Charter’, 
was seldom enforced by the Courts. The reason for this was reported to be the 
fact that ‘a significant majority of the Provisions of these texts have no direct effect in 
domestic law.’1492 However, Belgium provided for a non-exclusive list of examples 
in which ICESCR Articles were somehow involved, although ‘never considered on 
its own but rather always in conjunction with other instruments.’1493 The reported 
Constitutional Court cases are: case 17/2002, 89/2002, (‘no discrimination between 
foreigners who have filed for recognition or refugee status (who are entitled to social 
assistance) and those who have filed for recognition of stateless persons’ status (‘who 
are not entitled to social assistance’), 49/2002 (violation of the right to education by 
a French decree establishing a ‘platform of skills in French as a basis for granting 
subsidies’), 131/2001,14/2002,16/2002, 17/2002, 205/2004 (‘The lack of a specific 
status for irregular migrants who have applied for regularisation is not discriminatory’), 
1486 E/C.12/1/Add.54, 1 December 2000, Section 20.
1487 E/C.12/BEL/NGO/3, 23 October 2007.
1488 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3, 10 April 2007, Section 3.
1489 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 50 and footnote 7.
1490 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 51.
1491 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, footnote 8.
1492 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 51.
1493 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 51.
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50/2002 (‘It is not discriminatory to deny’ the right to social assistance ‘to foreigners 
who are applying for refugee status for the second or third time’), 89/2002 (‘It is not 
discriminatory to accord foreigners who have submitted an application for regularisation 
on grounds of exceptional circumstances the right to emergency medical treatment 
only’), 106/2003 (Although the Court ruled that the ICRC was violated, it was 
‘unnecessary to consider a violation of the Covenant’), 5/2004 (although an Act 
was rescinded, the ICESCR was not violated), 107/2004 (‘Rescission of a decree by 
the French Community restricting access to postgraduate studies in health sciences’, 
violating the right to freedom of education) and 131/2005 (Although the ICESCR 
was not violated, ‘the holding of a minor irregular migrant in a reception centre 
violates the right to privacy and to family life, if the presence of the parents in the 
same centre is not guaranteed’).1494 Indeed, as was also observed in Section 12.5, 
the ICESCR Provisions were never considered on their own merits and had only 
a limited effect in the quoted verdicts. Furthermore, reference was made to four 
Court cases of other Belgian tribunals in which the standstill effect of Article 13 
ICESCR was acknowledged (Council of State, 6 September 1989, Court of Cassation, 
20 December 1990), the direct effect of the right to strike enshrined in the ESC 
was recognised (Council of State, 3 December 2002), and the denial of the direct 
effect of the right of an individual to benefit from the protection of his scientific, 
literary or artistic performance (Court of Cassation, 25 September 2003).1495 No 
further explanation was given.
The matter was also discussed during the sessions with the Committee, although 
no new arguments vice versa seem to have been invoked. The Delegation, on 
request on the Committee, underlined that (…) not all the Provisions were directly 
applicable, because direct application was regarded as a matter for the Courts; it was 
up to the Courts to decide whether a treaty was sufficiently clear and explicit. Hence, 
most of the Provisions of the Covenant had had to be given concrete form in a legislative 
and regulatory framework. The Provisions of the Covenant were not directly enforceable 
in the Courts, and references to it could only be made in support of an interpretation 
of Belgian law. A number of rights enunciated in the Covenant (right to work, right to 
equitable working conditions and right to housing, among others) had been included as 
such in the latest version of the Constitution in order to make them more effective.1496
Once more, the Committee expressed in the Concluding Observations its concern 
regarding the fact that most ICESCR Provisions, as well as some Provisions of 
Article 23 CA, have no direct effect and, as a result, are ‘rarely invoked separately 
before, and directly enforced by, national Courts and other tribunals or administrative 
authorities.’1497 Therefore, ‘The Committee draws the attention of the State Party to 
1494 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 51.
1495 E/C.12/BEL/Q/3/Add.1, 1 November 2007, Section 51.
1496 Mr Vandamme, E/C.12/2007/SR.41, 29 February 2008, Section 17.
1497 E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 12.
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its general comment No. 9 (1998) on the domestic application of the Covenant, and 
recommends, as already mentioned in Section 20 of its previous concluding observations, 
that the State Party take all appropriate steps in accordance with Article 2, Section 1 
of the Covenant, to guarantee the direct applicability of the Covenant Provisions in its 
domestic legal order. The Committee also requests that the State Party provide detailed 
information about the measures adopted in its next periodic report.’1498
13.2.5.4 The fourth periodic report
In the fourth periodic report, in response to the previous Concluding Observations, 
Belgium only briefly addresses the issue of direct applicability. Firstly, a reference 
is made to the two conditions that must be met in order for an international 
Provision to be directly applicable, that is, (a) it must be the intention of the State 
Parties to establish individual rights, and (b) the Provision must be ‘sufficiently 
precise and comprehensive’. Furthermore, Belgium reported again that the Belgian 
Courts rarely apply the ICESCR Provisions. ‘In the absence of any case law and in 
view of doctrinal disagreements, it is difficult to assess whether Covenant Provisions 
are directly applicable under Belgian law. Those Provisions are in fact formulated in 
a rather programmatic way: they commit States to taking measures but do not directly 
declare subjective individual rights.’1499 It is unclear what exactly those doctrinal 
disagreements are, although it is most likely a reference to a debate at a national 
level on the direct applicability of international standards amongst scholars.1500
In this light, it is interesting to note that Belgium proudly reported to be one 
of the first countries to have signed the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, on 24 
September 2009.1501
13.3 The ICRC reports
13.3.1 Introduction
In accordance with the harmonised treaty-specific reporting guidelines,1502 the 
Belgian reports on the ICRC are not structured in line with the order of appearance 
of the Provisions in the Convention, but rather in categories of rights and sub-
categories of substantive issues, whereby each time reference is made to the 
related Articles. In addition, due to the Belgian Constitutional structure, the issues 
1498 E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 25.
1499 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Sections 9 and 10.
1500 See for instance: G. Maes, De afdwingbaarheid van sociale grondrechten, Antwerp: Intersentia 2003.
1501 E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Section 7.
1502 CRC/C/58/Rev.2, 23 November 2010, treaty-specific guidelines regarding the form and content 
of periodic reports to be submitted by parties under Article 4, Section 1(b) of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.
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are discussed on the Federal level, Community level and Region level. See also 
Section 9.3.1.3, on the Dutch reporting obligations.
Issues on direct applicability are often discussed in Section 1: ‘General measures of 
implementation’, in particular in sub-Section 1: ‘measures taken to harmonise Belgian 
law and policy with the Provisions of the Convention’. The right to food, or related 
issues, is basically discussed in Section V on ‘family environment and alternative 
care’, more specifically in sub-Section V, ‘recovery of maintenance of the child’, Article 
27 Section 4, Section IV, ‘basic health and welfare’ (more specifically in sub-Section 
IV, ‘social security and child-care services and facilities’, Articles 26 and 18, Section 3, 
and sub-Section V, ‘standard of living’, Article 27, Sections 1-3). The issues relating 
the rights of foreign children (especially unaccompanied foreign children) in 
Belgium are mostly discussed in Section VII, ‘special protection measures’ (mostly 
sub-Section I, ‘children in emergency situations’, under A: ‘refugee children’, Article 
22). Since the right to food is very often invoked in the extensive case law on the 
rights of foreigners in Belgium, special attention to the Belgian reporting on the 
matter will be given below.
In general, it can be said that the reporting behaviour of Belgium was appreciated 
by the Committee. No significant delays – constructive and in compliance with the 
guidelines. For instance, in its Concluding Observations, the Committee noted with 
appreciation ‘that the report followed the guidelines for reporting. It notes that the report 
was timely, comprehensive, and self-critical in nature, as were the written replies to the 
List of Issues (…) and welcomes the additional information provided in the Annexes. The 
discussion in the report on the follow-up to the Committee’s earlier recommendations was 
especially appreciated. The Committee also notes with appreciation the presence of a 
high-level Delegation, which contributed to an open dialogue and a better understanding 
of the implementation of the Convention in Belgium.’1503
13.3.2 Federal structure
On various occasions during the reporting processes, also here the complex Belgian 
Constitution led to discussions on the possibility of an effective and uniform 
approach towards human rights in Belgium. More than once, it was necessary to 
further explain the Belgian Constitutional structure.1504
In its initial report, Belgium explains existing or planned mechanisms for 
coordinating policies regarding children and for monitoring the implementation 
of the convention, basically on the Community and Regional level. It appears that 
on a federal level no such mechanisms existed yet. However, Belgium reported to 
1503 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 2.
1504 For instance during the sessions with the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Mr Willems, CRC/C/
SR.222, 6 June 1995, Section 4.
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plan the establishment of a group of experts that should be responsible for ‘following 
up the implementation of the Convention in Belgium and supervising its execution, 
but also for coordinating the various initiatives taken at the Federal, Community, 
Regional or even local level relating to the rights of the child.’1505 Indeed, Belgium 
reports a large variety of initiatives undertaken in the federated areas that relate 
to the rights of the child, mostly coordinated by the French Community’s Birth 
and Children Office (ONE), the Flemish Community’s Kind en Gezin, and the 
German-Language Community’s Kind und Familie (DKF).1506 In its List of Issues, 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child asked whether Belgium was ‘planning 
to establish a mechanism at the national level to coordinate and evaluate measures for 
implementing the Convention.’1507 In its written replies, Belgium responded that 
several working groups were installed to investigate such a national approach. The 
working group set up by the King Baudouin Foundation specifically focussed on the 
monitoring in the context of the ICRC.1508 During the sessions with the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, the Committee asked on what manner a universal 
approach towards the rights embedded in the Convention could be guaranteed in 
such a complex Governmental system.1509 In response, the Delegation basically 
referred to the many initiatives to coordinate and monitor matters that relate to the 
Convention, but also discussed the different approaches between the Federation 
and the Communities.1510 The Flemish representative however explained that 
the cooperation between the Flemish Ombudsmen (falling under the scope of 
Kind en Gezin) and the Delegate General of the French-speaking Community (a 
post outside the normal administration, with a duty to ensure that the interests 
of the child were safeguarded in the French-Speaking Community) was ‘politically 
speaking, a thorny issue. “Personisable matters” from one region to another, differed, 
and the situation was likely to detoriate still further. It was therefore difficult to devise 
a body for overall cooperation.’1511
In its List of Issues on the second periodic report, the Committee wondered how 
‘in the light of the different competences of the different autonomous Governments (…) 
the co-ordination and co-operation on child rights’ was achieved.1512
During the sessions with the Committee, the first meeting consisted for the larger 
part of a discussion on the Belgian Constitutional structure and the difficulties in 
coordinating the rights of the child nationally.1513 In this light, the Chairperson 
1505 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 21.
1506 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Sections 22-33.
1507 CRC/C.9/WP.4, 17 February 1995, issue 7.
1508 Belg/1, 04 May 1995, reply to question 7.
1509 Mr Hammarberg, CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Section 21.
1510 See in particular: CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Sections 33-48.
1511 Mr Van Keymeulen, CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Section 46.
1512 CRC/C/Q/BELG/2, 8 February 2002, part I, B.2.
1513 CRC/C/SR.782, 24 July 2002.
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noted that the debate had been ‘stimulating and informative’, and found the 
‘occasional disagreement among Delegation Members themselves on certain points 
(…) encouraging.’1514 In its Concluding Observations, the Committee made several 
recommendations on the uniform and nationwide implementation and monitoring 
of the rights of the child, including the establishment, as already agreed upon by 
Belgium,1515 of a national commission for the rights of the child.1516
In its combined third and fourth periodic report, the Belgian Constitutional 
structure was once more clarified.1517 As recommended by the Committee, the 
establishment of a National Commission on the Rights of the Child was reported, 
based on a cooperation agreement between the State and all federated areas. 
The main purpose of this Commission is the ‘more extensive monitoring of the 
Convention’s implementation in Belgium and the effective coordination of measures 
for the benefit of the child’,1518 and its principle task is the draft of the reports on 
the implementation of the ICRC.1519 The Belgian Delegation proudly commented 
that Belgium was the first ICRC State Party with such a national body.1520 In the 
NGO shadow-report however, the coordination of children’s rights issues was 
critically reviewed. The NGOs stated that there is lack of coordination amongst 
the different policy areas concerning minors, and therefore recommended the 
establishment of a coordinating Minister on children’s rights on the federal level. 
In addition, the work of the National Commission on the Rights of the Child was 
criticised, due to the fact that usually Government representatives would take the 
most important decisions in the body, resulting in lack of autonomy and power 
to influence political decisions on children’s rights-related issues.1521
During the sessions, the Committee expressed its concerns ‘about the possibility 
that the federal structure of the State Party could hamper the implementation of the 
Convention’ and pointed out that since the Federal Government had signed the 
Convention it was solely responsible for implementing international law and 
therefore, national coordination was of vital importance. The Country Rapporteur 
1514 CRC/C/SR.783, 29 May 2002, Section 64.
1515 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Sections 158-164.
1516 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, especially Sections 10 and 11.
1517 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 1-13.
1518 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 17.
1519 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 18. Besides the drafting of the country report, its duties 
were ‘to contribute to drafting other documents’, ‘to coordinate the collection, analysis and processing of data 
intended for the Committee on the Rights of the Child’, ‘to encourage partnerships and an ongoing exchange 
of information between the authorities and bodies dealing wit children’s rights’, ‘to monitor and review the 
implementation measures needed to respond to the suggestions and recommendations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child’, and ‘to give advice.’
1520 Mrs D’hondt, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Section 4.
1521 Shadow-report of the NGOs on the implementation of the International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. Original title in Dutch: Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal 
Verdrag inzake de Rechten van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 
1, Section 1.
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(advising the Committee) stated that in the combined third and fourth periodic 
report a wealth of information was given on coordinating measures, suggesting that 
‘the problem lay not just in coordination, but in ensuring that children throughout the 
State Party could enjoy their rights equally.’1522 The Belgian Delegation replied that 
‘all Regions and Communities within Belgium had equal status and were competent to 
implement the Convention. The federal authorities provided the necessary guarantees 
and safeguards to ensure compliance with the Convention nationwide but, given the 
autonomy of the regions and communities, priorities and financing could vary in line 
with their different requirements and situations.’1523 The Country Rapporteur found 
it difficult ‘to gain an accurate understanding of the level of enjoyment of those rights 
by all children nationwide given that coordination between different regions, bodies 
and authorities was extremely complex.’1524
Therefore, in its Concluding Observations, the Committee recommended to ensure 
that all legislation, nationwide, was fully in conformity with the Convention, 
because of the varying legislation in the Communities.1525 Furthermore, the 
Committee recommended the establishment of ‘an effective system of coordination of 
the Convention and ensure cooperation of the coordination mechanisms established at the 
federal and Community level so as to achieve a comprehensive and coherent child rights 
policy.’1526 Also, the Committee regretted that the previously recommended1527 
national plan of action for children was not implemented.1528
13.3.3 The right to food in the ICRC reports
13.3.3.1 The initial report
In its initial report the right to food is not discussed as a separate issue, and the 
right to an adequate standard of living is mostly discussed in the context of social 
benefits. Noteworthy is that on Community level, the report informed about the 
adoption by the French Community of the Young Children’s charter, a ‘declaration 
of intent constituting an intermediate step towards the adoption of a Covenant on young 
children.’1529 Article 1 of this Charter stipulated the ‘right of the child to an adequate 
standard of living to permit its physical, intellectual, emotional and social development’, 
and Article 4 recognised the ‘right of the child to benefit from social security.’1530
1522 Mr Citarella, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Section 16.
1523 Mrs D’hondt, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Section 31
1524 Mr Citarella, CRC/C/SR.1523, 11 June 2011, Section 48.
1525 CRC/C/BEL/CO/3-4, 18 June 2010, Sections 11-12.
1526 CRC/C/BEL/CO/3-4, 18 June 2010, Section 14.
1527 CRC/C/OPAC/BEL/CO/1, 9 June 2006, Section 9, Concluding Observations on the initial report on 
the ICRC-OP on the rights of the child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.
1528 CRC/C/BEL/CO/3-4, 18 June 2010, Sections 15-16.
1529 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 13.
1530 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 13.
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Belgium reported extensively on its system of social benefits, which appears 
to be quite complex due to the fact that both the Federal Government and the 
Communities have certain responsibilities towards the allowances of these benefits. 
Belgium reported inter alia that all children are equal under Belgian law, regardless 
of their filiation (Article 10 CA, leading to amendments in the Civil Code by 
Statute of 31 March 1987),1531 that in case a child is aided by a Public Centre for 
Social Welfare, naturally the best interests of the child prevails (a reference was 
made to several Articles of the ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres for 
social welfare’),1532 and that family allowance is increased when a child is disabled 
(Royal Decree of 19 December 1993).1533
In the Report, reference was made to several plans and initiatives for the near 
future to improve the systems of social benefits. For instance, the goal was set 
‘of detaching the family allowances from the social-occupational status of the parents’ 
for ‘family allowances should no longer be a right stemming from the parents’ socio-
occupational situation, but an inherent right of the child as such.’1534
Belgium furthermore explained that a principal rule in the Belgian Civil Code 
is that ‘Minors, like everyone, are entitled to social assistance. But the law does not 
explain whether a minor may also file an application for assistance and receive it, or, 
for that matter, who should file the application when the beneficiary is a minor. It is a 
fundamental rule of civil law that a minor is legally incapable of taking action. Case 
law, however, has observed that minors are in fact capable of taking action in respect 
of acts of everyday life. Acts necessary for acquiring absolutely vital resources to enable 
himself to lead a life in keeping with human dignity can be seen as representing acts 
of everyday life.’1535 The child has thus entitlements of its own regarding social 
benefits that are necessary for an adequate standard of living.
13.3.3.2 Second periodic report
In the second report, the right to food is nowhere addressed as a separate issue 
either. Instead, Belgium further explains how its social security system works.
With regard to Article 27 (4) ICRC, Belgium reported that legislation on collective 
settlements of debts includes Provisions that protect the rights of the ‘maintenance 
1531 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 74. See: Statute of 31 March amending certain 
Provisions relating to the origin. Original title in Dutch: Wet van 31 maart 1987 tot wijziging van een aantal 
bepalingen betreffende de afstamming.
1532 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Sections 88-89. See: ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on the Public 
Centres for Social Welfare’. Original title in Dutch: Organieke Wet van 8 juli 1976 betreffende de openbare 
centra voor maatschappelijk welzijn, B.S. 5.VIII.1976 – err. B.S. 26.XI.1976.
1533 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 297.
1534 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 320.
1535 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 350.
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creditor.’ Thus, responsibilities towards the child as maintenance creditors can still 
be fulfilled, also in case of extensive debts or bankruptcy.1536 With regard to Article 
23 ICRC, special forms of care were introduced for disabled children, including 
increased insurance benefits and family allowance.1537 The report furthermore 
highlighted that access to healthcare (Article 24 ICRC) was guaranteed for children, 
regardless whether their parents were insurable or not, and discussed several 
initiatives on healthcare issues, including a number of initiatives on the cot-death 
syndrome, support systems for diabetic women wishing to become pregnant and 
pregnant diabetes patients, additional help for diabetic children, the creation of 
reference centres for children suffering from metabolic illness, mucoviscidosis and 
neuromuscular ailments and AIDS.1538 On a federated level, action programmes 
were discussed, mainly initiated by the French Community’s Birth and Children 
Office (ONE), and Flemish Community’s Kind en Gezin. The French Community 
for instance introduced a five-year programme consisting of a health promotion 
and prevention policy. Certain elements of this policy concerned food issues, 
such as the promotion of healthy eating habits, combatting malnutrition and the 
Provision of information on child health and nutrition.1539
With regard to the right to social security, Belgium reported on specific regulations 
regarding family allowances for children in complex family situations. Also, benefits 
that are paid directly to children (and not indirectly via its legal representatives) 
are discussed: ‘The range of circumstances in which allowance may be paid to the 
child himself is being extended in order to prevent loss of the right to family allowances. 
Such allowances are now paid when children attain the age of 16 (previously 18), when 
they have a separate principal residence or when they are themselves beneficiaries for 
their own children.’1540
On the standard of living (Article 27 (1-3) ICRC), Belgium reported that at the federal 
level, the Civil Code was amended, setting forth the role of fathers and mothers, 
which included ‘the obligation to assume, according to their means, maintenance, 
monitoring, raising and education of their children.’1541 On the federated level, the 
report mainly highlighted initiatives on the support of disadvantaged children 
and families.1542
1536 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 402.
1537 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Sections 500-507.
1538 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 535.
1539 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Sections 537-541.
1540 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Sections 552-561.
1541 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 575.
1542 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Sections 576-586.
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13.3.3.3 The combined third and fourth periodic report
Again, in the combined third and fourth report, no direct reference was made 
to the right to food, although certain aspects of social benefits to the child were 
discussed in detail, including occasionally food-related issues.
In general, Belgium expressed its intention to ratify the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities several times,1543 and confirmed the ratification during 
the sessions with the Committee on the Rights of the Child.1544
Furthermore, Belgium reported on Article 3 that ‘the interests of the child are taken 
into account on the coordinated legislation on family allowances for employees.’ Measures 
were adopted to assure that the child benefits from all its entitlements.1545
On Article 27 (4) ICRC Belgium referred to the Act of February 2003,1546 installing 
a Maintenance Recovery Service, collecting and/or recovering maintenance 
payments on behalf of the beneficiaries and – when necessary – making advance 
payments when the maintenance money was not properly paid.1547 As a future 
objective, the relatively vulnerable single parent families will be more intensively 
aided by this Maintenance Recovery Service.1548
Regarding Article 24 ICRC, Belgium reported on new federal legislation ‘designed 
to guarantee the quality of care for children in hospital.’1549 Special care for children 
is provided for, as well as arrangements for parents to accompany the child in 
the care process. In this light ‘resources are provided to ensure the quality of food 
given to patients, the psychological and social support of child and family, and for 
the organisation of leisure and educational activities.’ Furthermore, the care is both 
internally and externally assessed.1550 Also, reference was made to a pilot to 
develop the WHO-UNICEF driven ‘Baby Friendly Hospital Initiative’, aiming 
1543 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 53, 449, and 595.
1544 Ms. D’hondt, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Section 6.
1545 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 208.
1546 See: the Statute of 21 February 2003, establishing a service for maintenance claims at the 
Ministry of Finance. Original title in Dutch: Wet van 21 februari 2003 tot oprichting van een Dienst voor 
alimentatievorderingen bij de FOD Financiën.
1547 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 366-369.
1548 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 417.
1549 Especially the Royal Decree of 13 July 2006, establishing the standards that care for children 
must comply with in order to be recognised, and amending the Royal Decree of 25 November 1997 
establishing the standards for the ‘surgical day treatment’ function must comply with in order to 
be recognised. Original title in Dutch: Koninklijk Besluit van 13 juli 2006, houdende vaststelling van de 
normen waaraan het zorgprogramma voor kinderen moet voldoen om erkend te worden en tot wijziging 
van het Koninklijk Besluit van 25 november 1997 houdende vaststelling van de normen waaraan de functie 
‘chirurgische daghospitalisatie’ moet voldoen om te worden erkend.
1550 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 492.
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at inter alia the encouragement of breastfeeding.1551 Furthermore a national 
advertising campaign by the national plan for nutrition was reported, consisting 
of a television commercial, five guides to nutrition (of which three guides were 
especially aimed at children and young persons), and a website. Also, future 
actions were mentioned, such as the establishment of nutrition work groups, 
the stimulation of breastfeeding, and education on healthy nutrition.1552 In this 
context, the Flemish and French Community Governments and the Walloon Region 
also reported on several initiatives on the stimulation of healthy eating habits.1553
With regard to Articles 26 and 18 (3) ICRC, basically the general social security 
system of Belgium was explained.1554
On Article 27 (1-3) ICRC, Belgium mainly reported that childcare costs are tax-
deductible, and changes had been made to extend those costs arrangements, 
resulting in a positive effect for the standard of living of children.1555 Furthermore, 
Belgium reported improvements on the system of social benefits: firstly, the social 
benefits will increase when a recipient of the guaranteed minimum income has 
a child, regardless of the further family situation, which was not the case before. 
Secondly, reference was made to the improvement regarding the entitlements to 
social benefits of children of illegally residing parents in Belgium, which will be 
discussed in Section 13.3.4. Belgium also discussed some difficulties and future 
objectives related to poverty and the standard of living. As a future objective, 
Belgium reported to work towards reducing the poverty rate of 5%, as recommended 
by the UNICEF’s Innocenti Research Centre, although has to admit that this is 
a very ambitious level.1556 A ‘multi-faceted approach’ would be required to ‘cover 
all aspects and all types of difficulties encountered by families living in insecurity’. 
Furthermore, Belgium set the goal to improve the access to information on the 
assistance to vulnerable persons.1557 Also, it was planned to carry out a study 
on the possible measures of assistance that can be adopted to ensure access to 
energy, such as gas and electricity, for it appeared that families could be cut off 
from energy supplies (except during the winter from December until March), 
also when children were involved.1558 More in general, Belgium reported that 
people living in financial insecurity are – as a result – often living an unhealthy 
life, for instance because they ‘defer medical treatment because they do not have the 
1551 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 494.
1552 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 503-504.
1553 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 516 and 543-544.
1554 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, especially Sections 555-566.
1555 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 586-588.
1556 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 607.
1557 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 610.
1558 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 612-615. See also with regard to the Flemish 
Community: CRC/C/SR.1523, 11 June 2011, Section 26.
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means to pay’. Combatting poverty thus should also lead to a reduction of health 
problems.1559
During the sessions with the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the problem 
of (child) poverty was addressed on several occasions.1560
In its Concluding Observations, the Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the 
State Party to take ‘measures to monitor the state of health of children from the most 
disadvantaged families in their first year of life, ensuring access to health services to all 
children and encourage parents to seek the health services that are available for their 
children. The Committee also recommends that the State Party review health insurance 
systems in order to lower the cost of health services for the most disadvantaged families. 
The Committee further recommends the State Party to strengthen enforcement of the 
International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes in all parts of the State.’1561 
Furthermore, the Committee expressed its concern about the fact that 16.9% of 
all children in Belgium live below the poverty line.1562
13.3.4 The rights of foreign children in the ICRC reports
13.3.4.1 The initial report
Belgium made an interpretative declaration on Article 2 of the ICRC: ‘With regard 
to Article 2, Section 11, according to the interpretation of the Belgian Government non-
discrimination on grounds of national origins does not necessarily imply the obligation 
for States to automatically grant foreigners the same rights as their nationals. This 
concept should be understood as designed to rule all arbitrary conduct but not differences 
in treatment based on objective and reasonable considerations, in accordance with the 
principles prevailing in democratic societies.’1563 This declaration was discussed during 
the sessions with the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The Committee, which 
was not surprisingly concerned about the declaration, asked whether ‘that reservation 
was really necessary given that non-discrimination was one of the major principles of the 
Convention’, and recommended reconsideration of the declaration.1564 The Belgian 
Delegation responded that the declaration was ‘precautionary since the Convention 
affected various areas.’ Furthermore, it stated that the Belgian Government ‘already 
adopted a number of principles and sought to ensure equality of treatment for Belgians 
1559 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 616.
1560 Mr Citarella and Mrs D’hondt, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Sections 17, and 33.
1561 CRC/C/BEL/C/3-4, 18 June 2010, Section 57.
1562 CRC/C/BEL/C/3-4, 18 June 2010, Section 64.
1563 See for an overview of all reservations and interpretative declarations the UN official treaty database: 
http://treaties.un.org.
1564 MrsSanto Pais, CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Section 26.
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and aliens’.1565 Somehow, the above discussion led the Committee to believe that 
the Delegation was willing to consider the withdrawal of the declaration.1566
Indeed, in the initial report, several measures to ensure equality between Belgian 
citizens and foreigners were discussed. With regard to foreign children, reference 
was made to Article 1, Section 1 of the ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres 
for social welfare’: ‘Everyone is entitled to social assistance. The goal of social assistance 
is to enable everyone to live a life in keeping wit human dignity.’1567 This Article has 
two components, according to the report: ‘on the one hand, the universal scope of 
the right to social assistance, and on the other hand, the explicit reference to human 
dignity. The right to social assistance is considered to be an inalienable right founded 
on recognition of the humanity of everyone.’1568 This has thus the consequence 
that ‘No criteria of nationality or race are needed in order to avail oneself of this 
right. The only criterion is that of leading a life that is not (or is no longer) compatible 
with human dignity.’1569 Furthermore, the report held that ‘Social assistance is 
not reserved for nationals alone, and the law also prohibits any requirement of prior 
residence for a particular number of years. The only element taken into consideration 
is the presence in Belgium of a destitute person, regardless of that person’s residence 
status.’1570 And: ‘For example, the general terms which Article 1 of the Organisational 
Act make it impossible to reserve social assistance to foreigners properly entered in the 
town population or aliens registers, or to require legitimate residence in Belgium as an 
exclusive condition.’ Furthermore, Belgium reported that a minimum income was 
guaranteed to persons holding Belgian nationality, nationals of Member Countries 
of the EEC who are subject to Council Regulation 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 
(on the free movement of workers within the Community), stateless persons and 
recognised political refugees.1571
In its List of Issues, the Committee on the Rights of the Child asked whether 
there were ‘specific measures or procedures in force or envisaged with regard to 
unaccompanied minors in order to guarantee their full enjoyment of the rights recognised 
by the convention’.1572 Belgium responded in its written replies that there was 
no such specific procedure: unaccompanied minor foreigners could follow the 
1565 Mr Debrulle, CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Section 50.
1566 CRC/C/15/Add.38, 20 June 1995, Section 4. See also the responses of the Committee Members 
during the sessions, especially CRC/C/SR.224, 9 June 1995, Sections 72 (Mrs Badran) and 73 (Mrs 
Santos Pais).
1567 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 341.
1568 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 341. See also the initial report on the implementation of 
the ICESCR: E/1990/5/Add.15, 13 May 1993, Sections 143-145. See furthermore: Article 1, § 1, ‘Organic 
Law of 8 July 1976 on the Public Centres for Social Welfare’. Original title in Dutch: Organieke Wet van 8 juli 
1976 betreffende de openbare centra voor maatschappelijk welzijn, B.S. 5.VIII.1976 – err. B.S. 26.XI.1976).
1569 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 342.
1570 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 348.
1571 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 354.
1572 CRC/C.9/WP.4, 17 February 1995, question 23.
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same asylum procedures as adult asylum-seekers. The only difference was that 
an unaccompanied minor could not be removed from Belgian territory in case 
of refusal of a residence permit, for ‘no order to leave the territory may be delivered 
to a foreigner who is less than 18 years old or whose personal status is that of a 
minor’.1573 Instead, a reconduction order will be delivered, and a specified person 
will be enjoined to, if possible, return the minor to the place where he/she came 
from. However, Belgium admitted that the fact that unaccompanied children have 
no specific status in Belgian law gave rise to problems, especially with regard 
to social assistance. A commission was installed to determine such status for 
unaccompanied minors.1574
It may therefore come as no surprise that in its Concluding Observations, the 
Committee was ‘concerned about the application of the law and policy concerning 
children seeking asylum, including unaccompanied children. It is particularly concerned 
that unaccompanied minors who have had their asylum request rejected, but who can 
remain in the country until they are 18 years old, may be deprived of an identity and 
denied the full enjoyment of their rights, including healthcare and education. Such 
a situation, in the view of the Committee, raises concern as to its compatibility with 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.’1575
13.3.4.2 The second periodic report
Unaccompanied minor foreigners
In response to the Concluding Observations on the initial report, Belgium had to 
admit in its second periodic report that meanwhile still no specific regulations 
related to the care of unaccompanied minor asylum-seekers were adopted. Belgium 
stated that ‘social assistance centres are responsible for such care but, in practice, they 
do not provide it. Nor are there any regulations regarding minors whose application for 
asylum has been rejected but who are “allowed” to stay on Belgian territory.’1576 And 
furthermore: ‘In certain circumstances there are no specific regulations concerning 
guardianship of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum, so that protection of their 
interests is not guaranteed. The Legislature has entrusted the task to the Public Social 
Assistance Centres (CPAS), but, in practice, it is seldom implemented’1577 Basically, the 
normal procedure that is applicable to adults thus also applies to minors. However, 
Belgium reported that when a child seeks asylum but is not accompanied by both 
parents, the wishes of the child are also examined.1578 Furthermore, in Belgium, 
unaccompanied minors whose asylum request has been rejected may not be forced 
1573 Belg/1, 04 May 1995, reply to question 23.
1574 Belg/1, 04 May 1995, reply to question 23.
1575 CRC/C/15/Ad.38, 20 June 1995, Section 9.
1576 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 13.
1577 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 657.
1578 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 655.
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to leave Belgian territory. However, Belgium had to admit that ‘a number of minors, 
mainly aged 16-17 and supposedly sufficiently “mature”, are expelled in the same way 
as foreign adults.’1579 Again, Belgium promised improvement, and underlined to 
have taken part in several international symposiums on the matter.1580 Also, it 
was emphasised that illegally residing children in both the French-language and 
the Flemish Communities are allowed to participate in education.1581
The Committee on the Rights of the Child already announced in its List of Issues 
that the matter of unaccompanied minor, asylum-seeking and refugee children 
would be addressed during the sessions,1582 and asked for further data on the issue 
on the number of unaccompanied children that ‘(a) have applied for asylum; (b) have 
pending cases; and (c) were granted residency.’1583 In response, Belgium provided 
for this data.1584 With regard to the federated areas, the Flemish Community 
Government reported that ‘the situation of foreign unaccompanied minors is being 
carefully monitored by the Flemish Community’, and informed on several initiatives 
taken on the matter.1585
Unfortunately, the Committee hardly addressed the issue during the sessions, as 
it had promised in its List of Issues. When the meetings were almost at an end, 
the chairperson stated in the context of ‘adoption reform, discrimination, abuse 
and neglect and tax measures for poor families’1586, that it ‘seemed that current draft 
legislation provided that unaccompanied asylum-seekers could be refused entry at 
the frontier and sent to a centre to be regarded as extraterritorial. He wondered what 
law would apply here.’ Furthermore, the chairperson noted that in Belgium a 
Provision applied for minors to be sent back to their country of origin or another 
country for family reunification. He noted that families were not always willing 
to be reunited.1587 The Belgian Delegation however did not answer all those 
questions, but instead suggested that it would be better to answer them later by 
means of written replies.1588 The Delegation only underlined the fact that also 
unaccompanied foreign minors had access to free education, and that due to 
1579 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 659.
1580 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 14.
1581 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2005, Sections 15-16.
1582 CRC/C/Q/BELG/2, 8 February 2002, part IV, 6.
1583 CRC/C/Q/BELG/2, 8 February 2002, part 1, A.6.
1584 However, it must be noted that major parts of the data (such as the number of unaccompanied 
asylum-seekers granted residency) were only available since January 2002 (the written replies were 
received by the Committee on the Rights of the Child on 2 May 2002).CRC/C/RESP/7, received on 3 
May 2002, Section 1, A.6.
1585 In particular, schools were informed on the right to education of illegally residing foreign minors, 
an Association (‘t Huis) was founded that aimed at the reception of these children, and under certain 
conditions, facilities for disabled children were opened up for foreign unaccompanied minors. See: 
CRC/C/RESP/7, received on 3 May 2002, Flemish Community, part VIII.
1586 Mr Doek, in his capacity as chairperson, CRC/C/SR.783, 29 May 2002, Section 45.
1587 Mr Doek, in his capacity as chairperson, CRC/C/SR.783, 29 May 2002, Section 52.
1588 Mr Debrulle, CRC/C/SR.783, 29 May 2002, Section 53.
380 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Chapter 13
new legislation, all disabled children had access to facilities, regardless of their 
nationality.1589 Unfortunately, the written replies as suggested by the Delegation 
were never submitted.
In its Concluding Observations, the Committee regretted that some of the 
recommendations after the consideration of the initial report were ‘insufficiently 
addressed.’ The Committee referred to inter alia Section 9 of its Concluding 
Observations on the initial report1590 regarding its concerns about the position 
of unaccompanied foreign minors in Belgium. Therefore, the issue was reiterated 
in the second Concluding Observations,1591 and thus ‘The Committee urges the 
State Party to make every effort to address the previous recommendations that have not 
yet been implemented, and the list of concerns contained in the previous concluding 
observations.’1592 In general, the Committee welcomed the adoption of Article 
22bis of the Belgian Constitution on the protection of children.1593 Furthermore, 
the Committee recommended to ensure that all laws concerning children ‘are 
right-based and in conformity with international human rights standards, including 
the Convention’, especially in view of the draft legislation on unaccompanied 
minors that was addressed by the chairperson of the Committee during the 
sessions.1594 The Committee also recommended to ‘take all necessary measures to 
ensure that all children within its jurisdiction enjoy all the rights set out in the Convention 
without discrimination.’1595 Regarding the issue of unaccompanied foreign minors, 
the Committee welcomed a number of initiatives, such as a special bureau on 
unaccompanied minors in the Aliens Office for handling their request to stay, 
as well as some other activities, but also stressed that ‘there are not yet, as the 
Government acknowledges, specific regulations for unaccompanied minors, whether 
seeking asylum or not.’1596 The Committee therefore made the following, rather 
detailed, recommendations:
In accordance with the principles and Provisions of the Convention, especially 
Articles 2, 3, and 22, and with respect to unaccompanied persons under 18 
years of age, the Committee recommends that the State Party:
a. Expedite efforts to establish special reception centres for unaccompanied 
minors, with special attention to those who are victims of trafficking 
and/or sexual exploitation.
1589 Mr Parmentier, CRC/C/SR.783, 29 May 2002, Sections 54-56.
1590 CRC/C/15/Add.38, 20 June 1995, Section 9.
1591 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 4.
1592 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 5.
1593 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 3.
1594 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 9.
1595 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 19(b).
1596 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 27.
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b. Ensure that the stay in those centres is for the shortest time possible 
and that access to education and health is guaranteed during and after 
the stay in the reception centres.
c. Approve as soon as possible the draft law on the creation of a guardianship 
service, in order to ensure the appointment of a guardian for an 
unaccompanied minor from the beginning of the asylum process and 
thereafter as long as necessary, and make sure that this service is fully 
independent, allowing it to take any action it considers to be in the best 
interests of this minor.
d. Ensure unaccompanied minors are informed of their rights and have 
access to legal representation in the asylum process.
e. Improve cooperation and exchange of information among all actors 
involved, including the Aliens Office and other relevant authorities, 
police services, tribunals, reception centres and NGOs.
f. Ensure that, if family reunification is carried out, it is done in the best 
interests of the child.
g. Expand and improve follow-up of returned unaccompanied minors.’1597
The Belgian declaration on Article 2 ICRC
With regard to the interpretative declaration on Article 2 ICRC, Belgium reported, 
contrary to the understanding of the Committee in its Concluding Observations to 
the initial report,1598 that ‘the Belgian Government considers it necessary to retain this 
interpretative declaration. In fact, the purpose of the Provision of Article 2 is to rule out 
arbitrary conduct and not differences in treatment based on legitimate considerations. 
The given interpretation of the concept “discrimination” is in accordance with the now 
universally accepted doctrine regarding the term, in other words, the criterion used to 
constitute a breach of the principle of equality of treatment is the absence of an objective 
and reasonable justification for distinction. Such a justification is more likely if the 
purpose is to achieve a legitimate goal and there is a reasonable proportional link between 
the means used and the goal to be achieved.’1599 Furthermore, Belgium reported 
that the ‘Belgian institutions constantly endeavour to ensure the non-discriminatory 
treatment of persons on Belgian territory’.1600 To underline this, reference was made 
to Constitutional Court ruling 43/981601. It was proudly reported that in its verdict, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that social assistance should be provided to an 
illegally residing foreigner whose request for asylum had been rejected and was 
ordered to leave Belgian territory. No further explanation was given, suggesting 
that this ruling is standard case law in Belgium. In casu however, as demonstrated 
in Section 12.5.3.3, the asylum-seeker in question was awaiting a higher appeal 
1597 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 28.
1598 CRC/C/15/Add.38, 20 June 1995, Section 4.
1599 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Sections 28-29.
1600 CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 30.
1601 Constitutional Court, 43/98, 22 April 1998, B.S. (04)(83, pp.13348-13357).
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procedure before the Council of State, and therefore, as an exception to the earlier 
case law of the Court, was entitled to social benefits for the period of the appeal. 
In fact, in case 43/98, the Court confirmed the doctrine of case 51/941602 in which 
it had ruled that restricting the entitlements to social services was a legitimate 
means to restrict immigration. In this light, referring to this case to demonstrate 
that foreigners are not discriminated seems to be rather absurd. In addition, a 
technical juridical note could be made here, although it is only a detail: strictly 
considered, the Court only nullified the word ‘executable’ in the phrase ‘The social 
services to an alien (…) shall be stopped at the moment that an executable order to leave 
is addressed to him (…).’, of a Statute amending Article 57 § 2 ‘Organic Law of 8 
July 1976 on public centres for social welfare’, and did not (even could not) rule that 
social assistance must be granted to an illegally residing foreigner. The explanation 
in the report therefore seems to contradict the technical juridical working of the 
verdicts of the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, indeed the Legislature 
did amend the applicable legislation in line with the Court’s ruling, and since 
then, consequently, foreigners awaiting an appeal procedure against the refusal 
of their request for asylum were entitled to social benefits for this period.
In its List of Issues, the Committee on the Rights of the Child confirmed that 
Article 2 ICRC did not prohibit differences in treatment, ‘but only those which 
are based on grounds that are arbitrary and objectively unjustifiable, such as those 
enumerated in Article 2 (1), including nationality.’ The Committee therefore asked 
what the declaration ‘means in practice with respect to non-national children in 
Belgium.’1603 In its reply, Belgium repeated that Belgian law did not ‘grant the 
same rights to foreigners as to nationals or to different categories of foreigners’, but 
argued that this was not discriminate in the meaning of Article 2 ICRC ‘whenever 
the differences are based on grounds that are objective and reasonable.’1604 Belgium 
held that States decided for themselves under what conditions a foreigner was 
allowed to reside on their territory, ‘within the limits allowed by international law’. 
The fact that Belgium was also a Member State of the Fourth Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, recognising the freedom to leave any 
country, including ones own, did not change that principle, for ‘this right does 
not imply that a person may enter the territory of another country and remain there 
without permission.’ However, Belgium admitted that ‘the discretion allowed to States 
with regard to establishing rules governing admission and residence has for a long 
time been restricted by international conventions.’ Belgium then explained that the 
normal regulation on the admission, residence, establishment and expulsion of 
foreigners was not always applied, for not all foreigners had a so-called ‘normal’ 
status. There were categories of foreigners enjoying a more privileged status, 
1602 Constitutional Court, 51/94, 29 June 1994, B.S. 1994(07)(pp. 18551-18558); R.W. 1994(95)(pp. 356-
359).
1603 CRC/C/Q/BELG/2, 8 February 2002, part I, B.1.
1604 CRC/C/RESP/7, received on 3 May 2002, Section 1, B.1.
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such as EC and related nationals, nationals covered by agreements concluded 
between the EU and third countries, refugees, stateless persons, students, and 
other privileged foreigners. Then, Belgium clarified that, as a Member State of the 
ICRC, it ‘endeavours to avoid any discrimination with regard to children’, and reported 
that in case of a minor foreigner involving admission and residence, the ICRC is 
applied, ‘especially Articles 3 (best interest of the child), 8, 9, and 10 (preservation of 
the child’s identity, including nationality and family unity).’ Furthermore, in order to 
comply with the EU resolution of 26 June 1997,1605 and thereby protect foreign 
unaccompanied minors from human trafficking, a service memorandum was 
drafted by the Aliens Office, granting these children a protected status outside the 
‘normal’ asylum procedures. Also, it was underlined that in asylum procedures, 
minors were always heard in their mother tongue.1606
Interestingly, the Belgian reply mainly involves an explanation why Belgian law is 
not in contradiction with Article 2 ICRC, and initiatives to reduce discrimination 
regarding foreign children, or to improve their situation. However, it appears 
that the question what the practical effect of the interpretative declaration is, 
was not answered.
In response, naturally, the Committee expressed its concern in the Concluding 
Observations about the fact that Belgium did not intend to withdraw the declaration 
on Article 2 ICRC, and repeats that the Convention ‘prohibits differences in treatment 
on grounds that are arbitrary and objectively unjustifiable, including nationality.’ 
The Committee therefore ‘is concerned that the declaration on Article 2 may restrict 
the enjoyment of non-Belgian children of rights contained in the Convention’, and 
emphasised that the non-discrimination principle was applicable to ‘each child 
within (the State Party’s) jurisdiction.’1607
13.3.4.3 The combined third and fourth periodic report
During the reporting cycle of the combined third and fourth periodic report, the 
position of minor foreigners was extensively discussed. In the report and the NGO 
shadow-report, a clear distinction is made between the status of an unaccompanied 
and an accompanied foreign minor. This section is therefore subdivided into a 
sub-section on foreign minors in general, unaccompanied foreign minors, and 
accompanied foreign minors. Thereafter, since the position of foreign minors was 
discussed altogether into less detail in the List of Issues, during the sessions with 
the Committee, and the Concluding Observations, those parts of the reporting 
1605 Council Resolution 97/C 221/03 of 26 June 1997 on unaccompanied minors who are nationals of 
third countries.
1606 CRC/C/RESP/7, received on 3 May 2002, Section 1, B.1.
1607 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 6.
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process are discussed separately. Furthermore, a separate sub-section will be 
dedicated to the interpretative declaration on Article 2 ICRC.
Foreign minors in general
Belgium reported in its combined third and fourth periodic report that some 
alterations were made in the residence procedure of foreigners. A subsidiary 
protection was introduced, in line with EU law,1608 for foreigners who are no 
refugees, but are nevertheless considered to be in danger for serious reasons 
when a residence permit would be refused.1609 Also, in line with the case law of 
the Constitutional Court,1610 a foreigner cannot be refused residence in case of 
the medical impossibility of leaving the territory.1611
Regarding the position of foreign minors, Belgium reported in view of Article 3 
ICRC that ‘the interests of the child are always taken into consideration in any decision 
taken in relation to a foreign minor and pertaining access to the territory, residence, 
establishment and expulsion’.1612 Also, as mentioned in Section 13.3.3.3, improvement 
was reported regarding the entitlements to social benefits of children of illegally 
residing foreign parents: when the parents ‘are not fulfilling or are unable to fulfil 
their duty of care in relation to a foreigner under the age of 18 who is residing with 
them illegally. In those circumstances, the child will be able to benefit from material 
assistance that will be provided in a federal care centre. The presence in the care of 
persons who effectively exercise parental authority is also guaranteed.’1613 Also here, 
the effect of the case law of the Constitutional Court is recognisable.1614
Unaccompanied foreign minors
Regarding the specific situation of unaccompanied foreign minors, Belgium reported 
the establishment of the Guardianship Service,1615 ‘providing legal assistance to all 
unaccompanied minors in Belgium, by appointing to each of them a guardian’. The 
Guardian Service then determines ‘whether the minor meets the legal requirements 
1608 Council Directive 2004/83/EC, 29 April 2004, on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted. See for the definition in particular 
Article 2 (e) and (f).
1609 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 750-751.
1610 See especially the verdicts of the Constitutional Court, 90/99, 30 May 1999 and Constitutional Court 
194/2005, 21 December 2005.
1611 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 752.
1612 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 203.
1613 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 589.
1614 See especially the verdicts of the Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003, B.S. 4 November 
2003; and Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005, B.S. 8 August 2005, p. 34459.
1615 Programme Act of 24 December 2004, Title XIII, Chapter IV: Guardianship of unaccompanied 
foreign minors, B.S. 31 December 2004. Original title in Dutch: Programmawet van 24 december 2004; 
original title of Chapter: Voogdij over niet-begeleide minderjarige vreemdelingen.
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to benefit from the protection’, appoints a guardian to the minor who represents the 
minor in ‘all legal acts and procedures provided for under the legislation on access to 
the territory, residence, establishment and the removal of foreigners, and coordinates 
contacts with the authorities responsible for asylum and residence in regard to care 
and accommodation’, approves ‘guardians to secure the representatives of minors, 
coordinate and supervise the practical arrangements for guardians’, and ensures that 
‘a sustainable solution, in the young persons’ best interest, is sought’.1616 It is thus the 
task of a guardian to ‘assist the minor throughout all stages of the residence procedure, 
monitor care and school attendance, ensure that healthcare and psychological support 
are provided and act on the minor’s behalf in dealings with the bodies responsible for 
asylum-seeking and immigration. The Guardian must also submit to the Aliens Office 
a proposal for a sustainable solution.’1617
Furthermore, it was reported that when a minor is interviewed somewhere in 
the asylum procedure, special attention is given to the interviewing method, 
‘depending on the minor’s age, understanding and maturity’. A special questionnaire 
was introduced for unaccompanied foreign minors.1618
Regarding the reception of unaccompanied minors, Belgium introduced a two-stage 
reception system. The first stage lasts a maximum of two weeks (which may be 
extended once), during which the child is received in a general reception centre. 
The children will be identified ‘in order to channel them to the most appropriate 
reception facility’, and a Guardian will be appointed. During the second stage, the 
minor will be received in a collective facility for a period of 6 months to one year 
where 24 hours a day care is provided. Belgium reported the set up of two centres 
that take care of all unaccompanied minors. All the above then should put an end 
to holding unaccompanied minors in closed centres, except for exceptional cases 
in which the age of the person in question is under dispute.
However, the NGOs reported in their shadow-report that while the special reception 
centres for unaccompanied minors were indeed established, those centres were not 
suited for the youngest minors, or minors with health or other serious problems. 
Also, the capacity of these centres would have been exhausted, resulting in the 
frequent reception of unaccompanied minors in adult reception centres once 
again. In their report, the NGOs even stated that in some cases reception to 
unaccompanied minors is refused, and the minors have no access to any form of 
assistance. Furthermore, the NGOs express their concerns regarding the juridical 
status of the residence permit of unaccompanied foreign minors who did not request 
1616 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 728-732.
1617 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 733-145. During the sessions with the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child, concerns regarding the understaffing of the guardian services were raised by 
the Committee. See: CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Sections 58 (Mr Kotrane) and 59 (Mrs Lee in her 
capacity as chairperson).
1618 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 747.
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for asylum. While such minors are allowed to remain on Belgian territory, such 
a permit was not based on the Aliens Act, but on a circular of the Minister of the 
Interior, offering no legal certainty to the minors.1619 Also, the NGOs recommended 
the expansion of the reception facilities for minors, the adaption of the reception 
facilities for unaccompanied minors in line with their specific needs, and the 
granting of specialised care to some categories of extra vulnerable unaccompanied 
minors (such as pregnant minors, minors with children or minors with serious 
psychological problems). Furthermore, the NGOs recommended that a right for 
unaccompanied minors should be embedded in the Aliens Act, to remain on 
Belgian territory until a sustainable solution for the minor has been found. Also, 
decisions taken on the residence status should be taken by a committee of experts 
rather than by the Aliens Office, considering the best solution for the child. In 
addition, the NGOs recommended the draft of a cooperation agreement between 
the relevant authorities.1620
Accompanied foreign minors
Accompanied children however, may still be held in closed centres, in order to 
preserve and maintain the family unit. Belgium reported that since 2002, an effort 
was done to give the closed centres ‘a more humane face’ by organising recreational 
activities. ‘Children may, for example, attend courses and take part in recreational, 
cultural and sports activities’.1621
The NGOs however stated in their shadow report that children held in closed centres 
were mostly children accompanied by their parents who do not possess the required 
documents to access Belgian territory. They underlined that research showed that 
such reception was a traumatising experience for the child. Furthermore, the NGOs 
argued that the living conditions in these closed centres were not adapted to the 
presence of children: the food is often monotonous and inappropriate as a long-
term diet to children, there are no meaningful daily schedule and activities for 
children, healthcare is restricted to a minimum, and the children are not enrolled 
in school. The NGOs stressed that the situation regarding children who live on the 
streets with their parents are in even more precarious conditions and their rights 
are clearly violated: there is no housing, education nor quality access to the asylum 
procedure. The NGOs report on a distressing practice in which families receiving 
a negative decision on their asylum request were ordered to leave the reception 
centres, regardless of their right to social benefits in kind. It is my understanding 
1619 Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten 
van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 6, Section 2.
1620 Shadow-report of the NGOs on the implementation of the International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. Original title in Dutch: Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal 
Verdrag inzake de Rechten van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 
6, aanbevelingen (recommendations).
1621 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Section 774.
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that here the NGOs refer to the changes in Belgian law1622 as a result from the case 
law of the Constitutional Court regarding the matter. That is basically the case 
law starting from case 106/2003,1623 in which the Court decided that accompanied 
illegally residing children were entitled to social services in kind provided for at 
a reception centre, and case 131/2005,1624 in which the Court decided that these 
children had the right to be accompanied by their parents in the reception centre 
where the social services in kind were received (see more into detail: Sections 
12.5.4.1 and 12.5.4.2). In the opinion of the NGOs, the Belgian authorities are 
violating their own legislation with regard to the reception of aliens.1625
The NGOs were positive about a new initiative of the Belgian Government to 
establish the so-called ‘return homes (terugkeerwoningen)’, in which the families 
could reside for a period instead of a reception centre, and where the family is 
guided towards their return by a coach from the Aliens Office. However, the NGOs 
stated that such alternative for detention unfortunately was not available for all 
minors, and the coach was only then appointed when the family definitively had 
to leave the country.1626
In their report the NGOs recommended to put an end to the detention of children 
by legally banning all administrative detention of minors, to adopt more efficient 
measures to assure that every minor who has a right to social benefits effectively 
can be housed in a reception centre, and to assure the equal quality of such 
reception, regardless of the residence status or the family situation of the child. 
Furthermore, they recommended the Belgian Government to respect the child’s 
privacy and family life, to start with an integrated approach to assist families 
towards integration in society and guidance in the development of a realistic 
return perspective outside Belgium if that is in the best interest of the child, to 
assure that detention and transfer of families are done in a manner that is as 
humane as possible.1627 Also, in their Chapter on violence against children, the 
NGOs recommended to provide for alternate forms of reception to residential 
placement (in closed centres), especially due to the prevention of violence which 
is more likely to occur in a residential structure, against vulnerable groups of 
1622 Programme Act 9 January 2006, B.S. 30 December 2005.
1623 Constitutional Court, 106/2003, 22 July 2003.
1624 Constitutional Court, 131/2005, 19 July 2005.
1625 Shadow-report of the NGOs on the implementation of the International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. Original title in Dutch: Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal 
Verdrag inzake de Rechten van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 
6, Section 1.
1626 Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten 
van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 6, Section 1.
1627 Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten 
van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 6, Section 1.
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children (for instance children who are living in poverty, are illegally residing, 
are handicapped, or are in conflict with the law).1628
The written replies to the List of Issues on questions relating foreign 
minors
In its List of Issues, the Committee on the Rights of the Child asked Belgium 
to ‘indicate which categories of children do not have appropriate social and medical 
cover.’1629 In its reply, Belgium explained that ‘as regards coverage of medical costs 
through the compulsory health insurance system, to our knowledge no particular category 
of children is excluded from the system. Although children’s rights to reimbursement of 
health costs are most often exercised through their parents (enrolment as dependant), 
they can also be granted entitlement in their own right, if they are registered with the 
National Civil Register.’ However, Belgium explained that foreigners who are not 
authorised to remain on Belgian territory longer than three months would have 
no entitlements based on entry in the National Civil Register and consequently, 
some children would be excluded from the coverage of medical costs. Belgium 
added that with regard to unaccompanied foreign minors, ‘have enjoyed access to 
healthcare in their own right since 2009.’1630 However, reading between the lines, 
accompanied foreign children from illegally residing parents may find themselves 
excluded from the coverage of medical costs (except for urgent medical care, see 
Section 12.5.3).
The Flemish Government responded on the same question that its welfare policy 
focussed on the very young (under 14 years) unaccompanied foreign minors, a 
coordination agreement between the Federal Government and the Communities 
regarding their reception was under way, residential and non-residential capacity 
regarding the target group was expanded, further consultation with the Federal 
Government and the French Community regarding the reception and support of 
foreign minors were presumed, and several initiatives on informing unaccompanied 
foreign minors on their rights were mentioned. In addition, the Flemish Government 
stated in a rather obscure Section that ‘Health insurance now covers all foreign minors 
(…). To be eligible, they must fulfil the following criteria: have a guardian and attending 
school.’1631 Since the Section was written in a Section on unaccompanied foreign 
minors, and the guardian services were intended for this specific group of foreign 
minors, it is unclear whether the intention of the Flemish Government was to 
report that indeed ‘all’ foreign minors had access to health insurance.
1628 Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten 
van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 4, Section 4.
1629 CRC/C/BEL/Q/3-4, 8 March 2010, part I, question 9.
1630 CRC/C/BEL/Q/3-4/Add.1, 27 April 2010, part I, reply to Section 9 of the List of Issues. See for 
instance: http://www.kruispuntmi.be/vreemdelingenrecht/wegwijs.aspx?id=3985.
1631 CRC/C/BEL/Q/3-4/Add.1, 27 April 2010, part 1, reply to Section 9 of the List of Issues.
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Furthermore, the Committee asked to ‘indicate what problems affecting children 
the State Party considers to be priorities and in need of urgent attention with regard to 
the implementation of the Convention.’1632 Belgium replied that one of the future 
projects relating to children would be to ‘protect child asylum-seekers, unaccompanied 
foreigners and abused children’. Also, ‘a resolution on the protection of foreign minors 
adopted by the Senate on 21 January 2010 requests, inter alia, the Federal Government to 
establish a central database for automatic registration of unaccompanied foreign minors, 
provide them with better guidance and professional support, take all possible measures 
to permit the reunification of children with their parents, evaluate the Guardianship 
Act, and ease the administrative procedures for obtaining a residence permit.’1633
The sessions with the Committee on the Rights of the Child on foreign 
minors
During the sessions, the Belgian Delegation stated that unaccompanied minors 
‘had not been held in closed centres since the end of 2007’. This is contrary to the 
NGO shadow-report, in which the NGOs held that due to a lack of capacity, 
unaccompanied minors were still held in centres for adults or were refused any 
reception at all.1634 The Delegation underlined furthermore that families with 
children ‘that were in the State Party illegally had not been held in closed centres, but 
in repatriation centres where they received professional support, and the children could 
attend school. Thus, foreign children, whether accompanied or not, were no longer held 
in closed centres.’1635 The Committee however was not entirely convinced, and 
replied that ‘according to information before the Committee, there was a crisis within 
the reception centres and those centres were unable to care for many unaccompanied 
foreign minors. There were reports that those children were often detained by the police 
(…)’1636 The Belgian Delegation explained that the lack of capacity was due to an 
increase of asylum request of 40%, but additional budget was granted to the Agency 
for the Reception of Asylum-seekers. ‘With regard to the detention of unaccompanied 
minors, the information that Mrs Otiz had cited was not correct; minors were no longer 
detained in closed Centres.’ It is unclear whether this information referred to is the 
NGO shadow-report. However, it is obvious that the NGO shadow-report paints 
a very different picture on the matter compared to the official statements of the 
Belgian Government, in both the report and through their Delegation.
1632 CRC/C/BEL/Q/3-4, 8 March 2010, part I, question 11.
1633 CRC/C/BEL/Q/3-4/Add.1, 27 April 2010, part 1, reply to Section 11 of the List of Issues.
1634 Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten 
van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 6, Section 2.
1635 Mrs D’hondt, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Section 10.
1636 Mrs Otiz, CRC/C/SR.1523, 11 June 2011, Section 34.
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The Concluding Observations on foreign minors
In its Concluding Observations, the Committee on the Rights of the Child seems to 
doubt the statements of the Belgian Delegation concerning the type of reception 
of children. It expressed its concerns about the fact that unaccompanied minors 
may still be held in adult centres, and, in some cases, are excluded from any 
type of assistance, and recommended to ensure protection and assistance to all 
unaccompanied foreign minors, to ensure that all unaccompanied minors are 
appointed a guardian, to ensure that family reunification is dealt with in a positive, 
humane and expeditious manner, and to implement and accede to international 
law concerning stateless persons.1637 Also regarding accompanied minor aliens, 
the Committee was concerned about the fact that they are sometimes held in 
closed centres, and urged Belgium to ‘put an end to the detention of children in 
closed centres, create alternatives to detention for asylum-seeking families and take the 
necessary measures to urgently find temporary housing solutions for families whose 
asylum request has been rejected and who live on the streets.’1638 After all, the NGO 
shadow-report seems to have had its effect.
The Belgian Declaration on Article 2 ICRC
It is quite remarkable, especially bearing in mind the Concluding Observations on 
the second periodic report procedure,1639 that in the combined third and fourth 
periodic report no reference was made to the declaration on Article 2. The report 
mainly highlighted the equal treatment of foreigners and nationals in certain 
matters of family allowances and healthcare.1640
The NGOs reported in their shadow-report their concerns on the matter. The 
NGOs complained that they had no view on the current situation regarding the 
Declaration, and expressed their fear that no steps were taken to withdraw the 
Declaration.1641 It is remarkable that the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
did not address this issue in its List of Issues.1642
During the sessions with the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Country 
Rapporteur Mr Citarella welcomed the decision by the Sate Party to look again at 
its interpretative declaration on Article 2.1643 In this light, the Belgian Delegation 
stated that the declaration was ‘in accordance with the modern interpretation of 
1637 CRC/C/BEL/C/3-4, 18 June 2010, Sections 74-75.
1638 CRC/C/BEL/C/3-4, 18 June 2010, Sections 76-77.
1639 CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 6.
1640 CRC/C/BEL/3-4, 4 December 2009, Sections 152-158.
1641 Alternatief Rapport van de NGOs over de toepassing van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten 
van het Kind in België, 2010, available at: www.kinderrechtencoalitie.be, Chapter 1, Section 3.
1642 CRC/C/BEL/Q/3-4, 8 March 2010.
1643 Mr Citarella, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Section 14.
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that Article made by the Constitutional Court of Belgium and the European Court of 
Human Rights as well as with the jurisprudence of the Committee. The suggestion to 
withdraw that Declaration would be examined from a legal and political perspective, but 
it should be noted that a decision to rescind the Declaration could have consequences 
for the domestic Courts and that the same interpretative Declaration had been made 
in respect of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.’1644 
Again, the Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended in its Concluding 
Observations to withdraw the Declaration on Article 2.1645
13.3.5 Direct applicability of ECOSOC rights in the ICRC reports
13.3.5.1 The initial report
In its first periodic report, Belgium states that since the ICRC entered into force, 
‘there has been a trend in both the Legislature and the judicial practice towards 
compliance with the requirements of the convention in respect of, firstly, Article 12, 
and secondly, legislation on child labour.’1646 According to the report, the direct 
applicability of Article 12 ICRC was recognised by a judgment of the Court of 
Appeal of Mons (Bergen), resulting in an effective right of a minor to be heard 
in legal procedures.1647 This is the only reference to the direct effect of ICRC 
Provisions in the first report. Therefore, in its List of Issues, the Committee asked 
to ‘indicate to what extent the Provisions of the Convention other than Article 12 can 
be or have actually been invoked in Court.’1648
In its written replies, Belgium indeed referred to five Court cases in which ICRC 
Articles were invoked (Articles 3, 7, 9, and 14). Remarkably, one of the cases 
was the prejudicial ruling of the Constitutional Court on 14 July 1994.1649 In casu 
however, there were no parties who literally ‘invoked’ the Provisions of the ICRC. 
Besides the fact that this is not possible in a prejudicial ruling, in the original 
prejudicial question, the ICRC Provision was not even mentioned.1650 It is the 
Constitutional Court that eventually decided to take into consideration Articles 
1644 Mr Brauwers, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Section 30.
1645 CRC/BEL/CO/3-4, 18 June 2010, Section 10.
1646 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 3.
1647 CRC/C/11/Add.4, 6 September 1994, Section 5.
1648 CRC/C.9/WP.4, 17 February 1995, issue 3.
1649 Constitutional Court, 62/94, 14 July 1994.
1650 The Prejudicial Question was: ‘Does Article 319 § 4 of the Civil Code violate Articles 6 and 6a of the 
Constitution because, when the mother is in the impossibility to express her will, the Court is authorised, 
depending on its assessment of the interests of the child, to quash the recognition of a minor, not emancipated 
child by a man of whom it has not been established that he is not the biological father?’ Original text in 
Dutch: ‘Houdt artikel 319, § 4, van het Burgerlijk Wetboek een schending in van de artikelen 6 en 6bis van 
de Grondwet doordat het, wanneer de moeder in de onmogelijkheid is haar wil te kennen te geven, aan de 
rechtbank de bevoegdheid toekent om, afhankelijk van haar beoordeling van de belangen van het kind, de 
erkenning van een minderjarig, niet ontvoogd kind door een man van wie niet is aangetoond dat hij niet de 
biologische vader is, te vernietigen?’
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3 and 7 in its ruling, and thus, indirectly, the Provisions of the ICRC had some 
effect on the outcome of the case. However, on the other hand it seems somewhat 
excessive to speak of ICRC Provisions that were invoked in Court and considered 
to be directly applicable. In this light, it is remarkable that the Delegation would 
later, during the sessions, explain more about the particularities of the cases 
referred to in the report, except for this Constitutional Court ruling.
During the sessions with the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Belgian 
Delegation further explained in its opening statement how it was determined 
in the Belgian monistic system whether or not an international treaty Provision 
would have direct effect. As also discussed in Section 11.5, three conditions had 
to be fulfilled. The first was that the legal instrument is in force in international 
law. The second was that all national formalities required for legal effect should 
be fulfilled. In Belgium, this is basically the approval of the competent authorities 
(in case of the ICRC, this were the Federal Government and the Community 
Councils), ratification by the King, and promulgation in the official gazette. The 
third condition was that the content of the international instrument would meet 
certain criteria: the Provisions should have a legal purpose intended by the parties 
(a subjective criterion), and the instrument should indeed be self-executing in the 
sense that additional national legislation is not required (an objective criterion). 
The Belgian Delegation furthermore added that the Convention did not explicitly 
state that the Provisions should have direct effect in the national legal order of 
its Member States, and that therefore the Belgian Courts would have to decide 
whether a Provision would have direct effect, in the light of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties of 1969.1651 The Belgian Delegation continued to give more 
detailed information on the quoted Court cases in the written replies, and indeed 
demonstrated the direct effect of Articles 3, 12, 9 and 14 by referring to cases 
ruled by the Court of First Instance of Courtrai, the Ghent Court of Appeal and 
the Civil Court of Arlon and Liège. The Delegation held that ‘the examples cited 
showed a willingness by Courts to implement the Convention, as well as a high degree 
of judicial autonomy in applying its Provisions.’1652 As mentioned earlier, the ruling 
of the Constitutional Court (62/94) mentioned in the written replies however was 
not further discussed by the Delegation.
The Delegation furthermore pointed out that since the Franco-Suisse Le Ski ruling, 
it was clear that in Belgium international law had primacy over national law.1653
A curious thing is that the above was apparently understood by the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child that the entire Convention had direct effect in Belgium. In 
its Concluding Observations, the Committee wrote that it ‘welcomes the fact that 
1651 Mr Debrulle, CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Section 8-10.
1652 Mr Debrulle, CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Section 11-13.
1653 CRC/C/SR.222, 6 June 1995, Section 14. See also Section 11.5.
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the Convention is self-executing and that its Provisions may be, and in practice have 
been in several instances, invoked before the Court. It also notes with satisfaction the 
fact that Belgium applies the principles of the primacy of international human rights 
standards over national legislation in case of conflict of law.’1654
13.3.5.2 The second and combined third and fourth periodic report
Due to the conclusion of the Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding direct 
applicability of the Convention, it comes as no surprise that in the second and 
combined third and fourth periodic report, Belgium did not address the issue, nor 
did the Committee specifically ask questions on the matter in its List of Issues.
However, it was during the sessions with the Committee on the combined third 
and fourth report that the matter of direct applicability was discussed again. One 
of the Members of the Committee stated that ‘while, in theory, the Convention 
was directly applicable in Belgium, the Committee had heard of no cases in which 
participants in a trial, lawyers or judges had directly invoked it.’ The question was 
raised whether the Convention was sufficiently well known in judicial circles.1655 
The Delegation replied that although judges did not receive special training on 
the ICRC, training on certain child-related issues were offered to judges, barristers 
and lawyers. ‘With respect to the direct applicability of the Convention, the Court 
of Cassation, the Court of Arbitration (…) and the Council of State had given their 
views on several Articles of the Convention, including Articles 3 and 27, and all were 
considered to be directly applicable in Belgian Courts.’ A remarkable answer for 
several reasons. Firstly, technically the Constitutional Court is unable to apply 
international Provisions directly. Although it was demonstrated in Section 12.5 
that through indirect application ICRC Articles could have some effect in the case 
law of the Constitutional Court, the effect is very limited. Secondly, as discussed 
in Chapter 12 (Sections 12.3 and 12.4), considering the case law of the Council of 
State and the Court of Cassation, it is the rule that ICRC Articles have no direct 
effect. Only in some very rare occasions, the Court of Cassation has shown to 
grant some effect to ICRC Provisions. Thirdly, regarding the direct applicability 
of Article 3, at most it was recognised (but later also denied) by the Court of 
Cassation that the Provision could be used as a tool for interpretation of other 
Articles, but certainly had no direct effect. In addition, the direct applicability 
of Article 27 was never recognised by any Court in Belgium, and only indirectly 
applied by the Constitutional Court.
It is regrettable that here the discussion on the direct effect of the ICRC ends. No 
further questions were asked to the Delegations, and the Committee did not include 
any concern or recommendation on the matter in its Concluding Observations.
1654 CRC/C/15/Add.38, 20 June 1995, Section 6.
1655 Mr Kotrane, CRC/C/SR.1521, 10 June 2010, Section 21.
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13.4 The CEDAW reports
13.4.1 Introduction
Also during the reporting cycles on the implementation of the CEDAW, the federal 
structure (Section 14.4.2), the direct applicability of CEDAW Provisions (Section 
14.4.4) and the rights of migrant women (Section 14.4.5) were discussed. The 
right to food was hardly addressed as a separate issue, which is not a real surprise, 
considering the wordings of Article 12 CEDAW (Section 14.4.3).
The initial report has not been published in the currently used official databases, 
neither by the UN nor by the Belgian Government. Considering the quality, 
briefness and lack of detailed information of the second periodic report, it is not 
to be expected that any information of significance will be found in the initial 
report, dating back from 1987.1656 Therefore, the initial report was not included 
in the analysis below.
13.4.2 The Federal Structure
Also in the reporting procedures of the CEDAW, the federal structure was more 
than once food for discussion, and on several occasions Belgium needed to offer 
clarifications on the matter.1657 For instance, during the sessions on the combined 
third and fourth report, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women stated that ‘the complex structure of 
the federal system, with its different levels of authority each having competence in the 
separate regions, could appear to be a way of derogating from the implementation.’1658 
The Delegation answered that ‘the federal State and federated entities had different 
jurisdictions, although there were some split jurisdictions in some areas. The system 
in place allowed the various authorities to meet the specific needs and priorities of the 
different communities and regions.’1659
13.4.3 The right to food in the CEDAW reports
The right to food or food-related issues were seldom mentioned as a separate issue 
during the reporting procedures. Regarding most ECOSOC rights enshrined in the 
CEDAW, the Belgians mostly held that there was no gender based discrimination 
concerning these Provisions, in particular Article 12.
1656 CEDAW/C/5/Add.53, 25 September 1987.
1657 See for instance: Mrs Abaka, CEDAW/C/SR.560, 20 December 2002 (summary record on second 
periodic report), Section 31; CEDAW/C/BEL/3-4, 29 September 1998, on Article 3 (combined third and 
fourth periodic report); CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, p. 4.
1658 Mrs Kapalata, CEDAW/C/SR.559, 25 June 2005, Section 51.
1659 Mrs Paternottre, CEDAW/C/SR.559, 25 June 2005, Section 58.
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It must be said that the second periodic report is rather limited, especially 
concerning ECOSOC rights.1660 This was also noted by the Committee, which stated 
that ‘the report could, however, have been more specific with regard to the information 
provided under certain Articles of the Convention.’1661 This was also expressed in the 
Concluding Observations, in which the lack of factual information as occasionally 
considered to be a principal subject of concern,1662 and improvement on the 
matter was recommended.1663
The combined third and fourth is indeed much more detailed. On Article 12, no 
food-related issues were reported. Naturally, considering the wordings of Article 
12, there was a focus on initiatives in the field of healthcare, education and 
awareness-raising on healthcare issues and the combatting of specific diseases, 
such as specific forms of cancer and osteoporosis. Also, the Belgian regulations 
on voluntary abortion were discussed.1664
In its fifth and sixth combined report, Belgium reports even more extensively 
and into detail on the implementation of the CEDAW rights. Food-related issues 
are also here however seldom discussed. On the implementation of Article 12, 
Belgium mainly reports at the federal level on measures favourable to women 
regarding healthcare, studies on health, conducted by the Institute for the Equality 
of Women and Men and provides figures and statistics regarding the health of 
Belgian women.1665 Also on the federated level, a variety of initiatives is discussed 
in the field of healthcare.1666 Noteworthy detail in the report is the fact that 
women are considered to be a specific target group concerning food security in 
development cooperation of Flanders with their partner countries.1667
13.4.4 Direct applicability of ECOSOC rights in the CEDAW reports
In its second periodic report, Belgium stated that the Provisions of the CEDAW 
were for a major part already effectively guaranteed in Belgium, due to already 
existing international instruments and domestic legislation. Furthermore, Belgium 
argued that it ‘was already implementing the general Provisions of the Convention well 
before ratifying it and that the national law in force at the time did not require much 
amendment following the entering into force of the Convention.’1668 Then, Belgium 
underlined that ‘this was due to the Belgian legislative system, which gives international 
1660 CEDAW/C/BEL/2, 8 April 1993, especially Articles 10-14. The shortest explanation was on Article 
13, merely stating that: ‘there is no discrimination in these fields.’
1661 CEDAW/C/SR.301, 6 February 1996, Section 9.
1662 A/51/38, 9 May 1996, Section 185.
1663 A/51/38, 9 May 1996, especially Section 189.
1664 CEDAW/C/BEL/3-4, 29 September 1998, on Article 12.
1665 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, pp. 109-112.
1666 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, pp. 113-117.
1667 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, p. 75.
1668 CEDAW/C/BEL/2, 8 April 1993, Article 1.
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law precedence over national law; indeed, in most of the areas covered by the Convention 
a large number of international instruments, United Nations conventions, International 
Labour Organisation conventions, Council of Europe conventions and Directives of 
the European Economic Community had almost completely eliminated discrimination 
against women in the country.’1669 A rather obscure Section in which an unclear 
causal link was made between existing national legislation and directly applicable 
international law.
Regarding CEDAW case law, the Belgian Delegation explained during the sessions 
with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, that 
the case law on discrimination against women ‘mainly concerned rights relating 
to employment and social security.’ Also, an increase of cases concerning sexual 
harassment was observed. The Delegation pointed out that Belgian judges 
increasingly use their authority ‘to bring preliminary issues before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.’1670 No reference was made however to case law in 
which any of the CEDAW Provisions was invoked. The Delegation furthermore 
discussed the implementation of non-discrimination Provisions in Belgian law, 
especially in its Constitution: Articles 10 and 11.1671 Exceptions to the principle 
of non-discrimination were only permitted when ‘based on objective criteria and 
precise rules formulated as laws following broad consultations with institutional and 
other partners. Their purpose was to permit certain territorial adaptations in the 
organisation of the principles recognised in the Constitution; the principles themselves 
could not be changed.’ Moreover, they must be adopted by a two-third majority 
of all linguistic groups in the Parliament and the Senate, ‘to ensure that the laws 
enacted for such purposes reflected the wishes of a large part of the population.’1672
In its Concluding Observations, the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women did not address the issue.1673
In the combined third and fourth periodic report, no reference was made to the 
issue of direct effect, except for one remark of the Delegation during the sessions 
with the Committee. The Delegation stated that ‘under Belgian law, an international 
instrument to which Belgium was a party could indeed be invoked in a Court of law. It 
fell to the judge, however, to determine whether the Provisions were sufficiently precise 
to allow for their application under domestic law. Although the Convention had been 
found to be directly applicable, there were other instruments for which this was not the 
case.’1674 A remarkable statement, since this does not appear from the case law 
analysis of Chapter 12. During the sessions, the Delegation’s observation that the 
1669 CEDAW/C/BEL/2, 8 April 1993, Article 1.
1670 Mrs Paternottre, CEDAW/C/SR.300, 1 February 1996, Section 11.
1671 CEDAW/C/BEL/2, 8 April 1993, Article 1.
1672 Mrs Paternottre, CEDAW/C/SR.300, 1 February 1996, Section 8.
1673 A/51/38, 9 May 1996.
1674 Mrs Paternottre, CEDAW/C/SR.559, 25 June 2005, Section 32.
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CEDAW was directly applicable in the domestic legal order was not substantiated 
with any further arguments or case law. Nor did the Committee pay any attention 
to the matter.
Also in the combined fifth and sixth periodic report, no reference was made to 
the issue of direct effect. However, in its List of Issues, the Committee asked 
whether there are ‘instances of any Article of the Convention having been directly 
invoked before the Courts given that in Belgium, it is generally recognised that an 
international Provision produces direct effects? Please provide examples of any pertinent 
case law.’1675 In its written replies, Belgium answered that ‘Two conditions must be 
met if a Provision of international law is to have direct effect in Belgian law. Firstly, the 
intention of the parties must have been to create rights for private persons. Secondly, the 
Provision in question must be sufficiently precise and complete to be directly applicable 
in the domestic Courts without the need for an execution measure. Such matters are 
generally dealt with in case law. Hence, it is generally accepted that the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have direct effect.’ Nevertheless, Belgium had 
to admit that ‘a perusal of Belgian case law suggests that litigants have not invoked 
the CEDAW Convention, but rely more on other Provisions of Belgian law or European 
law relating to discrimination between women and men.’1676 This was reconfirmed 
by the Delegation during the sessions.1677 In its Concluding Observations, the 
Committee expressed its concern about the fact ‘that the Convention has not been 
given central importance as a binding human rights instrument and as a basis for 
the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and the advancement of 
women in the State Party. In this connection, the Committee is concerned about the 
absence of direct reliance on the Convention by litigants, lawyers and judges, although 
its Provisions are in principle directly applicable.’1678
13.4.5 The rights of migrant women
In the second periodic report, no significant information was given on the status 
of foreign women in relation to the rights embedded in the CEDAW. Therefore, 
in its Concluding Observations, the Committee recommended to include in the 
next periodic report information on ‘Programmes and projects to address the needs 
of migrant women and other vulnerable women should be made available in the next 
report.’
However, in the combined third and fourth periodic report, hardly any reference 
was made to the position of foreign women either. Briefly, a reference was made 
1675 CEDAW/C/BEL/Q/6, 6 March 2008, Section 4.
1676 CEDAW/C/BEL/Q/6/Add.1, p. 5.
1677 Mrs Fastre, CEDAW/C/SR.853, 7 January 2009, Section 22; Mrs Grisard, CEDAW/C/SR.853, 26 
December 2008, Section 8.
1678 CEDAW/C/BEL/CO/6, 7 November 2008, Section 17.
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in view of Article 6 CEDAW to social measures on behalf of trafficking victims: ‘A 
system of temporary stay permits for victims has been instituted: victims are allowed 
a stay of 45 days in order to seek counselling and assistance from specialised social 
agencies before returning to their country of origin, and a renewable three-month 
stay permit is issued to victims who bring a complaint and cooperate with the justice 
system in the course of a judicial inquiry. Victims who have a temporary stay permit 
are entitled to social assistance.’1679 Furthermore, it was reported that the number 
of foreign prostitutes is on the rise.1680 The absence of detailed information on 
the status of migrant women was noticed by the Committee, which requested 
during the sessions, in the next report, for more statistics on migrant women.1681 
The Belgian Delegation replied that ‘with regard to the right to stay in Belgium, its 
Government applied the 1951 Geneva Convention in a broad manner. Refugee women 
could be granted political asylum on account of their sex, but there had to be reasonable 
grounds of fear of persecution. In 2000, 45 per cent of the applications for asylum had 
been granted, out of which 35 per cent were for women. Belgium not only penalised 
genital mutilation but also granted asylum for that reason. Once asylum-seekers had 
been granted asylum and had been recognised as refugees, they enjoyed rights on a par 
with Belgian citizens. Moreover, Belgium applied, by and large, the principle of family 
reunion.’1682 Also, the Delegate of the Flemish Community further explained the 
several responsibilities of the Community regarding the reception of migrants.1683 
In its Concluding Observations the Committee once again expressed its concern 
‘that the report provides insufficient information about the situation of migrant and 
refugee women’, and therefore ‘calls on the State Party to provide comprehensive 
information on these groups of women in its next periodic report.’1684
Finally, in its combined fifth and sixth periodic report, Belgium discussed in more 
detail the situation of migrant women. In particular, it is reported that when a 
women is the victim of sexual violence or acts directed against persons by reason 
of their sex, or against children, this is taken into consideration by the Asylum 
Courts when deciding on an asylum request.1685 Furthermore, two coordinators 
had been designated by the Office for Aliens to pay specific attention to ‘those 
requesting asylum with reference to the problem of gender.’ Also, women are specifically 
informed on asylum procedures, and are, as much as possible, questioned by female 
investigators during those procedures.1686 In addition, an information focus point 
on gender-related problems was installed at the General Commissariat for Refugees 
1679 CEDAW/C/BEL/3-4, 29 September 1998, on Article 6 (in particular, p. 44).
1680 CEDAW/C/BEL/3-4, 29 September 1998, on Article 6 (in particular, p. 46).
1681 Mrs Acar, in her capacity as chairperson, CEDAW/C/SR.559, 25 June 2005, Section 53.
1682 Mrs Verzele, CEDAW/C/SR.559, 25 June 2005, Section 66.
1683 Mrs Franken, CEDAW/C/SR.560, 20 December 2002, Section 8
1684 A/57/38 part II, 8 October 2002, Sections 155-156.
1685 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, pp. 23-24.
1686 This was later discussed during the sessions: Mr Flinterman, CEDAW/C/SR.852, 7 January 2009, 
Section 18, in response: Mrs Fastre, Section 35. See also the Committee’s Concluding Observations: 
CEDAW/C/BEL/CO/6, 7 November 2008, Sections 36 and 37.
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and Stateless Persons.1687 Belgium provided statistics on asylum requests, and 
informed (almost proudly) that significantly more women than men were granted 
a residence permit.1688 Regarding the reception of asylum-seekers, Belgium stated 
that ‘During the first phase of the procedure for requesting asylum, those requesting 
asylum receive material assistance only sufficient for meeting their basic needs. Care 
is provided either in large care centres or in individual residences. In addition to 
housing and food, those requesting asylum receive social and administrative support 
as well as medical care. They may take part in a large variety of leisure, educational, 
and sports activities.’1689 Then, Belgium reported on the capacity and gender of 
the personnel charged with providing care to asylum-seekers, the materials and 
infrastructure available for female asylum-seekers1690 and activities they can 
participate in.1691 Also on the federated level, the position of migrant women 
was (briefly) discussed.1692 During the sessions, the Belgian Delegation further 
elaborated on its asylum procedures.1693
13.5 The Universal Periodic Review
Although the right to adequate food has not been significantly discussed during the 
reporting cycle of the UPR, the federal structure,1694 the right to social security,1695 
the Belgian asylum policy,1696 and the rights of the child1697 were discussed, 
touching similar aspects compared to the treaty reports and subsequent procedures.
13.6 Concluding remarks
To conclude, some observations can be made. In general, firstly Belgium seems 
to prefer to report on initiatives, policies and changes in legislation that lead to a 
better implementation of the human rights instruments discussed, but is cautious 
1687 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, pp. 24-25.
1688 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, p. 25.
1689 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, p. 26.
1690 According to the report (CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, p. 27): ‘ (a) in a standard package of monthly 
materials, women receive items of feminine hygiene and tampons. Deodorant and razors are furnished upon 
request; (b) women have access to contraceptives through the medical services at the care centres; (c) restrooms 
for women are separated from those for men; (d) recreational halls are created for women and their children; 
(e) in certain centres, women have a special room for watching television; (f) in large care centres, women are 
housed in special wings; (g) women are questioned regarding their needs with respect to infrastructure and 
materials, and, whenever possible, their needs are met; (h) certain centres provide a room for ironing that is 
only accessible to women; similarly, certain Centres provide kitchen stoves, sewing rooms, or beauty salons 
exclusively for women.’
1691 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, p. 27.
1692 CEDAW/C/BEL/6, 22 June 2007, p. 33 (Flemish Region and Community), p. 43 (Walloon Region), 
p. 46 (German-speaking Community).
1693 Mrs De Ruyck, CEDAW/C/SR.852, 7 January 2009, Section 36.
1694 A/HRC/WG.6/11/BEL/1, 16 February 2011, Sections 2-7.
1695 A/HRC/WG.6/11/BEL/1, 16 February 2011, Sections 34-36.
1696 A/HRC/WG.6/11/BEL/1, 16 February 2011, Sections 43-53.
1697 A/HRC/WG.6/11/BEL/1, 16 February 2011, Sections 54-59.
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in reporting on points for improvement. Therefore, with the exception of some 
of the ICRC reports,1698 the Committee more than once considers the submitted 
reports as incomplete.1699
Secondly, Belgium hardly reported on the right to food as a separate issue, except for 
once, on the request of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,1700 
in its fourth periodic report on the implementation of the ICESCR.1701 Issues that 
relate to the right to adequate food are however discussed more extensively, such 
as the right to social security, the right to healthcare, and the position of foreigners 
in relation with entitlements to social benefits.
With regard to the last categories, it must be concluded thirdly, that the Committees 
are often concerned about the principle not to grant illegally residing aliens 
adequate social benefits. Of course, especially regarding children, there are plenty 
of exceptions to that principle, although the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
seems hardly convinced that the position of illegally residing (unaccompanied or 
accompanied) children is in accordance with the rights stipulated in the ICRC.
Fourthly, it seems that the complex federal structure of Belgium causes difficulties in 
the communication between the Government and the treaty bodies. The Committees 
are often concerned that the federal structure stands in the way of a uniform, 
coherent approach towards the implementation of the human rights embedded 
in the treaties. Also, the complexity leads occasionally to misunderstandings, 
especially regarding the issue of direct applicability. In particular, the function 
of the Constitutional Court is not always clear amongst the Committees, and the 
Belgian Government does not hesitate to refer to its case law to demonstrate that 
certain Provisions are directly applicable in Belgium. Those are questionable 
statements, considering the fact that the Courts of Last Instance in the subjective 
litigation usually rule otherwise, and that the Constitutional Court at most grants 
some indirect effect to international Provisions.
In this light, fifthly, regarding the case law in Belgium, the Delegations seem to 
be poorly informed on what actually happens with regard to the assessment on 
direct applicability amongst the Belgian Courts. It is completely unclear how the 
Belgian Delegation in the sessions on the combined third and fourth report on the 
implementation of the CEDAW could conclude that the entire CEDAW had direct 
effect in the national legal order.1702 It is also unclear how it is possible that both 
1698 See for instance: CRC/C/15/Add.178, 13 June 2002, Section 2.
1699 See for instance: E/C.12/BEL/CO/3, 4 January 2008, Section 9; see also the frequent requests of the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women for data on the position 
of migrant women, as discussed in Section 14.4.5.
1700 Mrs Bonoan-Dandan, E/C.12/2007/SR.42, 10 December 2007, Section 39.
1701 See in particular: E/C.12/BEL/4, 18 June 2012, Sections 244-246.
1702 Mrs Paternottre, CEDAW/C/SR.559, 25 June 2005, Section 32.
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the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child were led to believe that the entire ICRC had direct effect 
in Belgium.1703 It is even more remarkable that Belgium, whether or not through 
its Delegations, did nothing to correct, or even confirmed this understanding.1704 
Furthermore, the cases referred to are not always portrayed in their proper context, 
painting an overly positive picture, while this is certainly not a proper reflection 
of legal reality.1705
Sixthly, Belgium made an interpretative Declaration to Article 2 ICRC, declaring 
that non-discrimination on grounds of national origins does not necessarily imply 
the obligation for States to automatically guarantee foreigners the same rights as 
their nationals. Apparently the Committee on the Rights of the Child does not 
necessarily oppose to such reasoning, and even confirmed that Article 2 ICRC 
does not prohibit, under strict conditions, a difference in treatment.1706 While the 
Committee is wondering what then for Belgium could possibly be the reason for 
not withdrawing the Declaration, Belgium persists, although without explaining 
why.1707 It is furthermore remarkable that a similar interpretative declaration on 
the ICESCR did not lead to any discussion at all.
1703 See: CRC/C/15/Add.38, 20 June 1995, Section 6 and Mr Ahmed, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 
2000, Section 34.
1704 See for instance during the sessions on the third periodic report on the implementation of the 
ICESCR: Mr Deneve, E/C/12/2000/SR.64, 27 November 2000, Section 38.
1705 See: CRC/C/83/Add.2, 25 October 2000, Section 30.
1706 CRC/C/Q/BELG/2, 8 February 2002, part I, B.1.
1707 Most obviously: CRC/C/RESP/7, received on 3 May 2002, Section 1, B.1.
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14.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, the findings of Chapters 11-13 will be summarised. Furthermore, 
the legal practice in Belgium will be compared with the reporting behaviour 
of the Belgian Government on the enforceability of the right to adequate food 
(Comparison II).
14.2  The legal practice of Belgium regarding the 
enforceability of the rights of the child
Due to differences in language, culture and economy, Belgium has, since its 
profound State reforms in 1970, a rather complex trias politica, with a Legislature 
consisting of three legislative powers, equally and exclusively competent. This 
had an effect on the organisation of the Judiciary, culminating in the instalment 
of the Constitutional Court. The Belgian Judiciary seems organized, based on 
purpose and functionality, rather than pragmatic considerations. The organisation 
is complex. On the one hand there is a subjective contentieux, with two Courts of 
last instance (the Court of Cassation and the Council of State), and on the other 
hand an objective contentieux, with two highest tribunals (the Council of State 
and the Constitutional Court).
While the difference between both litigations may increasingly become less 
important for the parties involved in a Court case, since the legal effects of the 
verdicts seems to ‘merge’ rather than remain of a principally different nature, 
the judicial organisation has a strong effect on the legal reasoning of the Courts. 
Belgium is a monistic State, which follows not directly from the Constitution, 
bur from case law of the Court of Cassation. This means that in principle, an 
international standard is superior to a contradicting (anterior and posterior) 
national rule, as long as the international rule has direct effect. Besides some 
formal prerequisites, an international standard has direct effect when the State 
Parties involved expressed the intention that the standard should have direct 
effect, mostly recognisable when the standard is addressed to citizens and not to 
States (the subjective criterion) and/or when the standard invoked is self-executing 
(the objective criterion). Neither the Court of Cassation nor the Council of State 
appear to have recognised the direct effect of the right to adequate food, and as 
a rule, with some minor, seemingly random, exceptions, consider that ICESCR 
and ICRC Provisions have no direct effect. There is hardly any case law on (the 
direct effect of) CEDAW Articles.
However, the Constitutional Court is not bound by the principle of direct effect 
due to its primary function to review national legislation against the Constitution. 
As a result, international standards are only indirectly applied, via Articles 10, 
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11, and 24 CA, and later also via all other rights stipulated in Chapter II CA. The 
‘school-pact’ prompted the Legislature to broaden the reviewing competencies of the 
Constitutional Court. It is now authorized not only to settle conflicts between the 
three legislative powers, but also to review national legislation against fundamental 
rights. This is also reflected in the case law of the Court. The first rulings in 
which the Court indirectly reviewed against internationally embedded ECOSOC 
rights concerned Article 13 ICESCR. Only later, the Court also reviewed (mostly 
indirectly) against other ECOSOC provisions, including articles stipulating the 
right to adequate food.
Right to food Provisions, and other related ECOSOC rights embedded in UN 
treaties, mostly play a role in cases concerning the status of illegally residing 
aliens. In most cases, in both annulment procedures and preliminary rulings, the 
Court reviewed Article 57 § 2 of the ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centres 
for social welfare.’ This Provision restricts social benefits entitlements of illegally 
residing asylum seekers to urgent medical care only. The Court assessed whether 
this restriction, in light of the invoked fundamental rights, was objectively and 
reasonably justified, and proportionate towards a legitimate goal. The basic principle 
seems to be that it is the legitimate purpose of Belgium to restrict immigration, 
and that therefore it is not unreasonable to accept different obligations regarding 
the needs of legally residing persons in Belgium on the one hand and illegally 
residing persons on the other hand. That is to say that Article 11 ICESCR cannot 
reasonably be understood without limitations, and therefore, does not apply to 
persons Belgium is not responsible for, such as illegally residing aliens. In a series 
of rulings, the Court has further specified and nuanced this notion. Occasionally 
the Court allows for exceptions from this rule. In particular, the rights of the 
child usually seem to have more effect than rights stipulated in the ICESCR. In 
general, in line with its function, the Court shows little hesitation in nullifying 
legislation, or advising in preliminary proceedings that a Constitutional norm is 
violated, when it considers the disputed national legislation not objectively and 
reasonably justified, and/or a disproportionate means to reach a justified goal. 
Therefore, verdicts of the Constitutional Court often resulted in amendments 
to legislation, or the adoption of new regulations. However, while international 
Provisions in this case law are often reviewed against indirectly, no evidence 
could be found that those provisions made any difference of significance towards 
the outcome of the rulings on top of the – mostly equivalent – invoked national 
provisions. This is due to the ‘inward’ focus of the case law, involving mainly an 
assessment of national legislation and policies.
14.3  The reporting behaviour of Belgium on the 
enforceability of the right to adequate food
In its reports, Belgium seems to prefer to communicate initiatives, policies and 
legal measures that positively contribute to the implementation of human rights. 
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The reports show little self-evaluation or self-critique. The right to food is seldom 
addressed as a right in itself. Instead the Government seems to focus on related 
rights such as the right to healthcare, the right to social security, and more in 
particular, the position of foreigners in relation with entitlements to social benefits. 
Regarding the latter, the Committees often express concern. In particular they do 
not seem to be convinced that withholding rights based on the status of illegally 
residing foreigners, is compatible with the relevant human rights treaties, especially 
not in case of accompanied and unaccompanied children.
Furthermore, the complexity of the Belgian federal structure seems to be a reason 
for concern. The Committees regularly question whether Belgium is capable of a 
uniform and consistent approach in implementing human rights. It also leads to 
misunderstandings, especially regarding the issue of direct effect in combination 
with the function of the Constitutional Court. The delegations underline the 
direct effect of international ECOSOC provisions by referring to case law of the 
Constitutional Court. However, they fail to point out that this is at odds with the 
case law of the Court of Cassation and the Council of State. It appears that more 
than once, the impression is created that international human rights treaties, 
such as the ICRC and the CEDAW, have direct effect in the national legal order, 
even though this is contrary to the legal practice. The Committees seem to be 
poorly informed on the Belgian constitutional system. They do not really address 
the issue in-depth. The Belgian Government on the other hand is reluctant in 
correcting those misunderstandings.
14.4  Comparing the legal practice with the reporting 
behaviour
Considering the above, it must be concluded that the Belgian reports on the 
enforceability of the ICESCR, the ICRC and the CEDAW hardly match legal reality. 
Indeed, the complex federal structure, especially regarding the organisation of 
the Judiciary, in combination with the Committees’ lack of knowledge of Belgian 
constitutional law, seems to lead to misunderstandings and inaccurate assumptions. 
Legal practice shows that ECOSOC rights in general, with some rare exceptions, 
do not have direct effect in the subjective contentieux. Nevertheless, in several 
reporting cycles it was suggested or assumed that the both ICRC and CEDAW do 
in their entirety have direct effect. Interestingly, the case law of the Constitutional 
Court is often invoked by Belgium to demonstrate the direct effect of international 
human rights provisions, or to paint a positive picture on the implementation 
of treaty provisions, while such examples seem inaccurate, for there is at most a 
little indirect effect for the international provisions. In addition, its added value 
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15. Conclusions
15.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, the Dutch and Belgian legal practices will be compared to one 
another (comparison I), and also with the UN perception of enforceability of the 
right to food (comparison III). In doing so, an answer will be given to the main 
research question: What legal factors explain the differences and similarities regarding 
the response of the Dutch and Belgian Judiciary and Government to the enforceability 
of the right to adequate food in view of the UN human rights system?
Section 15.2 will compare the Dutch and Belgian monism, for it is in this context 
that the Judiciaries have to operate. Section 15.3 will compare their case law on 
the right to food, while in Section 15.4 their reporting behaviour will be compared. 
In Section 15.5 the national legal practice of the Netherlands and Belgium will be 
compared with the tertium comparationis: the UN perception of the enforceability 
of the right to adequate food. Then, in Section 15.6, the findings will be traced 
back to the model as discussed in Chapter 2: the functional method based on 
equivalent functionalism and on an epistemology of constructive functionalism. 
Finally, in Section 15.7, some concluding remarks will be made.
15.2 Dutch and Belgian monism compared
The Constitutional context in which a Judiciary operates naturally influences 
the way domestic Courts respond to the enforceability of the right to adequate 
food. Both the Netherlands and Belgium could be classified as a monistic system 
regarding the way in which international standards have effect in the domestic 
legal order. Also, both countries have limited the monistic effect to those standards 
that fulfil certain formal and substantive requirements. The formal prerequisites 
in both countries are that the standard, after being ratified by the Legislature, 
must have been published (Article 93 Dutch CA, Article 190 Belgian CA). In both 
countries, the formalities usually do not play a decisive role in assessing whether 
a standard is enforceable in the domestic legal order. Instead, the substantive 
requirements are of more importance. In the Netherlands and Belgium, a standard 
must have direct effect to be invoked in Court (the Dutch Constitution refers to 
this as standards that are ‘binding on all persons’). At this point, the similarities 
mostly end.
In the Netherlands, Article 93 and 94 CA1708 regulate the supremacy of international 
standards over national standards under the (strict) condition that they must be 
1708 It must be noted here, that it could be debated whether or not Dutch monism follows directly 
from Articles 93 and 94 CA (see in this light especially the viewpoints expressed in: M.C. Burkens, 
H.R.B.M. Kummeling, B.P. Vermeulen and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven, Beginselen van de Democratische 
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binding on all persons, while in Belgium, this is not regulated by Constitution, but 
rather follows from the case law of the Court of Cassation (basically the Franco-
Suisse Le Ski ruling).1709
In the Netherlands, it seems to be unclear what exactly is regulated by Articles 
93 and 94, especially regarding the question who eventually determines by what 
criterion whether or not an international standard is directly applicable. While 
both the Legislature and the Judiciary understand the Constitutional Provisions 
thus that it is the Judiciary who has a final say, especially because this is stipulated 
in Article 94 CA, there seems to be a profound role for the Legislature on the 
matter. After analysing literature and Parliamentary History, it can be concluded 
that the Legislature, throughout the years, explicitly expressed its view on the 
direct applicability of international human rights Provisions, and expects that 
the Judiciary takes its view into serious consideration while ruling on the direct 
applicability of an international standard. However, there seems to be a difference 
in hierarchy and nature of the criterion used by the Courts as portrayed in on the 
one hand literature, Parliamentary History, and occasionally the Courts themselves, 
and on the other hand, legal reality. Strong evidence could be found that in the 
assessment whether an international Provision stipulating an ECOSOC right has 
direct effect, the Courts generally follow the lead of the Legislature. Only in the 
absence of a clear view of the Legislature on the direct effect, the Courts seem 
to consider the nature, content and wordings of the Provision. This resulted in 
a rather blunt distinction between on the one hand civil and political rights that 
may have direct effect, an on the other hand, economic, social and cultural rights, 
that are not directly applicable.
In Belgium, the matter of direct effect is dealt with only by the Courts and tribunals 
operating in the subjective litigation.1710 The Courts seem to randomly apply an 
objective criterion and/or a subjective criterion to determine whether or not an 
international Provision has direct effect. The subjective criterion encompasses 
the question whether or not it was the intention of the State Parties to adopt a 
standard that has direct effect, which is mostly demonstrated by the addressee of 
the Provision (either citizens or States). The objective criterion encompasses the 
rechtstaat, inleiding tot de grondslagen van het Nederlandse staats- en bestuursrecht (5e druk), Deventer: 
Tjeenk Willink, 2001). What is obvious however, after analysing the Parliamentary History on the 
various Constitutional reforms, is that it was the intention of the Legislator to regulate the supremacy of 
international standards over national standards by Constitution. Since this is the most important effect 
of monism, the discussion whether monism in itself follows from the Constitution or from earlier case 
law (for instance, the ‘Grenstractaat Aken’ ruling; see: Supreme Court, 3 March 1919, NJ 1919, p. 371), 
seems to be only of theoretical relevance here.
1709 Court of Cassation, 27 May 1971, arresten van het Hof van Cassatie, 1971 (p. 959).
1710 Although the Constitutional Court only considers itself competent in reviewing against international 
Provisions that have no direct effect since 2002 (Constitutional Court, 41/2002, 20 February 2002), 
and only reviewed against international standards that are directly applicable in the period 1990-2002 
(Constitutional Court, 18/90, 23 May 1990).
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question whether a standard is self-executing, and thus no further clarification in 
national legislation is required. The Constitutional Court holds a special position in 
the Belgian Constitutional context. Installed in the first place to rule in competence 
matters between the three equal legislative powers, the Court evolved into a true 
Constitutional Court, and is competent in reviewing national legislation against 
the Constitution. Firstly, the Court ruled against Articles 10, 11, and 24 CA, but 
used Articles 10 and 11 CA in a creative way, and consequently reviewed via those 
Articles, indirectly, against the other fundamental rights enshrined elsewhere in 
the Constitutional Act, but also against Articles stipulating International Human 
Right. Later, the Constitutional Court’s competences were broadened in line with 
legal practice, and the Court could now directly review against inter alia all rights 
stipulated in Chapter II of the Belgian Constitutional Act. However, the case law 
of the Court shows that it tends to continue involving Articles 10 and 11 in its 
rulings. If the Constitutional structure of Articles 10 and 11 CA are the ‘filter’ 
through which international Provisions have effect in the domestic legal order, 
they have in that sense, for the Constitutional Court only, a similar function 
compared to Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch CA.
While in the Netherlands there appears to be a significant role for the Legislature 
in the assessment of the enforceability of international legal standards in the 
domestic legal order, the analysis of Belgian case law demonstrates that the 
Belgian Legislature seems to play no role of any significance. This might be 
explained by the relatively complex organisation and purpose of the Belgian 
Legislature and Judiciary. The organisational structure of the Legislature finds 
its origin in the differences within Belgium in language, culture and economy. 
Therefore, to guarantee an optimal democratic process, the Legislature consists 
of three Legislators, whose competences are based on the principles of equality 
and exclusiveness. It is the original purpose of the Constitutional Court (then 
referred to as Court of Arbitration) to settle disputes amongst the Legislators 
regarding their competences, and thus where necessary to nullify legislation that 
is in contradiction with the Constitution. Gradually, those reviewing competences 
also implied the indirect review against international Provisions. Comparing this 
process with the Dutch, it can be concluded that the Constitutional Court has a 
much more autonomous role compared to the Dutch Courts when it concerns 
the application of international Provisions. This may also be related to the fact 
that in the Netherlands, Constitutional review is exclusively a competence of the 
Legislature (Article 120 CA), while in Belgium this competence is attributed to the 
Constitutional Court. In general, it can thus be concluded that in Belgium there is 
a different relation between Legislature and Judiciary, in which the Constitutional 
Court plays a crucial role compared to the Netherlands. Due to the Dutch, rather 
obscure Constitutional structure stipulated in Articles 93 and 94 CA, the Dutch 
Legislature is able to greatly influence the case law of the Courts when it concerns 
the effect of international Provisions in the domestic legal order.
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In general it can thus be concluded that these Constitutional circumstances and 
developments play a profound role in the enforceability of international standards, 
and thus not in the first place, the content of the international Provisions that 
are invoked in Court.
15.3 Dutch and Belgian case law compared
Comparing Dutch case law on the right to adequate food with the Belgian, it can 
be concluded in general, that in the Netherlands there is a rather clear distinction 
between civil and political rights, that may be directly applicable, and economic, 
social and cultural rights, that are not. ECOSOC rights are sometimes even all 
treated the same way in one instance. The right to food is thus considered not to 
be directly applicable. Only occasionally, Article 27 is used as an interpretative 
standard. In Belgium, the situation is somewhat more differentiated. In the 
subjective litigation there are hardly any cases in which right to food Provisions 
play a significant role and it seems that in general ECOSOC rights are not directly 
applicable. However, there appear to be incidental exceptions in which at least 
some effect is granted to ECOSOC Provisions. In Belgian case law the contrast 
between civil and political rights on the one hand, and ECOSOC rights on the other 
hand appears not to be as explicit as in the Dutch.1711 A contributing factor for 
this could be that traditionally, the right to education (in particular as embedded 
in Articles 24 CA and 13 ICESCR), is a sensitive issue in Belgium, and played 
an important role in the early rulings of the Constitutional Court, while also the 
Council of State seems to grant some effect to Article 13 ICESCR. In the objective 
litigation, the matter of direct effect is not an issue, but the Constitutional Court 
has developed a vivid and extensive case law, involving the indirect review against 
international Provisions stipulating the right to food.
In both countries, indirect application of the right to food is mostly done in the 
context of a balancing of interests. The national policies with the aim to restrict 
immigration are balanced with the individual interests of the foreigner. However, 
such weighing-up may stand in the way of truly assessing the content of a human 
right, and makes it subdued to legal uncertainty. For instance, this resulted in the 
Netherlands in the fact that in case of a legally residing foreign minor, Article 27 
ICRC is applied indirectly based on its core content, while in case of an illegally 
residing foreign minor, the right is (mostly) declared to be not directly applicable, 
without considering the content. A similar remark could be made about the case 
law of the Constitutional Court, where the non-discrimination principles are only 
applied in a balancing of interests. However, in this balancing of interests it seems 
1711 However, it is in this light remarkable that also in Belgium, the Council of State considers the right 
to strike to have direct effect (Article 8 ICESCR), similar to the Dutch case law, on Article 6 ESC. The 
right to strike is one of the few ECOSOC rights that imply negative obligations of States as their core 
content, instead of positive duties.
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that in the Dutch cases, Article 27 (among others) has a noticeable impact on the 
rulings, while it can be questioned whether invoked international Provisions in 
the rulings of the Constitutional Court offer a broader protection, or have any 
effect of significance on the verdicts besides the invoked national Provisions.
Furthermore, in the case law in both countries in which Provisions are invoked 
stipulating the right to food, the Courts prefer to solve the matter by applying 
domestic legislation instead of international standards, and therefore, the case 
law could be characterised as ‘focussed inwards’. No evidence could be found that 
the authoritative legal interpretations on the invoked standards, as adopted by 
the treaty bodies, were taken into serious consideration by the Dutch or Belgian 
Courts.1712
15.3.1 ICESCR
In the Netherlands and Belgium, no evidence could be found that Article 11 is 
enforceable in the Courts, in a way that the Article can be successfully invoked 
by an individual. Amongst the Dutch Courts, the Provision is also not used as an 
interpretative norm. In Belgium, the Constitutional Court frequently reviewed 
indirectly against the Provision.
15.3.2 ICRC
It is remarkable, that in both countries the rights enshrined in the ICRC seem to 
have more influence compared to other international human rights treaties. In 
the Netherlands, increasingly, case law seems to emerge in which ICRC standards, 
including Article 27, are used as an interpretative norm, in some cases via Article 
2 or 3 ICRC. While technically the standards invoked are not directly applied, 
they seem to have a significant effect on the verdict. Here, the Articles appear 
to have a clear added value on top of domestic legislation. Also in Belgium the 
Courts seem to be more merciful when the position of children is involved, 
which is demonstrated by the case law of the Constitutional Court that reviewed 
occasionally against inter alia Article 27 ICRC.
15.3.3 CEDAW
It is interesting to learn that in both countries, there is hardly any case law of 
significance on the enforceability of CEDAW provisions that stipulate ECOSOC 
rights. This contrasts with the extensive reporting history of both countries on 
the implementation of the CEDAW Provisions.
1712 Exception to that rule however is the Dutch ruling Central Court of Appeal, 8 August 2005, LJN 
AU0687, in which a brief reference was made to the General Comments of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child.
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15.3.4 Foreigners and the right to food
Perhaps it is not surprising that in two relatively prosperous countries, both having 
implemented an extensive system of social security, the right to food has been 
invoked most often by those whose access to that social security system is not 
self-evident: foreigners, and more in particular, illegally residing foreigners. In 
both countries this has led to extensive case law, in which the policies regarding 
foreigners were often contested and the Courts had to assess whether they are 
in compliance with the human rights duties of the Netherlands and Belgium. In 
both countries, the Courts have ruled that the aliens policies, mainly excluding 
illegally residing foreigners from access to social benefits, are a suitable means 
to achieve the purpose of restricting immigration. However, the legal reasoning 
resulting in the adoption of this principle of the Dutch Courts differs from Belgian 
Constitutional Court, when it concerns the assessment whether or not international 
human rights are violated. The Dutch Courts merely stated that the invoked 
Provisions, including Articles 11 ICESCR and 27 ICRC, are not directly applicable 
due to various reasons as discussed in Chapter 4, and therefore no individual 
rights can be distilled from the Articles. The Belgian Constitutional Court however 
reasoned differently and argued that the right to an adequate standard of living 
could not reasonably be understood without limitations, and excluded the illegally 
residing alien from the ratione personae of the Provision, considering that Belgium 
was not responsible for them.
However, it are the exceptions to the principle that limiting access to social benefits 
to illegally residing aliens is a justifiable means to restrict immigration, in which 
human rights seem to have some effect. In the Netherlands, invoking especially 
Article 27 ICRC, has led to the exception that foreign children, awaiting a decision 
on their application for a residence permit, should have access to the means 
necessary for adequate living conditions. However, this does not apply to illegally 
residing children, although a development in case law seems to emerge in which 
the COA is, based indirectly on inter alia Article 27 ICRC, not permitted to remove 
illegally residing children and their families from their facilities. In Belgium, as 
a result of the case law of the Constitutional Court, there are more exceptions to 
the principle. In a chain of case law, in which national Provisions, whether or not 
read in conjunction with international Provisions (including Articles 11 ICESCR 
and 27 ICRC) were invoked, several exceptions were accepted. Aliens who were 
in the medical impossibility to leave Belgian territory, or appealed to the (first) 
order to leave the territory were granted entitlements to social benefits (Article 
11 ICESCR cases). Furthermore, the children of illegally residing parents were 
granted the necessary social benefits in kind. Later, also the Public Centres for Social 
Welfare had to take into account the fact that when the child was accompanied 
by parents, it had a right to family life. Therefore, in granting social benefits, this 
should be taken into consideration (Article 27 ICRC cases).
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To conclude, it appears that the Belgian Constitutional Court allows more exceptions 
to the principle that illegally residing aliens have no entitlements to social benefits, 
compared to the Dutch Courts. It might be tempting here to conclude that the 
Constitutional Court’s rulings are more humane. However, a thorough comparison 
of all existing legislation and correlating case law in the field of aliens law would 
be necessary to determine whether one of the two countries has a more favourable 
approach towards (illegally residing) aliens. Only an analysis of Court cases on 
the enforceability of international standards stipulating the right to food cannot 
possibly lead to such a conclusion. However, of course the basic principle adopted 
in both countries that illegally residing aliens have no entitlements to social 
benefits, not even to basic needs to lead a humane life, can be questioned seriously. 
Especially when the interest of the Country to restrict immigration appears to 
be more important than the interest of the individual to have access to inter alia 
adequate food.
15.4 The Dutch and Belgian reports compared
Analysis of the various reporting cycles of the Netherlands and Belgium 
demonstrates that both countries have the tendency to focus primarily on 
domestic policies, legislation and initiatives that positively contribute to the 
implementation of the rights stipulated in the related international treaties. It 
can be seriously questioned whether the reporting duties are taken seriously. 
Firstly, the reports are very often submitted generously overdue. Secondly, the 
quality of the reports is questioned more than once by the various Committees, 
since not all the relevant information seems to be included and especially matters 
of concern are omitted. Thirdly, more than once improvement, reconsideration 
or information is promised, but the promises are hardly fulfilled. Furthermore, 
both Governments seem to refer to the domestic Courts when the matter of direct 
applicability/direct effect is discussed, and argue that it is their responsibility to 
assess whether or not an international Provision is directly applicable/has direct 
effect. While this might be a reasonable reflection of legal reality in Belgium, this is 
questionable in the case of the Netherlands, considering the significant influence 
of the Legislature on the enforceability of international standards. Also, the matter 
of asylum-seekers is discussed in detail, and often a primary point of concern for 
the Committees. In general, it can be concluded that both countries are painting 
an overly positive picture of the implementation of human rights Provisions, 
especially when it concerns the enforceability of these rights. The Committees 
appear to be poorly informed on the particularities of the Constitutional context 
in which the enforceability of the human rights are discussed. This leads to 
occasional misunderstandings about the functioning of Articles 93 and 94 CA in 
the Netherlands, and about the complex Constitutional organisation in Belgium, 
while the Delegations, when clarifying national case law appear to be bending 
legal reality into questionable directions, or even providing the Committees with 
incorrect information. The NGOs’ parallel reports and later assigned country 
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rapporteurs are only partly capable correcting this. In this light, it is also noteworthy 
that there seems to be insufficient time during the sessions to exhaustively discuss 
all the relevant issues in-depth.
Also some differences in reporting behaviour could be found. Firstly, in the Belgian 
reporting cycles the Constitutional structure is a recurring cause for debate. The 
Committees are concerned that the structure stands in the way of a coherent and 
uniform approach towards the implementation of human rights. This is hardly 
the case in the Netherlands, although the structure of Articles 93 and 94 CA often 
requires some further clarification. Secondly, the Netherlands seem to report 
more specifically on the right to food compared to Belgium, especially in view 
of Article 11 ICESCR. Thirdly, the direct effect of the ICRC is hardly discussed in 
the reporting cycles of the Netherlands, while this was a point of concern during 
the Belgian reporting cycles. Fourthly, the difference between civil and political 
rights on the one hand and ECOSOC rights on the other hand, regarding their 
enforceability, is more emphasised by the Netherlands compared to Belgium. The 
Netherlands frequently emphasise the different nature of ECOSOC rights, and 
underline that due to their impreciseness most ECOSOC rights are not directed 
at States. The Belgian reports are less blunt. In view of the ICRC and CEDAW, a 
possible distinction between two different types of rights was never discussed 
during the Belgian reporting cycles. Instead, as discussed in Chapter 13, the 
direct effect of the treaty in general was debated: a discussion that was mostly 
led by misunderstandings and miscommunications. Regarding the direct effect of 
ICESCR, Belgium focussed on the effect of Article 2 and stated that the progressive 
realisation implied a margin of discretion for the Legislature, resulting in the fact 
that the ICESCR Articles had no direct effect, although Belgium was bound by 
the standstill effect of the treaty. Fifthly, perhaps also due to the bluntness of 
the Dutch in their reports on the distinction between types of rights and the fact 
that some direct questions of the Committees (especially the CESCR) were only 
partly answered or ignored, the atmosphere during the reporting cycles becomes 
more stiff along the way. This development cannot be encountered that clearly 
when observing the Belgian reporting cycles.
15.5  The enforceability of the right to food in the 
Netherlands and Belgium in view of the UN human 
rights system
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is difficult to exactly establish whether the right to 
food is considered an enforceable right in the UN arena, when considering the 
viewpoints of all bodies that are related to the matter, including those in which 
intergovernmental decision-making procedures are followed based on the principle 
of consensus. However, the bodies that are installed specifically to contribute to the 
realisation of ECOSOC rights in general, and more particularly the right to food, 
such as the Committees and the Special Rapporteurs, have frequently addressed 
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the urgency of enforceable rights, and certainly consider a core content of the 
right to food justiciable, or even self-executing.
In general, it can be concluded that the right to adequate food as embedded 
in the UN human rights system is not enforceable in the domestic Dutch and 
Belgian Courts by individuals, in the sense that the right is directly applicable 
in the domestic legal order, constituting subjective rights. Especially the Dutch 
Courts, in line with the viewpoints of the Legislature, generally seem to make a 
clear distinction in this between civil and political rights on the one hand, and 
ECOSOC rights on the other hand. As discussed in Chapter 3, such an approach 
is widely criticised in UN circles. However, in both the Netherlands and Belgium, 
elements of the right to food may have an indirect effect in case law. To put this 
in the terms used by the CESCR in its General Comments 3 and 9: while both 
countries technically have a monistic system in which it could be possible, the 
rights are considered not to be self-executing, but there seems to be some room 
for justiciability, although these cases seem to be the exception to the rule. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the CESCR and the Special Rapporteurs on the right to 
food, consider that the right has at least a core content, consisting of a minimum 
substance, and a non-discrimination principle. This then should at least have 
some effect in the domestic Court (either as justiciable or self-executing rights).
In this light, the Dutch rulings on Article 11 ICESCR, consistently denying the right 
of any effect at all in the Court seems to be in contradiction with the understanding 
in the UN arena. Especially where the Courts use the argument that the Provision is 
not specific enough to distill subjective rights from its nature, content and wordings. 
The case law on Article 27 ICRC seems to be more in line, indeed guaranteeing 
a core content of the right to food in some specific situations. However, illegally 
residing minor asylum-seekers have been mainly excluded from this treatment, 
which appears to be in contradiction with the non-discrimination principle. On 
the other hand, new developments in case law also show some mercy for the 
latter category.
The Belgian rulings in the subjective litigation, in the spare cases that exist on the 
right to food (two rulings of the Council of State on Article 27 ICRC), also do not 
seem to consider the core content of the right. They merely rule that the right 
has no direct effect, also using the argument that the right is not specific enough. 
Furthermore, the rulings of the Constitutional Court on the one hand seem to 
violate the principle of non-discrimination when excluding illegally residing aliens 
from the ratione personae of the right to food. On the other hand, in the exceptions 
to this rule, the Court seems to consider the non-discrimination principle in 
determining whether the alleged discrimination is indeed against the law, or 
justified. This reasoning is mainly caused by the habit to review indirectly via 
Articles 10 and 11 CA, in a balancing of interests. The side effect of this is that 
there seems to be less focus on the core content of the right.
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15.6 Some comparative considerations
As discussed in Chapter 2, in terms of comparative law the commonly shared 
social problem was defined as ‘the right to food and ECOSOC rights in general can 
be understood to imply immediate state obligations that should be enforceable through 
domestic Courts. There seems to be at least a core content, consisting of a minimum 
substance without which the right would be stripped of its raison d’être, and a non-
discrimination principle, that should be justiciable, or even self-executing.’ The national 
social institutions that respond to this problem are the domestic Courts through 
their case law, and the Governments through their periodic reports. It has already 
been observed that those responses (the response of the Courts compared to the 
response of the Government) differ in both countries. The response in itself is 
heavily influenced by the Constitutional circumstances: in the Netherlands, the 
structure as embedded in Articles 93 and 94 CA, and in Belgium, the complex 
organisation and development of their trias politoca. Considering this in relation 
to the analysed case law, in both countries it is thus doubtful whether the content 
of the internationally embedded human rights play a primary role in their effect 
in the domestic legal order. Furthermore, as it seems, most cases in which the 
right to food, or ECOSOC rights in general are invoked, concern foreigners, mostly 
illegally residing on Dutch or Belgian territory. In both countries, any possible 
effect of an international Provision stipulating the right to food seems to emerge 
from a balance of interests, in which the domestic policies to restrict immigration 
are the counterbalance of the individual interest of the foreigner. This leads to 
the impression that the Courts through their case law respond to another shared 
social problem, that is: the restriction of immigration.
The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 419 
Conclusions
15.7 Concluding remarks
This research found its origin and inspiration in the analysis of two Court rulings, 
one Dutch and one Belgian, in which entitlements based on the right to food 
were denied to a claimant. This sparked the question which added value such a 
human right would have in these two countries, which have the means to ensure 
adequate food to all within their jurisdiction. In line with the nature of human 
rights, one would expect that such rights basically would have to serve as a safety 
net, to catch those individuals that somehow fall through the – mostly already 
very solid and extensive – domestic safety nets. The more so, as both countries 
communicate in their reports on the implementation of various treaties to fulfill 
all their duties the right to food implies. In short, the question was raised what 
the two countries actually do, what they say they do, and what they should do 
regarding the enforceability of the right to adequate food.
This research has shown that unfortunately it is the main rule that the right to 
food does not serve as a safety net, and it is hardly possible to invoke the right 
in Court in both the Netherlands and Belgium. I say ‘hardly’, because there are 
some developments in which the Courts do show some compassion for those 
people who are in most distressing situations, and allow international provisions 
that stipulate the right to food to have some (indirect) effect in their verdicts. It is 
those exceptions to the rule that we could be hopeful for. In the Netherlands that 
is mostly the increasing use of the ICRC as an interpretative standard, whereas 
in Belgium it is the increasing indirect review against international standards 
through Constitutional Provisions. The general impression however is that it are the 
coincidental Constitutional circumstances that mainly determine the enforceability 
of the right to food, rather than the actual content of the right in itself.
This research has also shown that there is a difference between the legal practice in 
Belgium and the Netherlands on the one hand, and what is reported on this practice 
on the other hand. Both countries paint a positive picture of their performances 
in human rights implementation, while there is little space for self-evaluation or 
self-criticism regarding the implementation of ECOSOC rights in general, and the 
right to food in particular. Both countries appear to have hardly any ambition to 
improve the implementation of the rights enshrined in the treaties they ratified, 
and certainly not because it is part of their States’ duties. In the international 
arena thus both countries want to show off their good intentions, whilst those 
differ from the domestic legal practices. An interesting contradiction, to underline 
this impression, is that the Netherlands and Belgium signed the OP-ICESCR, 
involving complaints procedures, while the ICESCR Provisions in their domestic 
legal order have no direct effect.
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Lastly, while it might be disputed what countries should do in this light, the treaty 
bodies and the Special Rapporteurs, with sound arguments consequently defend 
the position that at least a core substance of the right to food (including a non-
discrimination principle) should be justiciable or even self-executing in the Courts. 
While in both countries developments can be observed that tend towards more 
justiciability, in the large majority of all cases the right to food is not considered 
to be a justiciable right, let alone a right that is self-executing.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the countries do not do what they should do, 
and do not say what they really do.
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Based on the previous research, the following recommendations can be made
16.1 The Netherlands
Currently, the Constitutional system as embedded in Articles 93 and 94 leads to 
legal uncertainty that has lasted for decades now. This research shows that the 
effect of the indistinctiveness in the Articles is more extensive than one might 
expect at first glance, and truly hinders the Courts in seriously considering the 
effect of the invoked international standards based on their substance. It might be 
a welcome development if the Constitutional Provisions would be amended in such 
way that it is unambiguously clear what the role of the Legislature is with regard 
to the assessment of the Courts in determining whether or not an international 
Provision is binding on all persons. Since amendments to the Constitutional Act 
are not easy to achieve, meanwhile it would be helpful if the Parliamentarians, 
Senators and Ministers who are responsible for adopting new ratification Bills to 
international treaties stipulating human rights would study the Constitutional 
structure of Articles 93 and 94 and the developments in case law in the field of 
human rights in-depth.
The Courts are reluctant in recognising direct effect of international Provisions 
stipulating ECOSOC rights, in line with the opinion of the Legislature. The case law 
on Article 27 ICRC, in which the Provision is used as an interpretative standard, 
shows that there is more between direct applicability and non-applicability. While 
it is not perfect and certainly also has its disadvantages, this route could inspire 
more Courts in their verdicts and open the door to a more differentiated case law 
that does more justice to the nature, content and wordings of the human rights 
Provisions. Perhaps the indirect application through non-discrimination Provisions, 
as used by the Belgian Constitutional Court, might also be a source for inspiration.
In the periodic reports, submitted to the UN treaty bodies, an additional focus on 
points for improvement as well as accurately reporting on the Dutch case law – 
including the recent developments in the indirect application of ICRC Provisions 
– might contribute to a more fruitful dialogue with the different Committees.
16.2 Belgium
It is not always clear what the exact role is of international Provisions when the 
Constitutional Court reviews against a Constitutional standard in conjunction 
with an international standard. It might enrich the case law when the Court 
would reach slightly more ‘outwards’ and is more precise on what elements of 
the international Provision are considered in what exact context. Besides the 
fact that this would do more justice to internationally recognised human rights 
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Provisions, this might also even further differentiate the balancing of interests 
in view of the general principle of non-discrimination.
Through the prejudicial procedure, but also through annulment procedures, the 
effects of the verdicts of the Constitutional Court are increasingly having an impact 
on subjective rights of individuals. In that light, it seems that nothing stands in 
the way for the Courts operating in the subjective litigation to simultaneously 
apply (if need be: indirectly) international Provisions. This might lead to a more 
coherent approach amongst the Courts, especially the Court of Cassation and the 
Council of State, in their case law on international Provisions, in particular those 
that stipulate ECOSOC rights.
In the periodic reports, submitted to the UN treaty bodies, an additional focus 
on points for improvement might contribute to a more fruitful dialogue with the 
different Committees. In addition, it might be helpful if this dialogue is based on 
accurate information on the functioning of the domestic Judiciary. Especially the 
exact functioning of the Courts of Last Instance (in particular the Constitutional 
Court), the subdivision in an objective and subjective litigation, its nuances in 
legal practice, and the effects of the verdicts of the Courts on individuals might 
be further clarified, as well as the actual case law produced by the Courts.
16.3 The Committees of the UN
While the argument of Courts of the Netherlands or Belgium may often be that 
the right to food is too imprecise to apply directly, this research shows that it 
can be questioned whether that is the real argument. The characteristics of the 
monistic system, mostly regulated in the Constitution or Constitutional law of 
the country, have an influence that is not to be underestimated. Furthermore, in 
case of indirect application, policy considerations and the balancing of national 
interests seem to be the major influence on the effect of the right to food. It is 
doubtful therefore, whether more attempts to further clarify the right to food in 
the international arena will be of any help in this case. Instead, a coordinated 
focus on Constitutional obstacles in the direct effect of international Provisions, 
or best practices in indirect applications (for instance through non-discrimination 
Provisions) might be more effective. Furthermore, the question can be asked 
whether the right to food as a justiciable or self-executing right is a realistic goal 
to strive for. While there are certainly good arguments to consider that at least a 
core content of the right to food is a justiciable right, the consistent legal practice 
of the Netherlands and Belgium shows otherwise. Since human rights naturally 
stand for entitlements, the final goal might still be a right to food that is (partly) 
self-executing, but it might be helpful in the communication with Member States 
to also focus on the indirect solutions. While indirect application of human rights 
is far from perfect, and as demonstrated in Chapter 15.3 may be blurring the 
content the right should have, it is a step forward in the right direction.
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16.4 Legal comparists
While the current debates on comparative law are extremely vivid, inspiring, 
friendly and all-inclusive, they did not yet result in a widely accepted method that 
can be used by researchers, especially not in the field of public law, or more in 
particular, human rights law. Perhaps the intense debates might shift somewhat 
to a focus on actually performing a comparison, comparing best practices, and 
didactics on how to teach students to compare. In other words: it might yield more 
practical result when considering comparative law slightly more as a means to 
an end, instead of a goal in itself.
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Part 1.  Introduction, methodology and tertium 
comparationis
Chapter 1. Introduction
While the right to adequate food is often discussed in the context of developing 
countries, especially in situations where access to adequate food is a problem on 
a larger scale, this book focusses on the right to food in two western countries 
in which theoretically the circumstances allow this right to be enjoyed by each 
individual: the Netherlands and Belgium. This book addresses the question whether 
in those countries an individual, that falls through the cracks of all national safety 
nets and finds her/himself deprived of basic sustenance to lead a life in dignity, 
can invoke the right to adequate food, as embedded in international human rights 
treaties, in the domestic Courts.
The main research objectives of this thesis are:
1. to gain knowledge about the enforceability of the right to food as embedded 
in UN human right instruments in the Netherlands and Belgium through law 
comparison; and
2. where necessary critically evaluate both approaches in light of the UN human 
right doctrine regarding the enforceability of the right to food.
The main research question is:
What are the legal factors that explain the differences and similarities regarding 
the response of the Dutch and Belgium Judiciaries and Governments to the 
enforceability of the right to adequate food in view of the UN human rights system?
This research thus implies a triple comparison:
I. a comparison between the legal practice in Belgium and the Netherlands 
(what the countries really do);
II. a comparison of those legal practices with the reporting behavior of both 
countries (what the countries say they do); and
III. a comparison between the legal practice and the interpretation on the 
enforceability of the right to food within the UN human rights system (what 
the countries should do).
To be able to make a comparison, it is necessary to first collect and analyze the 
relevant data. Therefore, three sub-questions need to be answered:
1. To what extent is the right to adequate food perceived to be an enforceable 
right within the UN human rights system?
458 The enforceability of the human right to adequate food
Summary
2. A.  What is the response of the national Judiciaries of the Netherlands and 
Belgium when the right to food as stipulated in the UN human rights system 
is invoked by individuals?
 B.  And how can this response be explained?
3. What do the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium communicate in 
their reports in the United Nations arena regarding the enforceability of the 
right to food in their domestic legal order?
Chapter 2. Methods
This study applies legal comparative methods. However, in comparative law, 
no coherent methodology seems to have been adopted. Most methodological 
considerations refer back to a short passage on the functional method, as proposed 
by Zweigert and Kötz. While it has often been criticized, the functional method 
was not successfully replaced by a better alternative. Therefore, this study applies 
functionalism, but in a modern interpretation introduced by Ralf Michaels. It 
can be qualified as a functional method based on equivalence functionalism and 
on an epistemology of constructive functionalism. The constructive move that 
comes from this approach to functionalism will be used to determine the research 
direction regarding the sources that need to be examined and compared. These 
sources are necessary to answer the threefold sub-questions on how Member States 
should respond, do respond and say they respond to the need of enforceability of 
the right to food. This constructive move is not as flexible as Michaels proposed, 
but has a rigid core that is determined by the UN human rights system. In the 
comparative process, the extent to which the right to adequate food is perceived to 
be an enforceable right within the UN human rights system will then serve as the 
tertium comparationis. This will be determined by inventorying the international, 
regional and national provisions that either stipulate the right to food, or are related 
to the right to food, and the viewpoints of the relevant UN or UN related institutions 
that respond to the need to further clarify its meaning (sub-question 1). In this 
light, the countries’ social responses will be analyzed (answering sub-questions 2 
and 3). In order to determine and explain the response of the national Judiciary 
of the Netherlands and Belgium when the right to food as stipulated in the UN 
human rights system is invoked by individuals, the reasoning patterns of the Courts 
are leading in establishing the research direction (sub-question 2). To determine 
the communication of the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium in their 
reports in the United Nations arena regarding the enforceability of the right to 
food in their domestic legal order, the reporting cycles on the implementation of 
the ICESCR, ICRC, CEDAW, and the UPR will be analyzed (sub-question 3). Next 
to answering the sub-questions to find and explain the relevant data, the three 
comparisons are necessary to answer the main research question, and will be 
performed accordingly. Finally, in line with the second research objective, the 
Dutch and Belgian approach towards the enforceability of the right to food are 
critically evaluated in light of the UN human rights doctrine.
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Chapter 3.  The enforceability of the international human right to 
adequate food
Since World War II, considerable but also difficult progress was made to develop the 
right to food in the international human rights arena. This involved many actors 
who contributed from their different perspectives and out of different expertise. 
The work that has been done to further clarify the right to food, especially in 
light of Article 11 ICESCR, can be subdivided into three pillars. The first pillar 
is the work done by the treaty bodies, such as the CESCR. The second pillar is 
the work done within FAO context, which includes the World Food Summits and 
the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines. The third pillar is the work done in 
the context of the Human Rights Council, in particular the works of the special 
rapporteurs.
The right to food is most discussed in the context of Article 11 ICESCR. Limiting 
the right to food to the interpretation of only this Article, however, would do no 
justice to its full meaning. A survey through international human rights instruments 
shows that the right to food is also recognized directly in other documents that 
mostly aim at the protection of a particular group of individuals. Furthermore, the 
right is inextricably linked to other human rights or human rights related issues. 
Also, the right to food is recognized outside the UN context on a regional level. 
Finally, on a domestic level, it is sometimes recognized directly or indirectly in 
constitutions or used as a directive principle.
As it appears, the relevant articles and explanatory documents written in UN context 
seem to offer sufficient guidance to at least come to a minimum specification 
of what ‘adequate food’ means as a substantive right. While the realization of 
human rights is a responsibility for all, the international human rights system 
specifically addresses States.
The traditional distinction made between civil and political rights on the one 
hand, implying negative state obligations, and economic, social and cultural rights 
on the other, implying positive state obligations has been criticized for decades 
now. There are many good arguments to oppose such a distinction both from a 
practical point of view and from a legal theoretical perspective. Instead, a typology 
of duties applicable to all human rights, consisting of duties to respect, protect and 
fulfill seems to do more justice to the meaning of human rights. It demonstrates 
that ECOSOC rights do not leave States an undefined margin of discretion in the 
realization of these rights.
In general, according to the CESCR, Article 2 ICESCR implies that there is a 
minimum core obligation regarding ECOSOC rights, that requires immediate 
realization. In addition, there are immediate obligations of conduct to move as 
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expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of the right. 
Ultimately, this is an obligation of result.
It is difficult to establish whether in the UN context the right to food is unanimously 
considered to be an enforceable right, and if so, what it exactly means. The UN 
can hardly be considered to be one single entity speaking with one voice. A 
tertium comparationis in this light therefore, is not unambiguous. In general, no 
evidence could be found that immediate obligations of conduct are enforceable. 
The discussion on enforceability focusses more on the States’ core obligations. The 
specialized bodies of the UN, basically the CESCR and the Special Rapporteurs, 
consider, with sound arguments, that the right to food and ECOSOC rights in general 
can be understood to imply immediate state obligations that should be enforceable 
through domestic Courts. There seems to be at least a core content, consisting 
of a minimum substance without whom the right would be stripped of its raison 
d’être, and a non-discrimination principle, that should be justiciable, or even self-
executing. On the other hand, in the UN fora in which intergovernmental decision 
making procedures are used, the enforceability seems to be hardly supported. An 
approach that resembles the behavior of Member States towards the human rights 
treaties stipulating ECOSOC rights, in particular when considering the rich use 
of reservations and the reluctance to adopt complaint mechanisms.
Part 2. The Netherlands
Chapter 4. Dutch case law on enforceability
The international right to food is not directly applicable in the Netherlands. 
Article 11 ICESCR seems to be completely non-enforceable. However, case law 
seems to emerge in which ICRC standards, including Article 27, are used as 
an interpretative standard that is used in the treaty conform interpretation of 
national legislation. As a result, the ICRC provisions had a significant effect on the 
verdicts. The claimants are usually minors seeking asylum who lawfully reside in 
the Netherlands without a residence permit, and are in distressing humanitarian 
circumstances. Furthermore, the Supreme Court used Article 27 for a treaty conform 
interpretation in a landmark ruling. The Court decided that the COA could not 
remove illegally residing children from their facilities, and thus had to provide 
for the child’s basic needs. However, such cases are still exceptions to the rule 
that Article 27 is not applied. More than once, in rejecting the direct applicability 
of ECOSOC standards, reference was made to the Parliamentary Documents in 
which the Government, in their function of co-legislator, expressed that in their 
view, direct applicability of the ICESCR treaty would not be possible. It seems 
that the Courts follow this lead of politics in determining whether these rights 
can be directly invoked.
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Chapter 5. Dutch monism and constitutional reforms
Since 1953, the Netherlands have quite an obscure constitutional system regulating 
the position and effect of provisions under international law. This so called ‘qualified 
monistic system’ embedded in Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution, 
enables the Courts to apply international Provisions directly, but only when they 
are binding on all persons and have been published. Article 93 Constitutional Act 
(CA) determines what international legal standards are binding on individuals. 
Article 94 Constitutional Act regulates the relation between these international 
directly applicable standards and national legislation.
Especially the prerequisite that a provision must be binding on all persons has 
led to much confusion, in particular with regard to the question whether the 
Government or the Courts have a final say in the matter. Officially, the Government 
and the Courts agree that it is up to the Judiciary to finally decide whether or 
not a provision is binding on all persons. It was however the intention of the 
Constitutional Legislator to establish a legal practice in which the legislator would 
voice his opinion on direct applicability of international legal standards in their 
Parliamentary Documents. This is indeed done ever since by the Legislature 
when adopting a Bill on the ratification of human rights treaties.
Chapter 6-8.  The direct applicability of economic, social and 
cultural rights in the Netherlands
The Dutch Judiciary seems to follow the lead politics gave in the ratification 
Bill when a decision must be made on the direct applicability of ECOSOC rights. 
According to the legislator, civil and political rights in general are suitable for direct 
applicability, and ECOSOC rights are not, due to the fact that for the realization 
of ECOSOC rights policy decisions must be made, which is the responsibility 
of politics instead of the Courts. This point of view is persistently expressed by 
the Government in their various Explanatory Memoranda on the Bills on the 
ratification of the international human rights treaties, and during the various 
reporting procedures. The Government expresses similar opinions in case of 
international treaties for specific groups that address at the same time civil and 
political as well as economic, social and cultural rights, albeit not always as 
specific as for instance the Explanatory Memorandum to the ratification Bill of 
the ICESCR. It appears that when the Government did express itself clearly on the 
direct applicability of human rights provisions, normally, the Judiciary doesn’t 
hesitate to apply this view in their rulings. However, when the Government is not 
so specific, the Courts appear to take the liberty in reaching their own conclusions 
with regard to the matter. Their considerations are then of a more practical nature 
and closer related to the case. This is clearly demonstrated with regard to the right 
to strike (Article 6 ESC), which is often referred to in literature when scholars 
address the issue of direct applicability of ECOSOC rights.
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Four criteria can be distinguished to determine whether an international 
provision containing a human right is directly applicable: (1) the intentions of 
the state-parties of the international document expressed during the negotiations 
preceding its adoption; (2) the nature and content of the provision, as well as its 
wording; (3) the intentions of the national legislator expressed in its explanatory 
memorandum; and (4) the existence of legislation that has the purpose of fulfilling 
the obligations coming forth from the provision in question. The fourth criterion 
was only mentioned in the Parliamentary Documents of the Act of approval of 
the ICRC. It was hardly explained and has not been mentioned elsewhere since 
then. Furthermore, due to the various constitutional systems worldwide it seems 
unlikely that state parties will express their vision on direct applicability during 
the negotiations preceding and international human rights document. This leaves 
criteria (2) and (3) as the criteria that truly matter. There seems to be a difference 
between the hierarchy as explained by both the Dutch Legislature and the Judiciary 
on the one hand, and the hierarchy that is actually used by the Courts with regard 
to direct applicability ECOSOC rights. Officially, the Courts should look at the 
nature and content of the provisions, as well as its wording in the first place, 
and use the expressed intention of the legislator as a source of inspiration only. 
However, this research demonstrates that in situations in which the Legislature 
clearly expressed their view on the possibility of direct applicability of international 
ECOSOC standards, the Courts duly follow this interpretation, without giving due 
consideration to the nature, content or wording of the provision. Only when the 
legislator is unclear in their vision, the Courts feel free to base their verdict on 
the nature, content and wording of the article.
Chapter 9. The Dutch periodic country reports
At the time of ratification of the right to food in several treaty provisions, the Dutch 
Government underlined that the Netherlands already fulfilled the obligations 
that follow from the ratification of this right. This practice seems to be standard 
procedure in case of the ratification of any economic, social and cultural right. A 
treaty provision will only be ratified if the Dutch legislator is of the opinion that 
the Netherlands already meet the obligations resulting from the human right in 
question. If there is any doubt, the provision will not be ratified, or ratified with 
reservations or interpretative declarations.
Also during the process of the diverse report procedures that form part of the 
obligations coming forth from the ratification of international human rights 
treaties, the Netherlands seem to have no ambition to improve the recognition 
of human rights within its borders, which seems to be contradicting with the 
obligation of progressive realization that can be found in various human rights 
treaties. Especially in the context of the ICESCR, this attitude led to increasing 
differences of opinion between the Dutch Government and the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, the Dutch Government does 
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not seem to be willing to seriously answer the questions of the treaty based bodies 
that consider these reports, while the quality of the reports is more than once 
considered to be doubtful.
The Dutch Government reported that within the Netherlands, there is sufficient 
food of good quality and affordable for everyone, basically due to a sound system of 
social security. However, most cases in which the right to food is invoked concern 
foreigners, who do not always have access to this system of social security. This is 
often discussed with and criticized by the Committees during the reporting cycles.
In general, it can be concluded that the Netherlands, also in their reports, make 
a sharp distinction between on the one hand, civil and political rights, and on the 
other hand, economic, social and cultural rights, especially when it concerns the 
possibility of direct applicability. It is unambiguously clear that the Netherlands 
does not recognize direct applicability of ECOSOC rights.
Chapter 10. Evaluation and comparison
As it appears, the Dutch reports are window-dressing when painting a positive 
image of the Dutch implementation of internationally recognized ECOSOC rights, 
including the substantive right to food. Simultaneously, the Dutch do not seem 
to be eager to answer critical questions, or to reflect on points for improvement. 
This has led to some remarkable statements of the Dutch Government on the 
domestic case law. For example that the Dutch judges are familiar with the General 
Comments of the CESCR, and also apply them in their verdicts, or that Article 11 
ICESCR has some effect in Dutch case law. It appears from the discussions with 
the various Committees that these treaty bodies have a rather accurate impression 
regarding the status of Dutch case law. However, it cannot be said that the Dutch 
reporting behaviour is in full conformity with legal reality.
Part 3. Belgium
Chapter 11-12.  The legal practice of Belgium regarding enforceability
Due to differences in language, culture and economy, Belgium has, since their 
profound State reforms in 1970, a rather complex trias politica. The Legislature 
consists of three legislative powers, equally and exclusively competent. This 
had an effect on the organisation of the Judiciary, culminating in the instalment 
of the Constitutional Court. The Belgian Judiciary seems organized, based on 
purpose and functionality, rather than pragmatic considerations. The organisation 
is complex. On the one hand there is a subjective contentieux, with two Courts of 
last instance (the Court of Cassation and the Council of State), and on the other 
hand an objective contentieux, with two highest tribunals (the Council of State 
and the Constitutional Court).
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The difference between both contentieux increasingly becomes less important for 
the parties involved in a court case. The legal effects of the verdicts seems to ‘merge’ 
rather than remain of a fundamentally different nature. Nevertheless, the Judicial 
organisation has a strong effect on the legal reasoning of the Courts. Belgium is 
a monistic State. This does not follow directly from the Constitution, but from 
case law of the Court of Cassation. This means that in principle, an international 
standard is superior to a contradicting (anterior and posterior) national rule, as 
long as the international rule has direct effect. For an international standard 
to have direct effect, some formal requirements have to be fulfilled. The main 
criterion, however, is that the State Parties involved have expressed the intention 
that the standard should have direct effect. Such expression can be recognized 
when the standard addresses citizens and not to States (the subjective criterion) 
and/or the standard is self-executing (objective criterion). Neither the Court of 
Cassation nor the Council of State appear to have recognized direct effect of the 
right to adequate food. As a rule, with some minor, seemingly random, exceptions, 
they consider that ICESC and ICRC provisions do not have direct effect. There is 
hardly any case law on (the direct effect of) CEDAW provisions.
The Constitutional Court is not bound by the principle of direct effect due to its 
function to review national legislation against the Constitution. As a result, it 
applies international standards only indirectly, initially via Articles 10 and 11 and 
24 CA, and later, also via all other rights stipulated in chapter II CA. The ‘school-
pact’ prompted the Legislature to broaden the reviewing competencies of the 
Constitutional Court. It is now authorized not only to settle conflicts between the 
three legislative powers, but also to review national legislation against fundamental 
rights. This is also reflected in the case law of the Court. The first rulings in 
which the Court indirectly reviewed against internationally embedded ECOSOC 
rights concerned Article 13 ICESCR. Only later, the Court also reviewed (mostly 
indirectly) against other ECOSOC provisions, including articles stipulating the 
right to adequate food.
It is mostly in cases concerning illegally residing aliens that right to food provisions, 
and other related ECOSOC rights embedded in UN treaties, play a role. In several 
cases, both in annulment procedures and in preliminary rulings, the Court reviewed 
Article 57 § 2 of the ‘Organic Law of 8 July 1976 on public centers for social welfare’. 
This provision restricts social benefits entitlements of illegally residing asylum 
seekers to urgent medical care only. The Court assessed whether this restriction, 
in light of the invoked fundamental rights, was objectively and reasonably justified, 
and proportionate towards a legitimate goal. The basic principle seems to be that 
it is the legitimate purpose of Belgium to restrict immigration, and that therefore 
it is not unreasonable to accept different obligations regarding the needs of legally 
residing persons in Belgium on the one hand and illegally residing persons on the 
other hand. That is to say that Article 11 ICESCR cannot reasonably be understood 
without limitations, and therefore, does not apply to persons Belgium is not 
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responsible for, such as illegally residing aliens. In a series of rulings, the Court 
has further specified and nuanced this notion. Occasionally the Court allows 
for exceptions from this rule. In particular, the rights of the child usually seem 
to have more effect than rights stipulated in the ICESCR. In general, in line 
with its function, the Court shows little hesitation in nullifying legislation, or 
advising in preliminary proceedings that a Constitutional standard is violated, 
when it considers the disputed national legislation not objectively and reasonably 
justified, and/or a disproportionate means to reach a justified goal. Therefore, 
verdicts of the Constitutional Court often resulted in amendments to legislation, 
or the adoption of new regulations. However, while international provisions in 
this case law are often reviewed against indirectly, no evidence could be found 
that those provisions made any difference of significance towards the outcome 
of the rulings on top of the – mostly equivalent – invoked national provisions. 
This is due to the ‘inward’ focus of the case law, involving mainly an assessment 
of national legislation and policies.
Chapter 13. The Belgian periodic country reports
In its reports, Belgium seems to prefer to communicate initiatives, policies and 
legal measures that positively contribute to the implementation of human rights. 
The reports show little self-evaluation or self-critique. The right to food is seldom 
addressed as a right in itself. Instead the Government seems to focus on related 
rights such as the right to healthcare, the right to social security, and more in 
particular, the position of foreigners in relation with entitlements to social benefits. 
Regarding the latter, the Committees often express concern. In particular they do 
not seem to be convinced that withholding rights based on the status of illegally 
residing foreigners, is compatible with the relevant human rights treaties, especially 
not in case of accompanied and unaccompanied children.
Furthermore, the complexity of the Belgian federal structure seems to be a reason 
for concern. The Committees regularly question whether Belgium is capable of a 
uniform and consistent approach in implementing human rights. It also leads to 
misunderstandings, especially regarding the issue of direct effect in combination 
with the function of the Constitutional Court. The delegations underline the 
direct effect of international ECOSOC provisions by referring to case law of the 
Constitutional Court. However, they fail to point out that this is at odds with the 
case law of the Court of Cassation and the Council of State. It appears that more 
than once, the impression is created that international human rights treaties, 
such as the ICRC and the CEDAW, have direct effect in the national legal order, 
even though this is contrary to the legal practice. The Committees seem to be 
poorly informed on the Belgian constitutional system. They do not really address 
the issue in-depth. The Belgian Government on the other hand is reluctant in 
correcting those misunderstandings.
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Chapter 14. Evaluation and comparison
It must be concluded that the Belgian reports on the enforceability of the ICESCR, 
the ICRC and the CEDAW hardly match legal reality. Indeed, the complex federal 
structure, especially regarding the organisation of the Judiciary, in combination 
with the Committees’ lack of knowledge of Belgian constitutional law, seems to 
lead to misunderstandings and inaccurate assumptions. Legal practice shows 
that ECOSOC rights in general, with some rare exceptions, do not have direct 
effect in the subjective contentieux. Nevertheless, in several reporting cycles it 
was suggested or assumed that the both ICRC and CEDAW do in their entirety 
have direct effect. Interestingly, the case law of the Constitutional Court is often 
invoked by Belgium to demonstrate the direct effect of international human 
rights provisions, or to paint a positive picture on the implementation of treaty 
provisions, while such examples seem inaccurate, for there is at most a little 
indirect effect for the international provisions. In addition, its added value in casu 
should not be overestimated.
Part 4. Conclusion and recommendations
Chapter 15. Conclusions
This research found its origin and inspiration in the analysis of two Court rulings, 
one Dutch and one Belgian, in which entitlements based on the right to food were 
denied to a claimant. This sparked the question which added value such a human 
right would have in these two countries, which have the means to ensure adequate 
food to all within their jurisdiction. In line with the nature of human rights, one 
would expect that such rights basically would serve as an ultimate safety net, to 
catch those individuals that somehow fall through the domestic safety nets. The 
more so, as both countries communicate in their reports on the implementation 
of various treaties to fulfill all their duties the right to food implies. In short, the 
question was raised what the two countries actually do, what they say they do, 
and what they should do regarding the enforceability of the right to adequate food.
In light of the question what the countries should do, it is difficult to exactly 
establish whether the right to food is considered an enforceable right in the 
UN arena, when considering the viewpoints of all bodies that are related to the 
matter, including those in which intergovernmental decision-making procedures 
are followed, based on the principle of consensus. However, the bodies that are 
installed specifically to contribute to the realisation of ECOSOC rights in general, 
such as the Committees and the Special Rapporteurs, have frequently addressed 
the urgency of recognizing enforceability of these rights. They certainly consider 
a core content of the right to food justiciable, or even self-executing.
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Regarding the question what the countries actually do, this research has shown 
that unfortunately it is the main rule both in the Netherlands and Belgium, that 
the right to food does not function as a safety net, and that it is hardly possible to 
successfully invoke the right to food in Court of law. I say ‘hardly’, because there 
are some developments in which the Courts do show some compassion for those 
people who are in most distressing situations, and allow international provisions 
that stipulate the right to food to have some (indirect) effect in their verdicts. It is 
those exceptions to the rule that we could be hopeful for. In the Netherlands that 
is mostly the increasing use of the ICRC as an interpretative standard, whereas 
in Belgium it is the increasing indirect review against international standards 
through Constitutional Provisions. The general impression however is that it 
are the coincidental Constitutional circumstances that mainly determine the 
enforceability of the right to food, rather than the actual content of the right in 
itself. In the Netherlands, that is mainly the rather obscure construction of Articles 
93 and 94 CA, while in Belgium it is the complex organisation of trias politica.
As it seems, most cases in which the right to food is invoked, concern foreigners, 
illegally residing on the Dutch or Belgian territory. It is remarkable that in both 
Countries, any possible effect of an international Provision stipulating the right 
to food seems to emerge from a balancing of interests, in which the domestic 
policies to restrict immigration are the counterbalance of the individual interest 
of the foreigner. This leads to the impression that the Courts through their case 
law not only respond to the shared social problem that the right to food should be 
an enforceable right (in this research the tertium comparationis), but also respond 
to another problem, that is the restriction of immigration.
Regarding the question what countries say they do, this research has shown 
that there is a considerable discrepancy between the legal practice in Belgium 
and the Netherlands on the one hand, and what is reported on this practice on 
the other hand. Both countries paint a positive picture of their performances in 
human rights implementation, but devote little space to self-evaluation or self-
criticism regarding the implementation of ECOSOC rights in general, and the 
right to food in particular. Neither country evidences much ambition to improve 
the implementation of the rights enshrined in the treaties they ratified. They 
certainly do not consider this to be part of their State’s duties. In the international 
arena thus, both countries want to emphasize their accurate implementation of 
human rights, while this contradicts the domestic legal practices.
Considering the above, it can be concluded that the countries do not do what 
they should do, and do not say what they really do concerning the enforceability 
of the right to adequate food.
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Summary
Chapter 16. Recommendations
Countries should act in accordance to the obligations they have subscribed to 
when ratifying human rights treaties and they should truthfully report what they 
do. To this end, the study concludes with recommendations to the Netherlands, 
Belgium, the UN Committees and legal comparists.
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Deel 1. Inleiding, methodologie en tertium comparationis
Hoofdstuk 1. Inleiding
Het recht op adequate voeding wordt vaak bediscussieerd in de context van 
ontwikkelingslanden, vooral in situaties waarin de toegang tot voldoende voedsel 
een grootschalig probleem is. Dit boek richt zich echter op het recht op voedsel 
in twee westerse landen, waarin de omstandigheden van dien aard zijn dat het 
recht op adequate voeding aan ieder individu gewaarborgd zou moeten kunnen 
worden: Nederland en België. Dit boek vond zijn inspiratie in de vraag of in 
deze landen een persoon die op de een of andere manier door de mazen valt 
van de bestaande nationale sociale vangnetten, en daardoor niet in staat is een 
menswaardig bestaan te leiden, bij de nationale rechter een beroep kan doen op 
het internationaal verankerde recht op adequate voeding.
De voornaamste onderzoeksdoelstellingen van dit proefschrift zijn:
1. kennis te verwerven over de afdwingbaarheid van het recht op voedsel 
in Nederland en België, zoals dat is neergelegd in het VN-mensenrechten 
instrumentarium, door middel van rechtsvergelijking; en
2. waar nodig kritisch beide benaderingen te evalueren in het licht van de VN-
mensenrechten doctrine betreffende de afdwingbaarheid van het recht op 
voedsel.
De hoofd-onderzoeksvraag is:
Welke juridische factoren verklaren de verschillen en overeenkomsten in de reactie 
van de Nederlandse en Belgische rechterlijke macht en regering ten aanzien van 
de afdwingbaarheid van het recht op adequate voeding in het licht van het VN-
mensenrechtensysteem?
Dit onderzoek behelst een drievoudige vergelijking:
I. een vergelijking tussen de juridische praktijk in België en Nederland (wat de 
landen daadwerkelijk doen);
II. een vergelijking tussen die juridische praktijk en de manier waarop beide 
landen daarover rapporteren (wat de landen zeggen dat ze doen); en
III. een vergelijking tussen de juridische praktijk en de heersende interpretatie 
binnen het VN-mensenrechtensysteem omtrent de afdwingbaarheid van het 
recht op voedsel (wat de landen zouden moeten doen).
Om te kunnen vergelijken, is het nodig om eerst de relevante gegevens te 
verzamelen en te analyseren. Daartoe moeten drie sub-vragen worden beantwoord:
1. In hoeverre wordt het recht op adequate voeding binnen het VN-mensenrecht 
systeem gezien als een afdwingbaar recht?
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2. A.  Hoe reageert de nationale rechter in Nederland en België in gevallen waarin 
een individu zich beroept op het recht op voedsel, zoals vastgelegd in het 
VN-mensenrechtensysteem,?
 B.  En hoe kan deze reactie worden verklaard?
3. Wat berichten de Nederlandse en Belgische regering in hun VN-rapportages 
over de afdwingbaarheid van het recht op voedsel in hun nationale rechtsorde?
Hoofdstuk 2. Methodologie
De methoden die in dit onderzoek gebruikt worden zijn rechtsvergelijkende 
van aard. Binnen het vakgebied van de rechtsvergelijking blijkt echter geen 
overeenstemming te bestaan over een samenhangende methode. De meeste 
methodologische overwegingen in de literatuur verwijzen simpelweg naar een 
korte passage over de functionele methode, in het handboek van Zweigert en 
Kötz. Hoewel deze methode vaak bekritiseerd werd, is de functionele methode 
nooit vervangen door een beter alternatief. Daarom zal ook dit onderzoek gestoeld 
zijn op het functionalisme, maar wel in een moderne interpretatie ervan zoals 
geïntroduceerd door Ralf Michaels. Deze aanpak kan worden gekwalificeerd 
als een functionele methode op basis van functionele equivalentie en op een 
epistemologie van constructief functionalisme. De constructieve beweging die 
deze aanpak vereist, zal worden gebruikt om de onderzoeksrichting ten aanzien 
van de bronnen die onderzocht en vergeleken moeten worden te bepalen met 
betrekking tot de drie deelvragen. Deze deelvragen houden kortgezegd in dat een 
antwoord gevonden moet worden op de vraag wat de onderzochte lidstaten moeten 
doen, doen, en zeggen dat ze doen inzake de afdwingbaarheid van het recht op 
voedsel. In dit concrete geval is deze constructieve beweging is niet zo flexibel als 
Michaels heeft voorgesteld, maar heeft zij een rigide kern die wordt bepaald door 
het VN-mensenrechtensysteem. In de vergelijking zal de mate waarin het recht 
op adequate voeding binnen het VN-mensenrechtensysteem wordt gezien als een 
afdwingbaar recht dienen als de tertium comparationis. Deze zal worden vastgesteld 
na een analyse van de internationale, regionale en nationale bepalingen die het 
recht op voedsel erkennen, of tenminste gerelateerd zijn aan het recht op voedsel, 
alsmede de standpunten van de relevante VN of VN-gerelateerde instellingen 
die de betekenis van het recht verder verduidelijken (deelvraag 1). In dat licht 
zullen de (institutionele) reacties van beide landen hierop worden geanalyseerd, 
bestaande uit de reactie van de rechterlijk macht enerzijds, en de regering anderzijds 
(beantwoorden van deelvragen 2 en 3). Teneinde de reacties van de Nederlandse 
en Belgische rechterlijke macht ten aanzien van de afdwingbaarheid van het recht 
op voedsel vast te stellen en te verklaren zijn de redeneervormen die de rechter 
hanteert leidend bij het vaststellen van de onderzoeksrichting (sub-vraag 2). Om 
de zienswijze van de regeringen van Nederland en België in hun VN-rapportages 
met betrekking tot de afdwingbaarheid van het recht op voedsel in hun interne 
rechtsorde vast te stellen, zullen de rapportage cycli betreffende de implementatie 
van het Internationaal Verdrag inzake Economische, Sociale en Culturele Rechten 
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(IVESCR), het Internationaal Verdrag inzake de Rechten van het Kind (IVRK), 
het VN-Vrouwenverdrag (CEDAW), alsmede de Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
worden geanalyseerd (deelvraag 3). Na het beantwoorden van de deelvragen om de 
relevante gegevens te vinden en te verklaren, dienen de drie rechtsvergelijkingen 
te worden uitgevoerd om de hoofd-onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden. Tot slot, 
gezien het tweede doel van dit onderzoek, zal de Nederlandse en Belgische houding 
ten aanzien van de afdwingbaarheid van het recht op voedsel kritisch worden 
geëvalueerd in het licht van het VN-mensenrechtensysteem.
Hoofdstuk 3.  De afdwingbaarheid van het internationale recht op 
adequate voeding
Sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog is aanzienlijke, maar tegelijkertijd ook moeizame 
vooruitgang geboekt ten aanzien van de ontwikkeling van het recht op voedsel 
in de internationale mensenrechten-arena. Hierbij waren vele actoren betrokken 
die, vanuit verschillende perspectieven en ieder vanuit een andere expertise 
hebben bijgedragen aan deze ontwikkeling, met name in het licht van Artikel 11 
IVESCR. Deze actoren kunnen worden gerangschikt in drie verschillende pijlers. 
De eerste pijler is het werk verricht door de verdragsorganen, zoals de CESCR. 
De tweede pijler is het werk verricht binnen de FAO, waaronder de organisatie 
van de World Food Summits en de goedkeuring van de Voluntary Guidelines. De 
derde pijler is het werk verricht op initiatief van de mensenrechtenraad en behelst 
voornamelijk de werkzaamheden van de speciale rapporteurs.
Het recht op voedsel wordt doorgaans besproken in de context van artikel 11 
IVESCR. Echter, het zou afbreuk doen aan de volle betekenis van dit recht 
wanneer het beperkt zou worden tot alleen dit artikel. Een brede analyse van 
het internationale mensenrechteninstrumentarium laat zien dat het recht op 
voedsel ook als een zelfstandig recht wordt erkend in andere verdragen vooral 
die welke gericht zijn op de bescherming van een bepaalde groep individuen. 
Bovendien is het recht onlosmakelijk verbonden met andere mensenrechten – of 
aan mensenrechten gerelateerde onderwerpen. Ook wordt het recht op voedsel 
erkend buiten VN-verband op regionaal niveau. Tot slot, op landelijk niveau, kan 
het recht op voedsel direct of indirect erkend worden in de grondwet of gebruikt 
worden als een rechtsbeginsel.
De verdragsbepalingen in samenhang gelezen met de verschillende toelichtingen 
daarop die geschreven zijn in VN-verband lijken voldoende duidelijkheid te 
bieden om tot een heldere omschrijving te komen van wat de term ‘adequate 
voeding’ minimaal behelst. Ten aanzien van deze minimum inhoud is het in het 
internationaal recht gebruikelijk om Staten verantwoordelijk te houden voor de 
juiste realisering.
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Nog steeds wordt vaak het traditionele onderscheid gemaakt tussen burgerlijke 
en politieke rechten enerzijds, welke dan overheidsonthouding vergen, 
en economische, sociale en culturele rechten anderzijds, welke positieve 
overheidsverplichtingen impliceren. Dit onderscheid wordt echter al tientallen 
jaren met goede argumenten bekritiseerd zowel vanuit een praktisch oogpunt als 
vanuit een juridisch theoretisch perspectief. Een typologie van verplichtingen 
die toepasbaar zijn op alle mensenrechten daarentegen, bestaande uit een ‘duty 
to respect’, een ‘duty to protect’ en een ‘duty to fulfil’ lijkt meer recht te doen 
aan de betekenis van mensenrechten, en toont aan dat ECOSOC rechten niet 
een ongedefinieerde beoordelingsvrijheid aan Staten laten in de realisatie van 
deze rechten.
Het Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights leidt uit Artikel 2 IVESCR 
af dat er in het algemeen een minimale verzekeringsplicht inzake ECOSOC rechten 
bestaat voor Staten, die onmiddellijke realisatie vereist. Daarnaast zijn er directe 
prestatieverplichtingen om zo snel en doeltreffend mogelijk actie te ondernemen 
in de richting van de volledige realisatie van het recht. Deze volledige realisatie 
is vervolgens de uiteindelijke resultaatverplichting van een Staat.
Het is moeilijk vast te stellen of binnen de VN het recht op voedsel unaniem 
beschouwd wordt als een afdwingbaar recht, en zo ja, wat dat dan precies betekent, 
gezien het feit dat de VN nauwelijks kan worden beschouwd als een enkele 
entiteit met een eenduidige visie. Hierdoor zal een tertium comparationis dan 
ook niet eensluidend zijn. In het algemeen kon geen bewijs worden gevonden 
dat directe resultaatverplichtingen juridisch afdwingbaar zijn. De discussie 
over de afdwingbaarheid wordt eerder gevoerd in het licht van minimale 
verzekeringsplichten van de lidstaten. Het blijkt dat de gespecialiseerde organen van 
de VN, voornamelijk het CESCR en de speciale rapporteurs, met goede argumenten 
betogen dat het recht op zijn minst een aantal aspecten omvat dat afdwingbaar of 
zelfs rechtstreeks werkend zou moeten zijn. Dit zijn: een kern met een minimale 
inhoud zonder welke het recht zou worden ontdaan van zijn raison d’être, en een 
non-discriminatie beding. Echter binnen de VN-fora waar beslissingen worden 
genomen op basis van intergouvernementele besluitvormingsprocedures lijkt 
juridische afdwingbaarheid van ECOSOC rechten nauwelijks aanvaard. Een houding 
die overigens overeenkomt met het gedrag van de lidstaten ten opzichte van 
verdragen die ECOSOC rechten bevatten, zoals met name blijkt uit het veelvuldig 
gebruik van voorbehouden en de onwil om klachtenmechanismen te ratificeren.
Deel 2. Nederland
Hoofdstuk 4. Nederlandse jurisprudentie over de afdwingbaarheid
In Nederland is het internationaal verankerde recht op voedsel is in beginsel niet 
een rechtstreeks werkend mensenrecht. Artikel 11 IVESCR lijkt in zijn geheel 
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niet afdwingbaar. Echter, er valt een ontwikkeling in de rechtspraak te bespeuren 
met betrekking tot het IVRK, met inbegrip van artikel 27, waarin IVRK artikelen 
dienen ter inspiratie voor een verdragsconforme uitleg van nationale wetgeving. 
Op deze wijze hebben IVRK bepalingen een significant effect op de beslissing van 
de rechter. De eisers in casu zijn meestal minderjarige asielzoekers die rechtmatig, 
maar zonder verblijfsvergunning, in Nederland verblijven, en die zich bevinden in 
schrijnende humanitaire omstandigheden. Bovendien gebruikte de Hoger Raad in 
een baanbrekend arrest Artikel 27 IVRK bij de interpretatie van nationale normen. 
In casu, besliste de Hoge Raad dat het COA illegaal verblijvende minderjarige 
asielzoekers niet mocht verwijderen van haar faciliteiten, en aldus de verplichting 
had te zorgen voor de basisbehoeften van het kind. Echter, dergelijke zaken lijken 
uitzonderingen te zijn op de regel dat Artikel 27 in het algemeen niet rechtstreeks 
werkend is, en geen enkel effect heeft in de betreffende zaken.
Met enige regelmaat beriep de rechter zich op de Parlementaire Geschiedenis 
behorende bij de goedkeuringswet van verdragen om het afwijzen van rechtstreekse 
werking van ECOSOC normen te onderbouwen. In haar Memorie van Toelichting 
heeft de regering, in haar rol van medewetgever, meermaals tot uitdrukking 
gebracht dat in haar ogen rechtstreekse werking van met name het IVESCR niet 
mogelijk is. Het lijkt er zodoende op dat de rechter de politiek volgt in zijn keuze 
rechtstreekse werking aan dergelijke normen te onthouden.
Hoofdstuk 5.  Nederlands monisme en de grondwetsherziening van 
artikel 93 en 94 GW
Sinds 1953 kent Nederland een onheldere grondwettelijke regeling van de positie 
en het effect van internationale bepalingen in de nationale rechtsorde. Dit 
zogenaamde ‘gekwalificeerd monistisch systeem’ is neergelegd in de artikelen 
93 en 94 van de Nederlandse Grondwet. Hieruit volgt dat de rechter internationale 
bepalingen rechtstreeks dient toe te passen, maar alleen wanneer deze eenieder 
verbindend zijn, en zijn gepubliceerd. Om precies te zijn bepaalt Artikel 93 GW 
welke internationale bepalingen bindend zijn ten aanzien van burgers, en regelt 
Artikel 94 GW de relatie tussen deze internationale rechtstreeks werkende normen 
en nationale wetgeving. Vooral de voorwaarde dat een bepaling eenieder verbindend 
moet zijn, heeft tot veel verwarring geleid, met name met betrekking tot de vraag 
of het de wetgever of de rechter is die dit uiteindelijk bepaalt. Officieel zijn zowel 
de regering als de rechter het erover eens dat het aan de rechterlijke macht is om 
hier een laatste oordeel over te vellen. Het was echter de nadrukkelijke bedoeling 
van het constitutionele wetgever om een praktijk in het leven te roepen waarin de 
wetgever via de parlementaire geschiedenis haar mening zou geven betreffende 
de rechtstreekse werking van internationale rechtsnormen, hetgeen sindsdien 
ook daadwerkelijk plaatsvindt in met name de Memorie van Toelichting op de 
goedkeuringswetten van mensenrechtenverdragen.
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Hoofdstuk 6-8.  De rechtstreekse werking van economische, sociale 
en culturele rechten in Nederland
Zoals gezegd lijkt de Nederlandse rechter veelal de politiek te volgen wanneer 
een beslissing moet worden genomen betreffende de rechtstreekse werking 
van ECOSOC rechten. Volgens de wetgever zijn burgerlijke en politieke rechten 
in het algemeen wel geschikt voor rechtstreekse toepasselijkheid en ECOSOC 
rechten niet. Dit laatste wordt met name veroorzaakt door de omstandigheid 
dat voor de realisatie van ECOSOC-rechten beleidsbeslissingen moeten worden 
genomen, wat onder de verantwoordelijkheid valt van de uitvoerende macht, en 
niet van de rechterlijke macht. De regering heeft dit standpunt zeer consequent 
geuit in de memorie van toelichting van verschillende goedkeuringswetten van 
mensenrechtenverdragen, maar ook in haar VN-rapportages betreffende de 
implementatie van deze verdragen. Dat geldt ook ten aanzien van internationale 
verdragen die de rechten van specifieke groepen waarborgen, waarin beide soorten 
rechten erkend worden. Echter, de regering is bij dergelijke verdragen niet altijd 
zo uitgesproken als bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot het IVESCR. Het blijkt dat 
wanneer de regering een duidelijk standpunt heeft ingenomen betreffende de 
rechtstreekse werking van een internationaal verankerd mensenrecht, dit standpunt 
vrijwel klakkeloos wordt overgenomen door de rechter. Alleen in die gevallen 
waarin de regering een minder duidelijk standpunt heeft ten aanzien van de 
rechtstreekse werking van een bepaling, blijkt dat de rechter zich meer vrijheid 
permitteert en een uitspraak over rechtstreekse werking baseert op argumenten 
die meer praktisch van aard zijn, en een nauwer verband houden met de feiten uit 
de zaak. Een voorbeeld hiervan is de ontwikkeling in rechtspraak betreffende de 
rechtstreekse werking van Artikel 6 ESH, waar in de literatuur vaak naar verwezen 
wordt wanneer de kwestie van rechtstreekse werking van verdragsbepalingen 
wordt besproken.
Vier criteria kunnen worden onderscheiden om te bepalen of een internationale 
mensenrechtenbepaling rechtstreeks werkend is: (1) de bedoeling van de Lidstaten 
ten aanzien van de betreffende internationale bepaling zoals geuit tijdens de 
onderhandelingen voorafgaand aan de totstandkoming van het verdrag; (2) de aard 
en de inhoud van de bepaling, alsmede de formulering ervan; (3) de bedoelingen 
van de nationale wetgever zoals geuit in haar memorie van toelichting; en (4) het 
bestaan  van wetgeving ter uitvoering van de verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit de 
internationale bepaling in kwestie. Dit vierde criterium is alleen genoemd – maar 
nauwelijks toegelicht – in de parlementaire geschiedenis van de goedkeuringswet 
van het IVRK, en is sindsdien niet elders in parlementaire geschiedenis ter sprake 
gekomen. Vanwege de verscheidenheid aan constitutionele systemen wereldwijd 
lijkt het onwaarschijnlijk dat Lidstaten een standpunt omtrent rechtstreekse werking 
van bepalingen zullen bespreken tijdens de onderhandelingen voorafgaande aan 
de totstandkoming van een verdrag. Hierdoor lijken criteria (2) en (3) over te 
blijven als criteria die daadwerkelijk een rol spelen.
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Het is opvallend dat er een verschil lijkt te bestaan tussen de hiërarchie in beide 
criteria zoals uitgelegd door zowel de Nederlandse wetgever en de rechterlijke 
macht enerzijds, en de hiërarchie die daadwerkelijk wordt toegepast door de 
rechter anderzijds, met betrekking tot de rechtstreekse werking van internationaal 
verankerde ECOSOC rechten. In principe zou de rechter op de eerste plaats zijn 
beslissing ten aanzien van rechtstreekse werking van verdragsbepalingen moeten 
baseren op de aard en inhoud en de formulering van de verdragsbepaling in kwestie, 
om vervolgens eventueel de bedoeling van de wetgever, te gebruiken louter als een 
bron van inspiratie. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat dit laatste niet gebeurt in situaties 
waarin de wetgever duidelijk haar visie op de mogelijkheid van rechtstreekse 
werking van een internationale ECOSOC norm heeft gegeven. De rechter past 
deze zienswijze dan simpelweg toe in zijn uitspraken, zonder noemenswaardig 
rekening te houden met de aard, inhoud of formulering van de bepaling. Alleen in 
die situaties waarin de wetgever onduidelijk is in zijn opvatting over rechtstreekse 
werking, permitteert de rechter zich de vrijheid om zijn oordeel te stoelen op de 
aard, inhoud en formulering van het betreffende artikel.
Hoofdstuk 9. De Nederlandse rapportages
Het is opvallend dat de Nederlandse regering de neiging heeft om op het moment 
van ratificatie van een internationale bepaling waarin het recht op adequate voeding 
wordt erkend, te benadrukken dat Nederland reeds ruimschoots voldoet aan de 
verplichtingen die voortvloeien uit de ratificatie van dit recht. Een praktijk die 
welhaast een standaardprocedure lijkt te zijn in het geval van de ratificatie van 
economische, sociale en culturele rechten in het algemeen. Als er enige twijfel 
is, wordt de bepaling simpelweg niet geratificeerd of wordt deze aangenomen 
met een voorbehoud of interpretatieve verklaring.
Ook in de diverse VN-rapportages lijkt Nederland geen enkele ambitie te hebben 
om de implementatie van mensenrechten in eigen land te verbeteren, ondanks 
de – in veel verdragen vastgelegde – verplichting om steeds nader tot een 
algehele verwezenlijking te komen van rechten. Vooral in de context van het 
IVESCR heeft deze houding in toenemende mate tot meningsverschillen geleid 
tussen de Nederlandse regering en het CESCR. Bovendien lijkt de Nederlandse 
regering niet bereid serieus antwoord te geven op vragen van de toezichthoudende 
verdragsorganen, terwijl de kwaliteit van de VN-rapporten meer dan eens als 
twijfelachtig wordt ervaren.
Met betrekking tot het recht op adequate voeding rapporteerde de Nederlandse 
regering stelselmatig dat in Nederland meer dan voldoende voedsel van een goede 
kwaliteit voorhanden is, dat bovendien betaalbaar is voor haar inwoners. Dit komt 
voornamelijk door de aanwezigheid van een degelijk systeem van sociale zekerheid. 
Echter, veelal wordt het recht op voedsel ingeroepen door vreemdelingen, die niet 
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zonder meer toegang tot dit systeem van sociale zekerheid hebben. Dit was dan 
ook met regelmaat onderwerp van discussie bij de verschillende verdragsorganen.
In het algemeen kan worden geconcludeerd dat Nederland ook in zijn rapportages 
een fundamenteel onderscheid maakt tussen enerzijds burgerlijke en politieke 
rechten, en anderzijds economische, sociale en culturele rechten, met name ten 
aanzien van mogelijke rechtstreekse werking. Het is duidelijk dat Nederland in 
zijn algemeenheid de rechtstreekse werking van ECOSOC rechten niet erkent.
Hoofdstuk 10. Evaluatie en vergelijking
De Nederlandse VN-rapportages geven een overdreven positief beeld van de 
Nederlandse implementatie van internationaal verankerde ECOSOC rechten, 
waaronder het recht op voedsel. Tegelijkertijd is de Nederlandse overheid erg 
terughoudend in het beantwoorden van kritische vragen gesteld gedurende de 
VN-rapportagecycli, of om een zelfkritische houding aan te nemen die kan leiden 
tot verbeterpunten. Deze attitude wordt gekenmerkt door enkele opmerkelijke 
uitspraken van de Nederlandse regering over nationale jurisprudentie, die 
niet of nauwelijks overeenkomen met de juridische werkelijkheid. Het is 
bijvoorbeeld moeilijk te volgen, hoe de Nederlandse regering tot de conclusie 
heeft kunnen komen dat de Nederlandse rechters vertrouwd zijn met de inhoud 
van de General Comments, zoals aangenomen door de CESCR, en deze ook toe 
passen in hun rechtspraak, of dat artikel 11 IVESCR effect zou hebben in de 
Nederlandse rechtspraak. Hoewel in het algemeen de VN-comités waarschijnlijk 
een accurate indruk zullen hebben van de Nederlandse jurisprudentie betreffende 
de rechtstreekse werking van ECOSOC rechten, moet worden geconcludeerd dat 
de Nederlandse rapportages niet overeenkomen met de juridische werkelijkheid.
Deel 3. België
Hoofdstuk 11-12.  De rechtspraktijk van België betreffende de 
afdwingbaarheid van het recht op adequate 
voeding
Vanwege de aanzienlijke verschillen in taal, cultuur en economie, kent België 
sinds haar ingrijpende staatshervorming van 1970 een complexe trias politica, 
met een wetgevende macht bestaande uit drie verschillende wetgevers, die op 
basis van gelijkheid en exclusiviteit bevoegd zijn. Deze hervormingen hadden 
ook gevolgen voor de organisatie van de rechterlijke macht, wat zich vooral uitte 
in het instellen van een Grondwettelijk Hof. De Belgische rechterlijke macht is 
vooral georganiseerd op basis van doel en functie, in plaats van pragmatische 
overwegingen. Dit leidt tot een complexe organisatie in enerzijds een subjectief 
contentieux, dat twee hoogste rechtscolleges omvat (het Hof van Cassatie en de Raad 
van State), en anderzijds een objectief contentieux, ook met twee rechtscolleges 
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in hoogste ressort (de Raad van State en het Grondwettelijk Hof). Hoewel voor 
de betrokken partijen in een rechtszaak het verschil tussen beide contentieux 
steeds minder belangrijk lijkt te worden, omdat de juridische gevolgen van de 
uitspraken lang niet zo fundamenteel verschillen als de rechterlijke indeling doet 
vermoeden, en steeds meer op elkaar gaan lijken, heeft deze rechterlijke organisatie 
weldegelijk een sterk effect op de juridische redenering van de rechtbanken. 
België is een monistisch Staat, wat niet direct uit de grondwet blijkt, maar wel 
uit de jurisprudentie van het Hof van Cassatie. Dit betekent dat in beginsel een 
internationale norm voorrang heeft boven een tegenstrijdige (anterieure zowel als 
posterieure) nationale regel, zolang de internationale norm rechtstreekse werking 
heeft. Een internationale norm heeft rechtstreekse werking wanneer voldaan wordt 
aan een aantal formele criteria. Daarnaast dienen de verdragsluitende partijen 
de intentie te hebben uitgesproken dat de norm rechtstreeks werkt, wat meestal 
afgeleid wordt uit het feit dat een norm gericht is tot burgers en niet tot staten 
(het subjectieve criterium) en/of dient de norm ‘self-executing’ te zijn (objectief 
criterium). Het Hof van Cassatie noch de Raad van State lijken de rechtstreekse 
werking van het recht op adequate voeding te hebben erkend, en zijn in de regel, 
enkele schijnbaar willekeurige uitzonderingen daargelaten, van mening dat IVESC 
en IVRK bepalingen geen rechtstreekse werking hebben. Er bestaat nauwelijks 
jurisprudentie over (de rechtstreekse werking van) CEDAW artikelen.
Echter, het Grondwettelijk Hof is niet gebonden aan het beginsel van rechtstreekse 
werking vanwege zijn functie om nationale wetgeving te toetsen aan de grondwet. 
Hierdoor kunnen internationale normen slechts onrechtstreeks worden toegepast, 
via artikel 10 en 11 en 24 GW, en later ook via alle andere rechten die erkend 
worden in hoofdstuk II van de Grondwet. Het besluit om de bevoegdheden van 
het Grondwettelijk Hof in die richting te verbreden werd met name ingegeven 
door het sluiten van het zogenaamde ‘school pact’, waardoor het Hof nationale 
wetgeving mocht toetsen aan fundamentele rechten, bovenop haar oorspronkelijke 
bevoegdheden om recht te spreken in conflicten tussen de drie wetgevers. Dit vindt 
ook haar weerslag in de jurisprudentie van het Hof: de eerste arresten waarin het 
Hof indirect toetst aan internationale ECOSOC bepalingen betreffen zaken waarin 
artikel 13 IVESCR werd ingeroepen. Pas later heeft het Hof ook (onrechtstreeks) 
getoetst aan andere ECOSOC bepalingen, waaronder ook internationale bepalingen 
die het recht op adequate voeding erkennen.
Het recht op adequate voeding, alsmede andere gerelateerde ECOSOC rechten 
erkend in VN-verdragen, speelt vooral een rol in zaken betreffende illegaal 
verblijvende vreemdelingen. In de meeste gevallen, in zowel een vernietigingsberoep 
als een prejudiciële beslissing, werd het Hof gevraagd Artikel 57 § 2 van de 
‘organieke wet betreffende de openbare centra voor maatschappelijk welzijn’, te toetsen 
aan diverse grondrechten, omdat deze wet de rechten op sociale zekerheid van 
illegaal verblijvende vreemdelingen beperken tot uitsluitend recht op dringende 
medische zorg. Het Hof gaat daarbij voornamelijk na of deze beperking, in het 
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licht van de ingeroepen grondrechten, objectief en in redelijkheid kan worden 
gerechtvaardigd en proportioneel is ten aanzien van een legitiem doel. Het Hof stelt 
in het algemeen vast dat het doel van België om de immigratie te beperken een 
rechtvaardig doel is, en dat het daarom niet onredelijk is dat België niet dezelfde 
verplichtingen op zich neemt betreffende de behoeften van personen die legaal in 
België verblijven enerzijds en illegale immigranten anderzijds, hetgeen betekent 
dat artikel 11 IVESCR in redelijkheid niet onbeperkt kan worden opgevat, en dus 
niet van toepassing is op personen waarvoor België niet verantwoordelijk voor is, 
zoals illegaal verblijvende vreemdelingen. Dit uitgangspunt is in een reeks van 
uitvoerige uitspraken verder gespecificeerd en genuanceerd, wat heeft geleid 
tot incidentele uitzonderingen op deze regel. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat in 
deze rechtspraak de Rechten van het Kind meestal meer effect lijken te hebben 
dan de rechten verankerd in het IVESCR. In het algemeen is het Hof, in lijn met 
haar functie, niet terughoudend met het vernietigen van wetgeving, of in een 
prejudiciële procedure te beslissen dat een constitutionele norm wordt geschonden, 
wanneer zij van mening is dat de betwiste nationale wetgeving niet objectief en 
redelijk gerechtvaardigd kan worden, en/of wanneer het een disproportioneel 
middel is ten aanzien van een gerechtvaardigd doel. Hierdoor leiden uitspraken 
van het Grondwettelijk Hof meer dan eens tot wetswijzigingen of de invoering van 
nieuwe regelgeving in het vreemdelingencontentieux. Echter, hoewel in dergelijke 
zaken veelvuldig internationale bepalingen onrechtstreeks getoetst worden, kon 
geen bewijs worden gevonden dat deze internationale bepalingen een verschil 
van enige betekenis hebben gemaakt in de uitspraken, bovenop de ingeroepen 
(equivalente) nationale bepalingen. Het Hof heeft namelijk een nogal inwaarts 
gerichte focus in haar uitspraken, gericht op nationale wetgeving en beleid.
Hoofdstuk 13. De Belgische periodieke verslagen
In haar VN-rapportages geeft België veelal een uitgebreide opsomming van 
initiatieven, beleid en wetgeving die op een positieve manier bijdragen aan de 
implementatie van de betreffende mensenrechten. Er lijkt weinig ruimte te zijn 
voor kritische zelfreflectie. Het recht op voedsel wordt zelden besproken als 
een opzichzelfstaand recht, en de regering lijkt zich voornamelijk te richten op 
gerelateerde rechten, zoals het recht op gezondheidszorg, het recht op sociale 
zekerheid, en meer in het bijzonder de positie van vreemdelingen ten aanzien 
van het recht op sociale zekerheid. Wat dit laatste betreft, uiten de verschillende 
verdragsorganen meerdere malen hun zorgen, en lijken niet overtuigd dat 
de status van illegaal verblijvende vreemdelingen, met name begeleide en 
onbegeleide minderjarige asielzoekers, in overeenstemming is met de betreffende 
mensenrechtenverdragen.
Daarnaast is de complexiteit van de Belgische federale structuur een andere 
reden tot zorg. De VN-comités vragen zich met regelmaat af of België in staat is 
een uniforme en consistente aanpak te hanteren bij de implementatie van de 
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mensenrechtenverdragen. Het leidt ook tot misverstanden, vooral wat betreft 
de kwestie van de rechtstreekse werking in het licht van de functie van het 
Grondwettelijk Hof. De Belgische delegaties benadrukken de mogelijkheid van 
rechtstreekse werking van internationale ECOSOC bepalingen meermaals door te 
verwijzen naar de rechtspraak van het Grondwettelijk Hof. Dit is een twijfelachtige 
praktijk, en bovendien niet overeenkomstig met de jurisprudentie van het Hof 
van Cassatie en de Raad van State. Het blijkt dat meer dan eens de indruk wordt 
gewekt dat internationale mensenrechtenverdragen, zoals het IVRK en de CEDAW, 
rechtstreekse werking hebben in de nationale rechtsorde, terwijl dit duidelijk 
niet overeenkomt met de Belgische rechtspraktijk. De VN-comités lijken slecht 
te zijn geïnformeerd over het Belgische staatsbestel, en gaan niet al te diep in op 
de kwestie, terwijl de Belgische regering aan de andere kant erg terughoudend 
is in het corrigeren van deze misvattingen.
Hoofdstuk 14. Evaluatie en vergelijking
Geconcludeerd moet worden dat de België VN-rapportages betreffende de 
implementatie van het IVESCR, het IVRK en het CEDAW nauwelijks overeenkomen 
met de juridische werkelijkheid. De complexe federale structuur, met name voor 
wat betreft de organisatie van de rechterlijke macht, in combinatie met het gebrek 
aan voldoende kennis onder de VN-comités van het Belgische constitutionele 
recht, lijken te leiden tot misverstanden en onjuiste veronderstellingen. Terwijl 
uit de analyse van Belgische rechtspraak blijkt dat ECOSOC rechten in het 
algemeen, op enkele uitzonderingen na, geen rechtstreekse werking hebben 
in het subjectieve contentieux, wordt tijdens de verschillende rapportagecycli 
gesuggereerd of aangenomen dat het IVRK en de CEDAW beide volledig 
rechtstreekse werking hebben. Interessant is dat België vaak verwijst naar de 
jurisprudentie van het Grondwettelijk Hof ter onderbouwing van de stelling dat 
internationale mensenrechtenbepalingen rechtstreeks werken, of om een positief 
beeld te schetsen van de implementatie van verdragsbepalingen, terwijl dergelijke 
argumenten onjuist lijken te zijn, gezien het feit dat internationale bepalingen 
hooguit een onrechtstreeks effect kunnen hebben in de nationale rechtsorde, en 
hun toegevoegde waarde in casu niet moet worden overschat.
Deel 4. Conclusie en aanbevelingen
Hoofdstuk 15. Conclusie
Dit onderzoek vond zijn oorsprong en inspiratie in de analyse van een Nederlands 
en een Belgisch arrest waarin de rechter aanspraken gebaseerd op het recht 
op voedsel niet toekende aan de eiser in kwestie. Dit heeft geleid tot de vraag 
welke toegevoegde waarde een mensenrecht zou hebben in deze twee relatief 
welvarende landen, die theoretisch gezien alles hebben wat nodig is om het recht 
op adequate voeding te realiseren. Men zou verwachten, gelet op de aard van 
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mensenrechten, dat deze in principe zouden moeten dienen als een ultiem vangnet, 
om die personen die op de een of andere manier door de veelal al zeer solide en 
uitgebreide binnenlandse sociale vangnetten heen vallen, alsnog op te vangen. 
Dit vermoeden wordt versterkt wanneer beide landen in hun VN-rapportages 
melden dat ze reeds aan al hun verplichtingen voldoen die voortvloeien uit het 
recht op voedsel. Kort samengevat is zodoende in dit onderzoek de vraag gesteld 
wat de twee landen daadwerkelijk doen, wat ze zeggen te doen, en wat ze zouden 
moeten doen wanneer het gaat om de juridische afdwingbaarheid van het recht 
op adequate voeding.
Met betrekking tot de vraag wat de landen zouden moeten doen, is het moeilijk om 
precies vast te stellen of het recht op voedsel wordt beschouwd als een afdwingbaar 
recht binnen de Verenigde Naties wanneer de standpunten van alle relevante 
VN-organen in ogenschouw worden genomen, met inbegrip van die organen die 
besluiten nemen op basis van intergouvernementele besluitvorming, gebaseerd 
op consensus. Echter, de organen die specifiek in het leven zijn geroepen om 
bij te dragen aan de realisatie van ECOSOC rechten, zoals de VN-comités en de 
speciale rapporteurs, benadrukken telkens de urgentie van afdwingbaarheid van 
ECOSOC rechten. Zij zijn van mening dat in ieder geval een kern van het recht 
op voedsel afdwingbaar, of zelfs ‘self-executing’ zou moeten zijn.
Met betrekking tot de vraag wat beide landen daadwerkelijk doen, is uit dit 
onderzoek gebleken dat het helaas de hoofdregel is dat het recht op voedsel in 
Nederland en België niet als een sociaal vangnet dient, en het nauwelijks mogelijk 
is om het recht in te roepen bij zowel de Nederlandse als de Belgische rechter. 
Echter, een aantal ontwikkelingen zijn waargenomen waarin rechtscolleges in 
beide landen wat meer compassie tonen voor die mensen die zich in de meest 
schrijnende situaties bevinden, en derhalve internationaal verankerde bepalingen 
die het recht op voedsel erkennen enigszins (indirect) effect toekennen in hun 
uitspraken. Het zijn deze uitzonderingen op de regel die enigszins hoop bieden 
voor toekomstige realisatie van het recht op adequate voeding. In Nederland is dat 
voornamelijk het feit dat de rechter IVRK bepalingen in toenemende mate gebruikt 
als een interpretatieve norm, terwijl in België sprake is van een toenemende 
indirecte toetsing aan internationale normen via constitutionele bepalingen. De 
algemene indruk is echter dat het voornamelijk de toevallige grondwettelijke 
context is die bepalend is voor de mate van afdwingbaarheid van het recht op 
voedsel, in plaats van de daadwerkelijke inhoud van het recht. Kort samengevat is 
dat in Nederland voornamelijk de onduidelijkheid die ontstaan is over de werking 
van Artikel 93 en 94 GW, terwijl het in België met name de complexe organisatie 
van haar trias politica betreft.
De meeste zaken waarin het recht op voedsel wordt ingeroepen betreffen de 
situatie van veelal illegaal verblijvende vreemdelingen. Het is opmerkelijk dat in 
beide landen een eventueel effect van het internationaal erkende recht op voedsel 
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onderdeel uitmaakt van een belangenafweging, waarbij het binnenlands beleid 
om de immigratie te beperken afgewogen wordt tegen het individuele belang 
van de vreemdeling. Dit wekt de indruk, om in termen van rechtsvergelijking te 
spreken, dat de rechters door middel van hun jurisprudentie niet alleen reageren 
op het gedeelde maatschappelijke probleem dat het recht op voedsel afdwingbaar 
dient te zijn (in dit onderzoek de tertium comparationis), maar ook op een ander 
gedeeld probleem, namelijk de beperking van de immigratie.
Met betrekking tot de vraag wat landen zeggen dat ze doen, blijkt uit dit onderzoek 
dat er een aanzienlijk verschil bestaat tussen de juridische werkelijkheid in België 
en Nederland aan de ene kant, en wat wordt gerapporteerd over deze praktijk 
aan de andere kant. Beide landen schetsen een positief beeld van hun prestaties 
ten aanzien van de implementatie van mensenrechten, terwijl er weinig ruimte 
bestaat voor kritische zelf-evaluatie ten aanzien van de implementatie van ECOSOC 
rechten, waaronder het recht op voedsel. Beide landen lijken nauwelijks enige 
ambitie te hebben om de implementatie van de rechten die zijn vastgelegd in 
de door hen geratificeerde verdragen te verbeteren, en zien dit ook niet als hun 
Statenverplichting. Het lijkt er dus op dat naar buiten toe, in de internationale 
arena, beide landen zich zo positief mogelijk willen profileren, terwijl dit niet 
overeenkomt met de nationale rechtspraktijk.
Geconcludeerd moet dus tenslotte worden dat beide landen niet doen wat ze moeten 
doen, en niet zeggen wat ze werkelijk doet met betrekking tot de afdwingbaarheid 
van het recht op adequate voeding.
Hoofdstuk 16. Aanbevelingen
Landen dienen te handelen in overeenstemming met de verplichtingen die zij 
hebben aanvaard bij de ratificatie van mensenrechtenverdragen en zij moeten 
waarheidsgetrouw rapporteren wat ze hierin doen. In het laatste hoofdstuk 
worden hiertoe aanbevelingen gedaan voor Nederland, België, de VN-comités 
en rechtsvergelijkers.

The enforceability of the human right to adequate food 483 
About the author
B.F.W. (Bart) Wernaart teaches law and ethics at Fontys University of Applied 
Sciences in Eindhoven and ’s-Hertogenbosch, the Netherlands. He is also a 
professional musician (drums, mallets and percussion), composer and conductor. 
Bart Wernaart was born in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, in 1983. After graduating 
from high school, he took courses at Tilburg University and the music academy 
of Brabant. He holds a master degree of international law, with a specialism 
in human rights, and two bachelor degrees of arts, with specialisms in drums, 
vibraphone and conducting. Since 2007, he worked on his PhD-thesis under the 
supervision of Professor Bernd van der Meulen, at the Law and Governance group 
of Wageningen University and Research Centre, Wageningen, the Netherlands, 
of which this book is the final result. Bart Wernaart was raised in a true teachers 
family, has two younger brothers, and lives together with his fiancée Sylvia in 
Dommelen, the Netherlands.
List of publications
Wernaart, B.F.W., 2009. Veiled justice. The courts’compassionate case law regarding hunger. In: 
Hospes, O. and Van der Meulen, B.M.J. (eds.) Fed up with the right to food? Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
Wernaart, B.F.W., 2010. The plural wells of the right to food. In: Hospes, O. and Hadiprayitno, 
I. (eds.) Governing food security, law, policies and the right to food. Wageningen Academic 
Publishers, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
Wernaart, B.F.W., 2010. The right to water in the Netherlands. European Food and Feed Law 
Review 5: 361-364.
The research described in this thesis was financially supported by Fontys University 
of Applied Sciences.
Financial support from the Law and Governance Group at Wageningen University 
for editing this thesis is gratefully acknowledged.
The enforceability 
of the human right 
to adequate food
A comparative study
Bart Wernaart
